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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis explores how the legal infrastructure for dispute resolution in 
transnational securities transactions can be improved, considering the regulatory and 
legal limits of the financial sector in each jurisdiction under study (US, Europe and Brazil). 
The two main objectives of the work are to a) identify the problems that currently 
exist for a dispute resolution mechanism in the securities area that can be used 
transnationally and b) propose solutions that can create a safe legal environment that can 
be used by the investor in case regulatory rules or the terms of the transaction are 
breached.  
The work is justified by the fact that financial markets are legal constructions, 
making legal certainty and the mechanisms available to enforce the terms of a transaction 
and apply regulatory rules, especially to the investor who is part of the transaction, 
essential for the own existence of financial markets. Therefore, the existence of 
transnational financial markets also depends on the existence of a transnational legal 
infrastructure, at least broad enough to protect the interest of investors.  
The argument developed through the work is that the creation of a transnational 
legal infrastructure depends on the type of dispute that is considered, since not only each 
type of dispute has its own peculiarities, but the national dispute resolution systems are 
also built based on the type of dispute that will be submitted to it. To create transnational 
dispute resolution systems for securities transactions, I propose the use of collective 
mechanisms of dispute resolution based on the initiative of private parties, the use of 
arbitration and the establishment of cooperation networks between national alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms used to solve financial disputes.  
Keywords: transnational dispute resolution, securities regulation, arbitration, 
collective redress, class action.
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Part I - Introduction 
As financial markets are legal constructs,1 the Rule of Law is essential to their 
proper functioning. The argument of this thesis is that a transnational legal infrastructure 
for transnational securities transactions is still lacking, undermining the creation of 
stronger transnational financial markets. This work attempts to propose an 
infrastructure that improves securities dispute resolution transnationally.  
The thesis is divided into 3 parts. The introduction is found in Part I. Chapter I sets 
out the research problem, the research question and the limitations of the study. Chapter 
II establishes the theoretical framework that the work is based upon by analyzing the 
development of the modern state, the economic importance of a legal system based on the 
Rule of Law, the role of regulatory law and the role of dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The underlying theme of Part II is securities regulation. The objective of this part 
is twofold: 1) to justify the purpose of securities regulation, since the rest of the thesis is 
premised on the fact that securities regulation is important to address market failures, 
benefiting capital markets and 2) to identify the types of disputes that arise out of 
securities transactions. Chapter III provides the historical background of the development 
of securities regulation, which shows that the regulatory character of securities law is 
related to real-life market failures. Chapter IV reviews the literature on securities 
regulation and theoretically justifies its importance, as well as the role that private 
enforcement plays. Chapter V describes and explains the securities issuance process and 
identifies the different types of disputes that may arise, providing the basis for the 
development of the last part of the thesis. 
Part III is concerned with dispute resolution. Chapter VI explores the institutional 
aspects that are important to efficient dispute resolution systems and which allow for the 
Rule of Law to operate. Chapter VII surveys some different models of dispute resolution 
mechanisms that can serve as a basis for the design of a system tailored to securities 
transactions. Chapter VIII discusses aggregate litigation to find a solution to the question 
                                                      
1 Katharina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) Columbia Public Law Research Paper No 13-348. 
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of access, exploring the institutional incentives and the legal aspects of the mechanism; 
some examples are provided in Chapter IX. Chapter X explores the problems that arise in 
the transnational context, examined via the analysis of private international law doctrines 
and their shortcomings for securities transactions. Finally, Chapter XI proposes some 
avenues for reform.  
 
 3 
Chapter I – The Research Problem, 
Questions and Limitations of the Study 
“[C]ross-border problems call for cross-border solutions”2 
This PhD thesis explores the dispute resolution systems for securities transactions in 
a transnational environment. Its objective is to identify the problems of transnational 
securities disputes and to propose a solution to improve the legal infrastructure that deals 
with them. 
Globalization results in a higher number of cross-border financial transactions, many 
of which involve securities transactions, which are regulated predominantly at the local 
level. While the flows of capital are becoming more and more global, the markets, from a 
legal perspective, are highly local, as are the regulatory systems and dispute resolution 
mechanisms available to investors. This situation may pose serious problems, especially 
to small and medium-sized investors, who may not be able to seek legal relief due to 
transaction cost constraints in pursuing a lawsuit against an entity in which it has made 
an investment. The problem becomes even more acute in an environment in which, 
notwithstanding the existence of multiple jurisdictions, there are political and legal 
processes in development which aim to facilitate a common internal market, such as the 
European Union, as it functions as a barrier to market development. Solving this problem 
would open up the scope for a higher degree of transnational financial transactions as a 
wider pool of capital would be available for investment, enhancing the benefits of the free 
flow of capital3 and guaranteeing that the investor’s rights would be protected.  
1. The Research Problem 
The world is a different place than it was 100 years ago. Technology has changed it 
completely, generating greater interconnectivity than ever before; financial transactions 
                                                      
2 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010) 115. 
3  For the benefits and risks of an increased flow of capital, see International Monetary Fund, ‘The 
Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: an Institutional View’ (2012), 10-14. 
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are not an exception. Two recent financial transactions with dire consequences to their 
investors can illustrate this point:  
1) Paulson & Co., a New York based hedge fund, requested that Goldman Sachs 
structure a synthetic financial product based on Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities4 to be sold to qualified institutional buyers under SEC Rule 144A5 and 
to foreigners outside the US under SEC Regulation S.6 Thereafter two different 
legal entities, one based in the Cayman Islands7 and another based in the State of 
Delaware in the United States were set up as Special Purpose Vehicles to issue the 
securities. To increase the marketability of the securities, ACA Management LLC, 
a portfolio selection agent, was chosen to select the underlying mortgages. During 
the selection process, Paulson & Co. helped ACA Management, but the hedge fund 
had – since the beginning – been betting against the residential mortgage market 
without disclosing such information. The deal was closed on April 26, 2007, the 
securities were sold, including to foreign investors,8 and by January 29, 2008, 
those investors had already lost more than $1 billion dollars on the product, while 
the hedge fund that helped to choose the underlying mortgages was profiting by 
a figure of around the same amount, i.e. $1 billion dollars.9 
2) In another case, National Australia Bank, an Australian bank with shares not 
traded on an American exchange, but traded on various foreign exchanges and 
also having ADRs traded on an US exchange, purchased HomeSide Lending, a 
company headquartered in Florida that was in the business of servicing 
mortgages. The purchase was made in 1998, and until 2001 National’s annual 
reports touted the success of HomeSide.10 On 5 July 2001, National Australia Bank 
wrote down HomeSide Lending assets by $450 million and did the same again on 
                                                      
4 This product is the ABACUS 2007-AC1 created by Goldman Sachs.  
5 17 C.F.R. § 200.144a (1992). 
6 17 C.F.R. § 200.901 – § 200.905 (1998). 
7 Abacus 2007-AC1 Indicative terms.  
8 E.g., IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG.  
9 See Complaint, SEC v Goldman Sachs and Fabrice Tourre, WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
10 Morrison v National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010). 
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September 3, this time by $1.75 billion, heavily impacting a multitude of 
Australian and other non-U.S. investors. 
The transnationality of these transactions is evident. Capital flows across borders and 
parties engage in commercial relationships that are anchored in many different legal 
systems. Globalization brings many advantages but it also poses serious risks, especially 
when it comes to finance.11 As the pace of globalization increases, the number of financial 
transactions with a transnational character also tends to increase, posing serious legal 
problems to the existing state-based legal framework.12 
The problem is one of a plurality of legal systems governing the same transactional 
scheme without any consistent mechanism of coordination. The Rule of Law and different 
legal concepts of national legal systems, which are essential to the successful functioning 
of markets, become increasingly difficult to manage when they are tied to different 
sources of legal authority that apply either to the specific parts of the transaction or to the 
transaction as a whole, often failing or being insufficient to address market failures that 
are essential to the development of healthy markets. 
Law, when applied to commercial and financial transactions, provides a background 
in which transactions can be made and disputes can be peacefully solved in cases of 
disagreement between the parties. It provides a level of certainty that allows parties to 
engage in transactions and to avoid the necessity of the private deployment of force. Trust 
solely in the counterparty is substituted, at least in part, for the trust in the legal system. 
A businessman living in an imaginary country with a robust legal system can invest in a 
company without having to worry if the information provided to him is true; if he has 
been misled he can summon his lawyer and recover the money that has been lost in the 
transaction. Even though the lawyer will be compensated, the legal system is designed in 
such a way to avoid high costs being imposed on the party who needs redress, even for a 
relatively small-sum lawsuit.  
                                                      
11 Hal S. Scott, International Finance: transactions, policy, and regulation (Foundation Press 2010) 20-22. 
12Randall Kroszner claims that ‘many international financial transactions occur in a realm that is close to 
anarchy’, see Randall Kroszner, ‘The Role of Private Regulation in Maintaining Global Financial Stability’ 
(1999) 18 Cato Journal 355, 355.  
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Now bring the same businessman to the real world and place him in the United States, 
a country considered to have a robust legal system and strong securities regulation. Make 
him invest in China. The businessman may invest in a Chinese company but if that 
company’s shares lose value because of fraudulent information, the investor may be left 
penniless, even though the whole strength of the U.S. Securities Regulation system may 
be at his side, simply because the Chinese company has its assets in China.13  
Transnational disputes give rise to additional questions than transactions that are 
merely national: Where can the dispute be entertained? Which law is applicable? Where 
and how is this decision enforceable? These questions increase the complexity of the 
factors that have to be weighed in deciding whether to invest abroad; the decision will 
depend on how developed the legal infrastructures are of the place in which the 
transaction is anchored. When it comes to finance, another wrinkle emerges in 
conceptualizing the problem: many of the transactions involve the use of securities, which 
are heavily regulated by national states. National mandatory law defines what securities 
are, the duties of the issuer and the range of action that brokers and market players are 
afforded when transacting these instruments, even though these transactions, 
considering the bigger picture, are often in fact transnational.  
The transnational character, embedded in the legal pluralism that is inherent in 
transactions occurring across borders, increases the complexity of the legal problems at 
stake. Due to the size of many transnational securities transactions and the amount of 
trading that is done, there is a lot at stake.14 The health of financial markets is tied to the 
                                                      
13 Cultural, language and legal barriers raise the costs of pursuing litigation in a case like this, since either 
the case is pursued in the United States and the judgment has to be enforced in China or the whole case has 
to be litigated in China. The small settlement amounts that have been reached in securities cases with 
Chinese companies listed in the U.S. are indicative of these possible hurdles. See Kevin LaCroix, ‘The Modest 
Early Settlements of Securities Suits Involving U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies’ (The D&O Diary, 22 June 22)  
<http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/06/articles/securities-litigation/the-modest-early-settlements-of-
securities-suits-involving-u-s-listed-chinese-companies/> accessed 07 July 2014. 
14 There is an increase in the number of securities transactions in the past years. The United States and 
Brazil can be seen as good examples of the increase of foreign positions on securities. In the United States 
there was an expressive increase of foreign private securities assets in the last 40 years, from US$ 44,157 
million in 1976 to US$ 6,222,864 million in 2010. Brazil also had an increase; on December 2001 Brazil’s 
international position regarding foreign securities assets was of US$6,402 million and 11 years later the 
amount increased to US$25,759 million. In Spain the increase in foreign positions in private securities 
investments was not so impressive; it went from € 78,053 million in 2004 to € 89,494 million in 2012. 
Before the crisis, Spain reached € 132,954 million in foreign securities assets, but evidenced a strong 
decrease following it. Nonetheless, the foreign position in securities remains substantial and it has been 
recovering. See Banco Central do Brasil, ‘Série Histórica da Posição Internacional de Investimento’   
 7 
legal and technological infrastructures underpinning them, and a decision of a national 
court can completely change expectations, sometimes putting at stake billions of dollars 
that are based on transactions similar to the one on the basis of which the decision was 
made.15 
At a more individual level, the question arises as to what extent investors are able to 
rely on the legal infrastructure in place. The free flow of capital is good for economic 
efficiency, but the aperture of the system can also bring fraudsters to the market; these 
fraudsters can harm investors in places far away from where they actually operate. A 
robust transnational legal system for dispute resolution could ease these concerns, as it 
would allow investors to obtain redress. 
The existence of multiple legal orders to which a single economic transaction can be 
attached is a legal risk that can become problematic to the development of global 
securities markets. Legal instability due to the competing sources of norm creation, 
decision-making and enforcement mechanisms affects the predictability of results, which 
in turn affect the costs of doing business. The development of complementary 
mechanisms of dispute resolution and coordination among different legal systems can be 
a valuable instrument to improve the costs of transacting in a globalized world.  
                                                      
<http://www.bcb.gov.br/?SERIEPIIH> accessed 07 July 2014; Bureau of Economic Analysis, ‘ International 
Investment Position of the United States at Yearend, 1976-2010’   
<http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/intinv10_t2.xls> accessed 07 July 2014; Banco de España, Boletín 
Estadístico 12/2012 (2013). 
15 An interesting example are two cases involving the same transaction in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: 
Lehman Brothers v. BNY Corporate Trustee, 422 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) and Belmont Park Investments v. 
BNY Corporate Trustee, [2011] UKSC 38. The transaction in these two cases was composed by a series of 
credit swap transactions through the use of various SPVs incorporated in jurisdictions chosen for tax 
purposes. In the specific transaction under consideration involving the SPV Saphir Finance plc, which was 
incorporated in Ireland, English Law was chosen. The SPV had a credit default swap with Lehman Brothers 
Special Financing. The transaction was collateralized, and the Trustee for the collateral was BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services Ltd. There was a provision in the transaction documents that the priority of the collateral 
would shift in case there was an Event of Default by Lehman Brothers Special Financing, which occurred 
when Lehman Brothers Special Financing went bankrupt. Even though there was an expectation of the 
parties ex ante that this was a possible transaction, the US decision in 2010 signaled otherwise, creating an 
uncertain environment for all similar transactions where the CDS counterparty is American. Later, the 
English Supreme Court confirmed that the transaction was valid under English Law. The American case 
settled in 2010, without a decision of a higher court, and new litigation on the same subject has started 
again. See  Tracy Alloway, ‘The Lehman flip-clause flap gets settled - sort of’ (FT Alphaville, 27 July 2011)  
<http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/07/27/634976/the-lehman-flip-clause-flap-gets-settled-sort-of/> 
accessed 7 July 2014. 
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2. The Research Question 
The instability of legal relations arising from the tension of the transnational being 
regulated nationally is the starting point of this research. While capital mobility is deemed 
to be easier today than it was 100 years ago, be it due to the increasing interlinkage among 
the different corners of the world or the technological developments that have been made 
in the last decades, moving capital and goods across borders is not yet as easy as moving 
them within a country. Notwithstanding claims as to the loss of power of the nation-state, 
its power still is substantial in regulating economic activity under its area of influence.16 
There is no vacuum; the nation-state is still present with its entire institutional 
framework remaining relevant to every aspect of everyday business life, either exercising 
power through direct regulation or constituting the background environment for 
business.17 
The role of the legal system in the operation of a market is threefold – firstly, it 
provides the background framework so economic transactions can be entered into; 
secondly, it regulates behavior that should not be allowed due to the negative effects that 
it may cause and finally, it provides avenues for redress for those who have been harmed 
by a party that does not comply with what has been promised or who does not behave 
according to the rules of the market.  
In contract law, an example of the first role of the legal system is the following: if A 
offers B to sell his car for US$10,000 and B accepts, a contract is formed. In case A decides 
to back out of the transaction, B can pursue A in a court of law to recover damages.18 In 
the securities area, the example of the second role and third role of the legal system is the 
                                                      
16 For a discussion of the nation-state in a globalized era, see Vincent Cable, ‘The Diminished Nation-State: 
a Study in the Loss of Economic Power’ (1995) 124 Daedalus 23. 
17 It is true that illegal activities fall outside of the direct control of the state, but this is not the focus of this 
work. In every other activity the state is deeply present. Think about a business that is within legality and 
all the necessary permits and taxes that it has to pay. The entrepreneur can avoid a nation state, but if he 
wants to operate within legality, he will unavoidably fall within the domain of another nation-state. 
Contracting around one nation state is possible, but this means not doing business in it and invariably one 
state or another will oversee business.  
18 Specific performance is not the usual method for compensation in the United States. See John Calamari 
and Joseph Perillo, The Law of Contracts (4th edn, West Group 1998) 611-13 . 
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following: if A is obliged to disclose information and fails to do so, A will be liable to B for 
the loss of value in stock when the information is subsequently discovered.  
The framework of a given legal system affects the way in which people behave. This 
is true not only in respect of the identification of the substantive rules and the expected 
outcome given the occurrence of a legal fact, but also with regard to the costs of engaging 
the state in the dispute, by solving it and enforcing the outcome. In each legal system the 
architecture is defined by policy choices that have been made throughout history, creating 
different substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms depending on the jurisdiction 
that is analyzed. These are aspects that have to be taken into consideration. It is clear that 
given a breach of a legal rule by A in a country where the legal system is effective, it is less 
likely that B will need other guarantees for the transaction since the legal system will be 
available to solve the problem. In the case that the legal infrastructure is weak, for 
example with high costs for litigation and trials that are too long, A would use other 
instruments, such as demanding collateral in an escrow account or the guarantee of a 
trustworthy person, before engaging in a transaction with B. This is important for the 
development of a local financial market, as high legal costs and uncertainty as to the rules 
operating at a given time, or the enforcement of those rules, may discourage investment.  
The transnational aspect raises the significance attached to the considerations that 
have to be taken into account. In this environment, no longer is there only one legal 
system that has to be considered, but rather, as many different jurisdictions as the number 
that may be involved in the transaction must be examined. The BNY case cited above 
involved Australian investors purchasing securities from an Australian SPV that 
purchased securities from an Irish SPV, which in turn had a swap transaction governed 
by English Law with an American company, with England being the chosen forum for any 
disputes. There were at least four different jurisdictions involved in this single case.  
The legal uncertainty arising from this scenario undermines the safety that law can 
provide to securities transactions. The problem of legal uncertainty is even stronger in 
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this field, as finance is a legal construction.19 Legal uncertainties create risk, but the fewer 
legal risks that are present, the better it is for the parties to engage in transactions.20 
The answer to any question arising out of these considerations has to include both 
the national and the international legal framework, substantively and procedurally. 
Depending on the legal question being decided, the answers can differ widely across 
different jurisdictions, even if the substantive rules of behavior are similar. In addition, 
even if the rules were the same, the enforcement of a decision from one jurisdiction is not 
always enforceable in a second one, where the assets of the person liable for the harm 
caused to the investor may be located. This is due to the public policy aspect of securities 
regulation, and more generally financial regulation, especially in the so-called public 
markets, where the general population can purchase securities. Business and investment 
decisions are, consciously or not, embedded in this social reality.  
The stability of the legal infrastructure upon which a transnational transaction is 
anchored matters because it allows for the enforceability of the parties’ rights when duties are 
breached, being related to the costs of doing business. As the legal structures in place to address 
these concerns are far from being perfect, this research will be guided by the following research 
question: 
‘How can the legal infrastructure for transnational securities transactions 
disputes be improved?’ 
The answer to the research question lies in the assessment of the problems 
currently present in the transnational framework for dispute resolution in securities 
disputes. The underlying goal of the research is to provide options to strengthen the 
procedural efficiency of the legal framework that can be used to solve transnational 
securities disputes, consequently enhancing investor protection to serve as the 
background for the development of a more robust global financial market. 
Notwithstanding that all countries do indeed have securities regulation and are 
interested in investor protection, the level of protection is a matter of public policy, which 
                                                      
19 See Pistor (n 1). 
20 For an overview on legal risk, see Roger McCormick, Legal Risk in the Financial Markets (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press Inc. 2010) 13. 
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can be a barrier to the effective transnationalization of securities transactions, or at least 
to the enforcement of decisions related to them. Therefore, to be able to properly answer 
the first question, a second question must also guide the research:  
‘To what extent do public policy considerations of securities transactions influence 
private (national and international) law?’ 
In order to answer these questions, the work proceeds in the following way: firstly, 
I establish the purpose of and importance of securities regulation and the policy choices 
behind it; secondly, I analyze the private liability regimes arising out of securities 
regulation in order to define the scope of disputes that are relevant in this field; thirdly, I 
provide a framework to analyze the important aspects of a dispute resolution system and 
survey certain frameworks that can be used in securities disputes; finally, I analyze the 
private international law regime and the legal problems arising therefrom, related to 
securities disputes. This provides a sufficient background in order to pose an answer to 
the main research question.  
3. Thesis and Outline of the Argument 
The thesis proposes the following: ‘considering that private enforcement is a 
crucial mechanism for the application of securities laws, investor protection and the 
construction of efficient capital markets, a more stable system of dispute resolution for 
transnational securities transactions is necessary for a better functioning of the 
transnational securities market.’ 
The main claims that I make throughout the next chapters can be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
1. As capital markets are legal constructs, the Rule of Law is necessary for 
their development (Chapters 2 and 4);  
2. The role of law for capital markets is twofold: a. to provide protection for 
property and to enforce promises; b. to regulate market failures in order to 
protect investors and avoid the ‘lemons problem’ (Chapters 2 and 4); 
3. These two goals run together: the regulatory aspect creates expectations; 
the breach of these expectations are better addressed through private 
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rights of action as a starting point, both from an economic as well as a social 
point of view (Chapter 4);  
4. Therefore, the enforcement of these expectations becomes a problem of 
access to justice, where the investor needs to be able to enforce both the 
rights arising out of the security itself as well as the rights related to the 
regulatory background within which the transaction was embedded 
(Chapters6, 7, 8 and 9);  
5. The adequacy of a dispute resolution method for securities transactions 
depends on the type of dispute at stake, since their specific characteristics 
may warrant different types of schemes (Chapter 5); 
6. Collective redress is adequate for disputes involving a multitude of 
claimants based on the same underlying facts, but not for transactions 
made with financial intermediaries (Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9); 
7. At the transnational level, the transnational infrastructure of private law 
enforcement does not yet provide a proper solution for the problem, as the 
rules of private international law remain too uncertain to be relied upon 
due to the underdevelopment of its rules concerning securities transactions 
and due to public policy considerations. (Chapter 10).  
Based on these claims and the analysis undertaken throughout the rest of this 
work, which shows that there is no one size fits all solution, I then propose two 
mechanisms to increase legal certainty and to provide better access/protection to 
investors in transnational securities transactions.  
4. Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The volume of literature on transnational litigation and securities regulation is quite 
dense, but the discussion of transnational securities litigation still is in its infancy. While 
a few studies have already been undertaken, a systematic understanding of the problems 
involved in these kinds of disputes is still lacking.  
The importance of the study is based on the use of securities as a method of financing 
the most varied types of economic activities. The process allows corporations to raise 
equity or to issue debt in order to pursue its business as well as to structure different 
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investment vehicles through the securitization process,21 which is backed by the legal 
system in creating duties and liabilities on the part of the parties involved. The breach of 
a duty is corrected through litigation or another form of dispute resolution, either public 
or private.22 Both types of enforcement form part of the regulatory architecture, but the 
private one plays a crucial role in stabilizing the expectations of the parties in a securities 
transaction and providing confidence for engaging therein, contributing to the integrity 
of a securities market. 
As the legal systems involved in securities regulation and the disputes in this area 
of law are grounded in state structures, the research is comparative in nature, which 
imposes a limitation on the current work. The main focus of the thesis is on the U.S., EU 
and Brazil, however some consideration will be given to important developments 
occurring in other jurisdictions. The choices have been made on the basis of 
determinations pertaining to relevance and practicality.  
The United States is the crib of securities regulation and securities disputes; 
discussing transnational securities dispute resolution without discussing the American 
literature would lead to a failure to grasp some important questions in this area. The EU 
was chosen due to its internal transnational aspect and its federalist structure, which is 
interesting both from a securities regulation perspective and in light of the legal 
infrastructure for transnational dispute resolution. Finally, with its growing importance 
in the international arena and being a country of interest for the author, Brazil was the 
third jurisdiction chosen for this study. Moreover, the different aspects of the dispute 
resolution structure and the practice involving securities litigation in these countries 
were deemed relevant to this decision. The United States has a predominantly dual 
structure, with the possibility of class actions against issuers and a highly institutionalized 
arbitration method against broker-dealers; The EU has seen some litigation against 
financial intermediaries, particularly following the demise of Lehman Brothers, 
                                                      
21  For an overview of the securitization process, see David Ramos Muñoz, The Law of Transnational 
Securitization (Oxford University Press 2010). 
22  Public litigation in this work is understood as litigation initiated by governmental bodies, such as 
Securities and Exchange Commissions or Public Attorney’s Offices, while private litigation is considered the 
one initiated by a party due to its capacity as an investor, or as an investor’s representative, be the litigant 
a private party or a State.  
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generating a good source of material to analyze dispute resolution in practice, while at 
the same time bringing to the fore relevant legislation as well as interesting mechanisms 
underpinning the creation of alternative methods of dispute resolution in this area.  
Finally, Brazil presents an obscure arbitration system that is mandatory to the 
corporations listed within the two higher corporate governance levels in the Brazilian 
stock exchange; at the same time there is almost no court litigation on securities matters, 
despite specific legislation for aggregate litigation in this area.  
The peculiarities of these systems provide ample material for the analysis of the 
problems in dispute resolution systems for securities transactions, giving foundation to a 
deeper reflection on how to improve the transnational infrastructure for dispute 
resolution in securities transactions.  
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Chapter II - States, Law and Dispute 
Resolution 
The overarching problem that this thesis tries to address is one of economic 
transactions being grounded in different legal structures and how disputes arising out of 
these transactions are solved. Legality is dependent on legal systems, which are in turn 
dependent on socio-political structures. The question underpinning this chapter is: ‘What 
is the relationship between states, law and dispute resolution?’ 
Legal systems have arisen out of the interaction between men and their political 
organizations in states or state-like structures. States rise from human interaction. As long 
as there is a group of men engaging in everyday activities amongst themselves for an 
extended period of time, states are bound to appear. Historically they exist at least as far 
back as the first agricultural societies, 10.000 years ago in Mesopotamia. 23  In the 
Weberian sense of the term, the ‘state’ can be defined as ‘a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory’, 24  which means that the state’s essence is nothing more than power of 
enforcement.25 More specifically, the state can be defined in the following manner:  
A compulsory political organization with continuous operations (politischer 
Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff 
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force in the enforcement of its order.26 
This essence of the state underpins the whole judicial structure and its effective 
use by private parties via litigation – and consequently securities litigation. As securities 
transactions become increasingly globalized, different states and their legal structures 
will be increasingly involved in sorting disputes that may arise out of them. The analysis 
of the possible interactions of different legal systems in dispute resolution must begin 
                                                      
23 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Cornell University 
Press 2004) 1. 
24 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge 1991) 78. 
25  Fukuyama 6 (n 23). 
26 Max Weber, Economy and Society (University of California Press 1978) 54. 
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with the understanding of the bases of legal systems and their role in regulating private 
relationships. This is the objective of this chapter.  
1. The Development of the Modern State 
The modern state has the following basic characteristics: 
[…]It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which 
are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims 
binding authority, not only over the members of the state, […] but also to a very 
large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. […] 
Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is 
either permitted by the state or prescribed by it.27 
The formation of the modern state has come a long way, and there are different 
theories as to how the state, as a political entity, has come into existence. A convincing 
one is based on ecological factors of particular regions of the world28 and its consequence 
in the organization of social groups.29 As far as the ecological theory goes, there are three 
factors that were relevant to the rise of the state: 30  environmental circumscription, 
resource concentration and social circumscription.  
The theory begins with small autonomous farming communities that did not 
interact with each other, but were bound territorially by environmental characteristics, 
such as mountains, valleys and rivers.31 With the growth of these farming communities, 
not only in size but also in quantity through the creation of new distinct ones, the available 
land for farming was soon depleted and the human pressure on the land began to increase, 
leading to physical disputes between the villages. 32  Since they were circumscribed 
                                                      
27 Ibid 56. 
28  Robert L. Carneiro, ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State: Traditional Theories of State Origins are 
Considered and Rejected in Favor of a New Ecological Hypothesis’ in John A. Hall (ed), The State: Critical 
Concepts, vol I (Routlegde 1994). 
29 This theory will be used to illustrate the initial evolution of the state until its current model. 
30 The author defines state as ‘an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its 
territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, 
and decree and enforce laws’ Carneiro 433 (n 28).  
31 The example used in the text was the Peruvian coastal valley. Ibid 437. 
32 Ibid 437-38. 
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territorially, those who lost could not flee, and to be able to stay on the land they became 
subordinated to the winners and obliged to pay taxes. This also involved the loss of 
political autonomy on the part of those who were defeated, as they were incorporated 
into the political unit of the winner. 33  The process would repeat itself, transforming 
villages into chiefdoms and chiefdoms into kingdoms. Meanwhile, internally, these newly-
formed kingdoms had to administer those new areas as they were conquered, leading to 
social divisions, through the empowerment of the persons loyal to the winning side of 
those disputes (the upper class) and the employment of the losers as servants and slaves 
(the lower class).34 Finally, those who were made landless but not enslaved tended to go 
to the towns and cities that were spawning at the time, earning a living through working 
for the upper class, financed by the surplus taken from village farmers.35  
The resource concentration and the social circumscription facets of the ecological 
theory of state creation explain the exceptions of the environmental circumscription 
factor: states were created not only on the basis of circumscribed agricultural land, but 
also from more open areas.  A small area with a high concentration of resources would 
play a similar concentrating role as environmental barriers, leading to a concentration of 
different autonomous groups of people that would end up fighting for these resources, 
and ultimately generating the same processes of warfare and political integration. 36 
Finally, another factor that may have played a role in political integration in the first days 
of state formation in the history of mankind may have been social circumscription. 
Research on the Yanomamo Indians of Venezuela shows that villages that were 
surrounded by other villages tended to be larger, possibly due to the higher probability 
of warfare with neighboring villages and the consequent political integration resulting 
therefrom, due to the fact that the villages in the center of an area might have been more 
prone to attacks and outside influence than those at the periphery.37 If this theory is 
correct, the initial formation of states is due to the consolidation and systematization of 
                                                      
33 Ibid 439. 
34 Ibid . 
35 Ibid . 
36 Ibid 440-41. 
37 Ibid 441-43. 
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the exercise of power through a delimited geographical space, confirming Weber’s 
definition of statehood.  
As previously mentioned, the definition of state comprises a claim of the monopoly 
on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, 38  in other words, the 
exercise of legitimate authority.39 At the beginning the conquered group may resist the 
commands of its new master, but over time, acceptance of the new status quo becomes 
embedded into the resisting social group. At some point, absent revolution, it is likely that 
the new master will be seen as a legitimate source of command by the group or by the 
successors of the group that had been conquered, who will acknowledge and obey the 
master’s commands as a legitimate authority. As long as there is a belief that those 
commands are legitimate, the ruled population will follow them without resistance.40 
This idea of legitimacy constitutes an important aspect of the exercise of power of 
a given state, since it determines the binding nature of its rules and the likelihood of its 
survival in respect of its internal aspects. Legitimacy creates authority, the right to 
command and to be obeyed, as acknowledged by the general population.41 The grounds 
for the legitimacy of a source of power can be categorized, according to Weber, in three 
different groups: rational grounds,42 traditional grounds43 and charismatic grounds.4445  
Until recently the idea of the state, and the exercise of power and authority was 
strongly linked to the ruler as a person, who was considered to possess and even embody 
                                                      
38 Or over a certain population. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Harper & Row 1998) 3. 
39 The concept of legitimate authority used here is not the morally justified legitimate authority, but the 
sociologically accepted one. To this extent, legitimacy within this context is the obedience by a group of 
people to the commands of a given source. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(The Free Press 1947) 124-32. 
40 See ibid 324-29. 
41 Wolff 4-5 (n 38). 
42 ‘[R]esting on a belief in the “legality” of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to 
authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).’ Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization 328. 
43 ‘[R]esting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status 
of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)’ ibid . 
44 ‘[R]esting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic 
authority).’ibid . 
45 Ibid 328-29. 
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the institutions of the state personally.46 From the old monarchical state to the more 
modern one based on popular sovereignty, this concept has changed, attributing to it a 
double impersonal character; the state authority is distinguishable both from the rulers 
entrusted with the exercise of such authority as well as the authority of the society over 
which the power of the state is exercised.47 As the state is seen as having its own authority, 
there is a fundamental change in the source of its legitimacy, that is, a shift from the 
traditional and charismatic grounds to the rational one.48 This idea of impersonal power 
brings with it the necessity of the articulation of the rules and processes that will govern 
the polity through objective determinations. The ‘subjective and arbitrary will of 
particular men’ is excluded, and those wielding power may even suffer sanctions if they 
decide to follow the path of arbitrariness, in disconformity with the general rules that are 
deemed to govern the state.49 This is what is known as the Rule of Law, and it is usually 
attributable to a core of rights attributed to the population of a given state, guaranteeing 
them minimum political rights.50  
One important aspect for the exercise of legitimate power is the existence of a 
theory on the source of the state’s power that is justifiable, at least to an extent that the 
                                                      
46 Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’ in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds), Contemporary Political Philosophy: 
An Anthology (Blackwell Publishing 2006) 9. 
47 Ibid 13. 
48 Not that the charismatic and traditional grounds are meaningless, just the weight that they have in the 
justification of the exercise of power by the state is reduced, while the weight given to the rational ground 
is increased.  
49 Christopher Pierson, The Modern State (Routledge 2011) 15-16. 
50 Tom Bingham translates the Rule of Law through a few principles:  
‘(1) [t]he law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable [;] (2) [q]uestions 
of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of 
discretion [;] (3) [t]he laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective 
differences justify differentiation [;] (4) [m]inisters and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers 
conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without 
exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably [;] (5) [t]he law must afford adequate protection 
of fundamental human rights [;] (6) [m]eans must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or 
inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve [;] (7) 
[a]djudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair [;] (8) [t]he rule of law requires compliance 
by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law.’ Bingham 37; 48; 55; 60; 66; 85; 90; 
110 (n 2). 
 20 
justification is accepted by the majority of the general population governed by the 
relevant state.51 The theory of choice in the western world is that of democracy.   
Notwithstanding the various types of democracy,52 the overarching idea behind 
the theory is seductive to justify the exercise of power by the state over its population. 
Democracy’s basic framework consists of treating each person equally and requiring a 
majority for a decision that will bind others. This is a very simplistic concept of 
democracy,53 but it is intuitive and provides an easy explanation that can be engaged by 
the population that the system of rules by which they are bound has in fact, as its source 
of power, the population itself, since they legitimize the exercise of power through their 
vote. As a legitimating mechanism for states, democracy is so important that even 
manifestly autocratic governments try to engage its convincing attributes, even if merely 
rhetorically, to advance their image as legitimate wielders of power.54  
Democracy and the Rule of Law tend to go together in modern states. The exercise 
of the state’s power is based on a legal infrastructure, which is anchored on a constitution 
that guarantees minimal rights to the population for the exercise of political rights, 
preventing an ‘undemocratization’ of society. 55  These rights have to be preserved by 
institutional mechanisms that offer effective protection; the concept of the Rule of Law is 
suited for the task. Having an impersonal state, with decision makers and mechanisms to 
balance the exercise of power within the state structure, the Rule of Law has to be built 
                                                      
51 The minority who disagree with the exercise of power by the state will nonetheless be subject to it, having 
the order imposed on them. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 132 (n 39). 
52 For a brief overview on the different types of democracy, see Amy Gutmann, ‘Democracy’ in Robert E. 
Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy vol 2 
(Blackwell Publishing 2007). 
53 Robert Talisse called it the schoolyard view of democracy. Robert B. Talisse, ‘Democracy’ in Gerald Gaus 
and Fred D'Agostino (eds), The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge 2013) 
608. 
54 The example that jumps to mind is the 1964 military coup in Brazil, characterized as the ‘Democratic 
Revolution of 1964’ by the dictatorship. The military forces still insist in teaching their trainees that what 
happened at the time was a democratic revolution, even though it is historically clear that there was nothing 
democratic about the ‘Democratic Revolution’. For an account on the military dictatorship in Brazil, see Elio 
Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, vol 1 (Companhia das Letras 2002) Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Escancarada, 
vol 2 (Companhia das Letras 2002) Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Derrotada, vol 3 (Companhia das Letras 2003) 
Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Encurralada, vol 4 (Companhia das Letras 2004). 
55 Not all modern societies have a Constitution to limit the sovereign’s power. For example, in the U.K. the 
Parliament is seen as the sovereign, having the power to change any rules that exist in the political system. 
See Albert Venn Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2013) 27-49. 
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around institutional mechanisms that arbitrate the exercise of power within the state 
itself, guaranteeing democracy through a prearranged set of rules56 and preventing the 
takeover of the state structure by a tyrant.  
The importance of the Rule of Law also goes beyond the political question of 
justifying the exercise of power, touching upon various economic problems, as will be 
explained below.  The economic benefits that legal rules can bring to the organization of 
society and to the functioning of markets is an essential theme underlying this work.  
2. The Modern State, the Rule of Law and the Judiciary 
The last section was concluded with the assertion that democracy and the Rule of 
Law tend to go together in modern states. This is a question of the distribution of power 
within the inner political workings of the state and its authority over those who are ruled. 
Law is, by essence, rationally-justified, legitimate commands from the state57 over those 
being ruled. 
However, legal systems are not a given in every single political society. As 
mentioned above, many states were merely the extension of the power of a specific 
person or a group of persons; these persons would do what they wanted and as they 
pleased. At some point during its development, a state might have been ‘legalized’. 
Legalization is nothing more than the application of the Rule of Law ideal to the 
governance of the state and the exercise of the state’s power, in the sense that the rulers 
will be bound by rules not deriving exclusively from their own will; the exercise of the 
state’s power will only be legitimate if such rules are followed.  
                                                      
56 The questions posed in such a political system will have to be decided by a human, since the exercise of 
power presupposes the human will. A rational basis for the interpretation and application of the rules 
guaranteeing democracy is, to a great extent, also a mechanism guaranteeing legitimacy, since well-
articulated decisions are more convincing than arbitrary ones. As long as there is a belief that the decisions 
within society have a rational basis and can be traced back to its democratic source and the norms 
guaranteeing it, legitimacy is more likely to be guaranteed.  
57 Or a similar institution, for those who see law outside the state.  
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Within the Rule of Law ideal, rules form the constraints of the political system,58 
but their legitimization is only operational to the extent that they are justifiable; it is here 
that the democratic ideal comes into play.  
In democracies, the democratic aspect of the state is the aspect that, from a power 
and authority perspective, backs and sustains the legal system anchored in a ‘rule of 
recognition’. This is a rule ‘for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation’,59 those that bind the population in a certain way. The rule of recognition lays 
the parameters for identification of the validity of a given rule within the legal system; 
one of them being the identification of the political body of the state that is authorized to 
promulgate rules, which can thus be considered the ruler of the population. 60  The 
problem arising is that if the population is not satisfied with the rulers that are embedded 
in this system, they may decide to launch a revolution and destroy the political system in 
place, together with the rule of recognition and the legal system established by it. 
Revolutions do not tend to constitute easy paths, bringing violence, a waste of resources 
and social paralysis that are better being avoided. Democracy, as an ideal, is an adequate 
concept to avoid these results, since it is the exercise of power by the people. By 
institutionalizing democracy within the legal system – and in consequence, also in the 
political system – the people do not need to engage in a messy revolution in order to 
change the rulers, but need only decide, through an orderly process, that new rulers 
should assume the place of those with whom they have come to be discontented, ensuring 
the legitimacy and continuity of the state and its legal system.61 Of course, revolution 
outwith the legal rules still is possible, but as long as the majority supports the system in 
place, the revolutionary activity will most likely be unsuccessful.62 Since rule through 
democracy is highly justifiable and acceptable by the general population, the duo of the 
                                                      
58 The foundational rule of a political system is their respective Constitution.  
59  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press 1994) 95. 
60 Not all rules of recognition need to identify the body that promulgates rules, but it is hard to envision a 
modern state that possesses a rule of recognition without this characteristic since the rules would then be 
completely static. 
61 A good discussion on this idea of democracy as a system for revolution can be found in Jean Hampton, 
‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ in Ian Shapiro (ed), The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI (New York University 
Press 1994) 32-38. 
62 Ibid 37. 
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Rule of Law and democracy is a good combination for the provision of stability to a 
political system that decides to adopt it. 
The characteristics that have been presented thus far for a modern legal system 
are the existence of a rule recognizing the rules that are binding on the population and 
the rules that are binding on the population, backed by a democratic system of 
empowerment. These rules regulate not only the relationship between the sovereign and 
subject, but also the relationships between subjects. The role of the Rule of Law and the 
rules on private transactions is also important for economic development, as it provides 
the foundations for people to transact without having to use significant resources to 
ensure their own protection.63 
In this scenario, there still is something missing; this consideration relates to the 
institutions that, when a conflict arises, will decide on the particular case, that is, on who 
has broken a rule of the system. This role falls to the judiciary,64 which has a double 
function within society: firstly, acting as a buffer between the rulers and the ruled and 
guaranteeing that the rules of the legal system are observed; and secondly, acting as the 
umpire of the legal rules applicable to private relationships.   
The rationale and importance of this second role of legal institutions in the 
economic area is the next topic of discussion. 
3. The Economic Function of Law on Private Matters and Dispute 
Resolution 
Economically, legal institutions are important for two main reasons: A) they create 
rules which economic actors can use to protect their investment and plan their economic 
activity and B) they reduce market inefficiencies in specific markets. In addition, a third 
reason in support of the two mentioned above is that C) legal institutions also provide a 
mechanism to solve disputes arising out of relationships based on A and B.  
                                                      
63 See the discussion below on section 3.  
64 Hart 96-98 (n 59). 
 24 
A. Basic Structure: Property and Contract Rights 
Property and contract rights are important mechanisms for the economic 
organization of private matters,65 being the basic legal instruments that allow for the 
planning and execution of economic activities. 
The same logic for the appearance of states is also that underpinning the 
appearance of property rights within the state. States appeared as the consequence of 
power disputes for the control of scarce resources, such as the landlocked agricultural 
areas of Peru and of the most productive margins of the Amazon River. Within a more 
stable set of social relationships, the more the population grew the more people had to 
organize themselves in terms of the exercise of economic activity,66 distributing land and 
allowing for the use of the natural structure available in an orderly manner.67 
There are at least three main problems that property rights are designed to 
address: a) the overuse of resources leading to its depletion; 68  b) the avoidance of 
disputes on the use of a resource; and c) the incentive to invest.  
These three objectives are all tied together and are based on the same source of 
concern, which is scarcity. If everyone can have access to a scarce good, such as fish in a 
pond, their capture will soon deplete the reserve available if there is no means to control 
                                                      
65 Private matters are understood as the relationships between individuals or individuals and governments 
acting in their private capacity, and not on a governmental or regulatory role. 
66  The relationship between the size of the population and the scarcity of resources is essential to 
understanding the genesis of property rights. It is interesting to quote the statement of Blackstone, back in 
18th-century England: ‘But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became necessary to 
entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion; and to appropriate to individuals not the immediate 
use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, 
and the good order of the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were 
striving to get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it.’ 2 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 4 (1766) in Richard A. Epstein (ed) Economics of 
Property Law (Edward Elgar 2007) x. 
67 After property rights are established, the actual contours of the institute and the specific types of division 
of property in a given society, thinking on a scale from commonly-held property to individually-held 
property, will be a function of the relationship between transaction costs and exclusion costs. See Barry C. 
Field, ‘The Evolution of Property Rights’ (1989) 42 Kyklos 319 An ancient system that has been widely 
studied is the Roman Legal System, which had a well-developed body of property law. See Andrew 
Borkowski, Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 151-204. 
68 This is known as the tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 
162 Science 1243. 
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the rate of extraction compared to the rate of reproduction. The second point is that 
scarce goods that have value will lead to disputes among people that want to use them, 
creating a waste of energy that could be focused on other, more productive, activities. 
Finally, people will only invest energy in a given enterprise, be it the construction of a 
house or the farming of land, if there is some sort of guarantee that they will be able to 
enjoy the proceeds of their investment.  
Property rights and an efficient legal system would diminish these costs.6970 By 
having clearly defined rights and a centralized dispute resolution system, people would 
not need to engage in arguments and/or physical power disputes to settle who has the 
right to a given property/resource, since they would be able to go to the dispute 
resolution system for the decision, which would then be enforced through the state 
mechanisms designed for such a purpose. 
In economic terms, a primary function of property rights is to internalize 
externalities.71 Extensive research has shown that strong property rights and efficient 
enforcement mechanisms can be an important catalyst to the development of economic 
activities.72 These studies have demonstrated that property rights can play a crucial role 
in economic activity and economic development, but poorly-designed property rights 
may actually have the reverse effect, pushing a given economy into a ‘tragedy of the 
anticommons’, where ‘multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others 
                                                      
69 One caveat, judicial disputes also consume resources, but they arguably constitute a better mechanism 
for the resolution of disputes than full-fledged warfare.  
70 On the tragedy of the commons problem, there are arguably three solutions: one is privatization, the 
attachment of property rights to common property and its division amongst its users, with a dispute 
resolution system to back it up as we are discussing here; the second is centralization, in other words 
regulation through the state; and finally, self-regulation through binding contracts, with the necessity of an 
external actor for enforcement. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the evolution of institutions for 
collective action (Cambridge University Press 1990) 1-28. 
71 (‘What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to 
bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile […]. 
“Internalizing” such effects refers to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects 
to bear […] on all interacting persons.’)Harold Demsetz, ‘Towards a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 347, 348. 
72  See e.g. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else (Bantam Press 2000) ; On the importance of strong investor protection, see e.g. Rafael 
LaPorta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 The Journal of Finance 1131; Rafael 
LaPorta and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 The Journal of Finance 1147. 
 26 
from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use’,73  leading to its 
underuse. 74  In any event, when properly designed, property rights are an important 
mechanism for the development of capitalist societies, being used for the distribution and 
control of scarce resources and the channeling of energy into economically-productive 
activities.  
Parallel to property rights, contract law also has an important economic function 
in enhancing economic outputs in a given society, as they are also designed to internalize 
externalities.75 The difference of contract law compared to property law is the object of 
regulation; instead of regulating a bundle of rights opposable to a group of people, 
contract law focuses on promises made by individual parties to each other. The operation 
of contract law makes these promises binding, and the normative justification for the legal 
enforcement of promises is the belief that the enforcement of promises is more beneficial 
than it is harmful to society, therefore creating a net social gain.76 
B. Imperfect Markets and Regulatory Law 
Due to power imbalances, the basic framework for private ordering may become 
inadequate, as those with more power may be able to exploit those with whom they 
engage in transactions. This is true in many different markets where one party has an 
advantage over the other, such as the labor market, securities market, and consumer 
market, amongst others. Exploitation and power imbalances can lead to inequitable 
situations, which can create market inefficiency and/or social unrest. 
The second goal of the state and the use of legal institutions is to create substantive 
rules and standards to avoid such situations, prohibiting behavior that is unfair and 
creating mechanisms that can diminish market imperfections in the relationship of 
                                                      
73 Michael A. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: property in the transition from Marx to Markets’ 
(1988) 111 Harvard Law Review 621, 624. 
74  This was common outcome in the transition from socialism to capitalism in the eastern European 
societies. See ibid . 
75 Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: an examination of the basis of contract’ (1980) 
89 Yale Law Journal 1261, 1276. 
76 Ibid 1286. For an economic explanation on the benefits and detriments of promises and the justification 
of some contract law rules, see the full article.  
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private parties. 77  The need for regulatory law was understood even in 19th-century 
England, when freedom of contract was deemed an important principle to be upheld,78 
both in the judiciary 79  and the legislative branches of government. 80  In this sense, 
regulatory law is a mechanism which is used to achieve social justice.81 
As these rules influence the private ordering of the parties they must be justified,82 
be it on collective interest grounds or moral grounds.83The justifications to regulation 
tend to be market specific; in general, in the securities field, regulation is justified on the 
broad grounds of market inefficiency and investor protection. A deeper analysis of the 
topic is undertaken in Chapter IV.  
Often regulatory rules are aimed at correcting problems that have an effect on the 
economy, diminishing transaction costs and enhancing economic outputs when designed 
and deployed in an efficient manner. Enforcement mechanisms are essential to their 
success.  
C. The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
As shown in the previous sections, legal rules are designed to diminish transaction 
costs amongst parties, creating certainty for future behavior, allowing parties to plan and 
                                                      
77 Hence the regulatory character they assume. 
78 See generally, Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 1979) 219-570. 
79 For example, by the 1860s the caveat emptor doctrine was weakened with cases such as Bigge v. Parkinson 
[1862] 7 H. & N. 955, 158 E.R. 758 and Jones v. Just [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 197. After these cases, caveat emptor 
was only to be applied in situations where the buyer had examined the goods sold, which had to be specific, 
and had exercised judgment. On generic goods the seller was responsible for their merchantability. This is 
clearly a ‘consumer common law’, which displaces the ‘freedom of contract’ formerly available. See  ibid 
474-75 
80  In the legislative, there were many statutes that limited freedom of contract and regulated private 
relationships, such as The Trade Union Act of 1871, The Truck Act of 1818 and the modifications came with 
The Poor Law of 1795, The Trade Union Act of 1871, The Anti-Truck Act of 1818 and The Passengers Act of 
1803, among others. For an overview of the legislation on the period that influenced freedom of contract, 
see ibid . 
81  On different concepts of social justice, see Hans- W. Micklitz, The many concepts of social justice in 
European private law (Edward Elgar 2011) 3-57. 
82 Even in 19th Century England freedom of contract was viewed as the starting point and any interference 
with it had to be justified. See Atiyah 386 (n 78). 
83 See Roger Brownsword, ‘The Theoretical Foundations of European Private Law: a time to stand and stare’ 
in Roger Brownsword and others (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 
161-64. 
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invest in activities that they know will be protected, while at the same time correcting 
imbalances that exists in specific markets. Since these rules need to be effective, an 
enforcement system has to be in place. Within modern society where states exist and 
claim a monopoly on the use of force, the legal enforcement system, since it is a system 
that if necessary can use force to achieve its ends, will have to be anchored in the power 
of the state, with institutions designed to facilitate enforcement. On practical terms, this 
means a wide array of mechanisms, from the police officers that will protect property to 
technological systems that may block bank accounts with a simple order from a judge.  
Enforcement can be initiated by public institutions or by private parties, either 
before the harmful event occurs or afterwards. Generally speaking, public enforcement 
emphasizes deterrence while private enforcement emphasizes compensation and the 
fulfillment of private interests.84 While this is the classical distinction, private parties also 
have a role in enforcing regulatory rules, either on an individual basis or by becoming 
‘private attorney generals’ to defend the interests of a collective.85  This is one of the 
underlying themes of this work and will be developed further in Chapter 4.  
Private legal enforcement is the second step to the problem of a dispute arising 
within a social context. Before any rule can be enforced, it is necessary to firstly establish 
what the rule is in the specific dispute and to then apply it.86 For the execution of these 
two functions, modern western states have institutions, the judiciary, and rules shaping 
the development and solution of the disputes and the enforcement of the outcomes. 
Through adjudication, ‘the legal process of deciding a dispute’, 87  courts produce two 
outcomes: the resolution of a dispute, which is beneficial to the parties of the dispute since 
it solves their problem with finality without resorting to aggression; and rule-making, 
                                                      
84 Christopher Hodges, ‘Public and Private Enforcement: the practical implications for policy architecture’ 
in Roger Brownsword and others (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing 2011). 
85  William B. Rubenstein, ‘On What a "Private Attorney General" is - and Why it Matters’ (2004) 57 
Vanderbilt Law Review 2129. 
86 Many times when rules are clear and information asymmetry is low disputes will not arise because it will 
be clear who will prevail.  
87 See ‘adjudication’, Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co. 2004). 
 29 
which in clarifying a certain aspect of the rules governing economic activities, attributes 
a higher degree of certainty to future cases and is therefore socially beneficial.88 
The creation and maintenance of these systems of law and the dispute resolution, 
as well as these enforcement institutions, have a cost attached to them and are only 
worthwhile as long as there is a critical mass of people and transactions in which the 
aggregate costs of self-dealing would be higher than having them mediated and solved 
through the alternative legal channel. In simpler terms, the social benefits of the existence 
of laws and courts have to be higher than the costs of maintaining them.  
One character of these institutions is that they have been formed by human beings 
who possess their own incentives to act in a certain way. Judges have to be well-
remunerated and immune from political influence to be able to exercise their duty of 
deciding disputes according to the Rule of Law. Otherwise corrupt pressures might be too 
strong to be resisted and the essence of the Rule of Law would itself be compromised, 
transforming the court into just another political forum and destroying any economic 
benefits that the legal system might attribute to private relationships. This theme will be 
further developed in Chapter VI. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter tried to establish the relationship between states, law and dispute 
resolution, assessing it with a view to the economic utility of these institutions.  
The state is a creature of political organization that has arisen out of long-lasting 
disputes amongst different human groups. Within the state the legal system serves 
economic purposes by giving rights to people and allowing them to engage in binding 
commitments to exchange resources, as well as correcting market failures when they 
appear and where they operate to undermine the economic health of a given market.  
When there are disagreements regarding the rights or the commitments that 
people have towards each other or towards the state, an available forum is necessary to 
                                                      
88 Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’ 
(1989) XXVII Journal of Economic Literature 1067, 1092-93. 
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effectively solve these disputes; this is a role that has been normally performed by the 
state through its court system. The role of the state is to function as a source of trust; the 
state becomes the guarantor that the counterparty in a transaction will behave according 
to the rules, either imposed by the state or agreed upon between the parties. This allows 
for people to plan and make investments based only on the guarantee that rules will 
govern their relationships with other parties. This is especially important in the context 
of regulated markets such as financial markets, as the identities of the counterparties to a 
transaction are often unknown.  
As different states have different sources legitimating their power, each legal 
system is often closed within itself,89 operating through its own internal logic and having 
few mechanisms to communicate with other states. Therefore, in the transnational 
context, legal mechanisms have to be built as bridges between different legal systems in 
order that transnational transactions can have the economic benefits that the legal system 
can provide.  
The chapters in Part III will analyze the institutional framework of dispute 
resolution systems, identify the characteristics that they should have in order to perform 
this role in society and discuss the different designs that can be used to achieve such an 
aim; finally, it will survey the possible regimes that can be used for transnational dispute 
resolution.  
                                                      
89 On the autopoietic nature of legal systems, see Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 
Publishers 1993). 
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Part II – Securities Regulation 
Securities are an important tool of finance. They are used both to raise new capital 
through traditional bond and equity issuance and also to transfer risk through the process 
of securitization. Securities represent a bundle of rights in a company, be it a property 
stake on the assets of a company or the right to claim repayment of a sum in the future.90 
The mechanism is only useful to the extent that companies can obtain funding or 
shift risks without much expense, or at least without engaging a much greater expense 
than what would have been necessary through other financing mechanisms. This is only 
possible when strong securities markets are in place, but as with any other type of market, 
securities markets may be prone to failures. 
The framework of different securities regulatory regimes have been a 
consequence of the failures that have led to many serious financial crises in this last 
century, especially in the United States. Reforms have been aimed at addressing the 
specific problems, recognized as the sources of these crises, and in many instances, they 
have been harshly criticized as creating more harm than benefits or not promoting 
enough change.  
The concept of ‘securities’ as a legal tool is embedded in these regulatory regimes 
governing the rights of the parties that are issuing, selling, buying and overseeing the 
whole process. The legal operation of these regimes is tied to national jurisdictions. The 
rules and norms by which a firm issuing securities will be bound depends on where the 
securities will be sold, the actors selling or advising on these securities and the possible 
overreach of distinct jurisdictions. Thus, while a Brazilian company may sell securities in 
the U.S. Market, the rules that that company will have to abide by are those of the United 
States.  
The strength of securities markets is therefore dependent on the institutional 
framework surrounding the activity of securities issuance and commercialization, from 
                                                      
90 George W. Arnett, Global Securities Markets: Navigating the World's Exchanges and OTC Markets (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011) 1030. 
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prudential supervision by government agencies and self-regulatory organizations to the 
redress mechanisms available to investors, the latter being the focus of this work.  
Before engaging in any discussion concerning the actual dispute resolution 
mechanisms in this area of law, it is first important to understand the theoretical 
underpinnings of these regulatory mechanisms and their substantive legal aspects, the 
black-letter law that purports to regulate actor’s behavior within these regimes and the 
grounds for redress. 
The objective of this part is to establish the theoretical importance of securities 
regulation and establish the legal rules that are applied in the jurisdictions under study; 
it is divided as follows: Chapter III discusses the financial crises underpinning the creation 
of and reforms to the securities regulatory regime in the United States; 91  Chapter IV 
explains the theoretical discussions and empirical evidence for the benefits of a system of 
securities regulation and the role of private litigation within it; finally, Chapter V analyses 
the legal framework for liability in securities transactions and identifies the types of 
disputes that can arise out of it.  
                                                      
91 The focus on the U.S. is that it is the country where a comprehensive system of securities regulation was 
first drafted and with which the other two systems under study have many similarities In fact, through the 
Agency for International Development, Brazil requested assistance from the SEC to draft its securities 
regulations. Norman S. Poser, ‘Securities Regulation in Developing Countries: the Brazilian Experience’ 
(1966) 52 Virginia Law Review 1283. 
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Chapter III - Financial Crises and Securities 
Regulation 
In the last century, financial crises played a major role in creating and reshaping 
securities regulation. After any major financial crisis, a political uprising would occur and 
cries for reforms to prevent the abuses perpetrated by market actors would be made. 
Then, laws would be passed and reforms would be executed. A common cycle throughout 
history is identifiable: investors enter into a speculative behavior, forgetting about reality 
and embracing a dreamland of endless moneymaking, while the market, or at least its 
smartest actors, start engaging in transactions that add fuel to the fire, making a 
considerable amount of money in the process; this continues until the bubble bursts, 
triggering dire economic consequences which lead to a regulatory reform process.92 
This has largely been the case with the U.S. system of securities regulation, a true 
creature of crises.93 The federal system of securities regulation was set up a few years 
after the crisis of 1929, while the accounting scandals of 2002 and the subprime mortgage 
crisis of 2008 also triggered important reforms.94 The phenomenon also seems to be the 
same in the UK, which also had a financial system reform rooted in scandal.95 
Of course, this is not true for the securities regulation regime of every single 
jurisdiction. The European Union, for example, has not engaged in this reactive type of 
regulatory reform. The proposals for regulation and the effective changes made have 
rather been well thought out and discussed in advance, with a focus not only on investor 
protection, but also on the harmonization of the European markets.96 
                                                      
92 See Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Bubble Laws’ (2003) 40 Houston Law Review 77, 164 (discussing the ‘boom, bust, 
regulation’ cyclical pattern). 
93  Stuart Banner, ‘What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence’ (1997) Washington 
University Law Quarterly 849, 850. 
94 See the sections below.  
95 Niamh Moloney, ‘Financial Services and Markets’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 438. 
96 Ibid 438-39. 
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In any event, these regulations are designed to address possible market failures. A 
minimal understanding of the history behind the major financial crises is important to the 
extent that it can help to identify the processes that led to the failures that caused these 
crises in the first place. The question to be answered is ‘what historical events have 
shaped securities regulation?’ This chapter briefly explains the three main crises that led 
to a reform in securities regulation in the United States. 
1. The Financial Crash of 1929 and the Creation of the Securities 
Regulation Framework in the United States 
The backbone of the legal regime of securities regulation in the US was enacted 
after a period of great panic and loss in the securities markets and during an era of 
economic hardship. Just before entering the Great Depression, the United States 
experienced good economic development. The 1920s was a period of great optimism; 
production and employment levels were rising and many people were living better than 
they ever had.97 Excessive optimism, however, has a tendency to create bubbles.98  
The first significant bubble in this period was the boom of the Florida real estate 
market. Houses were being sold at more than double the price for which they had been 
sold a few years before, and opportunistic ‘entrepreneurs’, such as Mr. Charles Ponzi, 
were selling non-existent real estate developments. 99  Speculation was rampant, with 
purchasers entering the market with the exclusive intent of reselling their rights to the 
property at a profit.100 The introduction of binders, a legal mechanism that gave the right 
                                                      
97 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash: 1929 (Houghton Mifflin Company 1997) 1-3. 
98 Especially if coupled with easy monetary policy, as it was the case with the Florida real estate bubble at 
the time. The Federal Reserve had lowered its discount rate from 4.5% in the end of 1922 to 3% in the 
second quarter of 1923. See  William B. Stronge, The Sunshine Economy (University Press of Florida 2008) 
98. 
99 See  Galbraith 4-5 (n 97). 
100 Stronge 97 (n 98). 
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to the buyer on the property without the effective transfer on public registries for thirty 
days, simply facilitated the process.101 
In 1926, the real estate market in Florida collapsed. The problem began with a lack 
of workers who could continue construction as it was demanded, the logistical problems 
of the area and the increasing awareness of the unethical practices engaged by real estate 
promoters.102 Then, in September 1926, a hurricane struck the region, causing severe 
damage and putting an end to any speculative activity that would otherwise have still 
been in place.103  
At the beginning of 1928, the same speculative frenzy and make-believe mindset 
took over the stock market in New York. 104  The amount of broker’s loans, used for 
purchases of securities on margin,105 was on the rise, increasing from $3,480,780,000106 
at the end of 1927 to $6,000,000,000 at the end of 1928.107 This was a clear sign that 
speculation was escalating.  
At the same time, in order to keep pace with the necessities of the market and the 
willingness of people to put their money in stocks and bonds, investment trusts were 
being created.108 These trusts were so popular and their managers so well-regarded that 
their securities value was superior to the underlying assets that they had, sometimes 
achieving a premium of 100%.109 
Within this environment, fraud and manipulation were also common. Some 
investment banks were not sufficiently careful in verifying the health of the companies 
                                                      
101 Binders were introduced because the recording offices in Florida were overloaded with work, and they 
were used to guarantee the rights until transfer would be made. Ibid 98. 
102Ibid 100-02. 
103 Ibid 102. 
104 Galbraith 11-14 (n 97). 
105 Purchases of securities where the broker loans the money to the purchaser and the security is kept by 
the broker as collateral.  
106 This was already a significant amount, since in the early twenties the value of these loans floated around 
one to one and a half billion dollars.  
107 Galbraith 11-14 (n 97). 
108 During the years of 1928 and 1929, around 451 investment trusts were created. Ibid 21. 
109 Ibid 49-50. 
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they were underwriting; in other instances, they had outright knowledge as to the 
worthlessness of the underwritten securities, but had no interest as they would 
subsequently dump them in the market through aggressive marketing strategies.110 Other 
actors would also manipulate securities prices; common instruments that could be 
engaged to do so included the creation of parallel markets and the facilitation of market 
manipulation through short sales111 and high-volume stock purchases.112 
In October 1929, after a year of strong appreciation, 113  the New York Stock 
Exchange experienced a crash that put the market into a downward spiral, resulting in a 
loss of 87% of market value by mid-1932.114 The stock market crash was a sign of the bad 
times that were coming, constituting, for many, the beginning of the Great Depression.115  
The federal statutes for securities regulation were enacted as responses to the 
market failures that had led to the crash.116 While state securities regulations had existed 
since 1911,117 the ‘blue-sky’118 statutes were problematic. They could barely be enforced 
across state lines, leaving fraudsters from other states practically immune to these 
laws.119 Moreover, evidence shows that the information provided on offering circulars 
before the enactment of the securities laws of 1933 and 1934 were poor, conveying 
inadequate information to allow for an informed investment decision.120  
                                                      
110 Ibid 53-54. 
111 Short sale is the sale of stock without owning it. Usually the stock is borrowed and sold, and has to be 
given back at a later date. Short sellers expected the stock price to drop, so they can repurchase the stock in 
the market at a lower price and return it to the owner, making a profit on the transaction.  
112 James Burk, ‘The Origins of Federal Securities Regulation: A Case Study in the Social Control of Finance’ 
(1985) 63 Social Forces 1010, 1016. 
113 From the date Herbert Hoover accepted its Republican nomination, on August 12, 1928, to September 
19, 1929, the New York Times Industrial Average rose from 257.98 to 460.2, a 44% increase. See ibid . 
114 Compared to the market’s peak value before the crash. See  ibid .  
115 For an overview of the Great Depression, see Daniel Leab and others, The Economic Depression (ABC-
CLIO 2010) 2-6. 
116 See  Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression & the New Deal: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 62. 
117 The first securities regulation statute was enacted in Kansas. See ‘Securities Commission’ (West Virginia 
State Auditor's Office)  <https://www.wvsao.gov/securitiescommission/history.aspx> accessed 7 July 2014.  
118 The term used for States’ securities statutes in the U.S. 
119 See Burk (n 112). 
120 Ibid. 
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The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 intended 
change this situation.121 The 1933 act was designed to impose disclosure duties on issuers 
of securities to better inform investors as to their decisions, while the 1934 act created 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and regulated stock exchanges and ongoing 
disclosure duties for issuers.  
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Reform 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the result of concerns arising out of major 
scandals related to the corporate governance structure of American corporations. 
Enron122  and Worldcom were the iconic examples of corporate failure of this period. 
These two cases were a culmination of a growing pattern of accounting irregularities in 
the 1990s.123 
One of the relevant dimensions of the market leading to these instances of fraud, 
was the incentives structure of compensation schemes, common in countries in which 
there is dispersed share ownership. Compensation through stock options is likely to lead 
to fraudulent behavior on the part of management since there is an incentive to inflate the 
company’s numbers for a higher option’s market value.124  
The abuses perpetrated by Enron were possible because of the accounting 
standards in place at the time, which allowed for the use of present values for its trading 
business,125 and also by its extensive use of structured finance.126 The first problem arose 
                                                      
121 For a historical overview of the acts and the creation of the SEC, see Joel Seligman, The Transformation 
of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 
(Northeastern University Press 1995). 
122 For a narrative of the events on Enron’s scandal, see Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest 
Guys in the Room: the Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (Penguin Books 2003). 
123 From 1990 to 1997, the number of accounting restatements in the U.S. was around 49 per year, rising to 
156 in 2000. See John C. Coffeee Jr., ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the United States and Europe 
Differ’ in Joseph J. Norton and Jonathan Rickford (eds), Corporate Governance Post-Enron: Comparative and 
International Aspects (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2006) 6. 
124 Ibid 10. 
125 This valuation process is known as mark-to-market accounting. It valuates an asset according to its 
market price, which in some instances may be determined through the anticipation of future income.  
126 Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu, ‘The Fall of Enron’ (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 
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out of the practice of recognizing future expected income from projects as revenue, where 
it was far from certain that such projects would be viable.127 The second problem was that 
Enron deliberately used Special Purpose Entities to manage its financial reports, hiding 
debts and risks that otherwise should have been disclosed.128 To make matters worse, the 
fundamentals of Enron’s businesses were not exactly in the best shape.129 
These problems have an important relationship to the underlying purposes of 
securities regulation, which is to provide reliable information to investors. That is to say, 
the information provided by Enron was deeply misleading as to the health of its 
businesses, showing a glowing picture of a deeply rotten business model.  
The reasons as why it took so long to detect the issues, and as to how they grew so 
much, have been explained as an informational intermediaries’ incentives problem.130 
The corporate governance system had design flaws that led many of the relevant 
intermediaries to overlook accounting issues that were at the core of the abuse, while the 
regulatory system was not well suited to prevent them. Arthur Andersen, one of the 
biggest accounting firms at the time and Enron’s auditor, was fatally wounded with the 
scandal and ceased its operations.131 The firm had not only failed to identify the financial 
misstatements that were pervasive through Enron’s financial statements,132 but they also 
actively engaged in destroying documents when it became likely that lawsuits would soon 
start.133 
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The political response was an overhaul of the accounting and disclosure regulatory 
system, in order to address the specific issues that took these companies down; this was 
facilitated through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.134 With a focus on investor protection, 
the act was designed to change the practices surrounding the corporate governance and 
accounting of publicly traded companies. 
The main changes introduced by the act were the creation of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, an oversight body for accounting audits on public 
companies, 135  the imposition of rules for auditor independence, 136  the creation of a 
financial statements certification duty for the officers of the company137 and enhanced 
financial disclosures.138 
These changes were designed to provide for better disclosure of information, both 
through a change in the institutional framework of the regulation of auditors and also by 
increasing the liability of corporate officers through the duty to certify financial 
statements. While heavily criticized in academic literature,139 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 has stood its ground without any major reforms in almost 10 years. 
3. The 2008 Crisis and its Consequences for Securities Regulation 
The crisis in 2007-2008 was the result of many different dimensions of the 
American economy and its financial system. Cheap credit fueled an already-growing 
                                                      
134 The Enron case was also useful to stir discussions on corporate governance matters in Europe. See  Paul 
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housing bubble that had been developing since 1997,140 leading to a classic boom-and-
bust scenario.  
The increase in easy credit was a political response to the increasing income 
inequality that had been mounting in the United States. From 1975 to 2005, the income 
of those who earn more than the other 90% of the general population rose by around 65%, 
compared to those that are in the 10th percentile.141 Failing to deal with the situation 
through better education and unable to put forward income redistribution reforms, easier 
credit seemed the only politically feasible way to improve the livelihood of the general 
population.142 The policy was advanced through lower interest rates established by the 
Federal Reserve System 143  and the use of government-sponsored entities promoting 
lending to low-income people, enabling them to afford housing.144 
With the increasing availability of mortgages in the market, the private sector 
realized that they had a new business opportunity: they could buy mortgages, bundle 
them together and sell them to investors, creating profits in a relatively low-risk 
activity.145 The process was undertaken via special purpose vehicles, corporate entities 
which had, as their only raison d’être, the holding of mortgages and the issuing of 
securities to be sold on the market.146 In practice, this meant that these banks would not 
hold any risk on these mortgages; as long as they could be bundled and sold, banks would 
                                                      
140 From 1997 to 2006 house prices increased at an annual rate of 9.3% while building costs at a rate of 
2.9%. See Marc Jarsulic, Anatomy of a Financial Crisis: a Real Estate Bubble, Runaway Credit Markets, and 
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not have a strong incentive to carefully scrutinize them. This mortgage business model 
became known as the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model and was key in creating systemic 
risk in the market. 
While mortgages were being securitized and distributed to the market, a demand 
from banks for this kind of asset was growing. Mortgage brokers were doing their job, but 
they also had an extra incentive to provide the mortgages that banks wanted: the higher 
the interest rate paid by the mortgagee, the higher the broker’s commission. 147  The 
quality of the loan did not really matter, since in the end they would be pooled and sold 
to investors, what did matter was that there were loans to be used. The practice 
deteriorated to the point that loans were being made to persons with no income, no jobs 
and no assets – the infamous NINJA loans.148 
While the quality of these loans was suffering considerably through the passage of 
time, investors were still happily buying mortgage-backed securities. Investors relied on 
Credit Rating Agencies to provide information about the risk of these products being sold 
instead of doing their own due diligence; at the same time, the Credit Rating Agencies 
were functioning as regulatory licensees, distributing licenses and being paid by the 
securitizers themselves to rate their products.149  
The excess credit that was created through this practice led to a rise in United 
States’ housing prices. From 1997 to 2006, housing prices were increasing at a rate of 
9.3%; meanwhile building costs were rising at a rate of only 2.9%.150 This was a growing 
bubble, becoming ripe to burst. 
                                                      
147 This kind of commission was known as the ‘yield-spread premium’. A higher interest rate, of course, 
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The stage was set for disaster. In 2006, the crisis started to unravel. Housing prices 
started to fall, homeowners were increasingly becoming unable to service their 
mortgages and by mid-2008, almost 4.5% of the subprime mortgages outstanding in the 
market were foreclosing. 151  Even though there were a lot of investors buying these 
products, many of the financial intermediaries were also holding a substantial amount of 
them. Massive bank failures began to occur;152 a downward spiral was triggered, pushing 
markets into a nosedive. The Dow Jones Industrial Average reached its lowest point 
during the crisis on March 9, 2009, hitting 6.547 points.153 
As the subprime crisis evolved in the U.S., international markets also started 
feeling its effects, while the real economy suffered the consequences.154 The expanding 
effects of the crisis prompted many policy responses and calls for reform all over the globe, 
leading to a restructuration of the global financial architecture.155 
These reforms, contrary to what had happened after the accounting scandals in the 
United States, did not substantially alter the general liability framework of the players in 
securities issuance. In particular, cases reporting duties were modified, 156  additional 
duties in specific financial transactions were required 157  and disclosure duties 
enhanced, 158  mainly when related to Asset Backed Securities. The reform had an 
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increased focus on avoiding systemic risk.159 On the other side of the Atlantic, in Europe, 
the reforms were mainly institutional, where the concern was focused more on facilitating 
a regulatory system where financial risks could be addressed at the European level.160 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Financial crises have been one of the factors shaping the American system of 
securities regulation. Each of these crises discussed here had a different market failure 
that led to the crash of the financial system, resulting in long-lasting reforms to the 
regulatory landscape in the United States.  
The importance of understanding the reasons that led to the creation and reform 
of the U.S. system of securities regulation is that it was the first well-known system of 
securities regulation and has served as a model to the creation of other systems. The 
market failures that the U.S. system addresses are the same as those that the other 
regulatory systems purport to address. This chapter thus provides a historical 
introduction to the theoretical discussion of securities regulation, which is undertaken in 
the next chapter.  
                                                      
159 For example, one of the provisions was studying a requirement to impose a minimum percentage of their 
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see also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Risk Retention (2010). 
160 See Jacques de Larosière, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision (2009). 
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Chapter IV - Securities Regulation Theory 
and the Importance of Private 
Enforcement 
The concept of ‘securities’ is an important one to financial markets. A ‘security’ is 
a legal mechanism used at the heart of many financial transactions. The underlying idea 
is of an ‘an investment pooled with others and managed by third parties with whom the 
investors participate in the economic fate of a common enterprise’.161 Through its formal 
materialization, a security becomes a product and can be sold like anything else.  
The consistent buying and selling of securities creates a market for these products. 
Like any other market, its proper functioning is dependent on the relationship of the 
parties that form part of it. In the absence of other mechanisms, for private parties, trust 
and the fear of reputational harm are the cornerstones of their functioning. Since these 
mechanisms are not perfect, market failures may arise, compromising market 
efficiency.162  
As with any other markets, there is a legitimate interest that securities markets 
work efficiently. Efficient markets avoid waste of resources. In some aspects, especially 
where securities markets are well developed, its efficiency is crucial for the economy of a 
country, and any pathology that might be developed within the market is unwanted and 
has to be remedied.  
As discussed in the preceding chapter, financial and securities regulation reform 
has often been implemented after a financial crisis, targeting specific market problems 
that at the time were seen as deficiencies that could have caused, or contributed to the 
                                                      
161 Arnett 1030 (n 90). 
162  Usually the more impersonal markets are, the less these personal mechanisms are efficient. Highly 
personal markets tend to use more reputational and trust mechanisms, as it can be seen from Lisa 
Bernstein’s research on the diamonds industry and the cotton market in Memphis. See  Lisa Bernstein, 
‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 
Journal of Legal Studies 115 Lisa Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2000-2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724. 
 46 
crisis. Within this context, the questions to be answered in this chapter are the following: 
‘what is the role of securities regulation?’ and ‘what is the best method of enforcement?’  
The objective of this chapter is thus to provide an overview of the literature on 
securities markets structures, and of the institutional mix in securities regulation and 
then to finally establish the importance of private enforcement in this area. 
1. The Market 
A market is where the exchange of goods or services takes place, regardless of 
whether it is a physical location or not.163 The level of supply and demand determines the 
prices of a given good on the market. For example, if the world’s coffee production is 
reduced in a year due to adverse weather conditions and the demand stays relatively the 
same, the price of coffee will rise due to the smaller supply until it reaches its equilibrium 
level for the new situation.164The equilibrium level is achieved through price adjustment 
due to the new conditions of supply and demand. In this example, the price rises because 
coffee consumers do not have as much coffee available to them as before, and those who 
value coffee will be willing to pay a higher amount to get the same quantity of coffee. The 
price ceases to rise when buyers reach the threshold of what they will accept to pay for a 
given quantity of coffee.   
Markets are not entities that pre-exist trade. Individuals engaging in transactions 
make markets, each with their own personalities, preferences and tastes. The importance 
attached to a given product depends on individual opinions about it. If no one likes coffee 
and would not even take it home for free, a coffee market would be unlikely to develop. 
This is an important aspect of a market; it is not a structure that adjusts automatically to 
a change in reality, but any change is dependent on the individual decisions of every single 
person transacting in it.  
                                                      
163 See ‘market’, Jonathan Law and John Smullen, A Dictionary of Finance and Banking (Oxford University 
Press 2008). 
164 The ‘equilibrium quantity and price’ is the level of price and quantity of a given product where both 
buyers and sellers are satisfied. See  Robert Frank, Microeconomics and Behavior (McGraw-Hill Irwin 2010) 
29-32. 
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The understanding of a market as a place where transactions are made brings 
further implications. Transactions, in the real world, have costs. Even if parties would 
have complete knowledge about a product, they would either have to get together to close 
the deal or ask someone to do it for them; in either case, time and energy would be spent. 
Complete knowledge is also an assumption that does not hold true in the real world, as 
parties have to obtain information about the product they want to purchase. A person 
buying a used car will want to know about the quality of the car, the problems it has and 
the adversities it was put through before the deal. Everything else being equal, a car in 
bad shape is less desirable than a car that has been given proper care. Knowledge 
acquisition is also a cost that is pervasive in any type of market.  
Developing rules and institutions for a market has the objective of diminishing 
these costs, therefore increasing its efficiency. An economically efficient market should 
provide for the lowest possible transaction cost. Of course, each market has its own 
characteristics and weaknesses that may warrant different types of rules. 
2. The Functioning of Capital Markets 
Capital Markets are a specific type of market with the function of allocating 
economic resources efficiently. In a very simplistic representation, there are two sides to 
a Capital Market structure: the savers and the entrepreneurs. The savers want to defer 
their expenses and not use their capital at the present time, while the entrepreneurs want 
to use capital to invest in ‘new capital’ that will create value in the future.165 The decision 
to make an investment through third-party financing is based on the price of a given 
security. The transaction depends on what the saver believes a given security is worth 
trading his money for and whether the entrepreneur is willing to accept such value in 
comparison with the future income streams that he may be willing to forgo given the value 
creation possibilities of the project.166 If their expectations are the same, the transaction 
will take place and the saver will be able to have his savings remunerated for future 
                                                      
165 See Jeffrey N. Gordon and Lewis A. Kornhauser, ‘Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research’ (1985) 60 New York University Law Journal 761, 767-70. 
166 For example, if the interest rate of borrowed money in the market is 10%, a project will only be executed 
through debt financing if it can provide a higher income than that.  
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spending while the investor will be able to execute a project that will create value and 
generate future income streams. 
An efficient resource allocation maximizes the welfare of the population as a whole, 
avoiding unnecessary costs. The more developed Capital Markets are, the more efficient 
the economy and its growth will be.167 The question here is not whether Capital Markets 
are beneficial. Any social structure that diminishes transaction costs and is able to 
increase the availability of goods to the population is welcome. The question is whether 
the regulation of these markets makes them more or less efficient.  
To address this question it is first necessary to understand the inner mechanics of 
Capital Markets and the link between economic efficiency and market efficiency, which 
are distinct concepts in the literature. A market is more economically efficient if, all else 
being equal, its transaction costs are lower than in a comparable market. The concept of 
market efficiency is different: a market is efficient if it reflects all available information.168 
The central concept of an efficient market is price accuracy.169 Markets where prices are 
inaccurate create unnecessary economic costs.170 The next two sections address: A) the 
mechanics of price accuracy and B) the costs of price inaccuracy.  
A. The Mechanics of Price Accuracy  
Price accuracy is dependent on the information available to the market regarding 
a certain security and its incorporation into the security’s price. The premise of an 
                                                      
167 Robert G. King and Ross Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right’ (1993) 108 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 717; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks and Economic 
Growth’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 537. 
168  There is theoretical distinction between fundamental efficiency and informational efficiency. 
Fundamental efficiency is the ability of a market to reflect the best estimate of the future incomes of an asset, 
while informational efficiency is the inability to profit from available information because they are already 
reflected in the securities price. This distinction is only relevant to the extent that there are mechanisms to 
predict securities price more accurately than the market, given the same set of available information. Since 
this is an unlikely proposition, the distinction is not relevant for the purposes of this work, and the 
underlying concept used here for market efficiency will be informational efficiency. See  Ronald J. Gilson and 
Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias’ 446 
Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 1, 2. 
169 Gordon and Kornhauser 768 (n 165). If the price is not accurate the decisions made by investors and 
savers will not be optimal.  
170 Therefore, there is also a link between market efficiency and economic efficiency. 
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efficient market is that it ‘fully reflects’ all available information.171  The ‘reflection of 
available information’ is dependent on two factors: a) how information is incorporated 
into prices and b) how information is made available.  
The incorporation of information into prices can be framed as a two-step process. 
Firstly, it depends on the number of potential investors that have access to a piece of 
information. Secondly, it depends on how these persons transmit this information to the 
market price of a security. The price adjustment is a function of the initial number of 
persons possessing the information and the amount of transactions that are made based 
on such information; the bigger the number of initial persons possessing the information 
and the bigger the transactions made based on it, the faster the information is 
incorporated into prices.172  
The availability of information can be thought of as a continuum that goes from 
publicly available information to restricted information. Information requires effort to be 
gathered; this is reflected in the use of personal time or by hiring researchers. Even if it is 
publicly available, its pieces can be raw data that must be organized to be understood. The 
costs of organizing information coherently in such a manner that some use might be made 
of it might be high. Moreover, it may be necessary to check whether the information 
provided is true, an activity that has also has a cost.173 Therefore, the level of availability 
of a piece of information can be translated in terms of the cost to acquire, organize and 
reasonably rely upon it.  
Due to the costs of obtaining, processing and verifying information, many different 
mechanisms have emerged to diminish these costs through economies of scale and scope. 
The press, financial intermediaries and individual networks are some of the avenues that 
are used for this purpose. Such mechanisms increase the initial availability of information 
to market participants. By diminishing information costs, they enhance price accuracy in 
                                                      
171 Eugene F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: a Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 The 
Journal of Finance 383, 383. 
172 Liquidity therefore is an important aspect for market price efficiency, the more liquid the market, the 
faster is the price adjustment. 
173 In sum, information costs can be divided into three categories: acquisition costs; processing costs and 
verification costs. For a more in depth overview, see Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, ‘The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 549, 597-609. 
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capital markets by increasing the distribution of reliable information while also 
contributing to economic efficiency, both directly, through the reduction of informational 
costs, and indirectly, through a more efficient capital market.174 
The second moment of price formation is the incorporation of available 
information into the prices of a product. In any given market, this ‘reflection’ occurs 
through different mechanisms.175 In the long-run, prices tend to adjust to equilibrium by 
incorporating new available information; the important question regarding price 
accuracy is how fast the information is incorporated into prices.176 The incorporation of 
information is basically done through transactions that are based on the new information. 
Actors using the information will evaluate and act on it, pushing securities prices up or 
down.  
There are four mechanisms of information incorporation into prices: ‘universally 
informed trading’, ‘professionally informed trading’, ‘derivatively informed trading’ and 
‘uninformed trading’,177 which have a parallel in the cost structure mentioned above.  
‘Universally informed trading’ is the situation where information is either already 
incorporated into prices, such as old information, or where the costs of obtaining it are so 
low that the market players will receive, process, adjust their expectations and act on it 
promptly, reaching near perfect efficiency.178  
In cases where information is widespread but further analysis is necessary for it 
to be understood, professional traders play a bigger role, entering into the universe of the 
‘professionally informed trading’. Professional traders have better tools to analyze 
                                                      
174 There is an apparent paradox in the relationship between the cost of obtaining information and market 
efficiency. The premise of an efficient market is that any available information is ‘fully reflected’ in stock 
prices at any time. Therefore, if the market is efficient, any information that becomes available is fully 
reflected in the stock prices, and the costs of acquiring new information will not be worthwhile, pushing the 
market to inefficiency again. The paradox is just apparent. Since price systems are not perfectly efficient 
there is always an opportunity to make a profit from arbitraging, justifying the existence of information 
providers and arbitrageurs. See  Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets’ (1980) 70 The American Economic Review 393. 
175 See  Gilson and Kraakman 554-65 (n 173). 
176 Ibid 559-60. 
177 Gilson & Kraakman, based on previous financial literature, elaborated these terms. See ibid 566. 
178 Ibid 568-69. One example would be an oil spill that is widely televised across the globe.  
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complex information that would not be meaningful to the unsophisticated investor. 
Professional trading is responsible for incorporating complex information into securities 
prices and it is an efficient mechanism so long as the trading volume, based on the new 
expectations that were formed from the analysis of such information, is sufficient to move 
the market price.179 As such, a certain consensus among professionals is needed for price 
movement.  
The third mechanism, ‘derivatively informed trading’, functions when information 
is not widespread and the costs of acquiring it are higher. The few players that are in 
control of the information will be able to trade on it and profit from their behavior until 
the information is leaked or other market players are able to ‘decode’ it. In this case, the 
price will only adjust to the extent that other players are able to obtain the information 
on which the insiders are trading the security. This happens through two processes: 1) if 
the trades made by insiders are sufficient to move the demand or supply of the security 
or 2) if outsiders realize that insiders are executing the trade and decide to engage in the 
same trades under the belief that those insiders have more information than they do.180 
There is a considerable gap in time from the moment when the new information is 
available to the insider to its incorporation into the security price; if insider trading 
volume is low and there are no other manners of outside traders to discover that insiders 
are trading their securities, the new information might never be incorporated into the 
price. This gap creates an informational asymmetry problem that may lead to an increase 
in transaction costs and an overall deterioration of the market.181  
The last mechanism is ‘uninformed trading’, a mechanism based on soft 
information, belonging to the realm of predictions and forecasts. Each individual trader 
has opinions and beliefs that are used as a basis for engaging in certain trades. By trading 
                                                      
179 Ibid 569-72. 
180 Gilson & Kraakman term these two mechanisms as ‘trade decoding’ and ‘price decoding’. Ibid 573. 
181 This is the well-known ‘lemons’ problem. When there is informational asymmetry regarding products in 
the same class and the purchasers are not able to differentiate between a good product and a medium one, 
the tendency is for the purchasers to discount prices to compensate for the risk of buying a product of 
medium quality. Since the price will not reflect the real quality of the good product, their owners might no 
longer be willing to sell them. The same process then happens with the medium and the bad product, 
pushing it into a downward spiral that may lead to the extinction of the market. See George A. Akerlof, ‘The 
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 488. 
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based on these beliefs, each and every single trader’s expectation is transferred to the 
market price of the security.182 The adjustment of securities prices will be a mean average 
of each individual investor’s expectations of what the price should be, and even though 
the market would behave as if its actors were informed, in fact they would not be.183 
These four mechanisms are not exclusive; they complement each other and they 
may even operate concomitantly regarding the same piece of information. It is through 
these mechanisms that information incorporates into securities prices, adjusting its 
accuracy. 
These mechanisms are shaped and limited by the institutional complexities 
surrounding the activities related to gathering, processing and verifying market 
information, as well as by the legal framework surrounding these processes.184  
B. Consequences of Price Inaccuracy 
Price inaccuracy in Capital Markets can bring different harmful effects to the 
efficiency of an economy. As discussed above, an inefficient economy wastes resources 
that could otherwise be used to maximize the well-being of the population. Identifying the 
social costs of price inaccuracy is important to further the discussion about the legal 
mechanisms that can be used to address them. The three main categories of social costs 
arising out of price inaccuracies are non-optimal capital allocation, market liquidity and 
corporate governance failures. 
Non-optimal capital allocation: The investment decisions of a company based on 
inaccurate stock prices may be socially suboptimal. Both the overvaluation and the 
undervaluation of a company raising money in the primary market through equity 
offerings may lead to social costs. If the stock price is overvalued, the company may invest 
in projects that are suffering loss because selling new shares will overcompensate older 
                                                      
182 The ‘uninformed trading mechanism’ is based on three conditions: 1) a trader forecast is based on 
secondary information that is exclusive; 2) traders’ forecasts are within an acceptable degree of variability 
within the market; 3) the aggregate market assessment is unbiased towards an hypothetical optimal price 
estimative of a fully informed trader. See Gilson and Kraakman 579-88 (n 173). 
183  In fact, one of the premises for the ‘uninformed trading’ mechanism to work is that each trader is 
informed by ‘secondary facts and evaluations to which only he has access’. Ibid 581. 
184 See Gilson and Kraakman 35-37 (n 168). 
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shareholders;185 on the other hand, if the stock price is undervalued, projects that could 
be socially valuable might be put aside if the stock price discount is higher than the 
expected added value of the investment.186187  
Under this specific problem, price accuracy is important to the extent that it is 
present at the period when the company is going through the process of issuing new 
shares. The investment decision is made having in consideration the amount of capital 
that can be obtained during an offer in the primary market: it is meaningless, at least as a 
direct consideration of an investment decision, whether the security price is accurate 
before or after the process is undertaken.188  
Market liquidity: Liquidity189 is both a cause and a consequence of price accuracy. 
As explained above, the higher the number of transactions in a given market, the faster is 
the incorporation of information into market prices, enhancing price accuracy. Liquid 
markets are markets where securities can be promptly transformed into cash, meaning 
that there is plenty of supply and demand for any person to buy or sell a given security.  
Apart from the fairness argument of accurate prices for securities transactions, 
price inaccuracies affect investor confidence, which in turn affects market liquidity. Price 
inaccuracies are mainly caused by informational asymmetry. When this is the case and 
                                                      
185 Imagine a company with a fundamental value of $100 million, with 100 shareholders having 1000 shares 
each. The fundamental value of a single share is $1000. The market values the company at a 20% premium. 
The company has an investment opportunity that will need $ 10 million in equity, but will increase the 
company value only by $ 9 million.  To raise this money the company needs to sell 8334 extra shares at 
$1200. After the transaction is completed the value of the company will be $ 109 million, with each share 
being worth $1006.14. Even though the project is not socially optimal, the old shareholders of the company 
would execute it nevertheless since they would profit from it.  
186 Imagine the same company, with its fundamental value of $100 million, the 100 shareholders holding 
1000 shares with a fundamental value of $1000 each. The company now has an investment opportunity 
that will increase the value of the company by $11 million, but the necessary equity to execute it is $10 
million. The company is trading at a 20% discount. To raise the capital it would be necessary to sell 
additional 12500 stocks. After the transaction each new share would be worth $986.67. Even though this is 
a socially desirable project, due to the share value mispricing the stockholders would not approve its 
execution because they would be worse off after its completion. 
187 See Marcel Kahan, ‘Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices’ (1992) 41 Duke Law 
Journal 977, 1005-08. The two examples before are based on the examples offered in this article.  
188 Ibid 1012-16. 
189 Market liquidity can be either the opportunity of finding a trade partner with which a large amount of 
trading can be made without causing market impact, or the possibility of converting securities into cash. 
Here market liquidity is used with this second meaning. For the first definition see Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches (Monthly Report January, 2006) 37. 
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there is a consistent practice in the market of trading on non-public information, the 
individual uninformed investor will be more likely to lose on his transactions and 
eventually will become aware that such a market is rigged against him. Since such a 
transaction represents a higher risk of loss with the least possible benefit, the investor 
may become wary of trading in such an unfair environment. 190  The withdrawal of 
investors who perceive the market as unfair to them will diminish the amount of trading, 
which translates into diminished liquidity.  
Investors value liquid securities more than illiquid ones. Everything else being 
equal, a bond that pays 10% interest and can be sold in one hour is more valuable than a 
bond with the same interest rate that can be sold only after a week. Therefore, the first 
consequence of an illiquid market is the higher cost of raising capital that arises out of 
it.191 
The second cost arising out of a diminished liquidity relates to the cost of 
transactions within the market. Transactions in illiquid markets tend to be more costly 
than in liquid ones due to higher brokerage fees.192 Since a decrease in liquidity means a 
lower level of trade, brokers and market makers earn less from their activities, 
notwithstanding that they still have fixed costs that they must bear to provide their 
services. The consequence is that they have to widen the bid-ask spread to compensate 
for the loss of business.193  
Corporate governance failures: Price inaccuracy can also have harmful social 
effects linked to the behavior of firm managers. Their behavior can be attached to 
securities prices in many different ways, ranging from direct ownership of stocks to a 
sense of duty to shareholders and the assumption that higher stock prices will be in their 
interest. 194  Unless managers are shorting the stock of their company, their incentive 
                                                      
190 Kahan 1018-19 (n 187). 
191  For a model on how informational asymmetry, liquidity and cost of capital are related see Douglas 
Diamond and Robert Verrecchia, ‘Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital’ (1991) 46 The Journal of 
Finance 1325. 
192 Kahan 1020 (n 187). 
193 See Hans R. Stoll, ‘Market Microstructure’ in George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris and René M. Stulz 
(eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, vol 1A (Elsevier 2003) 562-67. 
194 Kahan 1029 (n 187). 
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structure will be to increase the value of the company’s securities prices, either because 
they own stocks or options or for shareholder’s satisfaction. 
If the price is accurate, the only way in which managers will be able to change the 
value of the company’s securities will be through the improvement of its fundamental 
value.195 In perfectly efficient markets, managers, basing their decisions in stock prices, 
will not be able to cause socially harmful effects.  
Within the corporate governance structure, inaccurate prices raises two issues: 
the first is, similarly to the social costs arising out of equity funding as discussed above, 
the decision of investing in non-optimal enterprises due to incentives accruing from the 
management interest in focusing on a higher priced company; the second is the use of 
signaling techniques.  
The logic behind the first issue is the same as the one discussed in respect of the 
decision to offer securities to the public. If the company has some available capital and 
different options of investment, it may decide to opt for the choice that is less profitable 
but more valuable in the eyes of the market. The opportunity to pursue a more socially 
efficient option would be abandoned due to price inaccuracies in the market.196 
The second issue is rather one of transaction costs than of allocative efficiency. 
Signaling is the transmission of information to the market.197 The practice of signaling is 
undertaken to inform the market that the price of stock is undervalued. The practice of 
signaling has costs, and if the security price were accurate, management would not need 
to engage in signaling. Accuracy prevents the necessity of the company’s use of signaling 
mechanisms to transmit information to the market.  
                                                      
195 Ibid 1030. 
196 The inaccuracy here is not about the price of the manager’s firm, but of the one where the investment is 
going to be made, even though the decision is made based upon the expected share price increase of the 
manager’s firm.  
197  For an overview of signaling, see Michael Spence, ‘Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational 
Structure of Markets’ (2002) 92 The American Economic Review 434. 
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3. The Theoretical Justification for Securities Regulation 
Inefficient markets have consequences to the real economy; as such, increasing 
their efficiency is an important task. The economic efficiency of markets is developed 
through institutional design. There are different overlapping mechanisms that may be 
used for this purpose, but the creation of an institutional market framework has to be 
made with the specific market in mind.  
Market efficiency is a byproduct of transaction costs, availability of information 
and its incorporation into prices. In the securities field, outside the domain of the market 
microstructure, which is concerned with the nuts and bolts of trading, the underpinning 
concept of securities regulation is ‘information disclosure’. Narrowing informational 
asymmetry creates an environment for better-informed investors, who in turn then 
become more confident in engaging in financial transactions, contributing to market 
efficiency.  
While financial markets are regulated everywhere, the idea of imposing disclosure 
duties on actors involved in securities transactions is not a unanimous one. The securities 
market and its regulation has been a heavily discussed topic since the introduction of the 
federal securities law in the United States. Initially its discontents criticized only specific 
provisions of the securities acts that were thought to impede capital formation, and none 
of these was aimed at disclosure.198 It was then in the 1960s that a new wave of criticism 
emerged against the mandatory disclosure system.199 
A. The Argument against a Mandatory Disclosure System 
The initial criticisms against a mandatory disclosure system were based on the 
costs on corporations and the lack of evidence that mandatory disclosure was in fact 
necessary since corporations were already disclosing some information before the 
                                                      
198 Joel Seligman, ‘The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System’ (1983) 9 The Journal 
of Corporation Law 1, 2. 
199 See George J. Stigler, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’ (1964) 37 The Journal of Business 117; 
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press 1966); George J. Benston, ‘The Value 
of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements’ (1969) 44 The Accounting Review 515.  
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securities system reform.200 Moreover, insider trading was seen as something beneficial 
that could be used as means of rewarding entrepreneurs, therefore leading some 
commentators to argue that the prohibition of using inside information for trading could 
be harmful.201 Securities regulation, these studies preached, accrued few benefits for its 
costs. These arguments and the evidence used to reach these conclusions, were severely 
disputed;202 since then, much has been written on the subject.  
Much of the new criticism is based on the assumptions arising out of the efficient 
market hypothesis, the efficiency of market mechanisms to promote the proper 
functioning of capital markets and the inefficiency of mandatory disclosure systems.203 
Theoretically, if a firm were issuing securities to fund a project that was expected to be 
profitable, it would optimally disclose information to convince investors to buy those 
securities.204 The lack of disclosure by the firm would lead investors to think that they had 
only bad information about the project. This would imply that after it starts disclosing 
information, a firm would not be able to stop disclosing new information without 
triggering investors’ concerns linked to non-disclosure. To guarantee that the optimal 
amount of information would be disclosed, the firm would then utilize market 
mechanisms, such as verification and certification, to ‘borrow’ financial intermediaries’ 
reputations.205 
Informational intermediaries would also be used to signal to the market that there 
are other types of information that, due to competitive advantages, are better not to be 
directly disclosed at that particular moment, such as a new technology.206 By disclosing 
information to specific intermediaries that have the possibility of buying enough 
                                                      
200 Benston 531 (n 199). 
201 See Manne 139-41 (n 199). 
202 For an overview, see Seligman, ‘The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System’ (n 
198). 
203 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’ 
(1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 669; Lynn A. Stout, ‘The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation’ (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 613.  
204 See S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, ‘Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids’ (1980) 35 The Journal of Finance 
323, 323-27. 
205 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 203). The authors frame this idea as the principle of ‘self-induced disclosure’.  
206 Ibid 688. 
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securities to influence its market price, issuers would be signaling to the market that they 
have beneficial information that cannot be publicly disclosed.207 
Another criticism, focused more on the specifics of securities regulation in the 
United States, is about the quality of information provided. It advances that the focus of 
disclosure should be less on historical data but more on future projections, since stock 
prices are calculated on the basis of projected future income.208  
These criticisms assume that markets, as a matter of principle, will always do 
better if left untouched than if regulatory mechanisms are imposed on them. This is, of 
course, not always true, as history has demonstrated over and over again.209  
B. The Argument for a Mandatory Disclosure System 
The opposing view is that a mandatory disclosure system for securities regulation 
does matter for share price accuracy and also that its costs are lower than the benefits 
that they accrue to society. This position can be generally based in the public goods 
character of information and the possible inefficiencies in the absence of a mandatory 
disclosure system as well as the flaws of the self-induced disclosure theory.210  
Information is a public good because it is indivisible and unexcludable.211 A piece 
of information does not exhaust itself with its use; it will still be available to any other 
person who may want to use it. This allows persons that have not contributed to the costs 
of obtaining the information to use it for free.212 Since researchers will not be able to sell 
the information to all of its users, they will be undercompensated, and the consequence is 
that information tends to be underprovided. This under-provision of information is 
                                                      
207 This would fall within the insider-trading category.  
208  Homer Kripke, ‘The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities’ (1970) 45 New York 
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harmful because the less informed traders that are available to trade, the higher the 
amount of time necessary for the information to become incorporated into prices, a 
process which affects market efficiency.   
A mandatory system of disclosure would not only address this problem, but it 
would also cut the duplication efforts that are made in collecting and processing 
information. Absent a mandatory disclosure system, many different analysts engage in 
obtaining, processing and verifying the same set of information about a company, wasting 
unnecessary resources.213  
This first justification for a mandatory disclosure system is aligned with the idea 
underpinning the mechanisms incorporating information into market prices: it provides 
both for market efficiency through a wider base of information that reaches different 
persons faster and also for economic efficiency by diminishing duplicative economic 
efforts.  
Another line of argument goes against the theory that firms would disclose all 
beneficial information by themselves. The self-induced disclosure theory can be 
empirically demonstrated in the market through the various financial institutions and 
gatekeepers that provide ‘reputation’ for companies that wish to signal the market. The 
question though is not if these mechanisms exist, but to what extent they are sufficient to 
provide proper and sufficient information to the market.  
Conflicts of interest between ownership and control in the firm prevent an optimal 
self-induced disclosure. Even though the logic in the theory is sound, the premises of it 
are not. The lack of ongoing disclosures after a firm has started with the practice may 
signal to the market that there is bad news, and therefore the firm, as an institution, would 
disclose the information. The problem is that managers do not always have their interests 
aligned with those of the shareholders, and they might use this market response to pursue 
their own agenda.214 
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The theoretical case in favor of mandatory disclosure seems to be stronger than 
that against. The next section reviews the literature on the effects of strong securities 
regulation and investor protection in the economy, which provides evidence that this is 
in fact the case.  
4. The Empirical Evidence for Securities Regulation  
Does securities regulation matter in practice? Is there any added value in having a 
system to control the manner in which securities are issued and the actions of the relevant 
actors in respect of its trading?  
A body of literature demonstrates that securities law and more generally, 
corporate law, do matter to protect investors and to strengthen capital markets. The 
quality of legal rules and enforcement reflects on the size of capital markets. 215  For 
example, shareholder protection is a determinant to the dispersion of shares ownership, 
influencing the ability of a firm to obtain external finance.216  The argument is that a 
developed legal system of investor protection, by guaranteeing the rights of investors and 
preventing expropriation, will incentivize investors to pay more for a firm’s security since 
interest or profit will be more likely to come back to them than if such protection did not 
exist.217  This not only raises the value of the companies in general but it also allows 
investors to consider companies that would not have been considered absent good legal 
protection.218 A particular study has illustrated that firms that cross-list in the United 
States, which is known to have strong investor protection rules, have experienced an 
increase of up to 37% on their Tobin’s q ratio219 compared to firms that are not cross-
listed.220  
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Another argument that strong securities regulation is beneficial arises from the 
analysis of the costs of raising capital. Similarly, the literature also demonstrated that 
‘firms in countries with more extensive disclosure requirements and stronger securities 
regulation’ have a lower cost of equity capital, even after other risk variables were 
controlled.221  
Another article, also focused on the benefits to the economy of share price 
accuracy and the importance that mandatory disclosure systems have in accurate prices, 
reached similar results.222 Through the use of the R2 methodology, the study indicated 
that share price accuracy is important to capital allocation,223 while specific enhanced 
disclosure requirements - introduced in the US in the 1980s - showed an increase of 
information reflection in share prices.224  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that there is an important 
relationship between developed capital markets and their regulation. Securities 
regulation is a tool to promote market efficiency, and an efficient institutional framework, 
designed to address problems arising out of the development of financial markets, is 
important to economic development.  
5. Securities Regulation in the EU 
The idea of economic integration remains one of the central aspects of the EU 
project, the goal of a single market being one of its most pressing objectives.225 In the 
TFEU, the basis of the single market is reflected in the four freedoms: free movement of 
                                                      
221 See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi and René M. Stulz, ‘Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth 
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goods, workers, establishment and the provision of services, and capital.226 This logic is 
also applicable to securities regulation, focusing on the construction of an integrated EU 
securities and investment services market,227 with the consequence that any EU securities 
regulation has to be justified as a means towards the construction of the single market, as 
there is no other basis for regulation.  
Primarily, the approach to this area of regulation was based on maximum 
harmonization, attempting to equalize the different regulatory regimes in the Member 
States in order to remove the barriers arising from them.228 Due to negotiation difficulties 
and the implementation discretion that was given to Member States, this first attempt 
failed.229  
The next regulatory approach was based on the ‘mutual recognition’ principle 
established in the Cassis de Dijon230 judgment, establishing a minimum harmonization 
framework where supervision is delegated to the home country of the service 
provider/issuer and the host country is obliged to accept such regulation, without 
imposing any additional burdens.231 This approach also failed because there was still 
much power with the host Member State regarding issuer-disclosure and investment 
services, inhibiting the development of an integrated market.232 
These deficiencies were acknowledged and in 1998 a Financial Services Action 
Plan with 42 measures was devised and implemented to address these problems and to 
change the framework of the EU financial and securities regulation.233Today the EU is 
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becoming the ‘monopoly supplier of financial market regulation’,234 creating a regulatory 
level playing field among EU Member States and enabling market integration. 
Therefore, in addition to the importance of securities regulation as means to 
address the market failures discussed in this chapter, there is also a more important 
objective, at least under the EU logic, which is the creation of a single market for securities 
and investment services. This is relevant because the rules on securities regulation at EU 
level have to be enacted based on this principle, due to the limitations of EU regulatory 
competence.  
6. Public Law and Private Law in Securities Disputes 
The common conceptual distinction between public law and private law is that the 
first has the goal of pursuing collective goals, while the second serves as a regulatory 
background for private transactions to take place.235 Even though conceptually this is a 
clear-cut distinction, in practice the relationship between these two legal domains is much 
more intertwined.  
The reality is that not only can private law be shaped by public law, but that public 
law may also need to rely on private law to achieve its goals.236 This is especially relevant 
in the field of securities regulation where many of the regulatory standards enshrined in 
what would be considered within the domain of public law, e.g. standards used for 
supervision duties, create expectations for the parties engaging in private transactions, 
and in many instances actually serve as the basis for private law redress. 
Private standards can be the basis for the creation of public standards, which in 
turn can be used to create duties within private law. An interesting example of this 
public/private relationship in the field of investments is the duty to one’s client when 
providing investment advice. The duty started as a purely private law standard in the 
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Bond case in Germany, being transposed to the public law realm with its inclusion in 
MIFID, 237  an instrument used for supervision standards. 238  The journey back to the 
private law realm is evident when the national instruments transposing MIFID are used 
as a basis for liability in a private relationship,239 as is allowed in many jurisdictions, 
either directly or indirectly.240 
Within the EU context, this relationship is an important one since differences in 
the interaction between public law and private law may create wholly different private 
law regimes, despite the harmonized supervisory approach; this might create difficulties 
for the single market due to the divergent private law standards being applied in different 
Member States.  
7. Institutional Aspects of Securities Regulation: The Importance 
of Private Enforcement 
Assuming the premise that regulation is beneficial, as demonstrated throughout 
this chapter, a whole new set of questions becomes relevant. The design of the regulatory 
regime has to take into account many different aspects. What is the regulatory body in 
charge of the regime? What are its powers? How will the people in charge of the regime 
be hired? Who will finance it? How will the rules be developed? What might be the 
punishment for non-compliance? Who will enforce this punishment?  
These questions are a small sample of the wider considerations that should be 
engaged while deciding on the main dimensions of a regulatory system. The two spheres 
of regulation are the public, where the government designs and deploys a regulatory 
system, and the private, where private parties create a regulatory system to provide for 
their own needs. In many instances, these two different spheres become intertwined, each 
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in charge of specific functions of the regulatory system. 241  The moment where this 
interplay occurs is at the norm-setting stage and at the enforcement stage. Both public 
and private actors might set the standards and both might also enforce rules made by 
themselves or by other actors. The division of power between public and private, however, 
is of extreme importance to align the interests of the different parties in a manner to 
ensure that the regime will achieve optimal efficiency in respect of its proposed goals. 
Badly designed regulatory systems may fail, leading to unnecessary costs.242 
The objectives of this section are firstly, to set out the basic general framework of 
the regulatory regime in securities regulation and then to establish the importance of 
private enforcement in satisfying the policy objectives of investor protection and strong 
markets.   
A. The Regulatory Regime – Institutional Aspects 
The design of a regulatory regime can be divided in three different parts: the first 
is the determination of who should be empowered to create the rules of the regime; the 
second is the rules with which compliance should be required, that is, what the regime 
expects the regulatees to do; finally, it must be determined how these rules will be 
enforced to guarantee that the right incentives are in place so that the regulatees comply 
with the rules. In respect of the enforcement aspect, the system can be further subdivided 
into ex ante and ex post mechanisms.243 Ex ante mechanisms are those where compliance 
with the rules are checked before a harm arises,244 while ex post mechanisms are those 
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that can be deployed after the harm took place. 245  Since a regulatory regime will be 
embedded in a given social reality, the surrounding environment must be analyzed so that 
the best design may be drafted. In other words, the regulatory process has to take into 
account the institutional background available to assess the possible success of a 
regulatory scheme.246 
When designing regulatory systems it is necessary to identify at each stage of the 
process the potential regulators, regulatees, adressees and enforcers of the rules. Rule-
making may be seen as illegitimate if it is done by private actors,247 but on other occasions, 
the involvement of private actors might be the only solution for a specific problem, even 
if in the public interest.248 
The same is true for regulatory enforcement. If compliance control will be made 
before an action is taken, such as before the authorization of the issuance of a security, 
the regulators should guarantee that institutions overseeing the process have the 
necessary skills to do so, otherwise the regulatory scheme may overburden the economy 
with unnecessary costs and difficulty in compliance. 249  On the other hand, if the 
enforcement mechanisms are engaged ex post, for example through lawsuits, it is 
important to survey the environment to see if the decision makers are independent and 
if claimants will have sufficient incentives to pursue their claims.  
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B. The mix of regulatory mechanisms in securities regulation 
The regulatory system for securities is a diverse mix of the public and private 
sphere, tending more to the public side. Usually the rules of the game are set by 
government agencies created specifically for the task of regulating and supervising 
securities markets; with the rule-making power they also receive extensive enforcement 
powers.250  
Within their supervisory domain, they may also delegate some of their functions 
to private institutions. For example, rule-making authority regarding accounting 
standards - the language of financial disclosure - has been long delegated by the SEC in 
the United States to private standard setting bodies.251  
At the same time, private regulatory entities are allowed to co-exist with securities 
and exchange commissions, playing an important role in drafting and applying rules that 
are in compliance with the objectives of the underlying regulatory regime. 252  In the 
securities markets, two important examples are the organized markets, such as the NYSE 
and Bovespa, and private regulatory authorities, such as FINRA. Organized exchanges 
require compliance with rules of disclosure and corporate governance to admit 
companies to list, while private regulatory authorities regulate the behavior of the 
members of the profession, such as brokers and dealers, through delegated government 
power. 
These private entities also have their own enforcement mechanisms; they can 
deny access to the regime, which in most cases means denial of market access, and they 
can also apply various penalties. There is a caveat though: these regulators can only 
                                                      
250 The penalties range from imposing fines to the prohibition of exercising specific functions that may fall 
within the supervision of the agency.  
251 For an overview of the development of the accounting profession in the United States, see Stephen A. Zeff, 
‘How the U.S. Accounting Profession got Where it is Today: Part I’ (2003) 17 Accounting Horizons 189-205 
Stephen A. Zeff, ‘How the U.S. Accounting Profession got Where it is Today: Part II’ (2003) 17 Accounting 
Horizons 267-86. 
252 This type of a two-tiered regulatory structured, where the government oversees a private regulatory 
body, is known as meta-regulation. Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-
Regulation’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 147-51. 
 68 
enforce rules in respect of their members because their authority arises out of the 
membership of the regulatee in the regulatory scheme.  
The last set of enforcement mechanisms is more direct. The investor that is 
harmed due to a breach of a rule in the regime may start legal proceedings to obtain 
redress, as long as there are mechanisms available. These proceedings can either be 
judicial, in a court of law, or be initiated through other means, such as arbitration; this 
depends on the contractual or corporate scheme governing the relationship. The next 
section shows why private enforcement is important to achieve the goals of securities 
regulation.   
C. The Importance of Private Enforcement in Securities Regulation 
As mentioned above, the mere presence of substantive rules is not sufficient for 
them to accrue any value, since a proper system of enforcement is necessary for well-
designed black-letter law to be deployed. 253  The architecture of the enforcement 
mechanisms of a given regime is a policy-choice that has to be made. To this extent, both 
the public and private enforcement of securities regulation play an important role in the 
securities regulation system.254 
In the securities context, public enforcers are government agencies that are 
established with clear objectives to promote market efficiency and investor protection 
and are given the power to advert, fine or even suspend market actors from engaging in 
their professional roles as they relate to securities transactions. In some specific systems, 
they are given the power to sue in court, shifting the decision-making process of the 
enforcement mechanisms to an impartial judge. Private enforcers are the persons that 
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have been defrauded or otherwise have a claim against an issuer or a financial 
intermediary in respect of a harm inflicted upon them while transacting securities, and 
who can decide, given the incentives for the dispute resolution system, to sue, with the 
option also of submitting their claim to an independent third party.   
Both kinds of enforcement constitute parts of a regulatory system that tries to 
achieve market efficiency in capital markets and to create a just environment for trading. 
In addition to the economic aspects that securities regulation and its enforcement may 
bring, there is also another aspect that must be considered when securities regulation is 
discussed, which is investor protection.  
The basic differences between public and private enforcement can be summarized 
along the following lines: 255  while public enforcers obtain a salary to perform their 
duties, 256  private enforcers are remunerated either for the specific task at hand or 
through the spoils of their efforts. 257  Another consideration relates to the goals of 
enforcement: public seeks deterrence; while private aims at compensation.258 This is a 
simplified portrayal of the matter, as there are, for example, public enforcers that receive 
remuneration for their efforts259 and private enforcers that work for the public good, not 
expecting an economic advantage from their work;260 notwtstanding, this distinction is 
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the basic starting point from which the ‘pure’ public and private types of enforcement 
differ.  
As the state is the source of authority for legal rules, enforcement is in its own 
interest since noncompliance would be considered a failure of the legal system, and 
consequently of the state itself. This is especially important in areas where the legal rules 
purport to regulate behavior in the public interest; these are often the types of rules that 
need justification, as explained in chapter 2. 261  Public enforcement however is not 
without its shortcomings. At the outset, the creation and maintenance of an enforcement 
machine requires the expenditure of a substantial amount of resources, which could be 
used in more productive governmental activities. Then there are the problems to which 
the public enforcement machine is subject, creating the possibility of inadequate 
enforcement: on one hand, bribes, 262  political influence, 263  capture, 264  the individual 
interest of the enforcer in moving to the private sector,265 shirking266 and on the other, 
overreaction due to scandals267. 
                                                      
261 See Chapter II, Section 3.B. 
262 There are three important aspects to the mechanics of a bribe: 1) honesty: a person who is subject to a 
fine is willing to pay the enforcer a sum up to the value of that fine to forego enforcement. The enforcer, 
acting in his self-interest, may accept the bribe if the perceived profit from it is higher than the perceived 
cost of the action; 2) structure of incentives: both enforcers gain in enforcing law and violators gain in 
violating the law, but the variation in the gain of violators is higher than the gain of enforcers, consequently 
giving such violators more resources than enforcers, giving them more power to bribe; 3) temporal pattern 
of violations: repetitive violation is more likely to create situations where the enforcer can be bribed. See 
Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’ (1974) 
3 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 3-5.   
263 (‘Politicians may undermine enforcement efforts by replacing key personnel or cutting budgets, and 
limited resources may prevent public enforcers from uncovering and pursuing violations’) Lemos and 
Minzner 859 (n 255). 
264 For a general overview of the literature, see Ernesto Dal Bó, ‘Regulatory Capture: a review’ (2006) 22 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 203; Rachel E. Barkow, ‘Insulating Agencies: avoiding capture through 
institutional desing’ (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 15. 
265 This is known as the revolving door phenomenon, where the individual is interested in being part of the 
public enforcement agency only to gain expertise to move to the private industry later on. See Revolving 
Door Working Group, A Matter of Trust: how the revolving door undermines public confidence in government 
- and what to do about it (2005). 
266 On the question of individual incentives for public employees, see  Lemos and Minzner 886-95 (n 255). 
267 See A. C. Pritchard, ‘The SEC at 70: time for retirement? ’ (2005) 80 Notre Dame Law Review 1073, 1078-
83. 
 71 
Private enforcement, on the other hand is mainly a self-interested activity;268 as 
long as the expected benefits outweigh the costs of litigation, private parties will have an 
incentive to engage in enforcement. The risk with private enforcement is over-
enforcement, which is created when the rules allow a plaintiff to recoup more from the 
procedure than the harm actually suffered;269 this is a problem that is created through 
institutionally-designed incentives and which can be controlled in the same way. 
The other problem with private enforcement, if it were to be used exclusively, is 
that enforcement will only be executed in the case that expected benefits outweigh 
litigation costs. From a social point of view, it is not always true that a lawsuit that costs 
more than the dollar amount at stake is undesirable, as it may create deterrence effects 
that are more beneficial than the amount that will be spent on it.270 
Therefore, from this initial discussion, it can be implied that private enforcement 
is more adequate when there are incentives for plaintiffs to pursue it. If this is the case, in 
situations where a private party is harmed and the conduct does not constitute something 
that should be considered a crime,271 the best approach to enforcement would be to leave 
it to private parties. This is justified due to the fact that the state would not have to invest 
in an enforcement structure for these cases, saving resources for other activities and 
avoiding the problems that are susceptible in public enforcement operations. In addition, 
private enforcers also are free from the bureaucratic structure of government, being able 
to move more quickly than the public counterpart.272 
On the other hand, public enforcement is justified in two situations: a) when, even 
though there is a social benefit in enforcing a particular rule due to its deterrence effects, 
the cost of the lawsuit for the private party is higher than its expected benefit and b) 
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where the prohibited conduct is victimless, as there will be no private party interested in 
enforcing the rules. 273 
This is a general approach that can be applicable in any area when the deterrence 
function of litigation is at stake – to minimize costs, it is interesting to design the system 
in such a way that public enforcement will be used as little as possible, allowing private 
parties to seize the enforcement function when they have the incentives to do so, leaving 
public enforcement for cases when such incentives are absent.  
The purpose of securities law is twofold: namely, efficient markets and investor 
protection,274 where the latter is also important to economic efficiency.275 Deterrence 
therefore is not the only objective, as a system needs to be in place for investors to be 
protected so that they can be compensated in case they are harmed by behavior that 
violates securities laws. 
Therefore, as securities laws have a dual purpose of deterrence and compensation, 
the claim that private enforcement should be the first step of designing an enforcement 
regime becomes even stronger; an exclusive public enforcement system for compensation 
would be at a high risk of capture by the industry, especially in financial markets where 
there often is a lot of money at stake. For proper investor protection and the creation of 
market confidence, the best approach is to allow a regime for private enforcers, where 
enforcers are more likely to have their interest aligned with those of the plaintiffs. With 
the compensation regime set, deterrence objectives should then be engaged and other 
enforcement mechanisms created to calibrate the system, as a non-calibrated 
enforcement system may lead to either under-deterrence, which may breed abuse and 
trigger many of the social costs of inefficient markets discussed above, or it may cause 
                                                      
273 See Becker and Stigler 4-5 (n 262). 
274  ‘The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation’. SEC, ‘The Investor's Advocate’ (SEC)  
<http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> accessed 11 April 2012 See also CVM, ‘The Commission’ 
(CVM)  <http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp> accessed 7 July 2014 (‘The Law that instituted the 
Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM established that it should observe the following objectives: to assure 
the proper functioning of the exchange and over-the-counter markets; to protect all securities holders 
against fraudulent issues and illegal actions …’) 
275  For an overview on the discussion of investor protection and economic efficiency, see Andromachi 
Georgosouli, ‘The Debate over the Economic Rationale for Investor Protection Regulation: a Critical 
Appraisal’ (2007) 15 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 236. 
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over-deterrence, creating other kinds of costs that are unnecessary, consequently 
undermining economic efficiency.276 
The point I make for private enforcement and investor protection is an important 
one for this thesis. Its central aspect is to create dispute resolution systems where private 
enforcement can be effectively deployed transnationally, enhancing the scope of 
protection of securities laws - be they national or foreign - to the investors who wish to 
participate in foreign markets, or in transactions with foreign securities aspects.  
8. Concluding Remarks 
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that securities regulation does have 
a role in enhancing economic efficiency in securities transactions, whether through 
diminishing transaction costs for the allocation of capital or by giving investors 
confidence that the market will not be defrauded, thus avoiding the ‘lemons problem’  
On the enforcement side, the best approach is to have a private redress system as 
a starting point, as this avoids the unnecessary costs of creating and maintaining public 
enforcers and empowers investors to act in their own self-interest, helping to build their 
confidence in the market.  
  
                                                      
276  For a general overview on the potential problems of multiple enforcers, see Amanda M. Rose, ‘The 
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: a Critical Analysis’ (2010) 158 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 2173. 
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Chapter V - The Liability Regime for 
Securities Disputes 
Legal disputes arise out of the breach of a right. Recovery is only possible if a party 
that owes a legal obligation to another fails to comply with this obligation. Rules on 
liability establish the standard that should be complied with and are an essential part of 
any legal framework that purports to regulate conduct, guarantee rights and fix market 
failures. It is composed both by the basis used by plaintiffs to present their argument to a 
court as well as the defenses available to defendants to avoid the payment of damages.  
Securities transactions are executed in a fairly similar fashion across different 
jurisdictions; yet depending on the legal relationship that is at stake, the standards of 
conduct may differ, as might the liability regime available. Much of the design of a liability 
system for transactions with securities depends on the characteristics chosen to define 
the concept, yet there is no universal definition of what a security is, even though the 
concept is similar in every jurisdiction. The exact legal contours of the definition are, of 
course, set out within each different legal system. The American definition is quite broad, 
ranging from the more commonly known legal category of a company’s share to the more 
complicated investment contract, encompassing all sorts of derivatives in between.277 
Securities law is applicable if there is a transaction involving a security where there are 
no exemptions either to the security being transacted or to the transaction itself.  
The backbone of securities law and the liability regimes involved at every step of 
securities transactions are based on regulating information asymmetry and diminishing 
                                                      
277 The exact language is: ‘the term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, 
or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or 
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, 
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.’ Securities Act of 1933 s 2(a)(1). Security-based swap 
agreements do not fall within the definition of a ‘security’. Securities Act of 1933 s 2A. 
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the costs thereof, from the issuance of shares to the certification of financial statements 
by auditors. 
The objective of this chapter is to identify and classify the types of disputes arising 
out of securities transactions and to demonstrate, through a brief analysis, that the 
standards of conduct in different jurisdictions may differ depending on the type of dispute 
that is at stake and on the relevant liability regime. Moreover, the identification of the 
different types of disputes is relevant because the available dispute resolution 
mechanisms are closely related to the specific category of dispute.  
Therefore, the main question to be answered in this chapter is ‘what are the types 
of disputes arising out of securities transactions?’ To do so, this chapter explains (1) the 
securities commercialization process and its relationship to the disputes; identifies (2) 
the legal framework for securities liability on disclosure; (3) the legal framework for 
financial intermediaries on securities transactions; (4) the legal framework for 
informational gatekeepers and (5) analyses the specific aspects of each type of dispute.   
1. Transacting Securities and Disputes 
To understand securities disputes, it is important to firstly understand the 
securities issuance process and the role that each actor plays in it. The basis for securities 
liability is the placement of securities in the market and the ongoing regulatory disclosure 
duties after securities are placed and remain in commerce, and the commercialization 
efforts by intermediaries.  
A. Issuing Securities 
Securities are issued and placed in the ‘primary market’ and traded in the 
‘secondary market’. There are many reasons for issuing securities, but the main one is to 
raise capital in order to finance a business. There is a great deal of effort to market the 
securities, find buyers and price them before the initial offering. This is a role that is 
assigned to an underwriter, that is, a financial services provider that helps the issuer with 
the placement of securities in the market. There are two ways in which the underwriter 
performs this function: the firm commitment and the ‘best efforts’ method. In the first 
case, the underwriter assumes the risk of the issuance by committing to buy a percentage 
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of the shares issued at an agreed price, while in the second, the risk does not shift and the 
underwriter maintains the right to return any unsold shares. 
Before the securities are put on the market, it is common for the regulatory agency 
of the country in which the securities will be issued or the law itself, to require audited 
financial statements from the issuer. 278  These statements are signed by the relevant 
issuer’s officers and then certified by auditors, who are accountants that are members of 
a regulatory body that authorizes them to perform audits.279  
Another requirement is the filing of a registration statement and the distribution 
of prospectuses before the securities are placed in the market. These documents have to 
contain all the relevant information about the issuance and the company to allow 
investors to make informed decisions. The responsibility for the information’s veracity 
falls both with the issuer and the underwriter. Credit rating agencies also play a role by 
evaluating the risk of a given security. 
Finally, after the legal requirements have been complied with, the underwriter can 
place the securities in the market, which can be done either through qualified investors 
or via the general public.280 There are direct selling efforts made by banks and securities 
brokers; they can also incur liability depending on the information they provide to their 
customers.  
After the securities are placed, they can be traded openly through exchanges or on 
the over-the-counter markets. When the securities are traded on public markets, ongoing 
disclosures about the securities and the financial health of the company that has issued 
them are often required; this is a duty that falls on the issuer. At the same time, auditing 
firms certify financial statements and CRAs continue to evaluate the riskiness of certain 
securities and/or the companies issuing them.  
                                                      
278 E.g. Financial Audit Law Recast (Spain), first additional disposition.  
279 E.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, s 102.  
280 The legal requirements vary depending on which process is chosen.  
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The commercialization of securities is made through financial intermediaries, 
banks, brokers and dealers, who engage in contractual relationships with investors to sell 
the securities and to provide financial services in relation to them. 
 
Figure 1: Issuance Process 
B. Types of Disputes  
From this account of how securities are issued and traded, it is possible to identify 
three main categories of disputes arising out of securities transactions, which are 
dependent on the relationship that the investor has with the party from whom recovery 
is sought.  
Some legal relationships are clear; the investor who buys securities through a 
financial intermediary has a contract with him, creating a direct relationship between the 
parties. Other relationships are not so clear; this includes the investor who relied on a 
credit rating agency’s rating to buy securities.  
In any event, disputes arising out of securities transactions can be grouped into 
three categories: issuer - investor, financial intermediary – investor and informational 
intermediary – investor. While each type of dispute is not exclusive for each particular 
basis of liability, for example, financial intermediaries may fall within both disclosure 
liability as well as contractual liability, this categorization of disputes is helpful in order 
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to analyze the dispute resolution systems available to each of them, as the duties on 
different regulatory systems are usually divided in this manner.   
C. Transacting Transnationally 
a. General 
To establish the transnational character of securities transactions, it is necessary 
to start with the understanding that markets are, at least legally, tied to certain national 
regulatory schemes. There is no such thing as a global market in the legal world; what 
exist are local markets regulated by specific jurisdictions.  
A Brazilian company that wishes to raise money in the United States has to register 
its securities with the SEC and place them through financial intermediaries that are 
registered to do business in the United States. Selling efforts made to the U.S. market 
through a Brazilian financial intermediary without registration would be illegal under U.S. 
Law; the same is true the other way around.281  
There are two consequences of this situation: firstly, legal access to a market 
requires registration and compliance with local market rules, both regarding securities 
and financial intermediaries. Secondly, disputes with financial intermediaries, when the 
relationship has been started at the initiative of the financial intermediary, will be 
national since the financial intermediary will usually be required to have a local 
presence.282  
Even though the relationship between financial intermediaries and investors will 
be mainly national, a legal transnational transaction with a financial intermediary is also 
possible when the investor is the one going after a foreign financial intermediary to obtain 
access to different markets.283  
                                                      
281 Transactions regarding the general public. See Securities Act of 1933, s 5; Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, s 15(a)(1); Investment Advisers Act 1940, s 203(a); Law 6.385/76 (Brazil), art. 16. 
282 This affirmation does not apply to the EU area due to the passport scheme that exists there.  
283 For example, Charles Schwab has a service for international investors to open a brokerage account in the 
U.S. and invest directly in the U.S. Markets. See Charles Schwab, ‘Open an Account’   
<http://international.schwab.com/public/international/nn/open_an_account?country=BR.> accessed 7 
July 2014.  
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The securities on the other hand, while they have to be registered nationally, do 
not have to be from a company incorporated nationally. National Depositary shares, such 
as American Depositary Shares or Brazilian Depositary Shares are a common occurrence, 
as are cross-listed companies. The transnational aspect and the problems arising from it 
become evident; while the company issuing securities is being regulated in a given 
jurisdiction, its assets can only be found in another. As such, it may be difficult for the 
investor to solve a dispute effectively with a company if an event creating liability occurs 
due to the lack of effective transnational dispute resolution mechanisms.  
In these cases, credit rating agencies and auditor liability may also present the 
same type of problem; for example, in case an American investor relies on a rating issued 
by a Brazilian CRA of a Brazilian company that has its shares traded on a U.S. stock 
exchange. Absent an effective dispute resolution system, the CRA becomes immune 
towards foreign investors.284 
Therefore, despite the national character of securities regulation, these examples 
show that there are situations in which transnational disputes on securities transactions 
may occur.  
b. EU 
The European landscape of transnational securities is slightly different from the 
one presented above. The European Union has a passport mechanism,285 both regarding 
prospectuses and financial intermediaries, which make transnational securities 
transactions easier. Regarding the prospectus, its approval is required by only one of the 
Member States, being automatically valid within all other Member States. It is only 
required that the competent authority of the host Member State is notified.286 Financial 
                                                      
284 They might be immune as a matter of law and have no, or at least, a very low level of liability, in certain 
jurisdictions. For a comparative perspective of Credit Rating Agencies liability in different jurisdictions, see 
Alessandro Scarso, ‘The Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in a Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 4 Journal 
of European Tort Law 163. 
285 The passport mechanism is based on the mutual recognition principle established in the Cassis de Dijon 
judgment (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649), which comprises the mechanism of the single passport and home state supervision. See  
Hallgrímur Ásgeirsson, ‘Integration of European Securities Markets’ [2004] 2004 Monetary Bulletin - The 
Central Bank of Iceland 50, 51. 
286 Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 17. 
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intermediaries, when authorized in their home Member State, can provided services, as 
long as they fall within the scope of the services that they have been authorized to provide 
in their home state, within other Member States either directly, by using tied agents or by 
establishing a branch. 287 
This mechanism is based on the more general goal of the EU, that is the 
construction of an internal market,288 which for the purposes of this discussion is strongly 
tied to the right of establishment, 289  the freedom to provide services 290  and the free 
movement of capital.291Such passport regime increases the likelihood of transnational 
securities transactions as it relieves the burden of registration in every single jurisdiction, 
whether for the securities or for the financial intermediary, decreasing the costs of foreign 
market operation and capital-raising.  
The next sections will loosely follow the distinction among the types of disputes. 
The first section will address issuer liability, which is mainly related to disclosure liability, 
even though the standards that are articulated may also be applicable to the other players 
who provide information. The following two sections analyze the financial intermediaries 
dispute, where there is a contractual relationship between the parties, and the 
informational gatekeeper dispute, in respect of which liability is based mainly on a tort or 
securities regulation related standard, where there are no direct links between the 
investor and the informational gatekeeper. 
2. Legal Framework for Securities Liability – Issuers  
As the basis of securities regulation is information asymmetry, the main duty that 
persons involved with the issuance and distribution of securities have is the duty of 
information disclosure. Securities regulation imposes duties of information, both at the 
issuance stage of the process as well as at periodic stages thereafter, that is, information 
                                                      
287 Directive 2004/39/EC, arts. 31 and 32. 
288 TEU, art. 3(3) and TFEU, art. 26.  
289 TFEU, art. 49. 
290 TFEU, art. 56. 
291 TFEU, art. 63(1). 
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on the health of the company whose securities are being traded on the market. The breach 
of these duties creates a right for the person who has been harmed by false or misleading 
information or by an omission made by those obliged to provide such information.  
The breadth of this private right of action and the extent to which it can be effective 
for investors to recover is dependent not only on the substantive rules of conduct, but also 
on the procedural requirements that have to be met for a claim to prevail. While the 
purpose of this section is mainly to identify the standards of conduct of the jurisdictions 
under study, some of the procedural developments, especially in the United States system 
for securities disputes, must be considered because they have evolved together with the 
substantive reforms on the securities regulation system and are an essential part of the 
liability regime. 
A. The United States  
Securities regulation at the federal level in the U.S. appeared in a moment where 
there was great concern and frustration with the economic depression, just after the 1929 
crash.292 The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to avoid the ‘caveat emptor’ logic for 
selling securities by imposing extensive duties of truthfulness on issuers and on persons 
related to the issuance of securities, while the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
focused on the regulation of speculative trading.293 
Contrary to the civil law countries under analysis, the liability regime from 
securities transactions in the U.S. is heavily informed by the provisions of its securities 
laws.294 Most of the securities claims arise under the concept of misrepresentation and 
securities fraud, mainly under Rule 10b-5.295 In 2013 84% of class action lawsuits in 
securities litigation presented a Rule 10b-5 claim.296  
                                                      
292 Burk 1012 (n 112).  
293 Ibid 1012-13. 
294  Even though securities regulation standards also play a role in liability in civil law countries, the 
backbone of private enforcement relies more on general contractual and tort standards. 
295 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
296 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings - 2013 in Review (2013). 
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Two other important causes of action for private securities litigation in the United 
States, but not as nearly relevant as the 10b-5 claims, are Section 11 and Section 12 of the 
Securities Act of 1933. Section 11 claims were present in 9% of the filings in 2011, while 
the 12(2) variety of Section 12 was present in only 7%.297 
a. The Securities Act of 1933 
The Securities Act of 1933 § 11 Standard 
A security, unless exempted under Section 3(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a), 
must be registered with the SEC. A transaction of, or an attempt to transact, an 
unregistered security is expressly prohibited by Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
unless the transaction itself is also exempted by Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933.298  
The information that is required in a registration statement is extensive, including 
a business description, an outline of property owned, a description of the material legal 
proceedings that the company is facing, financial information, and management structure, 
amongst other information. 299  If, by its effective date, 300  any information in the 
registration statement is untrue regarding a material fact or if it is misleading by omission, 
the buyer of the security has a private right to sue under Section 11 of the Securities Act 
of 1933.301 In general, proving reliance on the statement is not necessary, it being only 
necessary that the plaintiff proves the existence of the falsity or of the omission made.302 
                                                      
297 Ibid . 
298 See also Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2013), Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144a (2013), Regulation D 
(Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 
1933), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 – 230.506 (2013) and Regulation S (Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made 
Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.905 (2013). 
299 See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2013). 
300 The effective date of a registration statement is deemed to be 20 days after it is filed and has to be 
calculated according to 17 C.F.R. § 230.459 (2013). 
301 For the materiality requirement to be fulfilled, it is necessary that ‘there must be a substantial likelihood 
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.’ Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-
232 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
302 Reliance is presumed under this Section if the purchase is made before the first 12-month earnings 
report covering a period of 12 months after the registration’s effective date (Securities Act of 1933 s 11(a)). 
See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)(‘if a plaintiff purchased a security 
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One caveat is that if the pleading is ‘sound in fraud’, it has to satisfy the heightened 
pleading standard of Section 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the 
party to plead with particularity the circumstances consisting of fraud or mistake.303 
This is a cause of action linked with the issuance of securities, and it creates a 
limited class of possible plaintiffs; only those who made the purchase of a primary offering 
are allowed to sue under Section 11(a).304 
The statute is generous in lining up defendants: the issuer, everyone who signed 
the registration statement, directors at the time of the filing, persons responsible for 
certifying statements in the filing and the underwriters can all be sued. 305  With the 
exception of outside directors, who are proportionally liable to their statements,306 all 
defendants are jointly and severally liable.307 
While the statute allows for various different defendants, it also provides them 
with various defenses. The first one is knowledge of the untrue or misleading statement 
by the plaintiff. If the defendant proves that the plaintiff knew that the statement was 
untrue or misleading, no liability can attach.308 
The second defense is resignation. Non-issuers are not liable under Section 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933 if, before the effective date of the part of the registration 
statement in which they are supposedly liable, they had resigned from office or had taken 
steps to do so and had also advised the Commission and the issuer that they would not be 
responsible for that part of the statement.309 
                                                      
issued pursuant to a registration statement, he need only show a material misstatement or omission to 
establish his prima facie case’).  
303 See also Todd R. David, Jessica P. Corley and Ambreen A. Delawalla, ‘Heightened Pleading Requirements, 
Due Diligence, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Truth-on-the-Market - Available Defenses to Claims under 
Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933’ (2009) 11 Transactions Tennessee Journal of Business Law 
53, 61-63. 
304 See APA Excelsior III L.P v. Premiere Technologies Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) . 
305 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(a)(1)-(a)(5). 
306 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(f)(2); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(f). 
307 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(f)(1). 
308 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(a). 
309 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(b)(1). 
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The third defense is a lack of knowledge regarding the part of the registration 
statement to which the person is liable coupled with the person’s resignation. If the 
registration statement becomes effective, liability can only be avoided if, by discovering 
the statement (or lack thereof), the person advises the SEC and the issuer and take the 
steps to resign, while also giving public notice that the statement became effective without 
his knowledge.310  
The last defense that is clearly provided for in the statute is reasonable belief. The 
defendant has to prove that, after a reasonable investigation, there were reasonable 
grounds to believe, and the defendant in fact believed, that the statements were true and 
not misleading, or in case of an expert, that his opinion in the statement was not fairly 
represented.311  
Besides these statutory defenses, there are also other important defenses created 
in the judicial context. Among them are the impossibility of reliance and the lack of loss 
causation. Reliance on the registration statement, for the purposes of a plaintiff’s claim in 
a class action, is presumed. If, from the facts, it is clear that plaintiffs could not have relied 
on the statements because they had committed themselves to the transaction before the 
filing of the registration statement, liability does not arise.312 The other defense comes 
from the logical link between the misleading or false statement and the harm suffered. If 
the defendants prove that there was no loss causation, liability does not attach.313 
Damages under this cause of action are the price paid for the security minus (a) its 
value at the time of the suit; (b) the price for which the securities were sold before the 
suit; or (c) the price for which it should have been disposed after the suit but before 
judgment, but only if such damages are less than the difference of the price paid for the 
                                                      
310 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(b)(2). 
311 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(b)(3). 
312 See APA Excelsior III L.P. v Premiere Technologies Inc. (n 304) 1277 (‘In sum, we hold that the Section 
11 presumption of reliance does not apply in the limited and narrow situation where sophisticated 
investors participating in an arms-length corporate merger make a legally binding investment commitment 
months before the filing of a defective registration statement’). For an extensive review on the recent 
judicial developments on Section 11, see Marc Steinberg and Brent Kirby, ‘The Assault on Section 11 of the 
Securities Act: a Study in Judicial Activism’ (2010) 63 Rutgers Law Review 1. 
313 See In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities Litigation 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
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securities (in which case it shall not be in excess of the price offered to the public) and 
their price at the time of the suit.314 
In sum, Section 11 of the Securities Act is a straightforward provision: if there is a 
registration statement with false or misleading information when shares are sold to the 
public and there is a subsequent price drop, any buyer of securities to whom the 
statement refers may recover the price difference only by proving that the statements 
were false or that there was a misleading omission contained within it.  
SA Section 12 
Section 12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides grounds for recovery in two 
different situations. The first is for any offering or selling of securities that is made without 
a registered statement315 while the second is for the offering or selling of securities, by 
means of prospectus or oral communications, that contains an untrue statement of 
material fact or are otherwise misleading.316  
In respect of the identification of the defendants that the plaintiff can bring to court, 
the language in Section 12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 is more restrictive than Section 
11: the opening of these two subsections state ‘offers or sells’ and further down also make 
clear that the defendant ‘shall be liable […] to the person purchasing such security from 
him’.317 The language of the statute defines ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ to include ‘every contract of sale 
or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value’ and ‘offer’ as ‘every attempt 
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy’.318 A strict reading of the statute 
would lead to the conclusion that only direct sellers would be liable for a violation of § 12, 
but the Supreme Court has already decided that those who engage in solicitation may also 
                                                      
314 Securities Act of 1933, s 11(e). 
315 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(a)(1). 
316 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(a)(2). 
317 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(a). See also Pinter v. Dahl 486 U.S. 622, 641-647 (1988).  
318 Securities Act of 1933, s 2(a)(3). 
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be sued under this section, as long as a sale has taken place.319 For Section 12(a)(2), the 
SEC has enacted a rule providing that only issuers can be deemed to be sellers.320 
Some of the defenses are also similar. Knowledge by the plaintiff of the untrue 
statement or omission or the existence of a reasonable belief that the information was 
true and not misleading, if proved by the defendants, will exempt them from liability.321 
The remedy in this section is either rescission of the transaction in case the 
plaintiff still has the securities, with payment of interest minus any dividends received, or, 
in case the securities have been sold, damages.322 Similarly as per § 11, in respect of the 
cause of action regarding untrue and misleading statements, if the defendant proves that 
the losses were not due to the statements, damages are not recoverable.323 
b. Claims under the Securities and Exchange act of 1934 
The backbone of securities fraud liability in the United States is Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange… to use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities based swap 
agreement, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe…324 
                                                      
319 Pinter v. Dahl, (n 317) 643 (‘the inclusion of the phrase “solicitation of an offer to buy” within the 
definition of “offer” brings an individual who engages in solicitation, an activity not inherently confined to 
the actual owner, within the scope of §12’); ibid 644 (‘The purchase requirement clearly confines §12 
liability to those situations in which a sale has taken place… The requirement, however, does not exclude 
solicitation from the category of activities that may render a person liable’).  
320 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2013). 
321 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(a)(2). 
322 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(a)(2). 
323 Securities Act of 1933, s 12(b). 
324 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s 10. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975) and Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1952). 
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Under this Section, the SEC prescribed Rule 10b-5, which establishes the 
prerequisites of forbidden behavior regarding securities transactions subject to U.S. law. 
The Rule prohibits the employment of devices, schemes or artifices to defraud, the making 
of untrue statements or omissions of material facts that are misleading and the 
engagement in business that would operate as fraud, if such conduct is made in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Even though the rule is also known as 
the securities fraud rule, it covers both fraudulent and non-fraudulent behavior. 325  
The framework of Rule 10b-5 for private actions is based not only on statutory 
grounds. Most of its contours were judicially established, as expressed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s famous statement that Rule 10b-5 is ‘a judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn’.326 The private right of action itself is nowhere to be 
found in the legislative text, there being an ‘implied’ right that emerged from judicial 
decisions.327 
The recognition of the rights under Rule 10b-5 and its scope has gone through an 
initial growth followed by a subsequent narrowing both through the development of 
jurisprudence328 and the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.329 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was enacted in the end of 1995 due to 
concerns about meritless and abusive suits.330 It was a statute intended to lower capital 
costs without destroying the incentives for meritorious lawsuits.331 The relevant changes 
                                                      
325 Fraud is ‘a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another 
to act to his or her detriment’. Fraud definition in Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing 
Co. 2009). For an overview of the concept of fraud in securities regulation, see Samuel Buell, ‘What is 
Securities Fraud? ’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal 511. 
326 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores (n 324) 737. 
327 The first court to recognize this right of action was the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania in 1946, see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (D.C. Pa. 1946). The US Supreme 
Court only dealt with the issue in 1971, in Superintendent of Insurance of State of New York v. Bankers Life 
and Casualty Co, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
328 As an example, see Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 511 U.S. 164 
(1994) (finding that there are no private right of action against aiders and abettors of violators of Rule 10b-
5).  
329 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  
330 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
331 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995). 
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for the purposes of this chapter were the safe-harbor for forward-looking statements, the 
heightened pleading standards and the change from joint and several to proportionate 
liability for some actors.  
The forward-looking statement’s safe-harbor diminished the range of application 
of Rule 10b-5. Its objective was to ‘encourage issuers to disseminate relevant information 
to the market without fear of open-ended liability’.332 The safe-harbor is applicable to 
issuers, their representatives and underwriters333 regarding forward-looking statements 
that are identified as such or are immaterial.334 Even if the forward-looking statement is 
not identified as such and is material, the plaintiff still has to prove actual knowledge if a 
natural person made the statement, and if it was made by a business entity, that the 
statement was approved by an executive officer that had actual knowledge of the 
misleading or false information.335 Before, forward-looking statements would fall within 
the same category of other general statements, and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act made it harder for a plaintiff to prevail on a suit based on misleading forward-
looking statements.336  
 Regarding the heightened pleading standard, the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act instituted a change, imposing a requirement that, in actions made under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 alleging an untrue statement of material fact or the 
omission of information that would make a statement misleading, the plaintiff must 
specify each alleged statement and the reason why they are deemed to be misleading.337 
In respect of each of these statements or omissions attributed to the defendant, the 
plaintiff must also state ‘with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference338 that 
                                                      
332 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
333 Securities Act of 1933 s 27A(a) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21E(a). 
334 Securities Act of 1933 s 27A(c) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21E(c). 
335 Ibid.  
336 For an analysis of problems that may arise when forward-looking statements are mixed with general 
statements about the business, see Wendy Gerwick Couture, ‘Mixed Statements: the Safe Harbor's Rocky 
Shore’ (2011) 39 Securities Regulation Law Journal 257. 
337 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(b)(1). 
338 The strong inference requirement was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tellabs Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (‘a complaint will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person 
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could 
draw from the facts alleged’).  
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the defendant acted with the required state of mind’, what is known as the scienter 
standard.339 It is also necessary to establish proof of loss causation.340  
Therefore, to prevail on a 10b-5 lawsuit, it is necessary for plaintiff to prove ‘(1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance; (5) economic loss and (6) loss causation.’341 If these elements are not present, 
the defendant prevails on a motion to dismiss.342 
Finally, the last modification by the PSLRA was the change from joint and several 
liability to proportionate liability.343 Joint and several liability is only available to the 
extent that the defendants knowingly committed the securities violation.344 
There were many empirical studies after the PSLRA was enacted testing its 
consequences in the securities class action environment. The statute had the effect of 
reducing both nuisance and non-nuisance litigation.345 The PSLRA had two important 
strands of impact related to litigation: firstly, smaller companies or those with a lower 
market turnover became less likely to be defendants in respect of a securities class action; 
secondly, companies engaging in fraud where there was no hard evidence before the suit 
also became less likely to be sued. The greatest impact was on suits between $2 million 
                                                      
339 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(b)(2)(A). For Credit Rating Agencies or controlling persons the 
required state of mind is a different one, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D (b)(2)(B). 
340 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(b)(4). 
341 See Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-342 (2005). 
342 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(b)(3)(A). These are requirements for pleading, and not for the 
plaintiff to obtain final judgment. If the plaintiff prevails on a motion to dismiss, it is still necessary to go to 
the end of the trial. Most lawsuits settle after this point.  
343 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(f)(2)(B). 
344 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21D(f)(2)(A). 
345 Nuisance litigation is the type of lawsuit that the plaintiffs sue, even without a proper case, to try to reach 
a settlement due to the costs of the lawsuit to defendants.  
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and $4 million dollars.346 Even though there was a reduction in nuisance suits, Professor 
Choi is skeptical that this reform was beneficial to the general welfare of investors.347 
Another important aspect in the liability design under Rule 10b-5 is the question 
of who can be a defendant in the lawsuit. The starting point is that the illegal conduct must 
be made in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.348 Buyers, sellers, brokers 
and the issuer may be defendants, but only those responsible for the statement may be 
put in this position. Aiders and abettors contributing to a statement, but who do not ‘make’ 
it, cannot be sued for a violation of Rule 10b-5.349 
On the question of damages, they are generally limited to the difference between 
the transaction price of the security and its mean trading price during the 90-day period 
starting on the day that the correct information was disseminated to the market.350 
In order to complete the overview of the liability system in securities litigation in 
the U.S., one more topic must be addressed: the fraud-on-market doctrine.  
The problem of reliance and the fraud on the market doctrine 
An important aspect of the liability regime in the United States for 10b-5 violations 
is procedural. Since the class action mechanism is constantly used in securities litigation, 
the class certification and pleading requirements play a major role in the development of 
the litigation. Most of the lawsuits settle after the motion to dismiss stage, and the ones 
that reach a verdict are minimal.351 
                                                      
346 Stephen J. Choi, ‘Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? ’ (2006) 23 
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 598, 623.  
347  Through a quick mathematical exercise, Professor Choi estimates that the benefit from eliminating 
nuisance suits during the period of the study would be around $16.2 million, while the lost deterrence 
arising out of the legislative reform was $93.9 million. Ibid . 
348 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.  
349 See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (n 328). 
350 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s 21D(e)(1). 
351 In the dataset of the Cornerstone Research for the period of 1996 to 2011, only 8% of the securities class 
actions reached a ruling on summary judgment, while the rest was either dismissed or reached a settlement 
before. Cornerstone Research, Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings - 2011 in Review (2011) 
18.  
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The Basic v Levinson352 decision brought a major change in the traditional reliance 
requirements for securities litigation in the United States. 353 Classically, to succeed in a 
claim of securities fraud, the plaintiff had to prove not only that had he known the truth, 
he would have acted differently, but also that the untruthful statement had a direct or 
proximate relation to the loss. 354  These are the transactional causation, a ‘but for’ 
argument that absent the untruthfulness plaintiff would have acted in another way, and 
the loss causation, a connection between the statement and the loss caused.355  
The fraud on the market theory 356  was developed to deal with the plaintiff’s 
reliance requirement in class actions. Requiring that every single member of a class prove 
that they relied on the allegedly false misstatement to certify the class would curb the 
possibility of the procedure since individual questions would overwhelm the common 
ones.357 
The presumption adopted was that shares traded on well-developed markets 
incorporate all available information into their securities prices, including any 
misrepresentations. 358  Therefore, by engaging in securities transactions in the 
marketplace, there is a presumption that the buyer (or seller) has relied on the integrity 
of the price to do so, and to this extent also on any material misrepresentations made 
since they are incorporated into that market price.359  
By transforming the question of reliance into a common problem, the fraud-on-
the-market theory allows for the use of the class mechanism for securities litigation. 
Under the theory, there is no requirement that the purchaser had actually relied, or even 
                                                      
352 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
353  For a discussion of the subject, see Merritt B. Fox, ‘Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market 
Actions’ (2005) 60 The Business Lawyer 507. 
354 Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). 
355 Fox 508-11 (n 353). 
356  For a historical perspective of the doctrine and a discussion about its functioning, see Donald C. 
Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market’ [2009] Wisconsin Law Review 151.  
357 Basic v Levinson (n 352).  
358 Ibid 246. 
359 Ibid.  
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read, the misstatement under scrutiny. The important aspect is the presumption of 
reliance on market prices and the transfer of the misleading information to them.  
Since ‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory consists of a presumption, defendants do have 
the possibility to rebut it. As long as it is demonstrated that the misstatement did not 
travel through the mechanisms of price incorporation, liability can be avoided.360  
The doctrine has been the object of much criticism. Commentators have pointed 
that it may cause overcompensation, and to the extent that it is usually the issuer that 
pays for the outcome of these suits, it may even reduce the general welfare of investors, 
increasing social costs. 361  Despite the criticisms, the doctrine is still in use and has 
recently been confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.362 
B. European Union 
The liability regime in securities regulation in the European context has a two-
tiered framework: the first are the legal instruments of the European Union, the Treaties, 
directives and regulations, while the second is the internal legislation of the country. The 
securities markets are heavily regulated by European directives, which oblige Member 
States to implement legislation in compliance therewith, even though the liability 
provisions are left for national legislation. 
a. The European Perspective 
Disclosure in capital markets is regulated at the European level mainly through 
three different directives and their amending and implementing legislative provisions:363 
                                                      
360 (‘Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received 
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of reliance.; )Ibid 248. 
361 Paul G. Mahoney, ‘Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets’ (1992) 78 Virginia Law 
Review 623.  
362 See Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
363 Directives are binding legislative instruments that the European Union member states are obliged to 
comply with by creating internal mechanisms that reflect the provisions of the Directives.  
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the prospectus directive, 364  the transparency directive 365  and the market abuse 
directive.366 The European framework for securities regulation is structured around two 
main axes, market efficiency and the creation of a pan-European market for securities.367 
Therefore, the set of problems arising at the European level that are addressed through 
regulation go beyond those discussed above, arising within the national spheres.  
As is the case with the two other systems for civil liability discussed above, the 
provisions of these directives are designed to impose extensive disclosure duties on 
issuers, underwriters and other participants of capital markets. As a matter of EU Law, 
these directives do not have horizontal direct effect368 since they constitute obligations 
imposed on the Members States to implement measures internally.369 The details of the 
civil liability for disclosure are thus left to the Member States.370 The Prospectus Directive, 
for example, only provides that responsibility for the information should attach at least to 
the issuer (or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies), the offeror, the 
person asking for the admission to trading in a regulated market or the guarantor, as the 
case may be.371 The way in which liability should be deemed to arise and the relevant 
                                                      
364  Directive 2003/71/EC (Prospectus Directive). See also Commission Regulation (EC) 809/2004, 
Commission Regulation (EC) 211/2007, Commission Regulation (EC) 1569/2007, Directive 2010/73/EU, 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 486/2012, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 862/2012, 
Commission Delegate Regulation (EU) 759/2013, Delegated Regulation (EU) 382/2014. 
365  Directive 2004/109/EC (Transparency Directive), Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, Commission 
Regulation (EC) 1569/2007, Commission Decision 2008/961/EC, Directive 2013/50/EU.  
366 Directive 2003/6/EC (Market Abuse Directive), Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003, Commission 
Directive 2003/124/EC, Commission Directive 2003/125/EC, Commission Directive 2004/72/EC. 
367  See also Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS Directive), the European legislative instrument on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities. 
368 They have vertical direct effect if the Member State does not implement the directives in the allotted 
time. See Case C-41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1975] Ch. 358  and Case C- 148/78 Pubblico Ministerio v 
Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
369  See Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 286-93. The exception to this rule is that directives may be directly effective against 
the Member States if the Member State has not transposed a given directive into internal legislation by the 
end of the transposition period. See also Minister of the Interior v. Cohn-Bendit [1980] 1 CMLR 543. 
370 Moloney, EC Securities Regulation 164-65 (n 227).; Iris H. Y. Chiu, Regulatory convergence in EU securities 
regulation (Kluwer Law International 2008) 160-62 See also Case C-174/12 Hirmann v Immofinanz AG (ECJ 
2nd Chamber, 19 December 2013). 
371 Prospectus Directive, art 6. 
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remedies are not provided for. Yet Member States have to adapt their systems so they are 
in compliance with the general framework of the directives.372  
b. Implementation in Domestic Systems: the Case of Spain 
The law setting up the regulatory regime for securities in Spain is Law 24/1988. 
This law was created in 1988 to give coherence to the reforms that had been made in the 
Spanish securities market regulations in the years before, and in light of the possibility of 
a European capital market being established by 1992; the idea was thus to modernize and 
prepare the Spanish markets in case this came to happen.373 The law created the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores [hereinafter CNMV], 374  the agency responsible for 
regulating and supervising financial markets in Spain,375 and set out the framework for 
the duties of market participants at many different levels. 
A prospectus is required for securities that are to be admitted to trading in a 
secondary official market376 or for an initial public offering.377 The obligation of preparing 
a prospectus brings also disclosure requirements. Under Spanish law, a prospectus has to 
provide sufficient information for investors to evaluate the financial situation of the issuer 
and their future possibilities; it must be drafted in an easily readable and comprehensible 
manner.378 The responsibility for the prospectus’ information lies with the issuer, the 
offeror, the entity asking for the admission to trade in a regulated market and all of their 
managers.379 
                                                      
372 See  Niamh Moloney, How to protect investors: lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 444-47. 
373 See Law 24/1988, Introduction. 
374 Law 24/1988, art 13. 
375 The CNMV can impose normative instruments that are known as ‘Circulares’, as long as there is previous 
authorization either by a ‘Real Decreto’ or an ‘Orden del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda’. Law 24/1988, 
art 15. 
376 Law 24/1988, art 26. 
377 Law 24/1988, art 30 bis.2. 
378 Law 24/1988, art 27.1.  
379 Law 24/1988, art 28.1.  
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After the securities are issued and are trading in a regulated market, issuers have 
a duty to disclose their annual financial statements,380 which have to be audited.381 Every 
three months, issuers must also make a statement which includes information about 
significant operations in the time period and their impact on the financial situation of the 
company.382 The responsibility for the annual financial statements falls to at least the 
issuer and its officers, under the conditions that the CNMV may establish.383  
This responsibility encompasses all the damages that the owners of such securities 
may have, if the information provided does not faithfully reflect the situation of the 
issuer.384  
A similar duty of information is also imposed on financial intermediaries. They are 
obliged to give clear and non-misleading information to their clients, with extra 
obligations when these institutions provide advisory services for their clients.385 
Like the U.S. and the Brazilian system, the Spanish system also has requirements 
of disclosure for relevant information386 and explicitly puts forward a ‘disclose or abstain’ 
policy for privileged information. 387  Relevant information is deemed to be any 
information that may affect a reasonable investor in transacting with securities, 
influencing its price in the secondary market. 388  Issuers have to make this kind of 
information public, 389  unless, under their own responsibility, they believe it may 
prejudice their legitimate interests.390 
                                                      
380 In case of debt securities, the statements have to be issued every semester. Law 24/1988, art 35.2.  
381 Law 24/1988, art 35.1. 
382 Law 24/1988, art 35.3.  
383 Law 24/1988, art 35 ter.1.  
384 Law 24/1988, art 35 ter.2.  
385 Law 24/1988, art 79 bis.  
386 Law 24/1988, art 81. 
387 Law 24/1988, art 82.  
388 Law 24/1988, art 82.1. 
389 Law 24/1988, art 82.2. 
390 Law 24/1988, art 82.4. 
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Even though there is a clear liability system against issuers, there is very little 
litigation on the subject. Most of the litigation regarding financial markets is of the 
financial intermediary-investor type.  
c. Implementation in Domestic Systems: Other Jurisdictions 
Liability systems for issuers in other EU Member States vary to the extent that 
there are different legal regimes. They can be based on the country’s tort liability, on its 
contractual liability, or specifically on the liability arising out of the relevant prospectus 
and transparency regulations available. Three examples, regarding prospectus liability, 
are sufficient to illustrate the difference: namely, France, Germany and the UK. 
In France, liability is based either on the general tort regime or on the contractual 
liability regime.391 In any event, for liability to attach it must be proven that there exists 
loss or damage, fault on the part of the persons who signed the prospectus and that there 
exists a causal link with the harm suffered.392 
In Germany, the liability regime is a specific one, implemented in the German 
Securities Prospectus Act, but complemented by the application of German tort law.393 
The purchaser has to prove that the prospectus is incorrect or incomplete, that the 
securities were purchased after the prospectus was published, and that the purchase was 
made within six months after the first trading of the securities or the public offering.394 
Pre-contractual liability only arises in case the transaction is a direct one between the 
purchaser and the issuer.395 
Finally, in the UK, prospectus liability can be based on section 90 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, common law negligence or common law deceit.396 Under 
                                                      
391 ESMA, Report: Comparison of Liability Regimes in Member States in Relation to the Prospectus Directive  
(2013) Annex III 77. 
392 Ibid  Annex III 79. 
393 Ibid  Annex III 87. 
394 Ibid  Annex III 89. 
395 Ibid  Annex III 88. 
396 Ibid  Annex III 313. 
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section 90, untrue or misleading statements, or omissions that were required, constitute 
sufficient grounds for liability, with the available defense being reasonable belief or 
reliance on an expert.397 
The standards for liability of these countries, and overall in Europe, are similar,398 
but notwithstanding this similarity the actual operation of liability may differ, sometimes 
because there are additional aspects that must be proved399 or because the standard of 
proof is diverse. 400  The recoverable damages can also be different. 401  Therefore, the 
liability regime will depend on the applicable legal regime, which can differ substantially 
notwithstanding EU harmonization efforts, having the potential to create legal 
uncertainty for issuers and consequently to undermine the free movement of capital 
principle. The positive aspect of the EU framework is that despite these differences in 
liability regimes, the operation of the directives and regulations function as a convergence 
tool, continuously approximating these different legal regimes.   
C. Brazil 
Securities regulation in Brazil is also extensive. Similarly to the U.S., Brazil has an 
agency in charge of regulating the securities market. The agency is known as Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários [hereinafter CVM], created by Law 6.385/76. The CVM has the power 
to define what can be considered fraudulent and non-equitable practices in the initial 
offering or intermediation of securities.402 
Through different legal instruments, the CVM has imposed many duties to issuers 
and market participants both in the initial offering of securities as well as duties regarding 
the trading of securities in the secondary market. As the SEC, the CVM not only sets the 
                                                      
397 Ibid  Annex III 313-315. 
398 Ibid  para 41. 
399 Ibid  para 44. 
400 Ibid  para 42. 
401 Ibid  paras 48-50. 
402 Law 6.385/76, art 18, II, b). 
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rules of the game, but it also has a strong enforcement presence in securities regulation, 
having the power to bring administrative proceedings against irregularities. 
In a way that differs from the U.S. though, the regime for securities liability in 
private litigation is not based predominantly on particular provisions of securities law, 
but relies heavily on the general provisions of civil liability of the Brazilian Civil Code.403 
It is interesting to mention that the litigation of these cases in Brazil is well below the U.S 
level. To facilitate the analysis, this section is divided into the duties of market 
participants and the general liability framework under the Brazilian Civil Code. 
a. Disclosure Duties 
With its authority derived from Brazilian legislation, the CVM has issued many 
different legal rules organizing the securities market in Brazil. Within these rules, there 
are many duties imposed to market participants on their proper behavior in the market. 
Disclosure obligations are widespread, and specific obligations are dependent on what 
transactions are being made and the identification of the person committing the act.  
Different regulations are applicable, imposing different disclosure duties, 
depending on whether what is relevant is an issuance of securities or secondary market 
trading. There are basically two different Instructions404 that impose disclosure duties to 
market players.405 They are the Instruction CVM 400, regulating the issuance of securities 
to the public and Instruction CVM 358, regulating the disclosure of material information 
and insider trading.  
The first duty is the preparation of the prospectus for the issuance of securities, 
the responsibility for which falls to both the offeror406 and the lead underwriter.407 The 
                                                      
403 Law 10.406/2002. 
404 An Instruction is one of the legal mechanisms through which the CVM regulates the market.  
405 There are also other Instructions with more specific disclosure duties, but their analysis is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
406 Brazilian securities law makes a distinction between offeror and issuer, but usually these two legal 
categories are vested in the issuer. 
407 Instruction CVM 400, art 38.  
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information in the prospectus should neither omit relevant facts nor have information 
that may mislead investors.408 
While responsibility for the prospectus falls to both the offeror and the lead 
underwriter, the duty of care is distinct: the offeror is responsible for the ‘truthfulness, 
consistency, quality and sufficiency of the information’,409 while the lead underwriter is 
under a duty to exercise due care to guarantee the accuracy of the information.410 
The second duty is one of disclosure of material facts. The list of facts considered 
to be material is extensive and comprises occurrences that are likely to influence 
securities prices, the investor’s decision to buy or sell them or the investor’s decision to 
exercise any rights arising out of the above-mentioned security.411 
Within the corporate structure, the person responsible for disclosing material 
facts is the Director of Investor Relationship, but in case disclosure is not made, if other 
actors (such as controlling shareholders, directors, Management Counsel 412 members, 
Fiscal Counsel or any other technical or consulting body within the corporation that is 
created by the corporate charter) have any knowledge about it, they also become 
responsible if they do not communicate the material fact promptly to the CVM.413 The 
disclosure may be exempted after a request to the CVM if there is a belief that it may harm 
a legitimate interest of the company.414 Even though the legislation is not explicit about 
the liability of the issuer, it can be implied from the goals of the legal framework; such 
liability has already been affirmed by the Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo.415 
Compared to the United States system, the standards of conduct under the 
Brazilian system are similar: the issuer and underwriter have a duty to disclose 
                                                      
408 Instruction CVM 400, art 39.  
409 Instruction CVM 400, art 56. 
410 Instruction CVM 400, art 56 § 1. 
411 Instruction CVM 358, art 2º. 
412 This is the name of the Board of Directors in Brazil.  
413 Instruction CVM 358, art 3º §§ 1,2.  
414 Instruction CVM 358, arts 6º, 7º. 
415 See Asa Administradora de Bens v ABN Amro Bank (TJSP, 5th Private Law Chamber, Civil Appeal n. 
9247433-87.2005.8.26.000) (2011). 
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information in an initial offering while the issuer and its officers have an ongoing duty to 
disclose relevant facts to the market.  
b. The Liability Regime 
The liability regime in securities fraud and misrepresentation in Brazil arises out 
of the operation of the provisions of the Brazilian Civil Code. For liability to arise, it is 
firstly necessary to assess the existence of a legal duty that can be breached. The legal 
duties in securities matters were analyzed in the last section. 
Legal duties are always primary juridical obligations. Their breach, when 
generating harm, gives rise to liability, a secondary obligation that arises out of the 
violation of the duty.416 The relevant provision of the Brazilian Civil Code provides the 
following: ‘anyone that, by an illicit act […], causes harm to another, is obliged to repair 
the harm.’417 Illicit acts are those that violate rights and cause harm to others, whenever 
they are made by a voluntary action or omission, negligence or imprudence.418 
Therefore, from the language of the statute, not only the duty and its breach are 
necessary for liability to arise, but harm must also be suffered. A logical consequence of 
this necessity is the causality relationship between the action or the omission that violates 
a right and the harm arising out of it. Without a causal relationship, the secondary 
obligation to repair liability does not arise.  
The harm caused will constitute the measure of damages to be paid in this kind of 
lawsuit, but the problem is that the jurisprudence has not yet developed a method on how 
to measure harm arising from securities litigation. After a survey of the São Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro Tribunals’ jurisprudence repositories, the only reference regarding damages 
in this type of case was found in Asa Adminstradora de Bens v. ABN Amro Bank S.A.419 The 
case was about the non-disclosure of a contract where ABN Amro S.A. would buy shares 
                                                      
416  Carlos Roberto Gonçalves, Direito Civil Brasileiro, Volume IV: Responsabilidade Civil (Editora Saraiva 
2009).  
417 Brazilian Civil Code, art 927. 
418 Brazilian Civil Code, art 186. The specific language is: ‘anyone that, by voluntary action or omission, 
negligence or imprudence, violates a right and causes harm to other, even if exclusively moral, commits and 
illicit act’. 
419 (n 415). 
 102 
of Banco Real S.A. and assume its control. After the contract was signed, but before the 
shares were effectively traded and the control of Banco Real S.A. had changed, ABN Amro 
made tender offers and bought shares of these companies in the market. The court 
determined that the defendant should ‘indemnify the harm suffered by plaintiffs arising 
out of the sale of these shares, harm which corresponds to the difference between the 
value effectively owed and the one paid…’ 420  Then the court enrolled a specialist to 
calculate the amount of harm done.421  
In this particular case, not only was the harm not proven, but moreover there were 
no reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiffs were harmed. It is dangerous to imply 
harm from the mere lack of information disclosure, since it is not always clear, depending 
on the information that was not disclosed, if the security price would go up or down in 
case the particular information had indeed been released to the public.422 Harm therefore 
should not be assumed abstractly, implied from the mere breach of duty to inform by the 
issuer, but must be proved, even if a more lax standard of proof is used.  
This was the concern of James Siano, the dissenting Justice.423 In fact, after the 
announcement of the material fact underpinning this dispute, the share prices of the 
securities that were sold by plaintiffs actually fell,424 a situation that would leave the 
plaintiffs with fewer assets in the case that they had not sold their securities. This 
constitutes strong evidence that if there was a mispricing due to the non-disclosure of 
material information to the market, it was one that fell in favor of plaintiffs. This suggests 
the plaintiffs were not harmed and no liability should have arisen out of this breach of 
                                                      
420 Asa Adminstradora de Bens v. ABN Amro Bank S.A. (n 415) 32. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Of course there are some cases where actual harm can be implied, for example when an oil company 
hides the fact that one of its main oil platforms has exploded.  
423 See Dissenting Opinion in Asa Adminstradora de Bens v. ABN Amro Bank S.A. (n 415). 
424 According to the estimates of defendants, the share price fell from 30% to 35%, but this assertion was 
not specifically contested by plaintiffs in the lawsuit.  
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disclosure duties by Banco Real S.A., 425 at least concerning the specific plaintiffs in this 
case.426 
D. Comparing Disclosure Liability Standards 
The private liability standards among the jurisdictions under study are fairly 
similar. Issuers of securities have to be truthful and disclose material information to their 
investors; many surrounding service providers are under a duty of due diligence to assert 
that the information provided is correct. The table below is a comparative table of the 
prohibited conducts, possible defendants, defenses and damages, as established in each 
legal system:  
Liability 
Standards 
Defendants Prohibited Conduct Defenses Damages 
Country     
USA     
SA Section 
11 
issuer; signers of 
the registration 
statement; 
directors; 
certifiers; 
underwriters 
Untrue statement or 
misleading omission 
 
Resignation; 
Resignation and 
notice; plaintiff's 
knowledge of 
statement; 
reasonable belief 
in truth 
 
Price paid 
minus price 
sold at the date 
of suit (or 
before) 
 
SA Section 
12 
Seller or 
solicitor 
Sales in violation of Section 5 
or untrue and misleading 
statements in connection 
with a prospectus or oral 
communication 
Reasonable care 
(only for 12(a)(2)) 
 
Rescission 
(with interest 
minus 
dividends) or 
damages 
 
                                                      
425 Banco Real S.A., and not ABN Amro S.A., was the party that had the duty to disclose relevant information 
to the market.  
426 If the plaintiffs were the ones who bought the shares, harm would be more evident.  
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Rule 10b-5 ‘any person’ 
who makes a 
material 
misstatement 
In connection with the 
purchase or sale of any 
security: 1) employ device, 
artifice or scheme to 
defraud; 2) make an untrue 
statement or omit a material 
fact (misleading statement; 
3) engage in acts or practices 
that would operate as fraud 
or deceit. 
General defenses  
 
Out-of-pocket 
damages in 
open market 
transactions 
and rescission 
or restitution 
in  face-to-face 
transactions 
 
Brazil     
Prospectus Issuer; offeror; 
underwriter; 
officers of the 
underwriter, the 
offeror and the 
issuer 
 
Hide material facts or induce 
investors in error.  
 
General defenses  
 
Compensatory 
damages 
 
Relevant 
Information 
Issuer, 
controlling 
shareholders, 
directors, 
counsel 
members 
 
Non-disclosure of relevant 
facts 
 
Prompt 
communication to 
CVM (for personal 
liability of other 
persons when the 
Investor Relations 
Director omits 
information);  
Compensatory 
damages 
 
Spain     
Prospectus Issuer, offeror, 
person 
requesting 
admission to 
trading; 
managers and 
underwriters 
False information in the 
prospectus 
 
General defenses  
 
Compensatory 
damages 
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Relevant 
Information 
Issuer and 
managers 
Information that does not 
provide a faithful 
representation of the issuer 
 
General defenses  
 
Compensatory 
damages 
 
Information Financial 
services 
providers 
Provision of inadequate 
information  
General defenses  
 
Compensatory 
damages 
 
 
The standard of conduct is quite similar in every jurisdiction since the idea behind 
these regulatory regimes is to diminish informational asymmetry by promoting a market 
where there is disclosure of truthful information. Some differences can be identified in 
respect of the scope of liability, if joint and several or if proportional to the act; the 
calculation of damages, which may be done through different methods, depending on the 
standard that is breached (especially in the United States); and finally the available 
defenses, of which some jurisdictions can provide extras, in addition to those generally 
used in other liability cases. 
Moreover, another important difference is the legal background structuring the 
private right of action in securities litigation: in the United States, this has been created 
and extracted from the legal statutes on securities regulation and by judicial decisions; in 
Spain, it is based on securities laws,427while in Brazil it is a corollary of the general liability 
framework available within its legal system.  
Finally, even though the standards of conduct may be generally similar, the 
operation of liability can vary substantially, even in places where the standard of conduct 
                                                      
427 Law 24/1988, art 28. 
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is harmonized, such as in the EU,428 creating the necessity of engaging efficient private 
international law rules so as to avoid legal uncertainty.429 
3. Legal Framework for Securities Liability – Financial 
Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries are those that operate between markets and investors. 
They can trade on their own account, buying and selling securities for themselves, or they 
can act as pure intermediaries, executing trades for the investors. In any event, together 
with the execution of these transactions, they may also provide other types of financial 
services, such as advising their clients as to the kinds of investments in which they should 
invest or by managing their portfolio.  
As a general matter, when financial intermediaries are transacting in securities, 
they are also subsumed to the disclosure regime, being prohibited to engage in these 
transactions through the use of false or misleading information; in addition to the 
securities regulation regime, they are also subject to specific regimes regulating their 
conduct in providing financial services. 
In the United States, the securities regulation liability regime for financial 
intermediaries is also anchored in Rule 10b-5, having another layer of protection - either 
through the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or the rules of FINRA, the Self-Regulatory 
Organization in charge of regulating the securities industry - 430 coupled with the common 
contractual liability regime. 
The difference between the legal sources that are applicable to financial 
intermediaries depends on whether they are classified as broker-dealers or as investment 
advisers. In theory, while broker-dealers have to comply only with the suitability 
                                                      
428 See  ESMA (n 391). 
429 See Chapter X. 
430  The provisions regulating SROs in the United States are found in Section 19 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. On the formation of Finra, see SEC Release No. 34-56145 (26 July 2007).  
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standard in advising clients about products, 431  investment advisers owe clients a 
complete fiduciary duty, including the duties of loyalty and care. 432  In practice, this 
distinction may be blurred when brokers hold discretionary accounts of their clients433 
or act as their client’s agent, in which case, fiduciary duties would also be owed, even 
though the extent of the duty or the determination of when it should be applied is not 
quite clear in the American legal system. 434  The institutional background for dispute 
resolution is also distinct since broker-dealers are not only subject to the regulatory 
overview of FINRA, but disputes arising with investors are also solved through arbitration 
by a panel organized according to FINRA’s arbitration system.435 
In any event, the distinction between the fiduciary duty owed by investment 
advisers and the suitability standard with which broker-dealers must comply when 
selling securities to clients has to be made clear. The suitability standard requires that the 
broker-dealer or an associated person ‘have a reasonable basis to believe that a 
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is 
suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable 
diligence […] to ascertain the customer’s investment profile’,436 while the fiduciary duty 
imposes, in addition to the suitability requirement, that the adviser acts in the best 
interest of the client and prohibits, absent disclosure, conflicts of interest between the 
fiduciary and the principal or between principals of the same fiduciary.437 
The situation in the United States at the moment is complicated in respect of the 
standard of conduct applicable to financial intermediaries. Broker-dealers at times do 
provide investment advice while being held to a lower standard than investment advisers. 
                                                      
431 SEC Section 913 Study 59-66. 
432 SEC Section 913 Study 21-22. 
433 A discretionary account exists when a client opens an account with a broker or an investment advisor 
and they can trade on that account without the client’s consent. See also SEC Section 913 Study 54-55. 
434 Arthur B. Laby, ‘Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should be Fiduciaries’ (2012) 87 
Washington Law Review 707, 724-25. 
435 On the institutional design of the FINRA arbitration system and its flaws, see chapter VII.  
436 FINRA Rules, s 2111.  
437 The fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires utmost good faith, full and fair 
disclosure of all material facts and reasonable care to avoid misleading clients. See SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); See also Laby 725 (n 434).  
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There have been some proposals for reform, 438  especially after the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the study by the SEC on the subject, but it still is not clear if this will 
continue to constitute the liability regime for financial intermediaries in securities 
transactions. 
In a manner different from the United States, which defines the intermediary 
liability according to the intermediary classification within the regulatory system and the 
activity performed, 439  in the European Union, the standard of conduct is defined 
according to the category of the client with whom the financial intermediary is transacting 
and the type of service offered.440 There are three main categories of duties owed by 
financial intermediaries, which arise depending on whether the party with whom they 
are transacting is a retail investor, professional investor or eligible counterparty.441 
Fundamentally, investment services intermediaries must ‘act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients’,442 while they are also 
obliged to execute orders on the terms most favorable to the client443 and to implement 
measures to ‘provide for the prompt, fair and expeditious execution’ of orders. 444 
Depending on whether the financial intermediary is providing investment advice, other 
types of investment services or execution-only services, a duty of suitability or 
appropriateness may also exist.  
The suitability requirement is applicable when investment advice is provided, and 
necessitates that the investment firm obtains the ‘necessary information regarding the 
client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field […], his 
financial situation and his investment objectives’ so that the firm can assess and 
                                                      
438 See ibid SEC Section 913 Study; Graham Ravdin, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Arguing for a 
Transatlantic Investor Protection Regime’ (2012) 50 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 490. 
439At least theoretically, since broker-dealers are not supposed to give investment advice that is not ‘solely 
incidental’, but often, they end up doing so. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, s 202 (a)(11)(C). 
440 Moloney, EC Securities Regulation 396-97 (n 227). The regulatory framework is set by the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive and its implementing regulation: Directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID Directive), 
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC, Commission Regulation (EC) 1287/2006.  
441 See Directive 2004/39/EC, arts 19(10) and 24(2). 
442 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 19(1). 
443 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 21(1). 
444 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 22(1). 
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recommend financial instruments that are suitable to the client.445 The appropriateness 
standard is applicable when investment services other than investment advice is 
provided, and requires that the investment firm ask the ‘client to provide information 
regarding his knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific 
type of product offered or demanded’, so the investment firm can assess whether the 
product is appropriate for the client. 446  Not only is the scope of the appropriateness 
standard requirement lower, necessitating only the provision of information regarding 
the investor’s knowledge about the product, but moreover, it is not determinant on the 
provision of services; if the intermediary finds that the product is not appropriate or if the 
client fails to inform the intermediary about his knowledge and experience, the 
intermediary may still proceed and provide the service as long as a warning is 
provided.447 
Remaining within the ‘type of service’ categorization, the execution-only service 
does not impose any kind of duty on intermediaries; however, certain requirements must 
be fulfilled for this category to be applicable: 1) the instruments covered must be shares 
traded in a regulated market, money market instruments, bonds or other forms of 
securitized debt (excluding those embedding a derivative); 2) the service must be 
provided at the initiative of the client and 3) the client must be informed that the 
suitability requirement is not applicable.448 
Moving up the ladder of investor sophistication, the requirements when 
transacting with professional investors are different. The difference when dealing with a 
professional investor is that, in respect of the suitability and appropriateness 
requirements, the financial intermediary is entitled to assume that they have the 
necessary experience and knowledge in respect of the products for which they are 
classified as professional investors and that as such, the client is financially able to bear 
                                                      
445 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 19(2). 
446 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 19(5). If the financial intermediary fails to obtain the information about the 
client it may not recommend investment services or financial instruments to the client. Commission 
Directive 2006/73/EC, art 35(5). 
447 Ibid. 
448 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 19(6). 
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the risks of such investment; 449  this reduces considerably the duties of the financial 
intermediary.  
Finally, the last category of clients is that of the eligible counterparty; this category 
imposes the least requirements on investment intermediaries. When dealing with this 
category of client, the duties of suitability, appropriateness, most favorable terms 
execution and measures for the prompt, fair and expeditious execution are not 
required.450  
 
Standards of Conduct - EU 
 Retail Investor Professional 
Investor 
Eligible 
Counterparty 
Investment Advice Suitability 
requirement 
(mandatory) / 
Most favorable 
execution / 
Procedures for 
prompt execution 
Client’s knowledge 
and financial 
capacity are 
presumed / Most 
favorable 
execution / 
Procedures for 
prompt execution 
 
 
 
 
There are no 
requirements of 
suitability, 
appropriateness, 
most favorable 
execution or 
procedures for 
prompt execution 
Investment 
Services 
Appropriateness 
requirement 
(waivable by 
warning) / Most 
favorable 
execution / 
Client’s knowledge 
is presumed / Most 
favorable 
execution / 
                                                      
449 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC, art 35(2) and 36. 
450 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 24(1). 
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Procedures for 
prompt execution 
Procedures for 
prompt execution 
Execution-Only Most favorable 
execution / 
Procedures for 
prompt execution 
Most favorable 
execution / 
Procedures for 
prompt execution 
 
While these categories set out the framework for the standard of conduct of 
investment intermediaries, they are not excessively rigid; generally, the client has the 
option to ask for a higher or lower level of protection, though there might be some 
limitations. For example, eligible counterparties may request, either generally or on a 
trade-by-trade basis, to have the financial intermediary subjected to the general standard 
of conduct regime; 451  professional investors may also wish to be treated as retail 
investors.452 Moreover, retail clients who comply with some requirements may request 
to be treated as professional clients.453 
A brief comparison of the American and EU systems on financial intermediary 
standards of conduct and liability shows that the EU system, while it is quite complex, is 
more straightforward and less confusing than the American system; the latter seems to 
suffer from a pathological regulatory overburden created by the imposition of two 
different systems of regulation that apply to theoretically different institutions but that in 
practice provide virtually the same services, the difference being only the 
(self)determination of classification. As the focus in the EU system is on the service 
provided rather than on how the institution is classified, absent the requirements for a 
lesser standard of conduct, the higher standard will be applicable, guaranteeing a higher 
legal certainty in respect of the market regulation operation and the standards of conduct 
                                                      
451 Directive 2004/39/EC, art 24(2). 
452 Directive 2004/39/EC, Annex II, I.  
453 Directive 2004/39/EC, Annex II, II(1). 
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that should be followed; this consequently establishes a more homogeneous level of 
protection for investors and creates less confusion for financial intermediaries. 
In the European context, it is important to bring attention to the fact that even 
though the standards of conduct that are expected from the financial intermediaries are 
the same, as they have been harmonized by European legislation, the specific imposition 
of liability regarding the non-compliance with these norms is left to Member States since 
no provision is made in the MIFID Directive; this creates a different regime for the private 
enforcement of these rules depending on which specific Member State law will be 
applicable.454 There is an ongoing discussion regarding the extent to which the MIFID 
standards displace private law in EU Member States, as the directive was created as 
supervision legislation.455 The trend seems to indicate that MIFID can also be a basis for 
private law litigation, complementing national private law standards, even though it still 
is not clear whether this is mandatory outcome as a matter of EU law, leaving Member 
States with a considerable margin of discretion regarding their private liability regime.456   
Finally, in Brazil, the manner in which the regulatory structure is set up is similar 
to the one in the United States, since it is divided according to the category in which the 
person is registered in the regulatory system. They are two categories: 1) autonomous 
investment agents, who perform client prospection activities, amongst others, and 
provide information about the investment products and services being offered,457 and 2) 
investment consultants, who can manage their client’s portfolio. 458  Autonomous 
investment agents have to act diligently and with good faith, acting with the care of a 
professional in his position towards his clients and the institutions of the securities 
                                                      
454 See Case 604/11 Genil 48 SL v Bankinter (ECJ 4th Chamber, 30 May 2013), para 59.3 (‘it is for the internal 
legal order of each Member State to determine the contractual consequences where an investment firm 
offering an investment service fails to comply with [the suitability and appropriateness standards], subject 
to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness’). 
455 Cherednychenko 927-31 (n 238). 
456 For a discussion on the issue, see Danny Busch, ‘Why MiFID Matter to Private Law - the example of 
MiFID's impact on an asset manager's civil liability’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 386; Stefan 
Grundmann, ‘The Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract Law’ (2013) 9 European Review of 
Contract Law 267. 
457 Instruction CVM 497, Art 1, I and III.  
458 Instruction CVM 306, Art 2. 
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markets. 459  A person may not be both an autonomous investment agent and an 
investment consultant at the same time; he must choose one of the activities. 460  The 
problem is that, at the moment, it is not clear what kind of activity would fall within the 
scope of a consultant, and in any event, it is not clear whether there is a different standard 
of conduct for each type of classification. However, at least, in Brazil, there is less 
confusion than in the United States about what type of service is being provided at a given 
moment, since it is not possible for a person to have a double registration.  
This section has demonstrated that the standards of care that are owed in financial 
intermediary-investor disputes are quite different depending on the jurisdiction at hand. 
Moreover, even in the EU with its harmonized regime, the actual enforcement of the rules 
by private parties can vary since the liability regime is left to the Member States.  
4. Legal Framework for Securities Liability – Informational 
Intermediaries 
The third type of disputes that investors may have in securities transactions are 
those related to the information providers with whom they do not have a direct 
relationship, such as Credit Rating Agencies and Auditing Firms. These are market players 
that provide information to the market and currently are an essential service provider in 
many securities regulation frameworks, with a legal mandate that changed their status 
from being mere information providers to market gatekeepers, to the extent that their use 
is mandatory for certain types of transactions.461 
The role of these players in the market is a simple one – to provide information to 
investors so they can make better investment decisions, be it through the provision of an 
analysis of a given financial product, a service provided by the Credit Rating Agencies, or 
                                                      
459 Instruction CVM 497, art 10. 
460 Instruction CVM 497, art 13, para 1. 
461 For a development on the regulatory role of CRAs and the obligation of certain institutions to purchase 
only rated investments, see footnote 161 of Nan Ellis, Lisa Fairchild and Frank D'Souza, ‘Is Imposing Liability 
on Credit Ratings Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis’ (2011-2012) 17 Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance 175, 213. 
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the lending of their ‘reputation’ to financial statements and guaranteeing that they are 
correct, as in the case of the service provided by financial auditors.  
The legal status of the opinions and statements of these players is relevant to 
investors; depending on how they are treated and the relevant standard of liability in case 
the opinion or information is wrong, investors may be able to successfully sue . 
In the beginning, CRAs and Auditors developed their services to provide investors 
with information at a lower cost, either by providing the service directly to the client, as 
in the case of the initial practice of CRAs of selling subscriptions to their newsletters, or 
through the provision of audits hired by audited companies and the reputational stamp 
that the audit would bring. The market developed because there was value to be provided 
by these market actors, which could only be sustained if the information they provided 
was more or less accurate, as inaccuracy of ratings or audits would put these information 
providers out of business. 
Later, these players were given a special legal status, as was the case for the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSO) status for the CRAs, or the 
SEC registered status for auditors, because it became a government policy that 
information provided to investors was presumably relevant. The only reason for the 
existence of this obligation was a belief that certified financial statements would reduce 
the probability of false or misleading information.  
Under both schemes, informational accuracy is an objective to be achieved, and the 
system of incentives to which these information providers are subject has to be calibrated 
to allow them to provide investors with accurate information.  
There are two ways to align interests: compensation and liability. In an economic 
environment, an action will be performed according to the gains that the actor might 
obtain from the action. Most professional activities on securities transactions arose out of 
the necessity of information intermediation, such as credit rating agencies and auditing 
companies. Initially, these practices were developed based on the reputation of the 
persons involved, who could only market and sell their professional activity to the extent 
that they were trustworthy. Without it, these parties would not be able to sell their 
services, as they would not be deemed reliable and thus have no economic value to those 
who were in need of information. The second aspect of interest alignment is liability. Even 
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if the compensation structure would work towards the alignment of interests between 
information intermediaries and information users, liability, be it in contract or in tort, 
constitutes another layer of interest alignment design. This section discusses: a) the 
transformation of the compensation structure of this industry and b) the importance of a 
liability regime for informational intermediaries. 
A. Compensation 
In 1909, the activity of rating securities started with John Moody rating U.S. 
railroad bonds that had already been in existence since 1850.462 The emergence of credit 
rating agencies was a convergence of the activities of credit reporting agencies, the 
specialized financial press and investment bankers, with each having their own particular 
role in providing financial information. 463  Compensation in the industry was 
straightforward: those who wanted to obtain financial information prepared by the rating 
agencies would subscribe to their services, which would be made available through 
periodic publications.464 The rating agencies then had an incentive to provide the most 
accurate information as they could by doing analysis in a manner that could reflect reality 
and provide useful information to their clients, since they would be hired on the basis of 
their reputational capital.465 
The change in the industry’s compensation scheme occurred in 1970, when issuers 
started paying rating agencies to rate bonds, an activity which today constitutes the main 
source of income for rating agencies.466 This modification of the CRA business model was 
a direct effect of securities regulation within the CRA activities domain, after CRAs were 
elevated to the status of NRSROs and were given the power to grant ‘regulatory 
                                                      
462  Richard Sylla, ‘A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating Agencies’ (The Role of Credit 
Reporting Systems in the International Economy) 6-7. For a general overview on the development of Credit 
Ratings, see  Frank Partnoy, ‘The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 619. 
463  Credit Reporting Agencies provided information about the creditworthiness of businesses, the 
specialized financial press provided information about specific industry sectors and investment bankers 
provided internal information from a business, usually by being part of the company’s board. Sylla 7-10 (n 
462). 
464 Partnoy 640 (n 462). 
465 See ibid 627-55. 
466 Sylla 24 (n 462). 
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licenses’. 467  One of the most important regulatory changes that had an effect in this 
business model was the requirement that certain investors could only invest in ‘safe’ 
assets, which would be classified as such according to a rating from one of the CRA. Issuers 
would then start to pay CRAs to rate their products, as they would want to be able to 
access this restricted investor market. The change in the compensation structure clearly 
also reflected a change of the client being served and the product being provided. The 
initial client was the user of financial information and the product was high-quality 
information; after this shift, the client became the issuer and the product became the 
highest rate possible within the models used by the rating agency. Regulation in this case 
has transformed the CRA market completely, as all issuers are now legally obliged to have 
a high rating to be able to tap a given market, incentivizing the practice of gaming the CRA 
models and, in the worst cases, even corrupting CRAs outright so that every product 
receives a rating that would comply with the minimum requirements; this results in a 
situation where even the not so good products receive the necessary rating.468 
This brief discussion shows that in the first business model scheme the CRA 
interests are aligned with those of the information users, who are in fact also their clients; 
in the second case, where there is a regulatory license that the CRAs can use to extract 
rent from issuers, the interests of CRAs are not aligned with those of the information users, 
leading to a deterioration in ratings quality.469  
The auditing industry also experienced a similar development; emerging as 
information intermediaries in colony times,470 the industry was later granted regulatory 
licenses and made legally essential to securities transactions.471 In the same way as the 
                                                      
467  Partnoy 623; 83-94 (n 462). See also Claire A. Hill, ‘Regulating the Rating Agencies’ (2004) 82 
Washington University Law Quarterly 43, 43. 
468 I do not claim that ratings are, as a matter of fact, of lower quality. The claim is only that there is an 
incentive for them to be of lower quality.  
469 It is true that even in the first case, if the benefits from a higher rating surpass the costs of capturing a 
CRA, issuers may decide to pay CRAs or their employees to issue higher ratings, even though this practice 
might hurt the very basis of the CRAs business, which is selling credibility to information users. 
470 See Dale L. Flesher, Gary John Previts and William D. Samson, ‘Auditing in the United States: a Historical 
perspective’ (2005) 41 Abacus 21. 
471 For example, in the United States public companies need to have their accounts audited by independent 
auditors. E.g., Securities and Exchange Act 1934, s 13(a)(2). 
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credit ratings market, the market for audited financial statements, based on the 
reputation of auditors, became a market for certified financial transactions.  
In a manner that differs from the CRAs, the conflict of interest in the auditing 
industry did not arise exclusively from the regulatory license granted by the government. 
In the U.S. history of auditing, U.K. investors initially used auditors to certify that economic 
activities taking place overseas were being performed properly.472 As the economy grew 
and capital markets developed, auditors were increasingly hired by securities issuers to 
increase the reliability of their financial statements.473 At this point, the conflict of interest 
between the auditor and the information user was already more acute than before, since 
the party remunerating the auditor was no longer the party using its information. 
Nonetheless, the business continued to be based on reputation, since any credibility that 
an auditing firm could attribute to a financial statement from an unknown or unreliable 
company was the credibility of the auditing firm itself, giving it an incentive to perform a 
thorough audit service.  
In a similar fashion to the experiences of the CRA industry, where it became 
required that every single financial statement must be audited,474 and where it became 
increasingly difficult for an accounting firm to be considered a public accounting firm that 
can perform audits, regulation operated to guarantee a perpetual market to those that 
were already in the industry. At the same time, since the number of audits is now more or 
less guaranteed and since competition is not likely to arise, regulation removes an 
important incentive for auditors to maintain their reputation.  
As the objective of information intermediaries is to provide reliable information, 
the regulatory changes that were made to the industries of the sector were, to a certain 
extent, prejudicial to this objective. As compensation might not be the main driver of 
information accuracy in respect of the services provided by information intermediaries, 
liability standards and the risk of being held responsible for an information inaccuracy 
                                                      
472 Flesher, Previts and Samson 24-26 (n 470). 
473  See Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu, ‘Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital 
Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature’ (2001) 21 Journal of Accounting and Economics 
405, 415. 
474 E.g., Securities and Exchange Act 1934, s 13(a)(2). 
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has become an important aspect of guaranteeing that the information reaching investors 
is accurate.  
B. The Liability Regime 
The problem in the case of informational intermediaries is that liability is more 
complicated to establish therein than in the case of issuers and financial intermediaries, 
as there is no direct legal relationship between the investor and the informational 
intermediary; in a general liability system, it would fall in the tort category.  
In the United States, the situation was even worse for the investor who had relied 
on a credit rating; CRAs were considered to have the same level of protection for their 
ratings as journalists had for their news, and could only be held liable for their ratings if 
plaintiffs could show ‘actual malice’ by the CRA,475 even in cases where the issuer was 
suing the rating agency in respect of ratings for which it had contracted.476 By 2003, this 
requirement was softened and some American courts started excluding CRAs from the 
legal protection that was afforded to news companies in cases in which issuers 
constituted their clients or were involved in the transaction being rated.477  
The level of protection that the CRAs had was lowered even more following the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which required, for purposes of pleading, that the sufficient state of mind 
for CRA liability is one of knowingly or recklessly failing, ‘(i) to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its 
own methodology for evaluating credit risk; or (ii) to obtain reasonable verification of 
such factual elements […] from other sources that the credit rating agency considered to 
be competent […]’.478  In addition, the act also repealed the protection that CRAs had 
against expert liability in registration statements.479 This led CRAs to refuse to accept the 
inclusion of their ratings in registration statements, which created a stoppage in the 
                                                      
475 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
245 (1964).  
476 In re Enron Corp, Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  
477 Theresa Nagy, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic 
Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation’ (2009) 94 Minnesota Law Review 140, 151-54. 
478 Dodd-Frank Act, s 933 (b). 
479 The repeal was of Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933.  
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markets for asset-backed securities.480 After some time in which the market was frozen 
by the new liability standard, the US House Financial Services Committee approved the 
removal of the expert liability for CRAs.481 
In other parts of the world, the status of CRA liability and their standard of care in 
respect of their activities, varies. Contractual claims are almost impossible to go advance, 
as there are no specific laws other than contract law governing these transactions; in this 
case, exclusion of liability is a common clause.482 Moreover, in tort, it is not an easy task 
to attach liability to CRAs, as proving causation may be a complicated task.483 
 In the European Union context, a recent regulation enacted in 2013 imposed civil 
liability on credit rating agencies.484  The system is two-tiered: at the European level, 
liability can be established when the CRA has infringed any of the rules of Annex III of 
Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, either intentionally or with gross negligence, causing 
damage to the investor, who has to establish reliance.485 To define what these terms mean, 
national legislation, determined according to the rules of private international law, will 
be applicable.486 This is a minimum harmonization measure, as the regulation allows for 
further civil liability if national law provides it.487 
Finally, the last development worth mentioning in respect of CRA liability arose in 
Australia. In Bathurst Regional Council v. Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd.488 
Standard & Poor’s was found liable for one of its ratings based on misrepresentation and 
negligence claims. An interesting aspect of the decision was that, despite all the language 
on the documentation disclaiming liability, the CRAs were held liable due to the function 
                                                      
480 Brigitte Haar, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies - Regulatory All-or-Nothing Approaches between 
Immunity and Over-Deterrence’ 2013-02 University of Olso Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series 1, 8. 
481 Ibid 8-9. 
482 Except in France, in which the Finance and Banking Regulation Law forbids this kind of clause. See ibid 
3. 
483 Ibid 5-6. 
484 Regulation (EU) 462/2013 amended Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 and introduced article 35a.   
485 Art 35a(1).  
486 Art 35a(4). 
487 Art 35a(5). 
488 (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200. 
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that they performed in the markets. As their role is to provide information to investors,489 
it was decided that they owe a duty of care to potential investors.490 This approach to CRA 
liability, if adopted elsewhere, will have an important impact on the industry, realigning 
CRA interests to those of the external users of information.  
On the auditors’ side, liability follows either the securities liability regime 
standards, with slight modifications in the specific case of auditors, or more general tort 
law in civil law countries - sometimes with certain limitations, as in Spain - but 
nonetheless following the logic of general tort law.491  
In the United States, the standard required to hold an auditor liable for 
misstatements is even higher in securities transactions than that imposed on other 
players. In addition to other pleading requirements, to properly plead scienter492 in an 
auditor liability case, the plaintiff ‘must allege sufficient facts to show that the accounting 
practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, or an egregious 
refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting judgments 
which were made were such that no reasonable accountant would have made the same 
decisions if confronted with the same facts’. 493  The standard for pleading a strong 
inference of scienter could be met when allegations of red flags coupled with GAAP or 
GAAS violations are made,494 as long as they can show that the auditor’s practice amounts, 
                                                      
489 In a passage, the judge explains that ‘[t]he issuer of the product is willing to pay for the rating not because 
it may be used by participants and others interested in financial markets for a whole range of purposes but 
because the rating will be highly material to the decision of potential investors to invest or not. S&P knew 
this was why it was being paid which is why it authorised ABN Amro to disseminate the rating in its ratings 
letters’. Bathurst Regional Council v. Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (n 488) 2480. 
490 Bathurst Regional Council v. Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (n 488) 2819. 
491 Another example is Belgium, where liability is not limited. See Ingrid De Poorter, ‘Auditor's Liability 
Towards Third Parties within the EU: A Comparative Study Between the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Belgium’ (2008) 3 Journal of International Commercial Law And Technology 68, 73 (‘By virtue 
of article 140 of the Belgian Company Code and the common liability principles, a Belgian auditor is liable 
towards each interested party’). 
492 As seen before, scienter is the state of mind of the defendant. 
493 In re Scottish Re Group Securities Litigation, 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting In re Refco, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d, 611, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
494 See In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and “ERISA” Litig., 381 F.Supp.2d 192, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (citing In 
re Complete Mgmt. Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F.Supp.2d 314, 334 (S.D.N.Y.2001). 
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at best, to a pretend audit.495 Auditor protection from liability seems to be a trend in 
common law jurisdictions; in the UK, it is also complicated to hold an auditor liable; 
‘[absent] special circumstances, an auditor of a public company owes no duty of care to 
an outside investor or an existing shareholder who buys stocks in reliance on a statutory 
audit.’496 
At the EU level, there has been an ongoing discussion about auditor liability, but so 
far no concrete actions have been taken; rather, the focus on solutions falls at the Member 
State level.497 In Spain, for example, the law regulating auditors changed in 2011, through 
the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2011. The new law provides that liability will be imposed 
for harm caused by auditing firms due to the breach of their obligations as imposed by the 
civil code.498 This law regulates the extent of the liability, rendering it proportional to the 
direct harm that the accounting firm could have caused to the audited entity or to a third 
party (e.g. investors) and excluding the harm caused by the audited company.499 Finally, 
the auditors signing the auditing statements are put on the same level as the auditing 
firms, thus being liable to the same extent.500 This is a change from the previous liability 
system, where responsibility was joint and direct.501 
The Brazilian system can be characterised as even more ‘general’; the law 
regulating the liability of independent auditors only provides that auditing firms will be 
liable, by willful or negligent conduct, for the harm they cause in exercising their auditing 
                                                      
495 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 f.3d 81, 98 (2nd Cir. 2000) (citing McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3rd 
Cir.1979)). 
496 Poorter 70 The case in which the comment was made is Caparo Industries v. Dickman and others [1990] 
1 All ER 568; AC 605. See also Al Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley, [1990] Ch 313; James McNaughton Papers v. 
Hicks Anderson Court [1991] 1 All ER 134. 
497 For an overview of the discussion, see  Commission Recommendation Concerning the Limitation of the 
Civil Liability of Statutory Auditors and Audit Firms – Impact Assessment SEC(2008) 1974. 
498 Art 22.1. 
499 Art 22.2. 
500 Art 22.3. 
501 Art 11 of the previous Financial Audit Law (Law 19/1988). For the movement to change the auditor’s 
liability system in Spain, see Christopher Humphrey, María Antonia García Benau and Emiliano Ruiz 
Barbadillo, ‘El Debate de la Responsabilidad Civil de la Auditoría en España: la Construcción del Discurso 
sobre la Limitación de Responsabilidades por las Corporaciones Profesionales’ (2003) XXXII Revista 
Española de Financiación y Contabilidad 1091. 
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duties. 502  This law does nothing more than to borrow from the general tort regime 
existing under Brazilian law. 
Even though CRAs and auditors perform similar functions in the market, the 
liability regimes to which they are subject are different: moreover, the differences 
between regimes within these two industries are also dependent on the laws of the 
specific country.  
The focus of this section has not been the discussion of what liability regime for 
third parties is better,503 but rather to establish that there are many industry-specific and 
country-specific differences.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter has been to identify the types of disputes that may 
arise out of securities transactions, the standards of conduct in different countries to 
which the relevant persons involved are subject and the important aspects of the liability 
regime in each legal system.  
The types of disputes differ depending on the legal relationship that the investor 
has with the defendant. The issuer-investor dispute arises mainly out of securities law, 
being based on the information disclosure duties that issuers owe to investors. The 
financial intermediary – investor dispute is the relationship arising out of the contractual 
relationship between the financial intermediary who is buying or selling a security to the 
investor, where either suitability or fiduciary duties may play a role in the litigation. 
Finally, the last category of disputes are those involving information intermediaries, such 
as CRA and auditors, who do not have a contractual relationship with the investor and are 
subject to duties arising mainly out of a general tort framework, if at all, notwithstanding 
the increase in the discussion regarding the need to impose liability on these actors.  
                                                      
502 Law 6.385/1976, art 26, para 2. 
503 For the discussion of the CRA, see Nagy (n 477) and Haar (n 480); for the discussion on auditor’s liability, 
see Eric L. Talley, ‘Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big Four Auditors’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review  
1641; Hassen T. Al-Shawaf, ‘Bargaining for Salvation: How Alternative Auditor Liability Regimes can Save 
the Capital Markets’ [2012] 2012 University of Illinois Law Review 502.  
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The relevance of these dispute categories for dispute resolution methods is related 
to the type of legal connections that the players have with each other. Investors and 
issuers, at some point in their relationship, had a connection through the securities that 
had been purchased or sold: there was a direct legal link between the two. The same is 
true with the investor and the financial intermediary, who are bound by a contract. In the 
last case, unless the investor is subscribing for credit ratings or hiring the auditor himself, 
there is no direct legal connection between the parties, leaving liability to be established 
through general tort law or regulatory law.  
Different regulatory regimes with different liability frameworks have important 
consequences for cross-border transactions: in this situation, legal certainty can only be 
achieved if a strong private international law mechanism is in place. This is true also in 
the European Union; even though their standards of conduct is highly harmonized for the 
different areas of securities regulation, the regulation of the liability aspects are left to the 
Member States, creating different frameworks for private enforcement that are 
dependent on the law applicable to the transaction.  
The next chapters will explore the dispute resolution design for each type of 
dispute, the shortcomings that these systems have in a transnational environment and 
the possible solutions that can be designed for a more simple dispute resolution system.  
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Part III – Dispute Resolution 
Legal disputes are nothing more than umpired battles. The courtroom is the forum 
in which both parties will engage in arguments and present their case, and the judge, 
according to a specific set of rules, will lead the development of the dispute and decide 
who is right, imposing a decision on the parties. Each dispute resolution system has its 
own characteristics and rules of procedure with which the parties must comply, varying 
to a greater or lesser degree depending on the similarities of the legal systems in which 
they are embedded. 
The rules and institutions in place are paramount to the specific outcome of the 
dispute. Procedural rules may weigh heavily on who will win; the institutional framework 
in place is also important with regards to how the procedure will be conducted and 
enforced. The very core of the Rule of Law itself and the function of law in society are both 
dependent on the mechanisms of dispute resolution.  
Until not long ago, the United States courts were seen as a very attractive forum 
for plaintiffs who wished to pursue securities litigation, both to Americans who were 
already familiar with their class action system but also increasingly to foreigners, who 
were bringing claims that had little connection with the United States.504 
As this movement was unfolding so too was the development of the American 
battlefield for securities litigation. In the last two decades, domestic plaintiffs have been 
consistently losing the ‘high ground’ through increased procedural hurdles,505 while more 
recently, some foreign plaintiffs have been shut out of the system completely.506  
                                                      
504 The most interesting scenario is the ‘foreign-cubed’ class actions, where foreign plaintiffs sue foreign 
issuers for securities bought in foreign markets. For a review of ‘foreign-cubed’ class actions see Hanna L. 
Buxbaum, ‘Multinantional Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict’ 
(2007-2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 14. 
505 The main U.S. Congress acts changing the landscape for securities litigation were the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, and the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4. 
506 In Morrison v National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010), decided in 2010, the US Supreme Court found 
that Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ‘does not provide a cause of action to foreign 
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At the same time as the U.S. and its courts steps down as the world forum of 
securities disputes, the discussion shifts to the use of other forums and the use of other 
mechanisms such as arbitration, 507  which is not only already a possibility in some 
countries,508 but has become institutionalized in others.509 
These developments have an important effect on the framework for the private 
litigation of securities disputes, also affecting the role that it plays in securities regulation. 
Both the private and public enforcement of securities laws are important in order to 
promote the efficiency of the market, enhancing the added value that these activities can 
provide. 510  As seen in Chapter V, the basic argument for private rights and their 
enforcement is that it promotes investor confidence, making markets stronger and 
enhancing competition for financial services providers, which in turn leads to a lower cost 
of capital.511  
The strength of the market and the amount that investors that have been misled 
may recover has a strong relationship to the design of the dispute resolution system in 
place, which allows them to adjudicate their claims. The objective of the last part of this 
thesis is to analyze different designs of dispute resolution mechanisms, both nationally 
and transnationally, to assess their advantages and shortcomings in respect of the 
different types of disputes and finally, to propose mechanisms to improve the current 
infrastructure. 
                                                      
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on 
foreign exchanges’.    
507 See Richard Shell, ‘Arbitration and Corporate Governance’ (1989) 67 North Carolina Law Review 517;  
Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (30 November 2006); McKinsey & Co., 
Sustaining New York's and the U.S.' Global Financial Services Leadership (22 January 2007); Christos 
Ravanides, ‘Arbitration Clauses in Public Company Charters: an Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or a 
Descent into Hades? ’ (2007) 18 The American Review of International Arbitration 371. 
508 Brazil and Spain are two jurisdictions where arbitration is expressly allowed in corporate charters, 
encompassing securities matters. See respectively Law 6.404/1976 (Brazil) art 109, §3º and Law 60/2003 
(Spain), art 11 bis. 
509  In the United States, securities disputes with brokers and dealers are usually solved under the 
framework of FINRA, and not through courts, while in Brazil companies listed in higher corporate 
governance levels in Bovespa need to have an arbitration clause in their corporate charter; the institution 
that is usually used is the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado.  
510 See Section II below for a discussion on the role of private and public enforcement in securities regulation.  
511 World Bank, Institutional Foundations for Financial Markets (2006) 3. 
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Chapter VI - Institutional Aspects of 
Dispute Resolution 
So far this thesis has tried to establish the importance of the private enforcement 
of investor protection in securities transactions and of the efficiency of financial markets. 
This chapter moves away from the focus on financial markets and the justification of 
private enforcement and enters into the discussion of dispute resolution mechanisms. Its 
objective is to explain the institutional framework of a dispute resolution system and to 
analyze the policy choices that can be made in respect of its design. The question to be 
answered is ‘what are the relevant aspects that have to be considered on the design of a 
dispute resolution system?’  
By answering this question, it is possible to establish a framework that will be 
(loosely) used for the analysis developed in the next two chapters; these chapters have a 
specific focus on dispute resolution systems in general (Chapter VII) and on systems 
which use aggregate litigation (Chapter VIII).  
For the purposes of this analysis, there are two categories of institutional aspects 
that have to be considered: the legal aspects and the economic aspects of a dispute 
resolution system. The legal aspects define the political and legal structures within which 
the dispute resolution system is embedded, while the economic aspects define the means 
through which the system will finance itself, engaging at the same time with the question 
of incentives to litigate. This second economic aspect is especially relevant as it relates 
directly to the efficiency of the system and the procedural level of protection that is given 
to litigants.  
These institutional aspects are essential for the construction of a dispute 
resolution system. These legal and economic aspects give shape to the structure of the 
system and are their minimum necessary components. Therefore, this chapter is divided 
into two parts: 1) legal aspects of the institutional framework and 2) economic aspects of 
the institutional framework.  
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1. Legal Aspects of the Institutional Framework 
In respect of the legal aspects, it is important to anchor the discussion in the 
premise that any dispute resolution system is tied to the legal framework of the state. This 
is a necessary condition of its existence because, without the power of the state, the 
dispute resolution system would either be ineffective absent the will of the losing party 
to comply with the decision or it would make any attempt of enforcement illegal.512 The 
legitimacy of the system and the legal framework underpinning its operation therefore 
becomes essential to justify its binding effects.  
In addition, to provide a just method for dispute resolution, the decision makers 
have to be independent, while at the same time the logic in which their decisions are 
reached has to be made known, allowing society to develop legitimate expectations on the 
rules of the legal system.513  
These institutional legal aspects are necessary for a system based on the Rule of 
Law, which has important consequences in respect of the mechanisms underpinning the 
economic organization of society.  
A. The Legal Basis of the Dispute Resolution System 
Since the legal power of a dispute resolution system has to be linked to the legal 
system in which the decision arising out of it has to be enforced, the legal basis of the 
system becomes an important aspect for its design. The legal basis for the authority of a 
dispute resolution system can either have a direct link to the state’s power or it can be 
indirect, having an extra requirement for legality to operate. At the same time, the 
dichotomy of the pure jurisdictional basis/consent jurisdictional basis defines the 
transnational legal infrastructure that is available for the cross-border operation of 
dispute resolution systems. This section explains each of them.  
                                                      
512 Unless the legal system authorizes private deployment of force to guarantee one’s rights.  
513 The conception of just used here is a formalistic one – a just decision is one that is or could be reasonably 
expected in a given legal system.  
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a. Pure Jurisdictional Basis 
The main dispute resolution system with a pure jurisdictional basis is the judiciary. 
As a part of the state structure and normally created and designed by a constitution, the 
judiciary is in charge of solving every type of dispute. It is the institution that applies and 
maintains the law.  
Its main characteristic is that it is a direct part of the state structure; judges are 
authorized to decide matters that are brought to them independently of the will of the 
parties of the dispute. It does not matter that one of the parties does not wish to be bound 
by the decision; as long as the requirements to make the party part of the legal procedure 
are satisfied, the judge may decide the dispute and the decision will be legally enforceable. 
Even though the court structure is the main body with a pure legal jurisdictional 
basis, it may not be the only one. Alternative dispute resolution arrangements can also be 
created on the basis of pure jurisdictional powers. Within this idea, the important 
characteristic of pure jurisdiction is the possibility of binding decisions without some 
prior authorization of the party being bound. 
Systems built on a pure jurisdictional basis are either constitutionally designed or 
created by legislation, always having support from the state that is attributing jurisdiction 
to it. This implies that in order to be created or modified, these systems require political 
energy.   
Another problem is the effects that decisions based on pure legal jurisdiction have 
on foreign jurisdictions. Today there is no wide-ranging mechanism for the recognition of 
foreign judgments, creating piecemeal solutions, or none at all, for cross-border dispute 
resolution.514  
b. Consent Jurisdictional Basis: Arbitration 
Systems with consent jurisdictional basis require not only the authorization of the 
legal system but also the consent of the parties in submitting their dispute to it. This is the 
                                                      
514 Attempts were made to create an international convention on jurisdiction and judgments (The Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments) but the efforts were unsuccessful. See Ralf Michaels, ‘Two 
Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 1003, 1009-10. 
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premise of arbitration, which is the use of a private third-party to decide a dispute 
between two litigants, binding them as to the outcome.515 Arbitration is a creature of 
consent. Parties are bound by it if they have agreed to the dispute resolution mechanism 
that settles their dispute. In addition, only those matters that are authorized, or not 
prohibited by law, can be arbitrated; as such, not all disputes can be decided via 
arbitration. 
The practice of employing third parties to solve disputes through the application 
of rules pervades ancient history. From the Middle East to Rome, there are many accounts 
of parties designing their dispute resolution methods and using third parties to give a 
binding decision on their dispute.516 It is true that the institutional setting of arbitration 
as we know today was only possible after the development of the modern nation-states, 
creating the interplay between public and private that permeates this dispute resolution 
process.517  
Even though there is an extensive body of literature that sees arbitration as a kind 
of lex mercatoria, the efficacy of an arbitral award depends on the legal framework in 
which it will be enforced; therefore, both the national legal state infrastructure and the 
international one, are essential to consider the use of arbitration.518  
Arbitration therefore has two levels of legitimacy: the first is the legal 
authorization allowing parties to empower a third-party to decide their dispute with 
finality, while the second is the agreement between the parties to empower the third-
                                                      
515 Orley Ashenfelter and Radha Iyengar (eds), Economics of Commercial Arbitration and Dispute Resolution 
(Edward Elgar 2009) ix. 
516  See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2009) 21-27. Such 
practice was also common during the Middle Ages, where it had a relevant role in guilds and trading places. 
See John Baker, ‘From Lovedays to ADR: Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in England 1066-1800’ [2006] 
2006 Transnational Dispute Management 1. 
517 Arbitration during the 18th and 19th centuries faced strong hostility from some states; in France this 
started to change only after its ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1923, which made agreements to 
arbitrate enforceable, while in the United States, this hostility was only overcome with the enactment of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and similar state rules. See Born 37-49 (n 516). 
518 ‘[…] international commercial arbitration, no less than arbitration within nation-states, while conducted 
in the sphere of private law, is a public legal creation whose operation and effectiveness is inextricably 
linked to prescribed actions by national courts’,  W. Michael Reisman and Brian Richardson, ‘Tribunals and 
Courts: An Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration’ in Albert Jan Van Den 
Berg (ed), Arbitration - The Next Fifty Years (Kluwer Law International 2012) 17. 
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party. This section briefly surveys some of the legal systems enabling arbitration at the 
national and the transnational levels.  
The National Legal Framework for Arbitration  
Even though arbitration could theoretically be envisioned based only on the legal 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, it is usually regulated by legislative provisions.  
The United States for example has a strong tradition of arbitration. The Federal 
Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925, 519  covering both domestic and international 
arbitration.520 It was the result of a movement from the business community in the years 
before its enactment, which pressed for legislation due to the concern on the costs and 
delays with litigation and the problems with the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. 521  As it is today, the FAA is a strong statute and preempts most state 
arbitration laws in the United States if they try to diminish or limit the contractual 
agreement of the parties to arbitrate, 522  creating a generous federal arbitration 
environment. Also, the case law developed in the United States opened up the possibilities 
of situations in which disputes could be submitted to arbitration, encompassing a wide 
array of cases.523 
Arbitration in Spain also has deep historical roots, to the extent that it was 
considered a fundamental right in the Cadiz Constitution, in 1812.524 The institute has 
suffered various changes since this time,525 reaching its current institutional design with 
Law 60/2003. Inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law,526 the Spanish Arbitration law is a 
                                                      
519 Federal Arbitration Act, Ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). 
520 Imre S. Szalai, ‘The Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts’ (2007) 12 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 319, 325. 
521 Ibid 354-55. 
522 See Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘Federal Arbitration Act Preemption’ (2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 393, 
407-20. 
523 Ravanides 373-74 (n 507). 
524 See José Fernando Merino Merchán, ‘La Constitución de 1812 y el Arbitraje’ (2012) 14 Revista del Club 
Español del Arbitraje 33. 
525 The modifications came with the Civil Procedure Law of 1855, the Jurisdiction Unification Decree of 1855, 
the Civil Procedure Law of 1881, the Arbitration Law from 1953, the Arbitration Law from 1988, and finally 
Law 60/2003. Ibid 34-35. 
526 Law 60/2003, Exposition of Motives. 
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modern law, encompassing all the necessary requirements for a strong environment for 
arbitration.   
Brazil, on the other hand, has a much younger arbitration culture. Having taking 
the same position as most Latin American countries and having embraced the ‘Calvo 
Doctrine’ in the past,527 Brazil was strongly opposed to the use of arbitration to solve 
international disputes.528 This approach started to change in the 1980s with the opening 
up of the Brazilian economy to foreign investment; the development of this area only 
reached maturity in 2002, with the ratification of the New York Convention.529  
Meanwhile, the journey to an efficient arbitral framework in Brazil was a turbulent 
one. The Brazilian arbitration law was enacted in September 1996,530 but soon enough its 
constitutionality was being challenged as violating article 5 XXXV of the Brazilian 
Constitution, which provides that ‘the law will not exclude from the appreciation of the 
Judicial Power a harm or threat to a right’. This challenge was only solved in 2001, and 
until then arbitration clauses were seen as mere promises to arbitrate, without any legal 
certainty as to their efficacy. The only manner to solve the dispute by arbitration was 
through an agreement to arbitrate after the dispute had arisen.531 With the decision in 
2001, the constitutionality of the Arbitration Law was confirmed by the STF,532 bringing 
to an end the legal insecurity that was present in the use of arbitration clauses in the 
Brazilian legal system.  
The International Framework for Arbitration  
The first international legal instrument that initiated the development of 
international arbitration was the Geneva Protocol on Arbitral Clauses of 1923. Ratified by 
                                                      
527 The Calvo Doctrine, named after Carlos Calvo, was a foreign policy principle that foreign investors had 
to use local courts to solve their disputes.  
528 Renata Brazil-David, ‘An Examination of the Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
in Brazil’ (2011) 27 Arbitration International 57, 57. 
529 Ibid 58. 
530 Law 9.307/1996. 
531 Brazil-David 58 (n 528). 
532 M.B.V. Commercial and Export Management Establishment v Resil Industria e Comercio Ltda (STF, SE 5206 
AgR) (2004). 
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various countries, it was the first truly, wide-ranging instrument backing arbitration.533 
This Protocol made agreements to arbitrate in connection with contracts valid, even 
though each country could limit the application of the Protocol to commercial 
contracts.534 Its practical advantage was that the courts of the signatories, when facing a 
valid arbitration clause, had to refer the parties to arbitration.535 
As the beginning of the modern framework for international arbitration, this 
instrument had some important limitations. The Protocol was only applicable when the 
agreement to arbitrate was made between parties of different jurisdictions, 536  and 
through this instrument only Contracting Parties had the duty to execute arbitral awards 
if they were made within their own territory. 537   Even with the presence of such 
limitations, the Protocol was indeed useful to many parties who wished to compel 
arbitration.538 
Soon came the second important international instrument for international 
arbitration, the Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. 
The Geneva Convention extended the territorial enforceability of arbitration made 
pursuant to a valid agreement under the Geneva Protocol, increasing the efficiency of the 
                                                      
533 The treaty was ratified by Albania, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, UK and some of its colonies, New Zealand, 
India, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand.  
534 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, art 1: ‘Each of the Contracting States recognises the validity of 
an agreement whether relating to existing or future differences between parties subject respectively to the 
jurisdiction of different Contracting States by which the parties to a contract agree to submit to arbitration 
all or any differences that may arise in connection with such contract relating to commercial matters or to 
any other matter capable of settlement by arbitration [...]. Each Contracting State reserves the right to limit 
the obligation mentioned above to contracts which are considered as commercial under its national law.’  
535 See Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, art 4. 
536 See Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, art 1. 
537 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, art 3: ‘each Contracting State undertakes to ensure the execution 
by its authorities and in accordance with the provisions of its national laws of arbitral awards made in its 
own territory under the preceding articles.’  
538  See Arthur Nussbaum, ‘Treaties on Commercial Arbitration: a Test of International Private-Law 
Legislation’ (1942) 56 Harvard Law Review 219, 231-32. 
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international arbitral system. 539  Another positive aspect of the Convention was the 
limitation of the substantive review of the merits of the awards.540 
Even though there were improvements in the system, it still was fairly 
burdensome. The party enforcing the award had to prove that the award was valid, the 
subject matter was capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the country it 
would be relied upon, that the award was made by an arbitral tribunal composed 
according to the will of the parties, that it was a final award and that its recognition was 
not contrary to the public policy of the country in which it was to be relied upon.541 Such 
requirements created a double-exequatur situation; the enforcing party firstly had to 
confirm the award in the country in which it was made before then pursuing enforcement 
in another country.542 These two instruments provided a comprehensive framework for 
international arbitration in the first half of the XX century, preparing the field for the 
developments that were about to come. 
Due to concerns from the business community regarding the instruments in place 
backing international arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce issued a 
preliminary draft convention with the objective of substituting the Geneva instruments of 
the 1920s’.543 The main idea behind the project was the creation of truly international 
awards, in other words, awards that are independent from national rules of procedure 
where the arbitration took place.544 
This idea of international arbitration completely detached from states was not well 
considered. The ICC Draft Convention was presented to the United Nations Economic and 
                                                      
539 Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art 1: ‘In the territories of any High 
Contracting Party to which the present Convention applies, an arbitral award made in pursuance of an 
agreement whether relating to existing or future differences […] covered by the Protocol on Arbitration 
Clauses […] shall be recognised as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with the rules of the 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon […]’ 
540 Born 61 (n 516). 
541 Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art 1.  
542 Born 62 (n 516). 
543  International Chamber of Commerce ICC, Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Report and 
Preliminary Draft Convention (ICC Brochure No 174, Paris, 1953). 
544 Ibid 7.  
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Social Council (ECOSOC), who, in 1955, came up with a new Draft Convention545 that was 
closer to the already-established international arbitration system. 546  This new draft 
received comments from various governments and non-governmental organizations,547 
leading to a ‘Conference on International Commercial Arbitration’ that was held in the 
United Nations in New York, from May 20 to June 10 in 1958.548 This conference ended 
with the signature of the New York Convention.  
Today, the New York Convention is in force in 149 countries. 549  Already 
considered for some time as the ‘cornerstone of current international commercial 
arbitration’, 550 it provides a global framework for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards and arbitration agreements. 
The scope of its application comprises arbitral awards made in the territory of a 
state other than the one in which the recognition or enforcement is sought or awards not 
considered domestic in the state in which it is to be recognized or enforced.551 By analogy, 
the same rationale is applicable to arbitration agreements552 when the seat is outside of 
the forum state.553 If the seat is in the same state, the applicability of Article II will be 
subject to domestic law.554 
                                                      
545 See ECOSOC ‘Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ UN Doc 
E/2704 (28 March 1955). 
546 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1981) 
7. 
547 See ECOSOC ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Report by the Secretary-General’ 
UN Doc E/2822 (31 January 1956). 
548 Berg 8 (n 546). See also UN Doc E/CONF.26/SR. 1- UN Doc E/CONF.26/SR 25. 
549 See ‘Status of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (Uncitral)  
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> accessed 8 
July 2014. 
550 Berg 1 (n 546). 
551 New York Convention, art 1(1). 
552  Recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements is governed by Article II of The New York 
Convention. 
553 See Dorothee Schramm, Elliott Geisinger and Philippe Pinsolle, ‘Article II’ in Herbert Kronke and others 
(eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: a Global Commentary on the New York 
Convention (Wolters Kluwer Law and Business 2010) 41. 
554 Ibid 42. 
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The Convention provides specific rules for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards and agreements. Under the Convention, an arbitration agreement has to 
be in writing in respect of a defined legal relationship of which the subject matter can be 
settled by arbitration.555 For the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, the 
plaintiff only has to provide the original award and the arbitration agreement or certified 
copies of these documents, translated to the language of the court in which recognition or 
enforcement is sought, if necessary.556 These conditions are the only two necessary for 
the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award; national implementing legislation 
requiring more from plaintiff is contrary to The New York Convention.557 
Compared to the Geneva Convention, the New York Convention presents an 
important evolution in this aspect, since it is no longer necessary for the plaintiff to prove 
either that the award is final in the country where it was made or that the arbitral tribunal 
was constituted in the manner agreed upon by the parties,558 removing the necessity of 
the double-exequatur.559 
The burden is now on the defendants, who, to avoid the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, have to prove one of the grounds available in article V, subject to the discretion 
of the enforcing courts. 560  Even though the approach to judicial discretion may vary 
depending where enforcement is sought, in practice the results are similar, independently 
of the approach taken by the court.561 
                                                      
555 Art II(1)(2).  
556 Art III(1)(2). 
557 Berg 248 (n 546). 
558 Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art 1 (c)(d). 
559 Even though the plaintiff does not have to prove these two aspects, they are still basis for a court to 
refuse enforcement of an arbitral award. See New York Convention, art V (d)(e). 
560 Article V reads: ‘Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition 
and enforcement is sought, proof that:’ 
561 Patricia Nacimiento, ‘Article V(1)(a)’ in Herbert Kronke and others (eds), Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: a Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business 2010) 207-09. 
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The improvements of the global international arbitration framework introduced 
by the New York Convention and the number of countries that have ratified it, render it 
an important component of the discussion of transnational dispute resolutions. 
c. Considerations on the Legal Basis of a Dispute Resolution System 
Why does it matter what legal basis is used to design a dispute resolution system 
for securities transactions? There are two important aspects that arise directly out of this 
question. 
The first is the level of entrenchment of the dispute resolution system within the 
institutional framework of governments. Nationally or internationally, systems that have 
a direct legal basis are harder to create and when they are created, they are not so easily 
dismantled. They are often part of a greater state or inter-state design, such as the 
judiciary or the WTO.  
On the other hand, systems based on indirect legal jurisdictional basis do not need 
the same political capital to be built. Anyone could start an arbitral institution from their 
home, as it does not usually require previous approval from the authorities. The success 
of the system would require convincing those persons who are party to disputes to use 
them; this however, is more of a marketing question.  
The second aspect is the enforcement of the decisions across borders. The direct 
legal jurisdiction systems often depend on treaties made in a piecemeal basis or on 
considerations of ‘comity’ in order to operate across borders, presenting serious legal 
barriers and legal uncertainty. The indirect legal jurisdiction systems are more effective 
due to the New York Convention, which allows for the world-wide enforcement of any 
decision made in such systems. This second aspect will be discussed more in depth in 
another chapter.562 
B. The Decision-maker’s Independence and Accountability 
In the context of legal decision-making, independence is the absence of external 
factors influencing the decision-making process, whether from the other political 
                                                      
562 See Chapter X. 
 138 
branches of the state or from private interests. Independence therefore is an essential 
characteristic of the Rule of Law, since for it to exist, those who are in charge of applying 
the law have to take their decisions on the basis only of the legal rules and principles of a 
given legal system. 
External influence in the decision-making process in dispute resolution systems is 
a dangerous path as it jeopardizes the Rule of Law ideal by bringing alien concepts into it. 
If this is allowed, law becomes pure politics, thus changing all the beneficial aspects that 
a legal system may play in solving disputes in a just and fair system.563 In the modern state 
context, judicial independence is so important that it is considered to be a fundamental 
human right.564 To avoid unwarranted influences565 and guarantee independence, formal 
institutional safeguards have to be put in place.566 The adjudicator, as a neutral third-
party, can only dispense justice and fairness according to the law if there is 
independence,567 and if this is valid both for judges as public officers as well as arbitrators 
acting through the power delegated by the parties in the dispute.  
The flipside of independence is accountability. Too much independence is also 
problematic, since, if left unchecked, judges may become the tyrants themselves, 
foregoing the application of the law for their own private interests.568 This is a matter of 
fine-tuning the institutional design of a political system, as judges are the gears in the 
wider machinery of the state. To the same extent that judges should not be allowed to 
decide based on bribes, nor should they be allowed to forego what has been politically 
                                                      
563 ‘A legislature required to generalize when crafting its rules will, we fear, be all too quick to abandon or 
distort those rules in particular cases involving favored or disfavored parties, thus subverting the law’s 
generality for improper reasons.’ John A. Ferejohn and Larry D. Kramer, ‘Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraing’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 962, 967. 
564 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 10. 
565 The influences to be concerned with are the illegal ones – those arising out of private bribes or political 
pressure, disfiguring the legal process and adding elements for the judge to consider that should be absent 
for a decision based solely on legal arguments.  
566  Georg Vanberg, ‘Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence’ in Keith Whittington, Daniel 
Kelemen and Gregory Caldeira (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 
2008) 100. 
567  Christopher Larkins, ‘Judicial Independence and Democratization: a Theoretical and Conceptual 
Analaysis’ (1996) 44 The American Journal of Comparative Law 605, 608. 
568 ‘Making judges independent of politicians and other lawmakers may free them from certain pressures 
to ignore the law […], but it also frees them from any pressure to follow it, and it allows them to make law 
in ways that could be problematic.’ Ferejohn and Kramer 972-73 (n 563). 
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established as ‘law’, apart from constitutional violations, within a democratic legal 
system.569 To address this problem, accountability mechanisms have to be created to 
provide some sort of control over decision makers, who will have different characteristics 
depending on whether the decision-maker is a public official (direct legal jurisdiction) or 
an arbitrator (consent-based jurisdiction).    
Public Officials 
The judge is the person holding a public office within the political structure of a 
state. If the state is a democratic one abiding by the Rule of Law standard, the judge’s 
independence has two essential aspects.570 
The first aspect is that of the judge as a public officer within a state branch vis-à-
vis the other state branches and his role in guaranteeing compliance with the rules of the 
political system. In this respect, the judge must be insulated from political pressures from 
other sectors of the state,571 as he is acting as a guarantor that the state will not be able to 
execute its will outside of what is authorized by law.572 
Some of the mechanisms to guarantee a judge’s independence are a strong 
selection process, tenure on the job, irreducibility of salaries,573 prohibition of transfers, 
judicial immunity and a country’s budget percentage that is guaranteed to the judicial 
branch.574 These mechanisms soften any concerns that a judge might have regarding the 
continuity of his standard of life and the proper work of the judicial institutions since 
                                                      
569 The power aspect is not the only relevant problem with judges who are too independent, as the legal 
uncertainty arising out of such a legal system design has also considerable economic impact due to the 
uncertainty that this brings into the legal system.  
570 Borrowing from the definition of Christopher Larkins, ‘Judicial independence refers to the existence of 
judges who are not manipulated for political gain, who are impartial toward the parties of a dispute, and 
who form a judicial branch which has the power as an institution to regulate the legality of government 
behaviour, enact ‘neutral’ justice, and determine significant constitutional and legal values.’ Larkins 611 (n 
567). 
571 Ibid 609. 
572 Constitutional courts are an important aspect of limiting a state’s power and guaranteeing that some 
rights will be left unaltered by the state.  
573 The salary standard should be linked to its purchasing power since inflation can deeply erode what the 
judges can effectively obtain from it.  See Keith Rosenn, ‘The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin 
America’ (1987) 19 The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 1, 29-30. 
574 Ibid 15-23. 
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there is guaranteed income both at a personal and institutional level. By ensuring these 
guarantees are satisfied, the judges are free to decide as they please, without being afraid 
of retaliation from other political bodies.  
As the fairness of decisions depend on judges deciding based on the law, their 
independence has to be balanced with other mechanisms that ensure that judges will not 
stray too far from the possibilities of decision within the legal system and applicable 
norms of which they are part. The structure of the judiciary itself already presents some 
accountability mechanisms that counter-balance the judge’s independence, such as the 
right to an appeal. Alongside with it, another incentive for judges to remain within some 
widely acceptable boundaries of the law is to have the rate of reversal of their decisions, 
as one of the yardsticks for promotion within the judicial career. An instrument of a more 
political character that is also used to control the exercise of the Judiciary’s power is the 
possibility of impeachment or the discharge of duties for judges; this  is a serious 
mechanism usually reserved to the most egregious offenses, such as outright 
corruption.575  
The second aspect is judicial independence from the external influences of the 
parties to the dispute. The practice of selling decisions or of deciding on the basis of 
friendship or family ties (with a party to the dispute) undermines the fairness and justice 
of the legal system, disrupting the Rule of Law. There are a few measures available to 
discourage this type of behavior. The first is to give judges sufficient income for the 
position they occupy in society. Guaranteeing a good income diminishes the incentives 
underpinning the judge’s acceptance of a bribe, to decide in their favor, from one of the 
parties to the dispute. The second measure is to provide the parties within the procedural 
system with a way to exclude a judge from a dispute due to the ties he might have with 
the other party.576 Finally, criminalizing corruption is also another means by which the 
                                                      
575 See Frank Thompson Jr. and Daniel H. Pollitt, ‘Impeachment of Federal Judges: an Historical Overview’ 
(1970-1971) 49 North Carolina Law Review 87; Supplementary Law 35/1979 (Brazil), art 26.  
576 Ideally this would be done by a second level review mechanism, and not by the judge presiding the case.  
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institutional design might be structured to avoid judge partiality and guarantee 
independence.577  
Private decision makers 
In the same manner that judges need to be independent and impartial to provide 
litigants with fair and just decisions, so do arbitrators. In fact, from the perspective of a 
single dispute, the independence of the arbitrator has to be even higher than that of the 
judge because in a state-based judicial system appellate review is normally available, 
what is uncommon in arbitration.578 Since arbitration is a matter of choice on the part of 
those who submit their disputes to it, the parties will necessarily only agree to do so if 
they believe that there is a certain level of honesty in the process.579  
Even though the importance of independence for the litigants in a specific case in 
arbitration may be even higher than in a judicial proceeding, the mechanisms 
guaranteeing independence from undue influence are not the same as in state structures. 
This difference between state mechanisms of independence and arbitration mechanisms 
are due to the different structural relationships that arbitrators and judges have with the 
parties.  
The difference is founded in the identification of the judge or the arbitrator to 
decide the dispute. In a lawsuit, the party will file a brief that will be randomly distributed 
to a judge competent to hear the matter.580 In other words, even though there might be a 
pool of judges that can decide the dispute, or only one judge that can decide the dispute 
depending on the size of the jurisdiction in which the dispute will be heard, the judge is 
not explicitly chosen by the parties. On the other hand, arbitrators are normally chosen 
by parties; they either act together, or each party will nominate an arbitrator, and the 
arbitrators nominate a third.  
                                                      
577 For a general overview on judicial corruption, see Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 
2007 (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
578 Born 1463-64 (n 516). 
579 ‘The perceived legitimacy of the international arbitration process cannot be greater than the degree of 
confidence that litigants have in the ethical standards of the arbitrator.’ Jan Paulsson, ‘Ethics, Elitism, 
Eligibility’ (1997) 14 Journal of International Arbitration 13. 
580 E.g., Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 252. 
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The second difference reflects remuneration. Judges are public employees, and are 
therefore paid by the government through revenue that is secured from the general 
population by taxation and sometimes from fees that the litigants pay to the judicial 
system.581 Arbitrators are usually exclusively remunerated by the parties to the dispute, 
who have to proportionally fund the costs of the dispute resolution process.  
Even though judges and arbitrators solve disputes for a living, it is a business only 
for the arbitrators, since they depend on ‘clients’ to select them to decide their cases and 
to generate revenue. This characteristic unpacks a wide array of considerations that are 
relevant to their independence. At the same time, while it is important to prevent 
arbitrators from being too close to one of the parties of the dispute, it is also important 
not to decrease too extensively the requirements authorizing a claim of partiality, since 
this could lead to problems in finding arbitrators for some disputes, especially in cases 
that, due to its geographical traits or subject matter, there are not that many arbitrators 
available. This could be a problem in a field as specialized as securities transactions. 
There is no single standard for assessing an arbitrator’s independence worldwide, 
but the one that is commonly used is ‘justifiable doubts’.582 The concept is used to assess 
the risk of partiality, since it is not necessary that a party demonstrate an actual lack of 
independence or impartiality, but only that there is a justifiable doubt in the mind of a 
reasonable third party.583 The standard is also coupled with the use of possible conflict 
disclosure requirements by arbitrators, which if not made, may generate sufficient 
grounds for disqualification, even if the possible conflict that should have been disclosed 
is not by itself sufficient for a partiality claim.584 With an obligation of disclosure, the 
parties have a higher awareness of the possible conflicts that the arbitrator may have in 
deciding their dispute, impeaching the arbitrator if necessary.  
                                                      
581 Only a few countries have a system where what is paid by the litigants is supposed to cover the costs of 
the justice system. See Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer and Magdalena Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and 
Funding of Civil Litigation: a Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing 2010) 13-15. 
582 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), art 12; IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest (2004), Part I(2).  
583 See Born 1475-79 (n 516). 
584 Ibid 1524. 
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These mechanisms are important to guarantee the integrity and legitimacy of the 
arbitration process, helping to lift it to the same level as the public justice system, at least 
as regards private enforcement. 
C. The Reasoning and Publicity of Decisions 
The reasoning behind legal decisions is an important aspect of any legal system. 
Law is dynamic, always evolving through new legislation and legal decisions. There are 
two special aspects of reasoned decisions that are important for a modern legal system: 
firstly, they constrain the judges in reaching a decision since they are obliged to use 
reason and the decision has to logically follow from the premises that were accepted in a 
judgment. If the premises are the ones being disputed, practical reason has to be used 
through the frame of reference of the law in general or of particular branches of law.585 
Secondly, they give the legal system new material to operate, clarifying situations that 
were before unclear and serving as the basis for the discussion and decision of similar 
cases.  
In respect of the first aspect, legal reasoning in a legal system functions as a 
guidepost for judges as it limits the range of decisions that can be taken. The lack of a 
reasoning obligation would allow them to reach any decision without having to provide 
justification. By imposing a duty to reason, judges have to do so through legal arguments, 
what can be made only according to the logic of the legal system itself. Reasoning 
therefore has to be developed based on legal norms, with the effect of constraining the 
possible arguments that can be made, and consequently the possible outcomes of a legal 
decision.586 This aspect of reasoning in law leads towards the ideal of certainty that is 
necessary for the Rule of Law to operate. 
                                                      
585 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and The Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford 2005) 254-55. 
586 (‘[…] the legal answer ‘always has to be capable of being framed in terms of law, through interpretation 
of statues or of precedents, or of legal principles developed through reflection on law as practically coherent 
normative order’. In this vein, a primary requirement of legal reasoning is to show that the ruling ‘does not 
contradict validly established rules of law’. A second requirement is to show that the decision is supported 
by established legal principles.  […]’) Flavia Carbonell, ‘Reasoning by Consequences: Applying Different 
Argumentation Structures to the Analysis of Consequentialist Reasoning in Judicial Decisions’ in Christian 
Dahlman and Eveline Feteris (eds), Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, vol 102 
(Springer 2013) 6. 
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In respect of the second aspect, which follows directly from the first, legal decisions 
are utterances of what the law is at a given moment, and as such they also function 
normatively in regulating the conduct of the population subsumed to it. The reasoning 
behind a decision, whether the precedent doctrine operates within the legal system or not, 
is informative of the state of the law and is used as a yardstick for legal/illegal behavior. 
Lawyers will advise their clients about the legality of a given path of behavior based both 
on statute and on the decisions of the relevant courts in the jurisdictions in which the 
client operates: in case a dispute arises out of a similar fact pattern as it had been decided 
before, the previous judgment will be used as an argument of the current state of the law, 
even if it is not strictly binding under the rules of that particular legal system.587 
As established in the previous paragraphs, the existence of reasoned decisions is 
an important aspect of the operation of a legal system which purports to regulate 
effectively the conduct of those subject to it. Even though reasoned decisions are 
important, something more is needed for them to comply with their function of being the 
substrate of legal arguments and future legal decisions. Any person who wants to access 
a judicial decision should be able to do so without incurring any major costs (and 
preferably, be able to do so for for free), therefore creating an environment of 
transparency in the operation of the legal system.  
Transparency in legal decision-making bodies brings important advantage to their 
operation and the efficiency of the legal system as a whole. An interesting study about 
transparency in the civil justice system in the United States was published in 2012, 
underlining its importance and the benefits accruing from it.588  Essentially, the study 
concluded that transparency would improve the functioning of the market in claim 
settlements, decrease fraud, increase confidence and decrease transaction costs.589 The 
conclusions are intuitive; if information is concentrated in a single database that is easily 
accessible, the general costs that the system creates will be lower since duplicative efforts 
                                                      
587 As in Brazil, that does not have a doctrine of stare decisis, even though many commentators argue that 
judicial decisions have legal value for future cases. See Fredie Didier Junior, Curso de Direito Processual Civil 
- Volume 2 (5 edn, Editora JusPODIVM 2010) 386-87. 
588 Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T. Reville and Laura Zakaras (eds), Confidentiality, Transparency, and the U.S. 
Civil Justice System (Oxford University Press 2012). 
589 Ibid xxv. 
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to produce the same information will be avoided.590 To a certain extent, the argument is 
the same as with disclosure duties for securities regulation. 
Also, at a more fundamental level, justice should be accessible to everyone; 
differentiating the access to crucial information about the law through the financial 
capabilities of the parties - by allowing access only through paid means, for example - 
would create an unnecessary and unjust bias to the party with greater financial means.591 
Whether it is a matter for the efficiency or the fairness of the system, reasoned 
decisions and easy access to it should be pursued as objectives in any proposal for a 
dispute resolution system.  
2. Economic Aspects of the Institutional Framework 
There are two sides to consider regarding the economic aspects of a dispute 
resolution system: A) the costs of maintaining a dispute resolution system; and B) the 
costs of accessing a dispute resolution system.  
A. Costs of Maintaining a Dispute Resolution System 
Dispute resolution systems need to be funded. They will require a physical location 
and employees to carry out the activities they perform. The total costs will depend on the 
size of the institution and the array of services offered; for example, those institutions that 
only coordinate dispute resolution but do not maintain the decision-makers in their 
payroll will have a lower percentage of fixed costs when compared to court systems, 
                                                      
590 Think for example on the case of a legal system that implemented a central database accessible through 
the internet – before the implementation each party would have to ask for the production of a copy of the 
judgment on paper, what would have to be mailed to the parties. After the implementation of the system 
the parties will only print the judgment if they feel the need to read it on paper, as it could be accessible 
through the internet at any time.  
591 See Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘The Future of Court System Transparency’ in Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T. Reville 
and Laura Zakaras (eds), Confidentiality, Transparency, and the US Civil Justice System (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 170-71. It is true that in any event the party with less money will be disadvantaged, but the 
difference is that at least theoretically, the lawyer of this party will have the same possibility of preparing a 
strong case than the lawyer of the richer party. In case money is charged to access court decisions, the access 
to law itself is impaired.  
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which will necessarily need judges and support staff that will be paid on a regular basis, 
regardless of the amount of cases being filed. 
Such considerations are important because the success of a dispute resolution 
system will depend on its costs and how the costs will be borne. A completely private 
design will create a dispute resolution body that is a business, which will lead to 
incentives in pleasing the users of the system. On the other hand, a system that is public 
will have a higher degree of independence but will also require financial commitment 
from states to be able to properly perform its activities.  
The choice then is how to allocate the costs between the users of the system and 
the political community supporting it. In most cases where the jurisdictional legal basis is 
direct, the system will be funded both by the political community through taxation and 
the requirement that the users pay a fee to access the system. On the other hand, when 
the legal basis for jurisdiction is indirect, the model of the dispute resolution system will 
be more of a business, receiving money from the users of the system and sometimes from 
the business community that has an interest in supporting it.  
B. Costs of Engaging in a Dispute Resolution Procedure 
Every decision to engage in a legal dispute has to take into account the costs that 
the dispute will entail compared to the likelihood of the claim’s success. The best-case 
scenario for someone considering engaging in litigation is a high value claim with a high 
likelihood of success. Each legal system differs substantially regarding the costs of 
litigation, which can amount to millions of dollars for each party. 592  Even though 
securities disputes costs may amount to millions, individual investors rarely have a high 
amount at stake in their dispute and depending on the costs needed access to justice, may 
be precluded exclusively based on them. 
Here there is an inherent tension between costs and access to justice. The higher 
the costs, the harder it is to obtain access, which then requires alternative methods of 
                                                      
592 For a comparative view on the costs of civil litigation, see  Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (n 581). 
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access and legal support to those parties that do not have it.  Costs can be divided into a) 
costs of access and b) costs of evidence and representation.  
a. Costs of Access 
Every court system or arbitral institution requires the payment of a fee for access 
to the dispute resolution system. The fee can be applied either at the beginning of the 
litigation or at various steps along the way.593 In any event, the minimum cost that should 
be considered for matters of ‘dispute resolution’ should be the amount dispensed from 
the beginning of the lawsuit until the first instance decision, which is the first stage at 
which the dispute has been effectively solved by a third-party to the dispute.594  Within 
this idea of cost of access, the remuneration of arbitrators has also to be taken into account 
since in many systems it has to be paid up front. These costs can vary immensely.  
To illustrate the difference, the table below shows a comparison for a $100.000 
value dispute among different dispute resolution systems: 
 US595 Brazil596 Spain597 Finra598 ICC599 
Filing Fees $350 $1.000 $695,15 $1.425 $3.000 
Arbitrator 
Fees600 
- - - $450 $10.060 
                                                      
593 Ibid 14. 
594 The dispute could be solved through settlement after the beginning of a lawsuit, but this would not entail 
the full use of the dispute resolution system.  
595 Southern District of New York. 
596 Sao Paulo Tribunal.  
597 Jean Albert, Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the European Union - Final 
Report - Annex 48 - Spain (2007) 22. 
598 Finra Customer Code, ss 12900 and 12902. 
599 International Chamber of Commerce ICC, ‘ICC Cost Calculator’   <http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-
Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Cost-and-payment/Cost-calculator/> accessed 8 July 2014. 
600 The arbitrator fees are based on the median value of those displayed in the documents regulating each 
system.  
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Total $350 $1.000 $695,15 $1.875 $13.060 
 
In this comparison, it becomes clear that stepping through the door of arbitration 
can be more expensive than proceeding to litigation. Even at Finra, the securities 
arbitration institution in the United States that is prepared to handle customer (investor) 
arbitrations, the cost of simply engaging in arbitration amounts almost to 2% of the total 
value of the dispute, where in courts this would not exceed 1%.601 At the ICC, one of the 
most prestigious arbitration institutions in the world, the cost of engaging in a $100.000 
dispute is simply prohibitive, amounting to more than 13% of the claim just for the filing 
of the dispute and remuneration of the arbitrators.  
b. Costs of Evidence and Representation 
Evidence production and review are other important aspects of the cost structure 
of dispute resolution in securities disputes. Here the main culprits are common law style 
discovery and expert witnesses.  
Discovery is an institution of civil procedure that is alien to civil law lawyers. It 
allows one party to demand the production of information by the other party on an 
extensive basis, encompassing more or less anything that is relevant to the claim or 
defense;602 this imposes extreme burdens both on the party who has to organize the 
documents and also on the party requesting the documents who will be required to 
review them.  
To the extent that any given type of dispute has a wide factual background that can 
be accessed through discovery, institutional designs that allow for this procedural 
possibility will be much more costly for litigants than the systems that have capped these 
methods. Document collection, review and production are tasks that are often done by 
                                                      
601 In the jurisdictions researched, the most expensive one would be Brazil. 
602 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 26(b). 
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the party’s lawyers, mixing to some degree this type of costs with the costs of 
representation.  
Lawyer’s fees depend largely on the jurisdiction and the profile of the law firm 
providing the service. Smaller law firms may charge by the lawsuit being pursued, while 
larger law firms usually have a hourly-rate fee for the service provided, which averages, 
at least in the United States, at $250,00 an hour.603 
At these rates, any type of dispute that would require even a not-so-extensive 
discovery process would, as a matter of fact, make it impossible for the average investor 
to pursue a lawsuit, unless the investor was joined by similarly situated investors to 
proceed with a mass claims proceeding. When low values are at stake, the dispute 
resolution system design has to allow for low costs of evidence and representation, 
otherwise low value claims will be banned from legal protection. 
3. Implications of the Institutional Framework for a Dispute 
Resolution System 
As the objective of this thesis is to propose a dispute resolution system for 
transnational securities transactions that is more reliable than the current alternatives in 
existence, the establishment of the parameters to analyze their institutional framework 
becomes the first step in achieving this aim.  
Legal systems exist to manage expectations and to coordinate social interactions. 
In economic transactions, they are important because they allow the parties to plan for 
the future, relying on the legal system to guarantee that promises will be kept and assets 
will be protected. With regards to this aspect, private enforcement is the centerpiece of 
the efficiency of the system.  
The reliability of the legal system is dependent on the operation of the Rule of Law 
principle through institutions designed to operate as objectively as possible. Since the 
                                                      
603 Nicholas M. Pace and Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigation Expenditures for 
Producing Electronic Discovery (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2012). 
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dispute resolution forum is where the law will be applied in the specific case, its design 
has to be made so as to avoid subjective considerations as much as possible.  
The first part of this chapter showed that two of the most essential component 
parts for this to be accomplished are a) the balance between the independence and 
accountability of the decision-makers and b) the transparency of their decisions. These 
considerations, while not definitely tied to the type of jurisdiction granting mechanism, 
are to some extent defined by it. 
By having a well-designed balance between the independence and the 
accountability of the decision-maker, the dispute resolution system guarantees that it will 
operate according to the Rule of Law, bringing to it all the positive aspects related to 
economic planning and production.  
Regarding transparency, it is not so important if a single dispute is considered; an 
arbitration, the main focus of which is simply to solve definitely a dispute, will most likely 
be tailored to the needs of the parties engaging in it. For example, confidentiality may be 
important because the parties do not want other parties to know about their dealings. The 
problem is that a dispute resolution system, with a specific focus in solving single disputes, 
may create problems for the legal system as a whole. Decisions that are not made public 
impair the development of law, as the market will not be able to be guided by these 
decisions and develop expectations around them; this brings back one of the most 
important issues that law has been created to solve, namely, certainty in social relations.  
Therefore, if a dispute resolution system purports to be comprehensive in a given 
field of disputes, be it vested with direct or indirect jurisdiction, it has to be designed in a 
manner whereby decision-makers have strong incentives to consider only legal 
arguments and where the transparency of decisions is allowed so the legal system can 
evolve.  
The second dimension of this chapter is related to the economic considerations of 
a dispute resolution system. On the one hand, the system has to be funded; the two pure 
models are state-funded systems and business-funded systems. In practice, this has some 
relationship to the type of jurisdiction-granting mechanism upon which the dispute 
resolution system is based; systems with direct jurisdiction are usually financed by some 
kind of taxation, either over the population in general or over specific users of the system, 
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while systems based on consent jurisdiction mechanisms are funded by the users of the 
system or by businesses that feel it appropriate to have a parallel dispute resolution 
system in place.  
Finally, the second economic aspect, the costs of engaging in litigation, is essential 
to the analysis made in the next chapters, as it is linked to the incentives for the exercise 
of private enforcement. For claims to be litigated, they have to bring an expected benefit 
to the claimant. If the value of the claim is lower than the cost of engaging in litigation, the 
claim will not be litigated. Even if the system allows claims to be litigated for free, as in 
some small claims systems, the claim value might be so low that it is not worthwhile for 
the claimant to pursue it. Aggregate litigation mechanisms then becomes an interesting 
option, allowing for the collection of claims to increase the possible economic output of 
the dispute, creating an opportunity for other parties to get involved and providing a 
wider avenue for access to justice.604  
The Rule of Law and access to justice, therefore, is paramount to the efficiency of 
private enforcement of securities laws, both in respect of the compensation and the 
deterrence aspects of securities regulation. The next chapter surveys different dispute 
resolution systems that could be used as models to create a system working within the 
principles of the Rule of Law and providing wider access for securities disputes, enabling 
self-reliance on the private enforcement of securities laws; thereafter, Chapter VIII 
analyses the incentives for private enforcement in aggregate litigation and the possible 
pitfalls that this type of procedural mechanism may create.  
 
 
  
                                                      
604 See Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 187-91 Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions’ 
[1999] 1999 Supreme Court Review 337. 
 152 
 
 153 
Chapter VII – Alternative Models of 
Dispute Resolution Systems 
The previous chapter has established core institutional aspects of a dispute 
resolution system and has provided some insight on how such a system could comply with 
the Rule of Law principle and be an adequate mechanism for private enforcement. This 
section will use this previous discussion as a basis to analyze some of the important 
dispute resolution systems that can be used to solve financial transactions in the world 
(and other systems not directly related to financial disputes but which could nevertheless 
be used to solve them). 
The objective of this chapter is to outline how different dispute resolution 
mechanisms that could be potentially used for securities disputes are structured. Due to 
the transnational character of the problem proposed by this thesis, this chapter is divided 
into 1) national models and 2) transnational models.  
1. National Models 
National models of dispute resolution systems are those based within the bounds 
of a state. Even though they can deal with disputes that are transnational, their 
institutional structure is nation-based.  
A. Small Claims Court Model 
Small claims courts are dispute resolution systems within the state structure that 
are an alternative to the normal procedure of the court system. They are designed to 
provide easy access to the justice system by allowing a person to sue without a lawyer 
and by having low access costs. The decision-maker is either a judge or a person overseen 
by a judge; the authority of the decision is the same as the one given through normal 
proceedings. Funding for the small claims courts comes from the state. Small claim courts 
have, by definition, a limited jurisdictional scope based on the claim’s amount, while at 
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the same time they may restrict those who have standing to sue.605 The small claim courts 
model is completely public.  
The Brazilian system is an interesting one. Small claim courts in Brazil have existed 
since 1984.606 Their introduction into the Brazilian legal system had the initial goal of 
opening access to justice to a part of the population that otherwise could not use the 
judiciary to seek legal relief.607 Subsequently, the justification for the system has also been 
broadened to encompass the overburdened courts that existed (and continue to exist) in 
Brazil.608  
Bureaucracy was previously a much more ugly monster than it is today in Brazil. 
In 1979, the Brazilian government started the National Program of Deburocratization to 
diminish the bureaucratic requirements that were widespread in the Brazilian 
government.609 In the same period, the Rio Grande do Sul Judiciary was testing a simpler 
method of dispute resolution that would avoid the high costs and the delay that were 
common in Brazilian courts.610 This setting, and the inspiration that a Secretary from the 
Deburocratization Ministry had from the small claims court in New York,611 formed the 
background against which the Brazilian small claims courts were created.  
In 1995, the legal and institutional structures of the small claims courts were 
broadened, both regarding the amount of the disputes that were accepted within its 
jurisdiction as well as the legal problems at stake. Law 9.099/95, currently in force, was 
the legal instrument that provided for these changes.  
                                                      
605 For example, in the NY Small Claims Court System, businesses are not allowed to sue. See Judith S. Kaye 
and Jonathan Lippman, A Guide to Small Claims in the NYS City, Town and Village Courts (New York State 
Unified Court System New York State Unified Court System). 
606 Law 7.244/1984. 
607  Ana Carolina da Matta Chasin, ‘Uma Simples Formalidade: estudo sobre a experiência dos Juizados 
Especiais Cíveis em São Paulo’ (LLM, USP 2007). 
608 Ibid . 
609 Ibid 42-43. 
610 See ibid 51-54. 
611 Ibid 50. 
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The procedure in the small claims courts is simpler than in normal courts. For 
disputes up to R$ 14.480, a lawyer is not necessary to assist in the lawsuit. 612  The 
procedure is basically divided into two hearings: during the first, a conciliator will try to 
lead the parties to an agreement;613 if an agreement is not reached, a second hearing will 
be organized so evidence can be presented and the judge can be instructed.614 Appeals 
are possible and are made to a collegiate of three career judges.615  
There are three main figures in the dispute resolution method of the small claim 
courts in Brazil: the career judge, the layman judge and the conciliator. The career judge 
is the only one who is a proper judge, approved by public exam and invested with judicial 
powers. Any actions that are taken by the layman judge or the conciliator are under the 
supervision of the career judge. The difference is a functional one; the layman judge will 
preside over the instruction and judgment hearings and proffer sentences subject to the 
career judge’s approval, 616  while the conciliator can only preside over conciliation 
hearings.617 
This structure allows for a smaller cost in dispensing justice and solving disputes. 
For example, while a judge earns around R$ 20.000, 618  a layman judge can be 
remunerated up to R$ 3.000 a month,619 depending on the amount of work that has been 
done. The difference is substantial.  
Criticisms have been advanced that the quality of justice would be different, 
depending on the claim chosen; those who could afford a full proceeding would have more 
                                                      
612 The parameter is disputes up to 20 minimum salaries (Art. 9 Lei 9.099/95). Also, small claims courts can 
entertain disputes up to 40 minimum salaries (Art. 3, I, Lei 9.099/95).  
613 Law 9.099/95, art 22. 
614 Law 9.099/95, arts 27-29. 
615 Law 9.099/95, art 41 §1. 
616 Law 9.099/95, art 40. 
617 Law 9.099/95, art 22. 
618 For example, in Mato Grosso do Sul a judge at the beginning of his career receives R$20.517,59. See 
‘Estrutura Remuneratória - Cargos Efetivos’ (TJMS)  
<http://www.tjms.jus.br/transparencia/resolucao102/anexo3_estrutura_remuneratoria.php> accessed 8 
July 2014. 
619 In the State of Mato Grosso do Sul, this would mean deciding around 42 cases, while for each case, the 
layman judge would receive R$ 71,00. Resolution TJMS 564 (2010), art 2.  
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‘justice’ than those subsumed to the small claims system.620 Even though there is some 
appeal to such an argument, since those who are paid more tend to be better trained than 
those who are paid less and more evidence results in more facts being provided to the 
decision-maker, this is also highly dependent on the institutional structure of the small 
claims courts.621 
A compromise must also be reached between costs, quality of justice, whatever 
this means, and access to justice. A slightly poorer justice is better than no justice at all, a 
situation which might arise because the costs are too high for disputes to be entertained 
or because the proceedings for the ‘better quality’ justice become too long due to the 
demand on the court system, such that it becomes virtually impossible for a judicial 
decision to be of any use.  
B. The Financial Ombudsman Service Model 
The Financial Ombudsman Service Model is a different scheme in comparison to 
the small claims court model. Its funding is more specific, the decision-makers are not 
judges and the binding effects of the decision are different than those of a judicial decision.  
One of the most successful financial ombudsman services is the UK Financial 
Ombudsman Service. It is a public body that was created by the UK Parliament in 2000622 
and run by a ‘company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital’, 623  the 
Financial Ombudsman Service Limited, the ‘scheme operator’ under the Financial Markets 
Act 2000.624 
The idea behind the scheme was to resolve disputes ‘quickly and with minimum 
formality by an independent person’625 regarding services provided within the financial 
industry in the UK; it appears that this service has been successful: the 2012/2013 annual 
                                                      
620 Chasin 54-58 (n 607). 
621 Chasin has shown in her work that despite being under the same ‘small claims court’ legislation and 
within the same city, there were significant differences in the operation of the ‘small claims court’ system 
in the two courts that she studied. See ibid 87-163. 
622 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Part XVI and Schedule 17. 
623 Articles of Association of Financial Ombudsman Service Limited.  
624 Financial Markets Act 2000, s 225.  
625 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 225(1).  
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review showed that there were 2,161,439 calls to their helpline and 508,881 new cases. 
Their track record was also good; 81% of all cases were solved in less than 12 months.626 
These are substantial numbers, which show that the service has attracted a 
considerable number of users. As substantial as the amount of cases with which the 
Financial Ombudsman Service is dealing, the budget for its operation, which was of 191.1 
million pounds for 2012/2013, is also substantial.627 Its financing structure is interesting. 
It depends on a levy imposed on financial firms as a cost of doing business and, mainly, on 
the income that is also received from these firms according to the cases that are brought 
against them.628 Even though the levy is a form of taxation and the burden of sustaining 
the system falls on financial firms, it is a fair structure as it provides access to justice to 
financial customers and to some extent, the financing also comes from the consumers 
themselves, since they will be paying for the services they obtain from financial firms, who 
have to take into account their costs of doing business while deciding how much they will 
charge their customers.  
The scheme derives its authority from the Financial Services Markets Act 2000,629 
the Consumer Credit Act 2006630 and from regulations enacted by the Financial Conduct 
Authority,631 the UK body in charge of regulating ‘conduct in retail, as well as wholesale, 
financial markets and the infrastructure that supports those markets’.632 More limited in 
                                                      
626  See ‘Annual Review 2012/2013’ (Financial Ombudsman Service, 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013)  
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar13/dealt.html> accessed 8 July 2014.  
627 There was an expected deficit of 6.4 million pounds for last year, but this was due to a surge in PPI cases 
and the necessity to hire and train new staff ibid . 
628 The levy ranges from 100 pounds to 300,000 pounds, depending on the size of the firm, and it covered 
9.3% of the budget in 2012/2013  ‘Our Plans and Budget for 2012/2013 - Finalised and Approved’ 
(Financial Ombudsman Service, 27 March 2012)  <http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/planandbudget-2012-13-approved.html> accessed 8 July 2014. Case 
fees are currently at 550 pounds per case, but are charged only on the cases after the 25th case that is 
brought against the company. There is also a surcharge of 350 pounds for cases involving payment 
protection insurance (see ‘Our Plans and Budget for 2013/2014 - Finalised and Approved’ (Financial 
Ombudsman Service, 20 March 2013)  <http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/plan_and_budget_13-14.html> accessed 8 July 2014.  
629 Part XVI and Schedule 17. 
630 Section 59. 
631 FCA Handbook. 
632  See ‘Regulatory Reform - Background’ (Financial Services Authority)  
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform/background> accessed 8 July 2014. 
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scope than courts, the disputes entertained within this system are only those related to 
regulated activities from investment firms in the UK or collective portfolio management 
services provided by an EEA UCITS management company or by an EEA AIFM; 633 the 
jurisdiction is also only available to consumers or otherwise low asset value 
institutions,634 with maximum awards of £150.000.635  
The dispute resolution system is mainly informal and is done first through a 
conciliation/mediation procedure that is performed by the ‘adjudicators’, who try to 
resolve the matter and issue an opinion on how the case should be solved. This opinion is 
not binding and if the parties do not reach an agreement they can make a request that the 
case be decided by the ombudsman. After the ombudsman decision is issued, the 
consumer can either accept it or not. If the decision is accepted, it is binding on both 
parties, otherwise it is not binding and the consumer can still seek redress through the 
court system.636  
The Ombudsman Service is under the supervision of a Board, with its members 
being appointed by the FCA. 637  Board members are appointed to serve in the public 
interest, and not as the representatives of any sector of the financial services industry.638 
The Board is then in charge of appointing and maintaining a panel of ombudsmen.639 
Finally, regarding the decision made, the UK Financial Ombudsmen Service is 
becoming more transparent. It has already started publishing the decisions taken, as 
required by the amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 introduced 
by the Financial Services Act 2012. The publicity of the decisions is a positive change since 
                                                      
633 FCA Handbook, DISP 2.3.1 and 2.6.1. 
634 FCA Handbook, DISP 2.7.6. 
635 FCA Handbook, DISP 3.7.4. 
636 See Financial Ombudsman Service, The Ombudsman and Larger Businesses (2012) 7-9; FCA Handbook 
DISP, 3.6.6(4) and 4(A). 
637 The chairman also needs the approval of the HM Treasury. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
Schedule 17, 3(2). 
638  ‘Information for Businesses Covered by the Ombudsman Service’ (Financial Ombudsman Service)  
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/rules_a8.html> accessed 8 July 2014. 
639 See Articles of Association of Financial Ombudsman Service Limited, s 15. 
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it makes the system more transparent and gives businesses more resources to 
understand better what is expected of them, improving legal certainty.  
For the purposes of this work, this is a very interesting scheme. It finances roughly 
80% of its operation through case-related revenue, it is consumer friendly, it solves 
disputes in a considerable short amount of time and it renders binding decisions. Such 
characteristics could be interesting for a transnational system for securities disputes, 
especially when having in mind the small and medium investor. 
C. Self-Regulation Model 
Another option is to have the dispute resolution system embedded in the market 
control mechanisms that are overseen by the organized securities markets, under a self-
regulation model.  
In Brazil, this is the option that has been chosen for disputes up to R$ 70.000640 
that involve financial intermediaries and investors when the dispute concerns the 
intermediation of securities transactions or custody services.641 
The mechanism is run by BMF&Bovespa through its regulatory body, the 
BM&FBovespa Supervisão de Mercados (BSM), which has rules and regulations that 
govern the procedure for the dispute resolution mechanism.642  
The decisions are taken either by the Supervision Council643 or the Director of Self-
Regulation, who are appointed by the General Assembly of the BSM.644 The arrangement 
does not guarantee much independence since the decision makers are under the complete 
control of BM&FBovespa, the Brazilian securities market. 
                                                      
640 Instruction CVM 461, art 80 para 1. 
641 Instruction CVM 461, art 77.  
642 See Regulation of the Loss Recovery Mechanism.  
643 A group of three Counselors will decide on a given dispute in the Ordinary Procedure.  
644 BM&FBOVESPA Supervisão de Mercados, Estatuto Social da BM&FBOVESPA Supervisão de Mercados - 
BSM (2011) arts 16, I and II. This means that legally BSM is totally controlled by the BM&FBovespa, since 
BSM associated parties are BM&FBovespa and Banco BM&F de Serviços de Liquidação e Custódia S.A, which 
is controlled by BM&FBovespa (see ‘Quem Somos’ (Banco BM&FBOVESPA)  
<http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/bancobmfbovespa/institucional.asp> accessed 8 July 2014). 
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Even though decisions are made by persons who are members of this private body, 
due to the public aspect of a securities market, the decision can be appealed to the CVM, 
the Brazilian public agency in charge of regulating the securities market,645 which then 
renders an administrative decision.646  Since administrative decisions in Brazil do not 
preclude the use of the judiciary, both parties can still start a lawsuit over the same subject 
matter of the dispute if they are not satisfied with the decision proffered. 
Regarding the reasoning of decisions and transparency, the mechanism can be 
used as a good example because both the BSM and the CVM decisions are published on 
the website and legal reasoning is provided, allowing a body of precedent to develop. 
Access is not as easy as it is for other mechanisms; it is highly bureaucratized, 
requiring the recognition of the claimant’s signature by a public notary. The good part 
about it is that it is free and they provide a form and a manual to make it easier for a 
complaint to be made.  
D. Arbitration 
Continuing on from the most to the least public dispute resolution scheme, 
arbitration may be divided into those schemes that have some degree of public influence, 
the State Supervised Model, to the more general arbitration schemes that operate only 
through the enabling legislation of a state.  
a. State Supervised Model 
Arbitration is supposedly a purely private mechanism of dispute resolution. Even 
though this is how arbitration initially developed, there are schemes that are based on an 
arbitration framework but in which there is a strong public presence, to the extent that 
its ‘voluntary’ character is stripped and it becomes the only de facto method for solving 
disputes.  
This is the case of FINRA, the dispute resolution scheme in the United States for 
disputes between consumers and financial intermediaries. ‘(FINRA) is the largest 
                                                      
645 Instruction CVM 461, art 81, para 1, and Regulation of the Loss Recovery Mechanism, art 26, III.  
646 Regulation of the Loss Recovery Mechanism, art. 29. 
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independent regulator of securities firms doing business with the public in the United 
States’.647  FINRA arose out of ‘the consolidation of NASD and the member regulation, 
enforcement and arbitration operations of the New York Stock Exchange’. 648  It is an 
industry self-regulatory organization, falling under the supervision of the SEC.  
The power exercised by FINRA derives from its registration with the SEC under 
Section 15A of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. Since any broker-dealer must be 
registered with a Section 15A-registered securities association, FINRA being the only one 
at the moment, it exercises a public power since registration and compliance with its rules 
is mandatory for brokers-dealers to be legally able to exercise their activity.649 
FINRA maintains a dispute resolution scheme based on arbitration, which is 
imposed on its members either by a contractual commitment with investors or by FINRA 
Rule 12200. 650  The option for the investor is only theoretical as most financial 
intermediaries include an arbitration clause in their contract, imposing the use of the 
FINRA forum for dispute resolution.651 On the other hand, and characterizing the public 
aspect of the FINRA scheme, the broker-dealers cannot escape this dispute resolution 
method since they must be registered with FINRA to exercise their functions. 
Arbitrators for a particular dispute are selected from a list that is randomly 
generated from FINRA’s roster. Parties then will be able to strike arbitrators from the list 
and rank their choices. Since January 31, 2011, on a three-arbitrator panel, customers 
                                                      
647 ‘About Finra’ (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority)  <http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/> accessed 
8 July 2014. 
648 FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
- FINRA (2007).  
649 Securities and Exchange Act 1934, s 15 (b)(1). 
650 ‘Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if:  
Arbitration under the Code is either: 
Required by a written agreement, or 
Requested by the customer; (…)’ 
651  See NASAA, ‘Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is it Fair and Voluntary?’ 15 September 2009 
<http://www.nasaa.org/807/mandatory-binding-arbitration-is-it-fair-and-voluntary/> accessed 8 July 
2014.  
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have a choice to request the appointment of a panel composed by public arbitrators only; 
previously, one arbitrator connected to the securities industry was always present.652  
FINRA arbitrators do need to have some qualifications, such as five years of 
professional experience and two years of college-level credits, in addition to completing 
a training program.653 These do not seem to be extremely high requirements and anyone 
who fulfills them is able to become a FINRA arbitrator. Therefore, there are no strong 
checks regarding arbitrator independence; moreover, reputation does not seem to be a 
proper mechanism to guarantee it in this context.654 
Another negative point of the FINRA arbitration process is that decisions are 
usually not reasoned. As mentioned above, the lack of reasoning is a problem to the 
operation of the Rule of Law, especially in an institutional setting where almost all similar 
disputes are solved through this forum. 
Fees are paid along the way, depending on the acts required. For example, a party 
has to pay a fee to file the claim, but if the other party wants to counterclaim, they also 
have to pay a fee. If a hearing is requested, additional fees are due.  
A positive point to this approach however is that most decisions against financial 
intermediaries are voluntarily complied with. As FINRA has regulatory power over its 
members, it can suspend or revoke their license if they do not comply with the arbitrators’ 
decision within 30 days, therefore being an extremely efficient dispute resolution 
mechanism.655 
                                                      
652  See FINRA, ‘Optional All Public Panel Rules’ (FINRA)  
<http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Rules/NoticestoArbitratorsParties/Notice
stoParties/P123997> accessed 8 July 2014. 
653  See FINRA, ‘FINRA's Arbitrators’ (FINRA)  
<http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/BecomeanArbitrator/FINRAArbitrators/in
dex.htm> accessed 8 July 2014. 
654 In a manner that differs from commercial arbitration, which involves high stakes disputes and has a 
small community of arbitrators that are chosen based on their reputation due to the repeat player nature 
of the law firms involved in them, securities arbitration involves smaller claims that are brought mainly by 
consumers who are not likely to be coming back and learning about the institutional characteristics of the 
forum and the specific arbitrators.  
655 See Jill I. Gross, ‘The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?’ (2010) 30 Pace Law Review 1174, 1189  
FINRA Rules 12904. 
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The interesting characteristic of this scheme is that it is privately managed under 
the supervision of a public authority, which will be in charge of guaranteeing that the 
scheme remains truthful to its goals.656 There are a few shortcomings, namely, the lack of 
proper mechanisms to guarantee arbitrator independence and the lack of reasoned 
decisions, which are important aspects of a legal system operating under the Rule of Law.  
b. Private Arbitration Model 
The Private Arbitration Model657 is the general arbitration model. Even though this 
sub-section falls within the ‘national’ division of this section, the private arbitration model 
functions both for national as well as transnational disputes; the decision to place it here 
was because their institutional structure is tied to a state, which is to say that it differs 
from the international arbitration model discussed in the next section, which is tied to 
more than one state.658 It is characterized by complete freedom of the parties to engage 
in arbitration, whether through a contractual clause agreed upon before the dispute arises 
or by an agreement to arbitrate afterwards.  
The only role of the state in a private arbitration model is to guarantee that 
agreements to arbitrate will be legally binding – which means that once someone agrees 
to arbitrate, the dispute has to be submitted to arbitration and the decision of the 
arbitrator will be executable through the courts of law of that state. The whole scheme is 
characterized by the exclusive presence of parties acting in their private capacity.  
An arbitral institution usually manages a private arbitration procedure. This 
institution is in charge of guaranteeing that the procedure develops seamlessly and that 
the decisions made by the arbitrators will be legally enforceable. Remuneration of the 
arbitral institution and of the arbitrators is paid by the parties to the dispute; the manner 
in which remuneration accrues varies depending on the arbitral institution.  
                                                      
656 For example, easy access to dispute resolution.  
657 In the arbitration scholarship, this is the commercial arbitration model, as investment arbitration always 
involves the state as one of the parties of the dispute and is based on treaties.   
658  An arbitral institution has to be constituted according to the laws of a state, unless created by an 
international treaty.  
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The guarantee of arbitrator independence is based mostly on reputational aspects. 
There are a few mechanisms within the legal framework for arbitration that can cure a 
lack of independence, but these are ex post mechanisms of control, such as the non-
enforcement based on arbitrator’s partiality.  
The specific dispute resolution schemes are tied to the arbitral institutions that 
manage the arbitration. Arbitration is usually used in the following manner: parties 
choose an arbitral institution to manage the dispute and then the selection of the 
arbitrators and the constitution of the arbitral panel will be done according to the rules 
of that arbitral institution.659 
There are various famous arbitral institutions, such as the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration 
Association and the London Court of International Arbitration. Two that are worth a 
closer look are the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado and P.R.I.M.E. Finance, since the 
propose to deal with disputes tied to financial transactions.  
The Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado (CAM) is an arbitral institution based in 
Brazil. It was created by BOVESPA (now BM&FBOVESPA), the Brazilian stock exchange, 
in 2001. CAM was designed to manage arbitral procedures based on conflicts originating 
from companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA.660  
The use of CAM to arbitrate corporate disputes is mandatory for those companies 
that are listed on the higher corporate governance levels of BM&FBOVESPA: Novo 
Mercado, Nível 2 and BOVESPA Mais.661  
The arbitrator roster is a limited one, with only 40 people.662 These are highly 
regarded professionals of the Brazilian bar, containing names such as Calixto Salomão 
                                                      
659For example, the ICC Rules of Arbitration.  
660  This information is on their website. See BM&FBOVESPA, ‘Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado’ 
(BM&FBOVESPA)  <http://www.camaradomercado.com.br/> accessed 8 July 2014. 
661 See BM&FBOVESPA, ‘O que são Segmentos de Listagem’ (BM&FBOVESPA)  
<http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/servicos/solucoes-para-empresas/segmentos-de-listagem/o-
que-sao-segmentos-de-listagem.aspx?Idioma=pt-br> accessed 8 July 2014. 
662 Other arbitrators can be chosen but have to be confirmed by the President and one of the Vice-Presidents 
of CAM. Regulation of the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado, s 3.7. 
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Filho, Ary Oswaldo Mattos Filho and Luis Olavo Baptista, amongst others. Independence 
therefore is based on reputation, as there are no other mechanisms of control besides the 
request to change arbitrators in case a suspicion of impartiality arises.663 
It is interesting that CAM uses the word transparency as something important for 
listed companies since the arbitral procedure that they offer is confidential according to 
their arbitration rules,664 giving no publicity for the decisions and actually diminishing 
transparency when compared to the Brazilian judicial procedure.665 It is true that there is 
no obligation for listed companies to solve their disputes through CAM arbitration, but 
those who wish to comply with higher corporate governance standards tend to be the 
bigger companies, a situation that necessarily leads to more complex disputes. Therefore, 
the decision of these disputes will most likely not be made public; it will therefore be hard 
to understand the reasons through which the decisions are reached and how they would 
be applicable in different cases.  
The second arbitral institution mentioned is P.R.I.M.E. Finance. Its model is the 
more general arbitral institution, without any formal links to government or government-
authorized organizations.666 According to its website, P.R.I.M.E. Finance was created after 
discussions with various market participants and government officials in which the need 
for an arbitral institution focusing on complex financial transactions was recognized.667  
P.R.I.M.E. finance had its opening conference on 16 January 2012 but so far its 
operation seems to be highly secretive as there are no reports on the amount or type of 
disputes that have been handled by this arbitral institution. As this is a more general 
arbitral institution, it is not something that should be criticized. On the other hand, such 
an institutional design would not be adequate as the main method of dispute resolution 
in a particular field of law.  
                                                      
663 See Regulation of the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado, ss 3.11-3.14. 
664 Regulation of the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado, s 9.1. 
665 The publicity of judicial acts is constitutionally guaranteed in Brazil. See Brazilian Federal Constitution, 
art 5, LX. 
666 Such as stock exchanges with self-regulatory powers.  
667 P.R.I.M.E. Finance, ‘About Us 
’ (P.R.I.M.E. Finance)  <http://primefinancedisputes.org/about-us/> accessed 8 July 2014. 
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2. International Models 
International dispute resolution mechanisms are those established with the 
authority of more than one state.668 As with national dispute resolution models, there is a 
wide array of different settings for international dispute resolution models. 
A. International Courts 
The defining characteristic of an international court or tribunal is the presence of 
sitting judges who are remunerated by the institution as their decision-makers. There are 
no other defining characteristics in the taxonomy of international organizations that can 
be used to make this distinction, as the other characteristic that is also used to define what 
is commonly understood as a court in the national sphere, compulsory jurisdiction, is not 
always present in the international sphere. 
International courts are established by treaties. Their initial authority derives 
from the authority attributed to them by the states entering the treaty to establish the 
international tribunal. While they may broaden their power by their own operation,669 in 
any event, it is necessary that this is accepted by the relevant countries involved, in order 
for the Tribunal to continue exercising authority.   
The typical example of an international court with non-compulsory jurisdiction is 
the International Court of Justice.670 The Court is composed of 15 independent judges.671 
In a given dispute, if a country does not have a judge from its nationality as part of the 
Court, it may appoint an ad hoc judge.672 The use of ad hoc judges is seen as problematic 
because it goes against the ideal of judicial independence, even though their use is 
                                                      
668 For the purposes of this work, the international/national division is made in accordance to the plurality 
of legal authority on which the dispute resolution body is based.  
669 For example, the ECJ. See Karen Alter, ‘The European Court's Political Power Across Time and Space’ 
(2009) Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No 09-03 1. 
670 Its jurisdiction becomes compulsory only when a country makes a declaration under Article 36(2) of the 
ICJ Statute, and only when the other country submitting the dispute for consideration has also made the 
same declaration.  
671 They are elected by the General Assembly and Security Council of the UN for a renewable 9 year term. 
ICJ Statute, arts 3(1), 4(1), 13(1). 
672 See Ruth Mackenzie and others, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 6-8. 
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justified as serving the ‘function of maintaining the confidence of the parties in the judicial 
process before the ICJ.’673 The ICJ has jurisdiction over any cases between states that refer 
their dispute to it, and in ‘matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations or in treaties or conventions in force’.674 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also has a similar institutional 
design. Jurisdiction is only exercisable if accepted by state parties, judges are elected and 
ad hoc judges can be appointed when there are no judges from the nationality of one of 
the states in the dispute.675     
At the other end of the spectrum, having compulsory jurisdiction over the disputes 
it encompasses, is the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,676 established in accordance with 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.677 The DSB has the authority to establish panels 
and adopt reports. 678  The dispute resolution procedure is embedded in a complex 
institutional setting and encompasses various steps before a final resolution is made. The 
first formal step is consultation, where the parties try to solve their disagreements 
without engaging in litigation.679 If consultation does not work, the second step is the 
establishment of a panel to decide the dispute. The panel procedure is more similar to 
arbitration since panelists are selected ad hoc, not being part of any permanent body 
within the WTO organization.680 The panel decision may either be adopted by the DSB or 
appealed.681 
If the Panel report is appealed, then it goes to a Standing Appellate Body for review. 
This is where the dispute resolution system of the WTO becomes more aligned to the idea 
                                                      
673 Ibid 8. 
674 ICJ Statute, art 36(1).  
675Mackenzie and others 40-44 (n 672). 
676 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 23.  
677 WTO Agreement, Annex 2.  
678 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 2.1. 
679 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 4.  
680 There is an indicative list of panelists that is maintained by the WTO but they are not formally tied to it. 
For the procedure of selecting panelists, see Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 8.  
681 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 16.4. 
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of a ‘court’ than an ‘arbitral tribunal’. Appellate Body members are appointed for a four-
year term with the possibility of one reappointment.682  
Panels and Appellate Body reports have to be adopted by the DSB unless there is a 
consensus on not adopting it.683 When a WTO member is applying measures that are 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, the panel or Appellate Body recommends that the 
Member bring the measure into conformity with the agreement.684  
These decisions are binding and if the Member does not comply with them, the 
complainant may either request compensation to the breaching party or resort to 
countermeasures after authorization by the DSB.685 
Even though the international court model may be adequate to solve diverse types 
of disputes, it might not constitute the best forum for transnational securities transactions. 
There are two problems that are quite clear from this model: 1) the necessity of 
establishing the body through a treaty, which requires spending a lot of political energy, 
especially with the broad scope of signatories required for a truly transnational dispute 
resolution system; and 2) the high maintenance costs of maintaining sitting judges and 
the whole structure of the body.  
B. International Arbitral Institutions 
The difference between International Arbitral Institutions and National Arbitral 
Institutions is that the former are constituted on the basis of international treaties, while 
the latter are constituted on the basis of articles of incorporation, in accordance with 
national law.  
International Arbitral Institutions perform the function of administering 
arbitrations. They do not decide cases, but provide rules, facilities and personnel to 
ensure that the arbitration process follows smoothly.  
                                                      
682 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 17.2. 
683 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 16.4 and 17.14. 
684 Dispute Resolution Understanding art 19.  
685 Dispute Resolution Understanding, art 22.  
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The two most recognized International Arbitral Institutions are the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, in Washington.  
The PCA is the oldest, established in 1899 by the Hague Conference through the 
adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.686 The 
ICSID was established in 1966 and the cases that it administers are more limited in scope 
than the PCA, being restricted to investment disputes.687 
C. The European Cross-Border Mechanism for Financial Disputes: a network of 
dispute resolution bodies 
The mechanism developed in Europe for cross-border consumer financial disputes 
involving the financial intermediary – investor type of dispute is Fin-Net, a financial 
dispute resolution network. It is not a dispute resolution body but only a network in which 
its members, national dispute resolution schemes, such as the UK Ombudsman Service, 
agree to cooperate with each other regarding financial disputes. For example, if an Italian 
has a problem with a UK financial company, the Italian may bring his problems to the 
Italian Dispute Resolution Body for financial disputes, who will then guide the Italian 
consumer to contact the UK scheme that can help him with his dispute, or it will forward 
the dispute directly to that scheme.688  
Clearly, Fin-Net is a cooperation forum as it only organizes and orients national 
dispute resolution schemes in the European Economic Area countries on how to deal with 
complaints that are cross-border or outside their jurisdictional scope.689  
Fin-Net was created in 2001 by the European Commission. It has a very modest 
budget.690 The number of complaints that have been through the system is rising, from 
                                                      
686 Mackenzie and others 102 (n 672). 
687 ICSID Convention, article 25.1. 
688 See Memorandum of Understanding on a Cross-Border Out-of-Court Complaints Network for Financial 
Services in the European Economic Area. 
689 I use ‘jurisdictional’ here in the sense of what disputes these schemes can entertain. 
690 The budget in 2008 was 65,326 Euros (DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of FIN-NET (Final 
Report June, 2009) 50). 
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1041 in 2007 to 1854 in 2011.691 This remains a small number of cases when compared 
to more local dispute resolution schemes,692 which indicates that consumer cross-border 
financial transactions are not that common when compared to similar national 
transactions. 
The Fin-Net was created to bring information to consumers on out-of-court 
redress mechanisms, to ensure information exchange between different ADRs schemes, 
to improve the provision of dispute resolution services and to ensure that there is a 
common set of principles governing the different ADR schemes.693 Basically, the broad 
objectives of the scheme are to ‘assist consumers in the resolution of cross-border 
disputes’ and to ‘raise consumer confidence in buying financial services cross-border’.694 
The positive aspect of Fin-Net is that it provides information and mechanisms, 
through local ADR schemes, to consumers on how to obtain redress on cross-border 
financial transactions and it does this at a low cost. By improving the prospect of 
information access and redress, this scheme is helpful in increasing confidence in the 
market for cross-border financial transactions.  
The negative aspect of the scheme is that it does not go far enough. Despite 
improving information and redress mechanism access, these ADR mechanisms vary 
depending on the jurisdiction at stake. They have a widely different range, from non-
binding to binding and from private-based to public-based.695 Someone who would like 
to engage in a cross-border financial transaction would have to perform a detailed study 
of the redress mechanisms that are available in the countries in which the investor would 
like to invest, defeating, at least to some extent, the purpose of the Fin-Net network itself. 
If someone has the need to look for information beforehand to be protected, a network 
that provides information would then become less useful, as the investor who has done 
his homework would already have it.   
                                                      
691 European Commission, FIN-NET Activity Report 2011 (June 2012).  
692 For example, the UK Financial Ombudsman Service dealt with 508,881 formal disputes in the 2012/2013 
year (See , ‘Annual Review 2012/2013’).  
693 DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of FIN-NET (Final Report June, 2009) 8. 
694 Ibid 9. 
695 Ibid 19. 
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Even though Fin-Net is a step forward in increasing confidence in markets through 
the provision of more information about the functioning of dispute resolution in financial 
transactions within the European context, the construction of a single market would 
profit from a European-wide dispute resolution system, or at least systems connected by 
the network that are similar in how they operate.  
3. Implications 
A. General Implications 
A serious dispute resolution system for securities transactions has to provide a 
high degree of certainty on its outcomes based on clear rules that are known by the parties 
before they engage in a transaction. In a perfect world, dispute resolution systems would 
operate only for enforcement of decisions, as everyone would know beforehand what the 
decision would be. Certainty requires institutional structures to isolate the decision-
maker from unwarranted external influence, be it from the political process or from 
parties to the dispute; yet at the same time, checks and balances are necessary to avoid 
that the decision maker goes rogue, becoming the tyrant himself.  
A consequence of the need for certainty in the legal system and the dispute 
resolution process is the need for reasoned decisions. Legal rules may need to be 
interpreted due to the impossibility of having ex ante a complete set of rules that would 
apply seamlessly to every single situation, creating the need that for every dispute, which 
by definition involves uncertainty,696 a decision is made to clarify the status of the law. 
The development and functioning of the dispute resolution system based on legal 
mechanisms therefore also depends on reasoned decisions. 
Finally, the cost of the system should be as low as possible while providing the 
necessary certainty for the dispute resolution process. High costs of access limit the 
availability of the system to those who have fewer resources, excluding them from the 
possibility to use formal redress mechanisms. This consequently removes confidence in 
the market as investors may feel helpless when facing unjust situations without having a 
                                                      
696 Apart from cases where one of the parties simply refuses to pay.  
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forum for the discussion of their dispute. As lack of confidence in a market may create the 
lemons problem, it is better if a properly structured system is in place. There is a prior 
question that arises concerning the desirability of having low asset investors in financial 
markets; this is not a question that this work is trying to answer.  Nevertheless, to the 
extent that low asset investors are included in the securities market, proper means of 
redress have also to be made available. 
Some of the alternative systems discussed in this chapter have these 
characteristics. The UK Ombudsmen Service, for example, is free for the complainant, 
provides fast decisions and provides reasons for the decisions, even though the decisions 
are not legally justified.697 The drawback of the system is that, with a more simple design 
than a full court procedure, it deals only with limited types of cases, namely those 
involving investors and financial intermediaries, up to the limit of £150.000. 
For a dispute resolution system to be an efficient tool for transnational securities 
transactions, all of the characteristics discussed above have to be included in its design, 
so the objectives of access to justice and legal certainty can be achieved.  
B. EU Implications 
In respect of the cross-border provision of financial services, the EU already has in 
place a solution for the transnational problem, which is the coordination of different out-
of-court dispute resolution system for financial consumer transactions. Even though this 
might be a very simple mechanism, it seems to be adequate for current EU needs, at least 
in the investor-financial intermediary type of dispute. The problems of certainty and 
access to the dispute resolution system would therefore have to be discussed on a case-
by-case basis, depending on the EU Member State being analyzed. The difference between 
the out-of-court settlement procedures could create distortion in competition, as the level 
of justice provided would differ. For example, in Italy the out-of-court dispute resolution 
system is not binding, while in the UK it is, as long as the consumer accepts the decision. 
Therefore, some kind of harmonization and similarity in access to justice and in the 
                                                      
697 There has been a trend towards more justification in the UK Financial Ombudsmen Service decisions, 
but the downside is that too much formalization may increase the amount of time necessary for a decision 
to be made.  
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consequences of the dispute resolution process, are objectives that should be pursued to 
normalize legal redress and to guarantee a level playing field for different investors within 
Europe.  
Outside the financial consumer context, the dispute resolution method in Europe 
is also local, but based on national courts. The interaction among EU members’ courts is 
done through the European International Private Law mechanisms, a regime that can 
create some legal certainty problems in transnational securities transactions, as will be 
explained in Chapter X.  
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Chapter VIII – Aggregate Litigation Design 
Civil procedure is a defining aspect of litigation in general. The mechanisms 
available to the parties and the rules of procedure are always taken into account when 
deciding whether to engage in litigation.  
Aggregate litigation mechanisms can play an important part in the determination 
of what cases go forward and who is able to obtain redress from an act that caused harm 
to a party. The bundling of economic incentives from different parties and the enrollment 
of a third party in the economic benefits that may accrue from the lawsuit can unlock 
justice for people that would otherwise not be able to achieve it.698 Aggregate litigation 
can be a particularly good solution in securities disputes; especially those involving the 
disputes between issuer-investor and information intermediary and investor, due to the 
widespread effects that false or misleading information may have on the market, linking 
all claims by the same facts.   
Procedural aspects are as important as substantive ones in the operation of the 
legal system; ‘the mechanisms of law – what courts are to deal with which causes and 
subject to what conditions – cannot be dissociated from the ends that law 
subserves’.699Aggregate litigation mechanisms can be an interesting option for access to 
justice and the enforcement of substantive law, but their design may encounter 
constitutional limits based on juridical values such as fairness and due process, which 
vary depending on the specific legal system under consideration. 
The broad questions that aggregate litigation design has to solve are twofold: 1) 
how to design proper incentives for claims to be brought forward without overburdening 
                                                      
698 (‘By combining the stakes of many plaintiffs, collective representation provides group lawyers sufficient 
incentive to invest heavily in the litigation. It allows lawyers to take advantage of economies of scale, 
reducing the per-plaintiff cost of litigating.’)  Howard Erichson, ‘Beyond the Class Action: lawyer loyalty and 
client autonomy in non-class collective representation’ [2003] 2003 University of Chicago Legal Forum 519, 
576. 
699 Stephen B. Burbank, ‘The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: a preliminary view’ 
(2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1439, 1439. 
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possible defendants due to too many unsubstantiated claims700 and 2) how to achieve 
finality on a particular dispute. Even though the focus of this work is on securities disputes, 
the discussion on aggregate litigation has a more general tone. The question that this 
chapter addresses is: ‘how can aggregate litigation be used to solve securities disputes?’  
The objective of this chapter is to establish a framework to analyze aggregate 
litigation and understand how it can be applied in securities disputes. The chapter is 
divided in two parts: 1) aggregate litigation design and 2) the role of aggregate litigation 
in securities disputes.  
1. Aggregate Litigation Design 
Aggregate litigation mechanisms can be designed to achieve diverse goals, such as 
access to justice, enhancing the economy and regulation through litigation, amongst other 
means.701 The two basic goals that aggregate litigation can accomplish are deterrence and 
compensation, 702 in addition to saving public resources due to widespread litigation. The 
discussion of this thesis focuses more on aggregate litigation as a means of compensation 
and access to justice, than on deterrence; this second goal is a matter more closely related 
to the prevention of abuses and law enforcement – the broader regulatory design of 
securities regulation - than to dispute resolution and redress. Even though aggregate 
litigation has been around the U.S. for some time, it has recently become an important 
topic in the European context.703 
Conceptually, aggregate litigation is a mechanism where a decision issued by a 
court binds many persons. It becomes especially relevant when private claims are of so 
little value that no single litigant would engage in litigation to have his rights protected 
                                                      
700 Alexander Layton, ‘Collective Redress: policy objectives and practical problems’ in Duncan Fairgrieve 
and Eva Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford University Press 2012) 94. 
701 Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems 187-222 (n 604). 
702 Christopher Hodges, ‘Objectives, mechanisms and policy choices in collective enforcement and redress’ 
in Jenny Steele and Willem H. van Boom (eds), Mass Justice: challenges of representation and distribution 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 102  Geoffrey Miller, ‘Compensation and Deterrence in Consumer Class Actions in the 
US and Europe’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans-W. Micklitz (eds), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection: the 
interplay between private and public enforcement (Intersentia 2009) 264-66. 
703  See Commission, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework Collective Redress’ (Communication) 
COM (2013) 401 final, 2013.  
 177 
because it would be more expensive in respect of time and/or money than to do nothing, 
as a result of the small value of the claim or the value of the claim minus the cost of 
litigation.704 By allowing the claims to be put together and litigated as a group, the total 
value of the pie increases. As long as the total value that can be recuperated is higher than 
the costs of bringing the suit, there are sufficient incentives for the claim to be litigated; 
the bigger the group of claims, the bigger the incentive. Even claims that could be litigated 
individually could also be grouped as there would be more resources for the lawsuit and 
the transaction costs would be smaller than if litigation was pursued on an individual 
basis.  
So far, there are two main actors that can be identified in the plaintiff’s side: the 
owners of the claims that will be grouped and the agent that will coordinate the litigation 
efforts on the part of the plaintiffs.  
This second player in the plaintiff’s side of the aggregate litigation game, the one 
who may benefit from the lawsuit in addition to the claim owners, constitutes a necessary 
piece of the puzzle as claimants themselves would otherwise have no interest in pursuing 
the litigation due to its cost.705 This player might have a private role, seeking profit from 
the activity, or a public one, seeking to correct a wrongful act or be in charge of enforcing 
the law.706 Its role can be either to coordinate the lawsuit and seek the most appropriate 
redress for the case or to provide funding when necessary; sometimes its role reflects 
both.  
This private party can either be the lawyer, who will receive money from the 
service performed for the group, or a third-party funder, who will provide money for the 
costs of the lawsuit. The incentives can be either the return on the investment from the 
                                                      
704 This is the concept of a negative claim. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (5th edn, 
Pearson Addison Wesley 2008) 420-23. 
705 This is part of the collective action problem, where even though it is beneficial for the members of a 
group to act in conjunction to achieve their own common goal, they fail to do so. See generally Mancur Olson, 
The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups (Harvard University Press 1971). 
706 The interest can be either because it is its institutional function to do so, such as the Public Ministry in 
Brazil, or because it is an association with a specific public interest goal.  
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lawsuit, or the sense of duty performed if the party is an association that has as its mission 
the defense of a particular group.707 
Depending on the identification of the manager/financier of the litigation and the 
different interest positions of group members, different conflicts of interest may arise. 
The first aspect of an aggregate litigation design revolves around the incentives of the 
parties to bring the claim forward, the costs of the lawsuit and the conflicts between those 
different players. Within this context, there are additional concerns that come into play, 
as the financial aspect is not the only one that influences the possibilities of aggregate 
litigation. Ethical rules of the legal profession can also limit the schemes that can be 
designed for aggregate litigation and for financing incentives. 
The second consideration, closely tied to the first, concerns whether the 
mechanism of aggregation will be an opt-in mechanism or an opt-out one. An opt-in 
mechanism requires each claimant to express their desire to participate in the lawsuit and 
to be bound by it, while the opt-out procedure binds absent claimants without their 
consent. This characteristic of the opt-out procedure also has implications for conflict of 
interest analysis, but this option is not available to every single legal system due to 
constitutional limitations.708  
Due to this, aggregate litigation differs widely in practice, especially when 
contrasting the American Class Action system with civil law systems; notwithstanding, 
the underlying problems that these systems are designed to solve are similar. This section 
analyzes the (A) conflicts in the relationships among the different parties involved in 
aggregate litigation, (B) ethical limitations on aggregate litigation and the (C) limitations 
on choosing the opt-in or opt-out character. This section does not attempt to exhaustively 
cover the subject, but only to give a broad overview of the main issues that are present in 
aggregate litigation design and its possible limitations. 
                                                      
707 The availability of these mechanisms is highly jurisdiction specific due to differences in procedural law 
and ethical standards for lawyers.  
708  Opt-out procedures are allowed in some Common Law jurisdictions such as the U.S., Canada and 
Australia. See Rachael Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Legal Systems (Hart Publishing 2004) 5-15. 
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A. Conflicts in Aggregate Litigation  
The purpose of an aggregate litigation system is to allow for litigation that 
otherwise would not exist due to cost/benefit constraints, or at least improve the 
economies of scale of it. Due to the inherent tensions of agency-principal relationships, 
exacerbated by the multiple claimants setting, aggregate litigation presents a wide array 
of conflict of interest problems.   709 
These conflicts can be divided into three groups: (a) conflicts between the lawyer 
and plaintiffs, (b) conflicts within the group and (c) conflicts involving third-party 
financiers.  
a. Conflicts between Plaintiffs and Lawyer 
The role of lawyers in legal disputes is to advise what the best course of action for 
a particular problem is and to represent the client in litigation if necessary. To perform 
this role, lawyers expect to be compensated, and there is a wide array of different schemes 
that can be designed for this purpose. The commonly-used schemes are the contingent 
fee, the hourly rate and the fixed sum. 
In the contingent fee710 arrangement, the lawyer is paid a part of the plaintiff’s 
recovery, becoming directly interested in a high outcome for the client. Even though their 
interests seem to be aligned, the alignment is not a complete one when a settlement 
possibility is introduced into the equation. If lawyers have the power to settle, they may 
                                                      
709 See Jenny Steele and Willem H. van Boon, ‘Mass Justice and its Challenges’ in Jenny Steele and Willem H. 
van Boon (eds), Mass Justice: challenges of representation and distribution (2011) On conflicts regarding the 
class action, see Geoffrey Miller, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: an inquiry into the 
appropriate standard’ [2003] 2003 University of Chicago Legal Forum 581, 581-90 More generally on the 
conflict of interest problems, see John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems 
and Legal Strategies’ in Reinier Kraakman and others (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a comparative 
and functional approach (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) On the conflict of interest problems when 
there is legal representation by a public officer, see Margareth Lemos, ‘Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: 
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General’ (2012) 126 Harvard Law Review 486. 
710 For some examples of where the contingent fee arrangement is allowed, see  Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, 
reputations, and rewards : contingency fee legal practice in the United States (Stanford Law and Politics 2004) 
258-59. 
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be tempted to settle early to avoid costs of litigating, even though litigation might be more 
economically efficient to the client.711 
In the hourly fee arrangement, the lawyer will sell his time and work by the hour, 
receiving a fee according to the amount of time that was dedicated to the case. This 
scheme does not combine with lawyer control for settlement, as the lawyers will have the 
incentive to go to trial to spend as many hours as possible working on the case.712 
Finally, in the fixed sum agreement, the lawyer will receive what has been agreed 
in the contract with the client, regardless of the outcome of the case; the lawyer has the 
incentive to work as little as possible for the benefit of the client, settling at the first 
possible opportunity.  
As long as the plaintiff has an important stake in the litigation and the information 
asymmetry between lawyer and plaintiff is low, the selection of the lawyer compensation 
scheme will not be a very important problem as both parties will be able to strike a deal 
that is in their best interest. Conflict of interest problems start to become serious when 
the monitoring power of plaintiff(s) over the lawyer diminishes.  
This is the case in situations where aggregate litigation is most adequate, as 
plaintiffs tend to be less well informed713 and have a weakened lawyer-client relationship 
due to the amount of similar cases that lawyers are handling and the small interest of each 
client compared to the overall amount at stake.714 To a certain extent, market incentives 
take care of this problem. As these tend to be claims that would not be pursued by each 
claimant alone, it is unlikely that they would be willing to pay upfront for the litigation, or 
commit to pay an hourly fee to the lawyer by whom they are being represented, leaving 
the contingent fee as the lawyer compensation scheme of choice, which aligns the interest 
                                                      
711 See Geoffrey Miller, ‘Some Agency Problems in Settlements’ (1987) 16 Journal of Legal Studies 189, 198-
202. The author in this article explains that any system besides the contingent fee system where the plaintiff 
has control over settlement tend to be non-optimal. 
712 Ibid 203-04. 
713 The information asymmetry comes from the fact that lawyers will understand better the chances of 
success of the lawsuit, whether due to their legal experience or due to their knowledge of the facts 
surrounding the case.  
714  (‘Moreover, although aggregating clients makes litigation economically viable and more efficient, it 
makes effective client monitoring nearly impossible’). Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ‘Litigating Together: 
social, moral, and legal obligations’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 87, 97. 
 181 
of lawyers with those of claimants, even though not perfectly.715  The decision of the 
lawyer in taking a case in these circumstances will depend on the profit that he will make; 
this is a function of the number of claims he can aggregate and the percentage he would 
be able to take home, which depends on the availability of an opt-out mechanism and on 
ethical obligations, both regarding solicitation and the manner in which the lawyer can 
charge the clients.716   
b. Conflicts between Group Members 
Different group members may have different interests, economic or personal, even 
if the claims are based on the same factual circumstances giving rise to liability. 
An example of diverse economic interests in securities litigation can be seen in a 
case where false or misleading statements were used to inflate the securities price and in 
which, posteriorly, there are various securities price drops after several curative 
disclosures made during an extended period of time. In this situation, there will be a 
difference of interest between those who bought the security after one of these 
disclosures and those who sold it. 717  While the buyers will want to maximize price 
inflation in the litigation so that they will receive more due to the stock price decrease, 
sellers will want to minimize it since this will also maximize their recovery.718 
Interests may also differ depending on the cohesion and goals of the individuals 
that may be part of the group, which leads to different perspectives and expectations 
about the autonomy of the lawsuit and its outcome, having consequences in respect of 
how the solutions for aggregate litigation should be designed regarding procedural 
fairness. Between the two extremes of individual litigation and class litigation (opt-out 
procedure), the concepts of individual-within-the-collective and group-oriented 
                                                      
715 The litigation becomes a joint venture where the lawyer assumes the costs and shares the benefits of the 
outcome, becoming the agent and the creditor of the clients at the same time, which creates an incentive to 
pay attention to stronger cases and settle quickly weaker cases. Ibid 97-98. 
716 See section B below for a discussion on ethical limitations.  
717 This example is based on Seagate Technology II Securities Litigation, 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal., 1994). 
718 See Miller, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: an inquiry into the appropriate standard’ 594  
(n 709). 
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individuals, can be used as a basis for the discussion.719 While in the first claimants are 
strongly tied due to overlapping egocentric interests and/or joint intent,720 in the second 
they are mainly self-interested but might have advantages in terms of acting 
collectively.721  
In this second case, plaintiffs may have different approaches in respect of how they 
would prefer to pursue the case and as to their different risk tolerances; this would lead 
to different strategies for each plaintiff. The problem is that to profit from the lawsuit 
collectivization, some of the plaintiffs would have to give away their autonomy and their 
preferences to be able to participate in the process. 722  When designing aggregate 
litigation procedures, these differences have to be taken into consideration, allowing 
different groups to exercise their different preferences. 
c. Third-Party Financiers 
One recent development in the legal market that has been getting increasing 
academic attention is the use of third-party financiers to finance litigation. The enrollment 
of third-party financing has the advantage of dismantling the double role that lawyers 
play - as both financier and agent - in many procedures of aggregate litigation, while it 
also engages a more sophisticated party and someone with more at stake in the litigation 
to monitor the lawyers;723 moreover, it broadens the opportunities for costly litigation to 
proceed when lawyers are not comfortable enough to risk their assets in a specific case. 
The downside of a third-party financier is that another party is added to the 
already complex conflict of interest matrix that is present in litigation. One of the practices 
of consumer litigation lenders is to lend money on a non-recourse basis, having only the 
outcome of the litigation as the source of future repayment.724 In a case, a third-party 
                                                      
719 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ‘Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation’ (2009) 44 Wake Forest Law 
Review 1, 11-24. 
720 Ibid 16. 
721 Ibid 20. 
722 Ibid 22. 
723  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ‘Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation’ (2012) 87 New York 
University Law Review 1273, 1277. 
724 Other practices can be commercial lending, also recovering the investment from the outcome of the 
lawsuit, or lending money to the law firms involved in the litigation at high interest rates. See ibid 1301-04. 
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financier provided $200.000 to a plaintiff expecting to receive $600.000 plus a percentage 
of the recovery; this led the plaintiff to reject a $1.000.000 dollar offer to settle.725 The 
lawyers were not pleased, as they were going to be paid on a contingent-fee basis, and 
sued the financing company.726 
Moreover, in these schemes, even though the lawyer loses some of the conflicts 
that were present before as a result of the contingent-fee system, these conflicts are 
simply transported to the financier, who will have similar incentives as the lawyer to 
suggest a quick settlement. The lawyer would then have a divided loyalty to the client, 
who he is supposed to represent, and the financier, who is a repeat player and might bring 
more business to the lawyer.  
In any event, the use of external litigation finance may be beneficial. For example, 
Professor Molot suggests that allowing third-party finance empowers plaintiffs by 
providing alternatives to settlement with the defendant, creating a market for claims that 
would increase the efficiency of settlements by allowing transactions that would reflect 
to a greater extent the merits of the case than simply the bargaining power of the 
parties.727  
d. Conflicts in an Opt-Out Procedure 
The most famous system of an opt-out procedure is the American class action. In 
an opt-out procedure, the concerns about conflicts of interest are even more acute than 
in opt-in aggregate litigation since the decision of the court binds absent parties, some of 
whom would not even know they are involved in a litigation or that they could be bound 
by it. The legitimacy of the decision becomes the central problem in these mechanisms. 
The legitimacy of a judicial decision is usually guaranteed because the parties to a 
dispute have the right and opportunity to participate in the judicial process, presenting 
its case and defending it in front of an impartial judge, who will issue a reasoned decision. 
                                                      
725 See Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F.Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.C. 2001).  
726 Ibid. 
727 See Jonathan Molot, ‘Litigation Finance: a market solution to a procedural problem’ (2010-2011) 99 
Georgetown Law Journal 65. 
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The guarantee of someone’s ‘day in court’728 is one of the tenets of the principle of due 
process of law, legitimating the final decision reached by the court. 729 Parties consent to 
being represented by a lawyer of their choice and to engaging in litigation.  
The central added value of the opt-out procedure mechanism is exactly the 
absence of this guarantee, binding persons that were not part of the judicial proceeding. 
This increases the economic benefits of aggregation, since all of those who have a similar 
case will be bound by the decision.730  
The same conflicts of interest that are present in normal aggregate litigation are 
also present in opt-out procedures, such as collusion between class counsel and 
defendants, with class counsel striding away from its duty to represent plaintiffs’ interests, 
leading to unfair settlement agreements.731 The important background question to the 
opt-out procedure, which has a link with the operation of preclusion principles, is how 
can a judicial decision legitimately bind someone who has not participated in the 
proceedings? 
Operationally, the answer to this question lies in the use of alternative legitimating 
mechanisms, which, in the classic class action/corporate governance literature, are 
typified as voice, exit and loyalty.732 At its core, this is a governance design problem,733 
                                                      
728 In the U.S., the Supreme Court was explicit about the right of a ‘day in court’ in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 762 (1989).  
729 The right to be heard guaranteeing the legitimacy of a judicial decision may even have constitutional 
status in some countries. The Brazilian Constitution, for example, provides that ‘the law won’t exclude from 
judiciary appreciation a harm or threat to a right’ (art 5 XXV) and ‘no one will be deprived of liberty or 
property without due process’ (art 5 LIV). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).  
730  ‘The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentives for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into 
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.’ Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F3d 338, 344 
(7th Cir 1997). 
731 ‘[S]ome defendants who face stronger claims may seek out plaintiffs’ attorneys who are willing to settle 
such claims at less than their true value in exchange for fees that arguably are more generous than they 
deserve, given what they have obtained for their class clients’. Deborah R. Hensler and Thomas D. Rowe, 
‘Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth It": Alternative Strategies for Damages Class Action Reform’ (2001) 64 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 137, 138. 
732 See John C. Coffee, ‘Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 370; Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses 
to Decline in Firms (Harvard University Press 1970). 
733 See Issacharoff (n 604). 
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which involves the main players of the civil justice system and their incentives to act.734 
In the U.S., contrary to other common principal-agent situations that are extensively 
regulated by legal standards and have legitimacy mechanisms to control the agent’s 
behavior, such as in corporate law and bankruptcy law, in the opt-out procedure context, 
they are either lacking or are inadequate to address the conflict issues that arise.735 
From a normative perspective, the basis for legitimizing a decision for a person 
that has not had their ‘day in court’ are consent, majoritarian control, prior 
association/community of interests and homogeneous preferences.736 The strength of 
these bases varies and is dependent on the circumstances. The strongest is consent; 
someone who consented to participate in a proceeding knowing beforehand that the 
results of it will have concrete effects, will be more likely to accept the decision as 
legitimate. 737  The prior association/community of interests basis may be more 
appropriate as a normative argument to bind a community that share the same interests, 
inherent from the status of the group.738 The majoritarian control basis is either linked to 
consent, through a contractual framework where a representative entity is created, or on 
other policy goals, when the entity created for representation has a basis on statutory 
provisions, such as a consumer association. Finally, homogeneous preferences can be 
justifiable to bind absent members, to the extent that their claims and preferences are in 
fact ‘homogeneous’, demonstrating that the different class members have aligned 
interests. 
                                                      
734 Deborah R. Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gains (RAND Institute for 
Civil Justice, 1999) 8-23.  
735 See Coffee, ‘Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative Litigation’ 
376 (n 732). (Criticizing the governance mechanisms to reduce agency costs identified by Jensen & Meckling 
as inadequate in the class action context.) See also Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 
305.  
736 Coffee, ‘Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative Litigation’ 
380-85 (n 732). 
737 The problem with consent in opt-out procedures boils down to what constitutes consent – the opt-out 
procedure assumes consent was given if the person has not opted-out, therefore other guarantees are built 
to legitimize the decision, such as the requirement of adequate representation. Ibid 381. 
738  For example, a decision binding asbestos victims only based on a prior association/community of 
interests criteria would hardly be seen as legitimate if every single person didn’t consent to it or had the 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings since the consequences of asbestos exposure vary greatly 
from victim to victim. 
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The consent basis, usually the strongest one to legitimize a judicial decision, has a 
lesser role in the case of the opt-out procedure; at the same time, other bases are used to 
make the decision more legitimate.  
The logic of the benefits of aggregate litigation apply even more to the case of the 
opt-out procedure; as class members do not have an actual interest in pursuing the 
lawsuit on an individual basis due to its value or its cost, someone has to take the lead.  
This is a job usually done by class counsel, who acts as the propelling engine for the 
litigation by seeking situations in which class actions could be brought and by financing 
it.739 Litigation is highly expensive in the United States, and by assuming the costs, lawyers 
invest a significant stake in the class action,740 frequently having a much higher interest 
in the outcome of the dispute than class members themselves.741 As class members have 
a small stake in the dispute, their incentive to monitor lawyers is also small; this often 
means that lawyers end up being free to act as they please.742 
The incentives therefore are a clear departure from the classic representative role 
of the lawyer.  Class counsel will perform in court rather with his own interests in mind 
than with those of the class; the plaintiffs become a mere conduit for the lawyer to play 
his role. In many types of cases, this is not a serious problem since class members either 
accept their condition of claimants, with the possibility of receiving a small sum at the end 
of the litigation, or they exercise their right to opt out and receive nothing. The stakes are 
so low that it is not economically profitable for a claimant to pursue the claim on his 
                                                      
739 One author explained that class actions are ‘characterized by a rent-seeking entrepreneur pursuing her 
own interests with little oversight by her principals.’ William B. Rubenstein, ‘On What a "Private Attorney 
General" Is - And Why it Matters’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 2129, 2162-63. 
740 Class action lawyers have been seen as self-interested entrepreneurs for quite a long time. See John C. 
Coffee, ‘The Regulation of Entrepeneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class 
Action’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 877. 
741 Of course, this is not always the case; many class actions involve highly emotionally charged situations – 
such as in asbestos litigation – in which the class representatives would clearly have an interest in the 
outcome of the dispute that surpass mere economic recovery. These cases though tend to involver higher 
stakes for class members than other more simple consumer cases.   
742 ‘[P]laintiff’s class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial 
amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.’ 
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, ‘The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1, 3. 
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own. 743  Even if lawyers are thinking about themselves and profiting more than they 
should be entitled to, claimants are still better off in this situation than otherwise. 
Legitimacy here is based both on consent 744  and homogenous preferences, 745  even 
though the consent basis is extremely weak, since it is a presumption that a class member 
has indeed learned about the litigation and decided not to opt-out.  
Conflicts exist that are specific to the opt-out procedure; this includes the ‘reverse 
auction’ practice, where there are many class actions on the same subject matter and 
defendant’s counsel seeks the best settlement deal by ‘shopping’ options among different 
class counsels.746  
Another problem arises when members of the class, individually considered, have 
a stronger economic interest than the rest of the members and would prefer to pursue the 
litigation themselves.747 In such situations, the class action mechanism shifts from being 
the plaintiffs’ sword and may become defendants’ shield.748 As they have higher stakes, 
particular class members may disagree with class counsel on the direction of the lawsuit; 
however, depending on how far the procedure has already been developed, they may not 
be able to opt out. Since disagreements may occur when the procedure is more advanced 
and plaintiffs may not opt-out anymore, class members may be precluded from litigating 
their rights to the fullest extent.749 In this situation, the normative legitimacy grounds are 
weak; they are based solely on inferred consent from a failure to opt-out at an ex ante 
moment when it was not clear that class counsel would not represent adequately the 
interests of the particular class member.  
                                                      
743 See Myriam Gilles and Gary B. Friedman, ‘Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: the Social Utility 
of Entrepreneurial Lawyers’ (2006-2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 103, 132-36. 
744 Consent here is based on the decision of not opting out of the class action. Of course, this presumption of 
consent is problematic because the parties may not have had a real chance to know the possible claims to 
which they might be entitled. Such justification only has some appeal in situations where claimants would 
not have otherwise had an interest in pursuing the claim themselves.   
745 By having a preference in receiving something rather than nothing. 
746 Gilles and Friedman 161-62 (n 743). 
747 John C. Coffee, ‘Class Wars: the Dillemma of the Mass Tort Class Action’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 
1351, 1351-52. 
748 Ibid 1350. 
749 See Coffee, ‘Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative Litigation’ 
419-25 (n 732). 
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Therefore, some conflicts of interest can be present specifically on the opt-out 
mechanism of aggregate litigation. These conflicts have to be considered so they can be 
addressed in any new design of an opt-out system. 
B. Ethical Limitations 
Aggregate litigation can be an interesting alternative for litigating securities claims 
and for providing access to justice to investors; however, the manners in which claims can 
be financed and aggregated can be drastically limited by the ethical obligations of the legal 
profession in different countries.  
Rules on champerty and maintenance, 750  client solicitation, attorney-client 
relationship and attorney-third party relationship can all be impediments to the 
formation of a group for litigation purposes. 
Champerty and maintenance rules limit how lawyers and third parties can 
participate in the funding of a lawsuit and how they can influence its direction.751 If the 
lawyers and third parties are limited to too great an extent, no one will be willing to 
assume any of the risks of litigation, either because it is outright prohibited or because 
the control over the litigation becomes too narrow and the investment becomes too risky.  
Rules on client solicitation preclude lawyers, or even third parties, from searching 
and engaging clients to initiate the lawsuit. This is true in Brazil, where it is forbidden for 
a lawyer to ‘recruit or capture cases, with or without the help of a third party’.752 Any 
active attempt to amass a critical number of similar cases for litigation will be seen as an 
ethical violation; this renders it almost impossible for a private lawyer to pursue litigation 
where the value for each claimant is low. 
                                                      
750 Maintenance is the ‘assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who 
has no bona fide interest in the case [or] meddling in someone else’s litigation’ and champerty is ‘[a]n 
agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps 
pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds’. Anthony Sebok, 
‘The Inauthentic Claim’ (2011) 64 Vanderbilt Law Review 61, 72-73 (Citing Black’s Law Dictionary 9th ed. 
2009). 
751 Ibid 109. 
752 Law 8.906/1994, art 34, IV. 
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Other types of prohibitions might also limit the compensation design that could 
further the plaintiffs’ interests in aggregate litigation; these include the prohibition on 
lawyers providing cash to clients for their claims and the prohibition against lawyers 
sharing fees with non-lawyers.753 
I do not imply here that all of these limitations are bad, as some have their 
foundations in convincing policy rationales; 754 however, their existence limits 
mechanisms that could be used by lawyers and other third parties to stimulate the 
aggregation of claims in cases that otherwise would not be litigated, opening up the access 
to justice and generating an efficient mechanism for compensation.  
C. Preclusion Principles and Limits on Choosing an Opt-in or Opt-out Mechanism 
Aggregate litigation can be based either on an opt-in system, where claimants 
express their consent in being bound by the decision by initiating the lawsuit, or an opt-
out procedure, where the decision involving a class binds all members of the class even 
though specific consent was not given.  
While an opt-in procedure guarantees each person the right over his or her claim 
and to be bound by the decision only if consent is expressly given to participate in the 
litigation, the opt-out procedure disposes of mass questions collectively and more 
efficiently, as it definitely solves and binds all those that might have been involved in a 
given dispute, even if consent is not given.  
The possibility of using one of the systems is closely tied to the operation of 
preclusion; each legal system has its own preferences of what normative basis should be 
accepted. Common law systems are more lenient in what to accept,755 while civil law 
systems tend to be more conservative, limiting the scope of preclusion in aggregate 
litigation to very specific circumstances. The choice of one system or another is not only 
a matter of policy design. Underlying the discussion there are constitutional limits that 
                                                      
753 Molot 109-11 (n 727). 
754 For example, the prohibition on sharing fees with non-lawyers allows lawyers to remain independent 
from outside influence. Ibid 110. 
755 Mulheron (n 708). 
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vary widely depending on the jurisdiction; these are imposed through the operation of 
preclusion. 
a. The Operation of Preclusion – general aspects 
Preclusion is the backbone of any legal procedure, including those of collective 
redress. The concept of preclusion is essential to the construction of a dispute resolution 
method capable of putting an end to disputes. It prevents the re-litigation of claims and 
issues already decided by a court, bringing stability to the relationship between the 
parties to a dispute. Preclusion guarantees that the parties will be able to rely on a judicial 
decision. A party that prevails on a claim will not have to worry about being brought to 
court in respect of the same disagreements, over which a decision has already been 
rendered, providing social pacification. To understand the operation of a collective 
redress system and the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out procedure, a general 
understanding of the rules of preclusion and its limits are necessary. 
The scope of preclusion varies depending on the jurisdiction, usually being more 
expansive in common law countries and more restricted in civil law ones, even though 
there have been some recent expansionist changes in the latter.756 The basic questions 
addressed by the doctrine concern who is bound by the decision and what legal questions 
and factual issues are encompassed by it.  
There is a tension between preclusion and fairness of legal proceedings757 and 
every legal system has to strike a balance between the two, especially because the second 
is a tenet of the Rule of Law concept. 758  This balance is usually struck through the 
requirements for the operation of claim preclusion, which are mutuality, identical causes 
of action and that a judgment on the merits of the dispute.759 
                                                      
756 See Linda Silberman, ‘Preclusion Doctrine’ in Oscar G. Chase and Helen Hershkoff (ed), Civil Litigation in 
Comparative Context (Thomson West 2007) 458; 61. 
757 Edward D. Cavanagh, ‘Issue Preclusion in Complex Litigation’ (2009-2010) 29 The Review of Litigation 
859, 870-71. 
758 Maintaining the Rule of Law is essential to fair dispute resolution, but from the State’s perspective it is 
even more so, since the Rule of Law is one of the basis of the legitimacy of the State’s authority. See Chapter 
2.  
759 Cavanagh 862 (n 757). 
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a. Mutuality 
Fairness through the operation of preclusion is anchored in the idea that everyone 
should have his own day in court; 760  this is one of the most basic requirements for 
preclusion to operate. To be bound by a judgment, a party has to be part of the litigation 
process; this is true both in common and in civil law systems.  
In the U.S., the Supreme Court explained that ‘in Anglo American jurisprudence […] 
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated 
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.’761 
In the EU context, the right to a fair trial is enshrined both in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union,762 which since the Lisbon Treaty763 has the 
same value as the EU Treaties and in the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Convention establishes that ‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’;764 this 
comprises the right of access to a court, even though this right can be limited.765 This is 
important because all the countries party to the Council of Europe are also party to the 
Convention, and soon the EU itself will accede to it,766 submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Therefore, the idea of a fair trial, as developed both 
under the Charter and the Convention, becomes an important concept regarding the 
extent to which the mutuality principle may be weakened in the design of aggregate 
litigation procedures.  
                                                      
760 Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 803 (1996). 
761 Ibid 798, citing Hansberry v Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).  
762 Art 47. 
763 TEU, art 6(1).  
764 Art 6(1).  
765 This is not an absolute right; the European Court of Human Rights will evaluate if the limitations pursue 
a legitimate aim, if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be achieved and if they do not restrict or reduce the access of the individual in a way that 
the very essence of his right is impaired. See Ashingdane v the United Kingdom (1985) Series A no 93, para 
57; Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 1998-IV, para 72. 
766 TEU, art 6(2) mandates the EU to accede to the ECHR.  
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The Brazilian Procedural Civil Code clearly states that a judicial decision on the 
merits creates res judicata for the parties in respect of whom it is issued, not benefiting or 
harming third parties.767 The same is true in the Spanish Act of Civil Procedure.768 
By requiring that in order to be bound by a judgment, the parties are present at a 
legal proceeding, the law guarantees that both parties will be heard and will be able to 
present their case, engaging in a fair dispute in front of a judge. As it will be demonstrated, 
there are many instances in which this requirement has been relativized, especially in the 
United States.  
b. Identity of Causes of Action 
Generally, a cause of action can be understood as comprising the facts that are 
legally relevant and the legal reasons that give rise to a claim, both in common and civil 
law; however, both the theory and operation of causes of action is highly dependent on 
the individual legal system.  
In the U.S. system, the concept of the cause of action has suffered a transformation, 
shifting from one based on theories of recovery to one based on transactions. Initially, a 
cause of action would have been substantiated on the legal theory that was used for 
recovery, and as such, it would have been possible to raise multiple lawsuits in respect of 
the same factual situation, based, for example, on torts for the first lawsuit and breach of 
contract in the second. A plaintiff could bring as many lawsuits as legal theories were 
applicable to a certain set of facts.769 After some time, the cause of action concept became 
more practical, not only admitting, but requiring that different theories of recovery be 
used in a single lawsuit when these theories are based on the same ‘transaction’ and set 
of proof at stake;770 parties would thus be precluded from using a new theory based on 
the same factual circumstances for another lawsuit.771 Therefore, the element ‘identity of 
                                                      
767 Art 472.  
768 Art 222.3: ‘La cosa juzgada afectará a las partes del proceso en que se dicte […]’. 
769 Cavanagh 866-67 (n 757). 
770 Ibid . 
771 See § 24.1, Restatement (Second) of Judgments (When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action 
extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the rules of merger and bar, the claim extinguished includes 
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causes of action’, for claim preclusion purposes, is nowadays based on the factual proof 
for the theories of recovery; if the factual proof is the same, there is identity of the causes 
of action for claim preclusion purposes.772  
The Brazilian system has a more limited view on the cause of action; any changes 
to the legally relevant facts also changes the cause of action for a lawsuit, therefore 
avoiding preclusion.773 The Spanish system, on the other hand, uses the concept of the 
actual and virtual object of civil procedure, enshrined in article 400.1 of the LEC, which 
states that ‘when what is claimed in a lawsuit can be based in different facts or different 
legal theories or titles, all of them will be deemed pleaded at the time of the request, 
without their use being admissible in a later lawsuit’.774  
Therefore, the definition of the cause of action and what causes of action a decision 
encompasses for preclusion purposes vary; this also has consequences on collective 
redress mechanisms. A more encompassing theory guarantees greater efficiency and 
protection to the defendant, while a less encompassing theory allows the claimant to sue 
over and over again for the same claim, on the basis of legal facts and theories that could 
have been used in the first procedure.  
c. Judgment on the Merits 
A judgment on the merits of the dispute is nothing more than a decision over the 
substantive portion of the claim made by the plaintiff. Generally, decisions that are not on 
the merits of the dispute, such as those related to lack of jurisdiction do not have 
                                                      
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, 
or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose).  
772  Cavanagh 867 (n 757); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24 (1982); See also O'Brien v. City of 
Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (N.Y. 1981) (‘once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims 
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based on different theories 
or if seeking a different remedy’); Farmers High Line Canal v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 203 (1999) 
(Furthermore, ‘[t]he best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent 
proceedings ... is whether the same evidence would sustain both, and if it would the two actions are the 
same, and this is true, although the two actions are different in form.’ Pomponio v. Larsen, 80 Colo. 318, 321, 
(1926)). 
773 See Marcus Vinicius Rios Gonçalves, Direito Processual Civil Esquematizado (Editora Saraiva 2012) 439-
40; Daniel Amorim Assumpção Neves, Manual de Direito Processual Civil (Metodo 2011) 541-42; Junior 427 
(n 587). 
774 See Andres de la Oliva Santos and Ignacio Diez-Picazo Gimenez, Derecho Procesal Civil: El Proceso de 
Declaracion (3 edn, Editorial Universitaria Ramon Areces 2004) 71-75. 
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preclusion effects.775 There are exceptions, such as the issue preclusion in the United 
States and the request for res judicata in prejudicial questions in Brazil.776 
d. Types and Scope of Preclusion 
The scope of preclusion delineates the matters that a judgment will cover and 
prohibits re-litigation. It is the last calibration element between the efficiency and fairness 
of the legal system, as it defines the aspects of the dispute that will be definitely solved. 
Here the difference between the common law and the civil law is considerable.  
In the United States, preclusion can be separated in two groups, claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion.  
The notion of claim preclusion can be dissected into the common law doctrines of 
bar and merger. When a plaintiff is successful in a lawsuit, the claim merges into the 
judgment and the plaintiff is then not allowed to pursue another lawsuit with the same 
claim.777 On the other hand, if plaintiff loses the litigation, his claim is extinguished and 
the judgment acts as a ‘bar’ to him.778 In practice this means that when the litigation comes 
to an end, the plaintiff is not allowed to start another lawsuit based on the same claim, 
whether the previous lawsuit was successful or not. The doctrine operates throughout the 
court systems of the United States, in the sense that a claim unsuccessfully pursued in a 
federal court may not be re-litigated in a state court. This is an important characteristic of 
the doctrine since the American legal system has a wide variety of court structures 
existing throughout the country, each of which might differ from the other due to the 
political design of the American state.779  
                                                      
775  See Cavanagh 867 (n 757). Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 267 and 269; Spanish Act of Civil 
Procedure, art 222.2. 
776 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 470. 
777 See Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978) (‘When the 
plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim “merges” in the judgment; he may seek no further relief 
on that claim in a separate action’).  
778 Id.: ‘Conversely, when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiff’s claim is extinguished; the 
judgment then acts as a “bar”.’ 
779 See Baker v General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (‘A final judgment in one State, if rendered 
by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, 
qualifies for recognition throughout the land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in 
other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide force.’)  
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Issue preclusion, on the other hand, is narrower than claim preclusion and 
prohibits only the re-litigation of ‘an issue of fact or law necessary to [a court’s] 
judgment’.780 The issue will be barred from being discussed in another lawsuit based on 
different causes of action between the same parties.  
In the European context, where there are many different legal systems operating 
and interacting with one another under EU law, res judicata has also been recognized as 
an important principle.781 Courts do not have to review a final decision adopted in breach 
of EU law unless, under their own national law, they have the power to do so.782 Generally, 
under the Brussels/Lugano Regime, the extension of the claim preclusion effect will be 
according to the rules of the country where the judgment was made, but this depends on 
the approach taken by each Member State.783 
In the civil law countries under study, preclusion effects are deployed through 
their own doctrine of res judicata, 784  which can be explained through two different 
aspects: the formal res judicata, having its effects within the legal procedure, i.e. internally, 
and the material res judicata, which extends the effects of the decision beyond the 
boundaries of the procedure.  
The formal res judicata operates through the immutability of the decision within 
the process due to the impossibility of appeal, either because the law does not allow for 
such an appeal or because the party that had the right to appeal did not launch it in due 
time or decided not to appeal.785 It is an internal effect of judicial decisions, operating 
                                                      
780 See Kremer v Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982). 
781 (‘[A]ttention should be drawn to the importance, both for the Community legal order and national legal 
systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and 
the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after 
all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time limits provided for in that connection 
can no longer be called into question ((Case C-224/01 Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239, 
para 38)’), Case C-234/04 Rosmarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick GmbH [2006] ECR I-2585, para 20. 
782 See Kapferer v Schlank (n 781), paragraph 24. On the arbitration context, see Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss 
China Time Ltd. v Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055, para 48. 
783 See Jacob van de Velden and Justine Stefanelli, The Effect in the European Community of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters: Recognition, Res Judicata and Abuse of Process (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law 2008) 51-62. 
784 ‘Coisa julgada’ or ‘cosa juzgada’. 
785 Humberto Theodoro Júnior, Curso de Direito Processual Civil - teoria geral do direito processual civil e 
processo de conhecimento, vol 1 (Forense 2012) 558. 
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within the procedure and binding the parties and the judge to its effects, imposing both a 
duty to decide according to the previous decision in the process and prohibiting the 
parties from asking for a measure that would deny the effects of such decision.786 The 
formal res judicata operates in respect of any decisions and is applicable at the moment 
when the possible appeals are exhausted, either through their use or by the lapse of time 
before which the appeal could have been launched. ‘The formal res judicata is related not 
to the effects of the decision, but to the decision itself as an act of the procedure.’787 
The material res judicata, on the other hand, ‘is the immutability of the substantial 
effects of a decision on the merits’.788 As a technical legal matter, the majority of Brazilian 
doctrine adopts the concept of material res judicata as relating to the quality of the judicial 
decision that makes its effects immutable.789  
Res judicata operates therefore by precluding those affected by it from discussing 
the matter again following the conclusion of the process (formal res judicata) and 
immunizing any change to the effect of the decision, either through the same legal process 
or through another one (material res judicata).  
As to the object of the lawsuit, res judicata operates differently in the Brazilian and 
the Spanish system. In Brazil, res judicata is more limited and operates only in respect of 
the dispositive part of the judgment; 790  it does not encompass its rationae decidendi 
concerning the necessary questions underpinning the outcome of the judgment,791 unless 
                                                      
786 Juan Montero Aroca and others, Derecho Jurisdiccional II - Proceso Civil (Tirant Lo Blanch 2004) 468. 
787 Candido Rangel Dinamarco, ‘Relativizar a Coisa Julgada Material’ (2001) 55/56 Revista da Procuradoria 
Geral do Estado de São Paulo 25, 7. 
788 Ibid 6. 
789 See ibid (‘Sendo um elemento imunizador dos efeitos que a sentença projecta para fora do processo e 
sobre a vida exterior dos litigantes, [a utilidade da coisa julgada] consiste em assegurar estabilidade a esses 
efeitos, impedindo que voltem a ser questionados depois de definitivamente estabelecidos por sentença não 
não (sic) mais sujeita a recurso’); Negi Calixto and Victor A. A. Bonfim Marins, ‘Eficácia da Sentença e Coisa 
Julgada Perante Terceiros’ (1989) 25 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFPR 93, 94. 
790 This is the part of the judgment where the judge solves the questions being asked by the parties to the 
lawsuit. Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 458 III.  
791 The exception to this would be if a contrary decision would put the dispositive part of the first decision 
in danger. See Neves 536-38 (n 773) (the example given in this book is the following: A sues B to perform a 
contract and B argues that the contract was invalid. The judge, based on this defense, decides that B does 
not have to perform the contract. Since B did not request the declaration of the invalidity of the contract, A 
could still sue for damages for non-compliance with the same contract). 
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required by one of the parties. 792  The Spanish system, on the other hand, operates 
differently as it extends the res judicata effects to the reasoning that underpins the 
outcome of the decision; it is thus closer to the U.S. system of preclusion.793 
In respect of these characteristics of the operation of preclusion, the mutuality 
requirement is the most important with regard to the limits on the use of the opt-out 
procedure.  
b. Preclusion and Non-Mutual Parties: possibility for the opt-out procedure 
The starting point for the subjective limits of preclusion is the mutuality 
requirement, which is cornerstone of this institution. The mutuality requirement is 
justifiable because, as a matter of due process and fairness, parties that did not have an 
opportunity to present their case or to defend themselves should not be bound by a 
decision.  As it is common with rules, for this particular one there also are exceptions, 
which vary widely depending on the relevant jurisdiction.  
a. United States 
In the United States, the exceptions to the mutuality requirement vary depending 
on the type of preclusion being discussed. There are six exceptions794 that can be reduced 
into 3 groups: the agreement of a non-party in being bound by a judgment to which it is 
not a party, a legal relationship between the party that was party to the previous judgment 
and the non-party suffering its preclusion effects, and finally, statutory schemes giving 
                                                      
792 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 470.  
793 The issue still is controversial, See Santos and Gimenez 554-57 (n 774). 
794 1) ‘A person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between other is bound 
in accordance with the terms of his agreement’, Restatement 2nd of Judgments, §40; 2) pre-existing 
substantive legal relationships between the non-mutual party to be bound and the party to the judgment, 
such as in the assignor-assignee relationship, see Taylor v Sturgell 552 U.S. 880, 881 (2008); 3) Adequate 
representation may be sufficient to bind a non-party on certain limited circumstances, such as the class 
action, see Martin v Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989); 4) Assuming control over a litigation in which the 
judgment was rendered is also a way of being bound by the decision, see Montana v United States, 440 U.S. 
147 (1979); 5)  A lawsuit through proxy is also preclusive. In other words, a person who brings a lawsuit as 
an agent or representative of a party bound by a previous decision also suffers its preclusive effects, see 
Taylor v Sturgell 552 U.S. 880, 881 (2008); and 6) when a statutory scheme that does not violate due process 
is sufficient to ‘foreclose successive litigation by nonlitigants, see Martin v Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989). 
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preclusive effects in respect of non-parties to a judgment,795 as long as there are no due 
process violations.  
In respect of issue preclusion, the discussion is slightly different. Even though 
parties who are not party to a judgment cannot be bound by it, the U.S. system allows 
strangers to a judgment to use the decision reached in it.796  
Issue preclusion can be used both defensively and offensively. A defensive use of 
preclusion occurs when a party uses a previous decision to prevent a plaintiff who was 
present in a previous lawsuit from pursuing his claim. The recognition of its use in federal 
courts was made in the Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation case797, where the Supreme Court overruled the holding of Triplett v. Lowell798 
‘that a determination of patent invalidity is not res judicata against the patentee in 
subsequent litigation’, 799  allowing the defendant to use a prior determination in a 
judgment where only plaintiff was a party, against plaintiff himself. The rationale for the 
decision was that ‘[i]n any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, 
is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has 
fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources.’800 
Therefore, the question of allowing estoppel against a plaintiff would rest on the 
determination of whether the plaintiff had ‘a full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the 
issue.801  
The offensive use of preclusion for non-mutual parties is also possible, but it has 
more complications than its defensive counterpart. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore802 was a 
stockholder’s class action in which the claim was made that the corporation and its 
officers had issued false and misleading statements in violation of the Federal Securities 
                                                      
795 This is the case of the class action.  
796 Cavanagh 869 (n 757). 
797 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
798 297 U.S. 638 (1936). 
799 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
800 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
801 Ibid.  
802 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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Act. While the class action was ongoing, the SEC brought suit against the same defendants 
regarding the same issue of facts, and after a non-jury trial, the case was decided in favor 
of the SEC. The plaintiffs in the stockholder’s action moved for summary judgment 
arguing collateral estoppel on the issues that has already been decided in the SEC suit; 
this argument was denied by the District Court and reversed by the Court of Appeals, 
finally being affirmed by the Supreme Court.803 The general rule established in the case 
was that ‘in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, 
either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive 
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel.’804 The textbook example of unfairness in collateral estoppel is the 
case where the defendant is sued for a small amount of money and does not have an 
incentive to defend himself vigorously and as such, loses the case; thereafter, other 
plaintiffs linked to the same set of facts try to sue the defendant for millions of dollars and 
use collateral estoppel in respect of the decision in the first case.805 
b. General Exceptions in Civil Law: Brazil and Spain 
The Brazilian Civil Procedure Code clearly states that a judicial decision on the 
merits creates res judicata for the parties in respect of whom it is issued, neither 
benefiting nor harming third parties. 806  The same is true for the Spanish Act of Civil 
Procedure.807 Mutuality is so important that it is a constitutional guarantee.808  
In Brazil, the exceptions are very specific and are related to cases where the third-
party res judicata effect is necessary or follows from the decision itself; this is the case, for 
example, in matters concerning the mental state of the person. Even though there is a 
third-party effect, there are guarantees in place for protection. The binding effect of the 
                                                      
803 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (n 802). 
804 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (n 802) 331. 
805 E.g. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2nd Cir. 1965). 
806 Art 472.  
807 Art 222.3: ‘La cosa juzgada afectará a las partes del proceso en que se dicte […]’. 
808 Art. 5, LV of the Brazilian Constitution guarantees litigants the right to answer (contraditório) and the 
right to a full defense. An article that provides a similar guarantee in the Spanish Constitution is article 24.1 
(‘Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de 
sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión’).  
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decision will only operate if all those who might have an interest in the lawsuit are served 
with process.809  
In Spain, res judicata also affects successors in title and heirs, as well as those who 
are entitled to the right that constitutes the basis legitimating one of the parties to the 
lawsuit.810 The third-party effect in the Spanish system, concerning the successors and 
heirs, only operates if the acquisition title was formed after the lawsuit regarding the 
object of dispute was initiated.811 In this sense, the system is designed simply to protect 
the party in a lawsuit from an unfair disposition of the defendant’s assets; it does not raise 
any greater problem of due process since the parties involved in the transaction should 
be aware of this peculiarity of the Spanish legal system. The second case of the application 
of res judicata to third parties arises where the condition of the person constitutes the 
legal question of the subject of the procedure. The operation of res judicata and the erga 
omnes effect of the decision is a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of decision. 
For example, a person who is judged incompetent for civil acts and the consequent change 
in legal status derived from the decision, has to be opposable to everyone, and not only in 
respect of the parties to the lawsuit. The erga omnes effect occurs only after the 
registration of the change of status in the Civil Registry, giving constructive legal notice 
about the status of the person to everyone.812  
Mutuality therefore is a strong principle in civil law systems, to the extent that the 
development of a full-blown opt-out aggregate litigation procedure might be highly 
unlikely in such systems; nevertheless, alternatives have been created in respect of mass 
procedures, in particular, within the consumer context. 
                                                      
809 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 472.  
810 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 222.3. This provision points to article 11 of the same legal text, which 
establish the use of some forms of class actions for consumer disputes within the Spanish legal system.  
811 Aroca and others 479 (n 786). 
812 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, Art. 222.3. 
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c. The Operation of Preclusion in Representative Actions: how the mutuality 
requirement is circumvented in Brazil and Spain 
A special topic in both Brazil and Spain is preclusion in collective litigation. As 
mutuality has a constitutional status, the design of collective means of redress and their 
effects on third parties, is more limited than in the United States.  
Despite this seemingly insurmountable obstacle, the Brazilian and Spanish legal 
systems have designed and deployed collective means of redress for some specific 
situations, with the most important having been developed in the consumer context; for 
these purposes, a workaround had to be made with regard to the operation of res judicata.  
The problem can be framed in the following way: as a matter of constitutional law 
and due process guarantees, a person cannot be bound by a lawsuit without being able to 
participate in it; as such, the question arises as to how a collective means of redress can 
be designed without including every possible party in the procedure?  
The answer to this question and the workaround developed can be explained 
through the categories of collective rights created, those which have been legitimated to 
pursue collective actions and the mitigated effects of res judicata in these situations.  
In Brazil, there are basically three categories of collective rights: diffuse rights, 
collective rights and individual homogeneous rights.813 Diffuse rights are transindividual 
and indivisible rights belonging to a group of unidentified people; collective rights are also 
transindividual and indivisible, but the group to which they belong can be identified; 
finally, individual homogenous rights belong to individuals and are divisible, albeit having 
a common origin.814 
The persons authorized to launch a collective action are highly limited, even in 
cases of individual homogenous rights; most of the legal entities authorized to bring such 
an action are public.815 In fact, the only private entity category that could pursue a lawsuit 
                                                      
813 For an overview of the topic, see Fredie Didier Jr and Hermes Zaneti Jr, Curso de Direito Processual Civil: 
Processo Coletivo, vol 4 (Editora Podivm 2011) 75-98. 
814 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 81. See ibid . 
815  Prosecutor’s office, political entities (Union, States and Municipalities) and entities from the public 
administration. Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art. 82, I, II and III.  
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for collective redress are associations that have been constituted for at least one year and 
that include within their objectives the defense of interests and rights of consumers;816 
this would also give a public spin to its operation. 
These entities are authorized to go before a court and engage in a lawsuit against 
a company that has violated the rights of a multitude of people, without the need for their 
participation in the lawsuit. As a logical matter, within the Brazilian legal system, while 
the res judicata cannot bind those who were not party to the lawsuit, at least to the extent 
that it might be prejudicial to them, it will operate against the defendant. Due to this 
particularity there are a few different ways as to how the res judicata will operate; this 
will depend on the class of rights being discussed.  
Due to the nature of the diffuse types of rights, which are transindivindual, 
indivisible and belonging to an unidentified group of people, the res judicata will be erga 
omnes, 817  unless the claim for relief is denied due to lack of evidence. 818  Both those 
legitimized to pursue the lawsuit and the defendant will not be able to discuss the same 
matter again. In respect of the collective type, the effect is ultra partes, encompassing the 
members of the group that has been harmed.819 To clarify, it is important to underline that 
the rights in question for these kinds of actions are those with a transindividual character, 
and not the individual rights of the persons who were harmed due to the transgression of 
a transindividual right. For example, in air pollution cases, the group of persons living 
close to a factory have a right to clean air, but the harm that they may suffer due to air 
pollution is an individual right, which is not encompassed by the concept of collective 
rights lato sensu.820 Therefore, a decision against the individuals in these lawsuits does 
not preclude them from proceeding with their own claims arising out of the same factual 
circumstances.821 
                                                      
816 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 82, IV. 
817 Binding everyone.  
818 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 103, I; Law 7.347/1985, art 16.  
819 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 103, II. 
820 Diffuse and collective rights.  
821 The law is clear on this point – see Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 103 §1.  
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In respect of the individual homogenous rights collective lawsuit, the res judicata 
is secundum eventum litis, in other words, its effect depends on its outcome. If the claim 
for relief is accepted, the effect of the res judicata is erga omnes, and thereafter, any of the 
individuals may execute the decision individually. On the other hand, if the claims are 
dismissed, even with prejudice, the individuals who have not assisted in the lawsuit may 
file another lawsuit for damages on an individual basis.822 One detail to be considered is 
that if the lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice, the res judicata operates in respect of those 
who are legitimized to propose a collective lawsuit on the matter, therefore precluding 
them from starting a new collective lawsuit on the basis of the same questions.823 This 
system protects the individuals from being bound by a decision against them when they 
were not able to participate and defend their rights, while at the same time, it is an 
effective mechanism to solve mass disputes in the case that the decision is favorable to 
the plaintiffs.  
Therefore, in Brazil, even though preclusion has a strong connection to the concept 
of mutuality, there are some exceptions that allow for third-party effects in respect of 
those who have not participated in the proceedings; this never operates to their detriment.  
In Spain, the practical effect of representative litigation in the consumer context is 
similar to the Brazilian scheme. A group that consists of more than half of the harmed, in 
the case that identity can be easily ascertained, are allowed to choose a person to 
represent them in the lawsuit.824 Consumer associations are also legitimized to represent 
consumers.825 The decision in these cases has to provide an identification of those who 
will benefit from the lawsuit; when the individualized determination is not possible, the 
characteristics and requirements to demand payment have to be made clear,826 so the 
individual consumers can execute the decision afterwards.827 Also, if the decision declares 
a certain type of behavior illegal, it must also declare if there will be effects on those who 
                                                      
822 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 103 §2.   
823 International Commercial Arbitration Committee ILA, ‘Interim Report: "res judicata" and Arbitration’ 
(Berlin Conference) 19. 
824 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 6.7, 7.7 and 11.2. 
825 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 11. 
826 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 221.1.1. 
827 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 519.  
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have not been a party to the lawsuit.828 Since these representative actions may have an 
effect on those who have not been party to the lawsuit, the Spanish system demands that 
notice is given either through every individual consumer when they are easily 
identifiable829 or through communication channels that cover the territory where those 
who have been harmed may be found.830  To this extent, the system is similar to the 
Brazilian one, as the court may only bind absent consumers if the decision is one that 
concerns the illegality of a certain type of behavior by those causing harm.  
c. Preclusion in arbitration: what law will govern its operation?  
The analysis of preclusion in arbitration should begin firstly at the national level. 
In most jurisdictions, the arbitral award will have the same preclusive effects as a 
judgment of a national court.831 Within the national context, preclusion in arbitration is 
no more problematic than preclusion from legal decisions; as long as the award comprises 
the necessary requirements, it will have the effects of a judicial decision in the national 
jurisdiction.  
The complexity of the question increases when the object of analysis is transposed 
to the transnational realm, as the clarity of what kind of preclusion will be applicable fades. 
When the dispute is transnational and arbitral awards become international, the legal 
infrastructure regulating them reflects such change through the applicability of the 
international treaties on the matter. Article III of the New York Convention provides that 
‘[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding’, implicitly imposing 
some kind of preclusion effects on the award, even though it does not provide any clear 
cut rule on how preclusion should be operational. This ‘binding’ quality of an arbitral 
award attributed by Article III of the New York Convention is a ‘constitutional statement 
of principle’832  that ‘impl[ies] at least equally broad principles of preclusion as those 
                                                      
828 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 221.1.2. 
829 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 15.2. 
830 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 15.1. 
831 For an analysis of the difference between judicially confirmed and unconfirmed awards in the U.S., see 
Born 2895-904 (n 516); Brazilian Arbitration Law, art. 31; Spanish Arbitration Act, art. 43. 
832 Ibid 2892. 
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applicable to national courts judgments’. 833  Since the preclusion rules vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the problem that is to be solved concerns the preclusion rule 
that will be applicable in a given case.  
At least four possibilities are available: (a) the law of the jurisdiction where the 
new lawsuit is brought; (b) the law of the arbitral seat; (c) the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement or to the merits of the dispute; and finally (d) international 
preclusion rules.834  
Each of these possibilities has its own rationale for its applicability. The idea that 
res judicata is a procedural defense, therefore belonging to the court of the second lawsuit, 
would lead to the applicability of the law in the jurisdiction where the second lawsuit is 
brought.835  On the other hand, the procedural aspect of res judicata could also be used to 
sustain the position that the applicable law for preclusion should be the law of the place 
where the award was rendered.836 Since arbitration agreements are creatures of consent, 
the substantive applicable law approach to define the res judicata effects of an arbitral 
award is also justifiable. 837  Finally, the international preclusion rules approach is 
defended by Gary Born;838 the idea that preclusion effects are, in a substantial manner, 
private rights derived from the arbitration agreement between the parties, Gary Born 
advances that international preclusion principles derived from the New York Convention 
and from the international arbitral process should be applicable, instead of a national 
preclusion rule.839 
There is no single correct solution to this question; pragmatically, both the law of 
the arbitral seat and the law of the enforcing forum are highly important when discussing 
the preclusive effects of an arbitral award. In any event, at a minimum, arbitral awards 
                                                      
833 Ibid 2893.  
834 See ibid 2909-13. 
835 ILA 14 (n 823). 
836 Audley Sheppard, ‘Res Judicata and Estoppel’ in Bernardo Cremades and Julian Lew (eds), Parallel State 
and Arbitral Procedures in Interantional Arbitration (ICC 2005) 229 Sheppard is in favor of using this 
approach for international arbitration (p. 231).  
837 Sheppard has acknowledged that this has already happened in an ICC Award. Ibid 230. 
838 Born 2911-13 (n 516). 
839 Ibid 2912. 
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will have preclusive effects that encompass, at least, the dispositive part of the decision, 
generating what is known in the U.S. system as claim preclusion. These international 
arbitral awards do have to be confirmed in order to have preclusion effects,840 but once 
they have been confirmed, they have the same preclusive force as national court 
decisions.841 In the U.S., the reach of the preclusion effects of an arbitral award is broader 
since issue preclusion also operates,842 even though its third-party effect is more limited 
than in U.S. court decisions.843 
As the type of preclusion and its extension are important to legal certainty, the 
question becomes an important one that has to be considered when designing an 
aggregate mechanism for dispute resolution based on arbitration.  
D. Final Considerations on Aggregate Litigation Design 
Aggregate litigation functions as a mechanism both to enable compensation and to 
guarantee the application of the law.844 The design of an aggregate litigation system has 
to consider the conflicts of interest that arise out of the different classes of claimants in 
the same legal procedure, the conflicts with legal counsel and the conflicts with third-
party financiers, if they will be a part of the system. 
In addition, the design must engage the limitations of the legal system in which the 
aggregate mechanism has to be applicable. As constraints of both an ethical and 
procedural nature, and sometimes tied to constitutional principles, they may limit the 
range of options that are available. Procedural constraints on preclusion become an 
especially important topic when the dispute is transposed to the transnational realm.845 
                                                      
840 Unconfirmed awards in the United States do not have the full faith and credit of a judicial judgment as a 
statutory matter, but nonetheless they do have comparable preclusive effects developed under the 
jurisprudence of U.S. courts. Ibid 2896-98. 
841 In the U.S., see Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). 
842 For exceptions on the application of preclusion, see Born 2900 (n 516). 
843 Ibid 2901. 
844 See Layton 93-96 (n 700). 
845 The transnational problems will be addressed more extensively in Chapter X. 
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2. Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Securities Disputes  
Throughout this chapter, it has been established that one of the purposes of 
aggregate litigation is to provide economies of scale to facilitate litigation that otherwise 
would not be initiated due to the costs or low value of the claims at stake, in addition to 
facilitating the management of claims by courts and ensuring the application of the law. 
Aggregate litigation, therefore, is a manner of pursuing redress in respect of claims that 
otherwise would not be litigated, thus providing access to justice. 
Aggregate dispute resolution design has to consider the incentives of the parties 
who will be part of the process; at the same time, it is important that in such design, 
consideration is made of the ethical and procedural limits relevant in specific jurisdictions. 
As a result of the different approaches of different legal systems, a one-size-fits-all 
solution may not be achievable. 846  In any event, it is important to understand those 
situations in which aggregate litigation can be used with securities disputes. As shown in 
a previous chapter, in the securities context, there are three main different types of 
disputes: 1) investor v. issuer, 2) investor v. financial intermediary847 and 3) investor v. 
informational intermediary.848  
Each of these disputes has their intrinsic characteristics, and some can benefit 
much more from an aggregate litigation approach than others. Aggregate litigation is only 
adequate where there are similar issues between the members of the group; otherwise, 
the management of such a procedure would become impossible. In the securities context, 
disputes that have this characteristic are those that involve one act which has 
consequences for a multitude of persons, such as a false or misleading statement made by 
an issuer or the issuing of a credit rating made with minimum regard for the fundamentals 
of the investment. In these cases, disputes concerning both the falsity of the statement 
and the lack of fundamentals of a rating would greatly benefit by being resolved in an 
aggregate manner, since the question would be applicable to all those that were harmed 
                                                      
846 A proposal will be developed in the last chapter.  
847 Financial intermediaries are the banks, brokers and dealers that sell securities to the investor.  
848 Informational intermediaries are those who provide information to the market or directly to the clients, 
such as credit rating agencies and auditing firms.  
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by the statement or the rating.849 This is most likely to occur in relation to investor-issuer 
and investor and informational-intermediary disputes. 
The other type of disputes - investor-financial intermediary - is unlikely to benefit 
from an aggregate procedure. The transaction between an investor and a financial 
intermediary is highly personal; the duties of the financial intermediary, such the duty to 
assess the suitability of the investment, is so linked to the personal characteristics of the 
investor that it would be highly unlikely that an aggregate procedure would provide any 
benefit, even if the practice creating harm has been engaged on a widespread basis.  
Another consideration arising is that aggregate litigation procedures are national, 
are tied to specific jurisdictions and thus lack a very strong transnational appeal. Class or 
aggregate arbitration could be a possible solution to transnationalize aggregate dispute 
resolution solutions. 
In respect of the disputes discussed previously, the likelihood of creating a class 
arbitration system is higher from the first to the last type of dispute due to their intrinsic 
characteristics. The first relationship arises out of the purchase or sale of a security, the 
most common types of which are shares of a company. Even though the harm has to arise 
out of a purchase or sale of securities, the link tying the buyer or holder to the company 
issuing the fraudulent statement is based on the shareholder/company legal relationship. 
To this extent, an arbitration agreement with a class arbitration provision could be 
inserted into the corporate charters of companies, which would bind all those who have 
a claim arising out of the shareholder relationship, even if it is based on the violation of 
securities law. In addition, the class aspect is stronger than in the other two types of 
dispute because there is an aspect to the company/shareholder relationship that is absent 
in those disputes, namely the fact that every single shareholder has something in common 
with the others, i.e. the company. They are partners of the enterprise that they are suing, 
and to this extent, they could be considered as a class or as members of a group.850  
                                                      
849 Causation and individual damages may have to be litigated individually; nonetheless, the question of 
whether the information was false or the rating had no fundamentals to back it up still is a common issue 
for the class.  
850 Depending on when the securities were bought, different shareholders might have different interests 
according to the misleading statements that were made and the answers that the market gave to such 
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The second set of disputes is the one in which investors sue the intermediaries 
buying or selling securities from them. The basis for arbitration would be the contractual 
agreement between investor and intermediary, and here the consumerist aspect of the 
relationship is much more relevant than in the previous case, which may prevent the use 
of arbitration in some countries. 851  Even if arbitration is allowed, the use of class 
arbitration still encounters other barriers. While the use of contracts of adhesion might 
be common, creating a single legal matrix for the disputes with different costumers, the 
relationships are mainly bilateral, and as mentioned above, the class aspect that is present 
in shareholders/company relationships is missing in this type of dispute. It is also highly 
unlikely that intermediaries would include a class arbitration clause in their contracts and 
set up a mass arbitration system so their customers could pursue their claims collectively, 
since a piecemeal approach to litigation would most likely reduce their costs in dispute 
settlement due to the transaction costs faced by single plaintiffs bringing arbitration 
claims against them.  
Finally, the last type of dispute would involve investors against informational 
intermediaries, where the latter have provided false or misleading information to the 
market. Even though a system of aggregate litigation would be beneficial in this case, the 
possibility of class arbitration is even lower than in the other two types of disputes. There 
would be no legal basis to confer jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal since there are no 
direct legal relationships between investors and the possible defendants; all of the links 
would have to go through the company. One way to allow for arbitration in these cases 
would be through the contractual arrangement between the company and the rating 
agencies and auditors, or through statutory provisions that could require that these kinds 
of disputes have to be arbitrated. In any event, strong public support for the arbitration 
system would be necessary for this to work.  
A first look at this question would then lead to a conclusion that class arbitration 
in the securities area outside the United States would only be viable in cases of securities 
                                                      
misstatements; in any event they have a link, namely of being ‘partners’ in an enterprise, one which is not 
present in the other types of disputes.  
851 For example, arbitration is forbidden in consumer relationships in Brazil. Consumer Defense Code, art. 
51 VII.  
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fraud where the company charter provides for class arbitration. Of course, the use of this 
mechanism is dependent on the inclusion of clear arbitration agreements in company 
charters allowing for class arbitration and the structuring a system that would not deny 
due process to the plaintiffs, since the question of notice might be an issue that should be 
considered to guarantee the effectiveness of the arbitral award. Therefore, outside 
jurisdictions that admit U.S. style class actions and class arbitration, the only possibility 
for this mechanism would be one arising within the context of issuer-investor disputes, 
assuming that this would be an acceptable arrangement under the public policy of the 
jurisdiction in which the award would have to be enforced.  
Having established in this chapter that there are some types of securities disputes 
that may profit from an aggregate dispute resolution approach, in the next chapter I will 
give some examples of aggregate litigation mechanisms that currently exist, and then 
present more coherently the transnational questions which will subsequently be 
combined with those presented herein, in order to propose a model for transnational 
dispute resolution for securities transactions in the last chapter. 
 
 211 
Chapter IX – Aggregate Litigation Models 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate some of the different Aggregate 
Litigation models that are available today. Broadly there are three different models of 
aggregate litigation: (a) the first is the joinder of the parties in a single lawsuit, where 
individuals participate and have standing in the legal procedure; (b) the second is the use 
of test cases, where even though each individual claimant still has standing and 
participates in the procedure, some cases are used to determine general common issues 
for those involved in the litigation; (c) finally, the last mechanism is where a 
representative has the legal standing for a group of people, who will be bound by the 
decision even though they have not participated in the procedure. This chapter provides 
a brief overview of the American class action, representative actions, the Dutch Act on 
Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, the English Group Litigation Order, the German 
Capital Market Model Claims Act and class arbitration.  
1. The American Class Action 
Conceptually, the American class action is a mechanism where one or a few 
persons represent a whole group with similar characteristics in a lawsuit; all of those 
sharing these characteristics are bound by the decision, even if they are not active 
participants in the lawsuit.  
A. A Brief History of the Class Action 
Historical records show that while the class action has roots dating back as far as 
the 12th century,852 it became a more commonly used mechanism only later in the 17th 
century. At this point in time, group litigation, both in England and the US, was used 
mostly to regulate relationships within social groups.853 
                                                      
852 The earliest case found by Professor Yeazell, who wrote extensively on the subject, is Martin, Rector of 
Barkway v. Parishioners of Nuthamstead, from 1199. See Stephen C. Yeazell, ‘The Past and Future of 
Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation’ (1997) 39 Arizona Law Review 687-704, 688. 
853  The social structure at that time was different than that which exists today, and so was the role 
performed by the judiciary. Aggregate litigation was the means through which a given social group, 
 212 
Contrary to the modern American class action, aggregate litigation in the 17th 
century required the consent of all members of the class, a requirement that was easily 
achievable due to the social structure in place at the time.854 The decisions achieved had 
less of an all-or-nothing character and more of a regulatory one, where the judicial system 
would perform a legislative function with the decree executed serving as the basis for a 
change in the substantive law governing the relationship between the parties.855 
In 1842, in the United States, Equity Rule 48 started governing group litigation in 
federal courts, even though it still was a mechanism that did not bind absent parties.856 
Despite this rule, eleven years later, in Smith v. Swormstedt,857 the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that:  
[W]here the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object 
common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of 
themselves and of the others; and a bill may also be maintained against a 
portion of a numerous body of defendants, representing a common interest.858 
                                                      
considered as a whole, would claim or resist claims from its direct administrative unit. Aggregate litigation 
therefore was a matter of status, and not of economic efficiency: not only did every single member of the 
group had identical rights to one another, since the relationship they had with their superiors was the same, 
but they were also organized as a political group, with institutions in place and communication channels 
with the manorial proprietor or the parishioner against whom they usually had to litigate. See Stephen C. 
Yeazell, ‘Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law 
Review 866-96, 867, 77 Geoffrey C. Hazard, John L. Gedid and Stephen Sowle, ‘An Historical Analysis of the 
Binding Effect of Class Suits’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1849, 1865. 
854 Groups were small and cohesive.  Yeazell, ‘Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the 
Class Action’ 878 (n 853). 
855 Ibid 882; 84 One of the first reported cases where the contours of aggregate litigation started moving 
towards the class action as seen today was Brown v. Vermuden (22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676), a case from 
1676, where a miner who had not been a part of previous proceedings was contesting the effects that they 
could have with regard to him. The court rejected the miner’s claim based on the argument that, in the case 
that the court would not bind similarly-situated parties, suits of such a nature would be impossible to finally 
come to an end. 
856 See FED. R. EQ. 48 (1842) (repealed 1912), quoted in 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843) in Debra Lyn Bassett, 
‘Constructing Class Action Reality’ 2006 Brigham Young University Law Review 1415, 1433 (‘Where the 
parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive 
delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them 
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests 
of the plaintiffs and defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without 
prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.’) 
857 57 U.S. 288. 
858 Id at 301. 
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The Supreme Court, with the language engaged in this decision, effectively 
established the possibility of binding effects of class actions on absent class members, 
which in fact created a contradiction with Equity Rule 48859 and generated important 
practical effects. From the date of this judgment until the revision of the Equity Rules, 
there were not only federal decisions binding absent class members based on Smith v. 
Swormstedt but also decisions based on Equity Rule 48 preserving the right of absent class 
members to sue, thus creating legal uncertainty.860  In 1912, the equity rules were revised, 
Equity Rule 48 was repealed and the procedure to deal with aggregate litigation was 
incorporated into Equity Rule 38.861 This Rule did not explicitly state that class actions 
could be binding on absent class members, but in 1921 this became clear under this new 
framework shaped by the Supreme Court decision of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble.862  
The next development of the American class action came with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act863 giving the 
Supreme Court the ‘power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules 
of evidence for cases in the United States district courts’, which was duly exercised in 
1938 with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 provided for 
class actions, allowing for ‘persons constituting a class […] so numerous as to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before the court’864 to sue or be sued on behalf of all, as 
long as the character of the right was joint or common, as long as the adjudication of 
claims forming the object of the action could affect a specific property involved in the 
                                                      
859 Hazard, Gedid and Sowle 1901-02 (n 853). 
860 See ibid 1902-09. 
861  Which provided that ‘[w]hen the question is one of common or general interest to many persons 
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more 
may sue or defend for the whole’, containing therefore both the ‘aggregate’ and ‘representative’ 
characteristics of the modern class action. John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 705, 705 (1997) citing JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 231 (1930). On 
the aggregate and representative characteristics of the class action see Bassett 1418-31 (n 856). 
862 (‘if the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which are obviously entitled, the decree 
when rendered must bind all of the class properly represented’) 255 U.S. 356 (1921) 367.  
863 Current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2014).  
864 The text of the 1938 Rule 23 is available at 39 Federal Rules Decisions 69. 
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action or as long there was a common question of law or facts and a common relief was 
sought.865  
Even though the 1938 Rule 23 was prima facie clear, it raised a lot of different 
problems, including, amongst others, the proper labeling of a class action, the effects 
arising from it,866 the extent of the judgments in class actions and the lack of binding effect 
of a ‘spurious’ class action on non-party class members.867 In 1966, with the revision of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 was significantly altered,868 bringing it to its 
current design. 
B. Types of Class Actions and its Prerequisites 
Under the current Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the basic 
prerequisites of a class action are numerosity, 869  commonality, 870  typicality 871  and 
adequate representation.872  
The first requirement, numerosity, is concerned more with the impracticability of 
joinder of all members of the class than with the actual quantity of members; it is not a 
highly contested issue.873 
The commonality and typicality requirements are the parameters in place for the 
efficiency of the class action and the protection of interests of class members. As stated in 
                                                      
865 These are the ‘true’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘spurious’ characters of the class action under the former Rule 23. See 
Bassett 1434-36 (n 856). 
866 Tom Ford, ‘The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23’ 
(1966) 32 Antitrust Law Journal 254, 257. 
867 For other issues that the former Rule 23 created, see the Advisory Committee’s Notes on 39 Federal 
Rules Decisions 69.  
868 39 Federal Rules Decisions 69. 
869 ‘the class is so numerous that joinder of all member is impracticable’. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 
23(a)(1). 
870 ‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class’. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(a)(2).  
871 ‘the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defences of the class’. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(a)(3).  
872 ‘the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class’ Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, s 23(a)(4).  
873 Richard Nagareda, The Law of Class Actions and Other Aggregate Litigation (Foundation Press 2009) 67. 
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General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 874 they ‘serve as guideposts for determining whether 
under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and 
whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the 
interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.’ 
While commonality concerns the relationship of the class members to one another, 
typicality is a matter of the relationship of the class representative with the absent 
members of the class.875 
Adequate representation was a prerequisite even before the enactment of Rule 23. 
In Hansberry v. Lee876 the petitioners, who were African-American, had bought a piece of 
real estate property and were sued on the basis of an alleged contractual stipulation 
between 500 property owners that those owners could not sell the properties to African-
American people. To be effective, the agreement had to be signed by 95% of the property 
owners, which had not in fact happened;877 this issue of fact had been decided as if the 
signatures had been made in a previous case to which petitioners had not been a party.878 
The Circuit Court found that the fulfillment of the condition precedent to the agreement 
was res judicata, a decision that the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. The question was 
whether the petitioners were bound by the previous judgment despite the fact that they 
were neither a part of it nor a successor in interest or in privity with the other parties to 
the suit. On constitutional grounds, it was a question of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Not only was the prior case one exclusively against the defendants, thus not 
having a class character, but also nor was it clear that ‘the interest in defeating the 
contract outweighed their interest in establishing its validity’.879 The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that in this situation neither the defendants nor the plaintiffs had assumed the power 
to represent the petitioner in the previous case, and also that, due to their dual interests, 
                                                      
874 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
875 Nagareda 73-74 (n 873). 
876 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
877 As established by the proceedings of the lower courts that led to this decision. See 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 
37. 
878 Burke v Kleiman, 277 Ill.App.519 (1934).  
879 Hansberry v Lee (n 876).  
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this representation was a responsibility that they could not discharge, reversing the lower 
court judgment. 
If these four prerequisites are satisfied, a class action can be entertained in four 
different situations: 1) when there is a risk of inconsistent adjudication creating 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; 880  2) when 
adjudications regarding individual class members would be dispositive or affect the 
interests of other members not party to the adjudication;881 3) when ‘the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole’;882 and finally, 4) when there are questions of law or fact common to 
class members that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members 
and the class action is a superior method of adjudication.883  
The three first types of class action contained in Fed. R. C. Proc. 23 (b)(1) and (2) 
are mandatory, meaning that the members of the class do not have the right to opt-out.884 
The last one, based on the predominance of common questions over individual ones, do 
provide for the right to opt-out, but the class-wide preclusion effect is dependent on 
discharging the duty of providing the ‘best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort’.885 
C. Class Certification 
Certification is the procedural step by which the lawsuit is stamped with the class 
action seal, unleashing the legal consequences arising out from the case falling within 
category. The court has to certify the class ‘[a]t an early practicable time after a person 
                                                      
880 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(b)(1)(A). 
881 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(b)(1)(B). 
882 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(b)(2). 
883 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(b)(3). 
884 The res judicata in this kind of cases is mostly for injunctive and declaratory relief. Monetary relief claims 
need to have a minimum procedural due process to bind absent members. See Brown v Ticor Title Insurance 
Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
885 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(c)(2)(B). 
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sues or is sued as a class representative’,886 and at the same time, identify the ‘claims, 
issues, or defenses’ and appoint class counsel.887  
The certification consists of checking whether the lawsuit complies with the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and fits within one of the categorizations of Rule 23(b). The 
inquiry must be comprehensive; trial judges are required to undertake a rigorous analysis 
and be convinced that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.888 Theoretically, 
since the Eisen889 decision, substantive merit-related inquiries should not be made at the 
certification stage, but because of the necessity of a ‘rigorous analysis’ as to its pre-
requites, class certification has a close relationship with the substantive merits of the 
dispute; depending on the specifics of the case, courts may have to engage in such an 
inquiry.890 Courts have to solve disputes as to whether certification requirements have 
been met and whether they are based on factual or legal assertions, even though this 
decision will not be binding on the trier of facts.891 While this might ease the concern over 
determinations of substantive issues, in any event, the decision must be strictly related to 
the certification requirements. This decision can be appealed within 14 days of the 
entering of the order.892  
Most class actions settle after certification, raising the importance of this stage in 
the judicial process.893 In practice, the trial occurs during the pre-trial phase, since the 
dispute will be solved promptly afterwards according to the outcome of class certification.  
Within the reality of such a context, the late Prof. Nagareda has suggested that it is 
                                                      
886 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(c)(1)(A).  
887 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(c)(1)(B). 
888 General Telephone Co. Of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-161 (1982). 
889 Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
890 For example, to assess the predominance requirement on a 23(b)(3) class action, the judge may have to 
determine, even if only preliminarily, the questions of law and fact that will be important in the lawsuit, a 
task which touches on the merits of the dispute. Nonetheless, under Eisen, evidence and the likelihood of 
success should not be considered at this moment. For a discussion on this question, see Robert G. Bone and 
David S. Evans, ‘Class Certification and the Substantive Merits’ (2001-2002) 51 Duke Law Journal 1521; 
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (‘sometimes it may be necessary for the court to 
probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question’).  
891 See Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 f.3d 24, 39-42 (2nd Cir. 2006). 
892 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(f).  
893 Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper and Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four 
Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (1996) 179 179.  
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important for courts to ‘say what the law is’, especially when the dispute for class 
certification arises between different accounts of the governing law, an inquiry that is 
similar to the one that is made within the choice-of-law context in nationwide state-law 
based class actions.894 This is a crucial aspect for the development of the law on issues 
that are more prone to class action disputes.895 
When a class is certified, all the persons that fall within the category delineated by 
the court as members of that class will be bound by the decision reached under the 
preclusion doctrine, meaning that if they do not opt out in the specified time period, none 
of the persons involved in the class will be able to re-litigate the matters decided therein.  
The same preclusion effects attach to class settlements, which constitute more than just 
an agreement of the parties but rather also an exercise of judicial authority.896 
D. Class Action and Securities Litigation 
In the United States, there were two important changes to the class action 
procedure in securities litigation, namely, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 
 The PSLRA brought major changes to securities litigation in the United States in 
order to address the increasingly significant problem of frivolous lawsuits. The Act 
restructured various procedural mechanisms and created a specific framework for the 
securities class action. Relevant to this part of this work are the reforms concerning the 
specific procedures that altered the basic process of a class action.  
A problem that was fairly present was the existence of plaintiffs for hire; these 
were persons paid by the law firm to buy securities and be ready to act as a representative 
plaintiff when necessary. The PSLRA tried to curb the practice by imposing a requirement 
                                                      
894 Richard A. Nagareda, ‘Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof’ (2009) 84 New York University 
Law Review 97, 164-73. 
895 See Chapter VI on the importance of reasoned and publicly available judicial decisions. 
896 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, s 23(e)(2). See also Tobias Barrington Wolff, ‘Preclusion in Class Action 
Litigation’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 717, 765 (‘It is through the issuance of a certification order 
that a court acquires the power to bind absentees to a settlement agreement – a fact reinforced by Rule 
23(e)’s requirement that a court provide further process to class members and then review and approve 
any settlement before such an agreement can take effect’).  
 219 
that plaintiffs should certify that they ‘did not purchase the security that is the subject of 
the complaint at the direction of plaintiff’s counsel or in order to participate in any private 
action arising under [the PSLRA]’ and that ‘the plaintiff will not accept any payment for 
serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff’s pro rata share 
of any recovery’.897  
Addressing the same problem, another important procedural mechanism that was 
changed was the one to appoint the lead plaintiff. The PSLRA created a rebuttable 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff, for the purpose of appointing a lead plaintiff, 
would be the party with ‘the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class’;898 
this is a determination that can only be rebutted upon proof that either the chosen 
plaintiff ‘will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class’899 or ‘is subject 
to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the 
class’.900 The idea of the rule was to change the power balance between lawyers and 
plaintiffs, giving control of the litigation to those with more interest in closely monitoring 
the actions of class counsels and negotiating more fiercely in order to lower their fees.901 
Congress’ objective in enacting this provision was to increase the role played by 
institutional investors in securities class actions.902 
The results intended by Congress were partially achieved. 903  Only public 
institutional investors stepped up as lead plaintiffs, while there was no significant change 
for private institutional investors.904 The same is true regarding the amount of recovery, 
                                                      
897 Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 21D(a)(2)(ii) and (vi).  
898 Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 21D(a)(3)(B) (iii)(I)(bb). 
899 Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 21D(a)(3)(B) (iii)(II)(aa). 
900 Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 21D (a)(3)(B) (iii)(II)(bb). 
901 Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard, ‘Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff 
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’ (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quarterly 
869, 869. 
902 Ibid . 
903 For an overview of the effects of the PSLRA, see Stephen J. Choi and Robert B. Thompson, ‘Securities 
Litigation and its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After PSLRA’ 06-26 NYU Law and Economics 
Research Paper Series 1. 
904 Choi, Fisch and Pritchard 870 (n 901). 
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which was higher when public institutional investors were involved.905 Finally, attorney’s 
fee awards were not reduced due to the increased participation of institutional 
investors.906 
This change therefore altered the framework of class actions in the specific field of 
securities litigation, providing a more certain basis to the court in deciding who will act 
as the class representative. Even though the objectives of Congress in enacting the 
legislation were not completely achieved, the procedure for appointing lead plaintiffs was 
rationalized, creating, at least theoretically, a sound mechanism to align the incentives of 
lawyers with those of the class.  
The second modification arose from the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998, created to prevent the ongoing flight of securities litigation from federal 
courts to state courts due to the enactment of the PSLRA. The act mainly prohibited the 
use of state law for securities class action litigation in which there were legal arguments 
that included securities fraud.907 
Notwithstanding the inconclusive evidence, the argument in favor of the 
legislation was that plaintiffs were moving their lawsuits to state courts to avoid the 
higher standards that were created after the PSLRA entered into force.908 
                                                      
905 Ibid. 
906 Ibid. It is important to note that there were other studies claiming otherwise, but Professor Choi pointed 
to methodological problems with them, such as failing to control for the size of the case. Ibid 878. 
907 The text of the legislation is:  
‘(f) LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES.— 
(1) CLASS ACTION LIMITATIONS.—No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any 
State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging— 
(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security; or 
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered security.  
(2) REMOVAL OF COVERED CLASS ACTIONS.—Any covered class action brought in any State court 
involving a covered security, as set forth in paragraph (1), shall be removable to the Federal district court 
for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to paragraph (1).’ 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb (f)(1) 
& (2)).  
908 See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court 8-12 (Lewis & Clark Law School Legal 
Research Paper Series No. 17, 2011). 
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The statute provided for some exceptions, such that class litigation related to 
securities could still be pursued at the state level; these exceptions included, for example, 
the case of the ‘Delaware carve-out’,909 where the basis of the claim is the statutory or 
common law of the state in which the issuer is incorporated and involves equity holders 
of the issuer, in a situation where the case is related to communications made by the 
issuer to its equity securities holders or where it concerns decisions of these holders with 
respect to their voting rights in tender offers or appraisal rights.910 
The result is that state law-based claims in class actions are preempted, 911 
diminishing the scope of remedies that are available to plaintiffs to pursue recovery. This 
was another step taken by the U.S. Congress, this time through the restriction of avenues 
available to plaintiffs, to increase the difficulty of obtaining relief in securities fraud cases. 
2. Representative Actions: Brazil and Spain 
Brazil and Spain also have procedures in place to deal with problems that affect a 
wide range of plaintiffs, but their characteristics are not quite the same as the American 
class action model. 912 Standing to sue is limited, preclusion rules are not as broad and 
moreover, the background civil procedure system is quite different. These systems seem 
to be designed in order to protect the interests that are more public, either by its 
substantive nature913 or by policy choice.914 
In Brazil, the idea of a legal procedure to address disputes with a collective 
character is as old as the 1934 Constitution, which introduced the Popular Action 
mechanism,915 but its proper regulation came only in 1965, with Law 4.717/65. Even 
                                                      
909 I borrowed the term from Ibid 8. 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 28(f)(3)(i) & (ii).  
911 See also Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
912 For a more in depth overview of class actions in Brazil and Spain, see Juan José Marín López, ‘Las Acciones 
de Clase en el Derecho Español’ (2001) 03/2001 InDret 1 Antonio Gidi, ‘Class Actions in Brazil: a Model for 
Civil Law Countries’ (2003) 51 The American Journal of Comparative Law 311. 
913 Such as those within the concept of diffuse rights.  
914 As in the case of more common consumer torts, such as false advertisement.  
915 The law regulating the procedure came only in 1965 (Law 4.717/65). 
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though standing was broad,916 its problem was the limited scope of substantive matters 
that could be protected, encompassing only public heritage/public property and public 
morality.917 
Twenty years later, law 7.347/85 was enacted, introducing the Public Civil Action, 
a procedure with a broader scope than the former Popular Action; it included the general 
expression of ‘diffuse or collective interests’ as a subject matter that could be protected. 
Nonetheless, what was given with one hand was partially taken away with the other; art 
5 of the law limited standing to initiate a Public Civil Action to the Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Union, states, municipalities, state companies and associations that had been constituted 
for at least one year. 918  Not long afterwards, legislation was passed to protect the 
collective rights of disabled persons, 919  securities investors, 920  children 921  and 
consumers,922 and within this legislation, specific changes and special circumstances to 
launch a Public Civil Action were provided for in each case.923 
While it had been played around with during the 80s and 90s,924, the concept of 
aggregate litigation only became entrenched in the Spanish legal system with the new 
Spanish Civil Procedure Act, enacted in 2000.925 Only matters related to consumer or user 
lawsuits, in other words, those who are the final purchasers or users of goods and 
services,926 can be litigated through a representative mechanism in Spain. 
                                                      
916 ‘Any citizen may be a legitimate part to propose the annulation or declaration of nullity…’ Law 4.717/65, 
art 1.  
917 Humberto Dalla Bernardina de Pinho, ‘A Tutela Coletiva no Brasil e a Sistemática dos Novos Direitos’ 
Revista Diálogo Jurídico, 4 . 
918 The scope of standing was also expanded later to the Public Defense Office.  
919 Law 7.853/89 (Brazil). 
920 Law 7.913/89 (Brazil). 
921 Law 8.069/90 (Brazil). 
922 Law 8.078/90 (Brazil). 
923 E.g., the changes on standing for public civil actions in Brazil.  
924 Spanish Law had specific legislation giving standing to consumer and user associations to propose class 
actions in cases of unfair advertisement (Law 34/1988 (Spain), art 25.1), antitrust (Law 3/1991 (Spain), 
art 19.2 .a ), abusive contract terms (Law 7/1998 (Spain), art  16.3).  
925 See López 3-4 (n 912) (According to the author, only in two very specific occasions class actions for 
damages were allowed in Spain before the Civil Procedure Act). 
926 Ibid 4. 
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Standing is broader than in Brazil, since the group of affected people,927 in addition 
to consumer and user associations928  and entities created for the specific purpose of 
protecting consumer and users,929 are allowed to bring a lawsuit. In practice though, this 
broader standing is of limited significance, since the people in the affected group have to 
be ‘determined or easily determinable’ and the group has to be constituted by a majority 
of the affected persons,930 which is not only a requirement that has to be proven by the 
group, but also raises questions of who, within the group, would control the direction of 
the lawsuit.931 
Therefore, in a manner that differs from the American class action, in which 
anyone can ‘create’ a class and sue, the trend of the class action procedure in Brazil and 
Spain is to enable specific parties in specific circumstances to use the judiciary to correct 
a wrong inflicted on the collective. The rights protected have either a public character or 
are rights of weaker groups that the legislator wanted to empower, such as consumers or 
the disabled.  
Another crucial difference that confirms the trend is the preclusion effects arising 
out of these civil law class actions. In both Brazil and Spain, there is a separation between 
‘collective right’ and the ‘individual right’, even when the individual right is litigated in a 
collective fashion. A class action in the United States binds all class members, whether 
they participate or not in the lawsuit. This is not the case in Brazil or in Spain. In Brazil, 
the effects of the judgment are secundum eventum litis to the individual, in other words, 
the effect depends on the results.932 If the plaintiffs are successful, the result is binding 
erga omnes, in the territory in which the judge (or court) has jurisdiction;933 if the lawsuit 
                                                      
927 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 6.1.7. 
928 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 11.1. 
929 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art 6.1.8. 
930 Spanish Act of Civil Procedure, art. 6.1.7. 
931 López 6-7 (n 912). 
932 Pinho 15 (n 917). 
933 Law 7.347/1985 (Brazil), art 16.. This is becoming a contested matter, as Federal Judges in the Rio 
Grande do Sul Judicial Section have been deciding that some Public Civil Actions have a national effect due 
to the national character of the infringement at hand. See Defensoria Pública da União v Caixa Econômica 
Federal (4th Federal Court of Porto Alegre, Statement of Claim Acceptance in Public Civil Action n. 5008379-
42.2014.404.7100) (04 February 2014) (deciding on the national effect of the Public Civil Action and citing 
Federal Judge Andrei Pitten Velloso in Defensoria Pública da União v União – Fazenda Nacional (14th Federal 
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is dismissed by lack of evidence, anyone can sue again in his own individual capacity as 
long as new evidence is available. 934  In the consumer context, even if the lawsuit is 
dismissed with prejudice, each individual consumer still maintains his right to sue.935 The 
same is true in the Spanish context.936 
As mentioned above, Brazil has specific public civil action legislation for securities 
transactions. The procedure to be followed is the same as the one regulated in the Public 
Civil Action Law,937 but the scope of standing is limited to the Prosecutor’s Office.938 Only 
cases of fraud, use of insider information and omission of relevant information, when 
there was a duty to inform, can be raised.939 Apparently, the mechanism has been used 
very sparsely in securities cases: a survey of the federal jurisprudence showed only three 
cases in which the Public Civil Action was used,940 while a search in the São Paulo state 
showed only 2 more relevant cases.941 
For defendants, the prospects of multiple lawsuits, even after prevailing in a class 
action, may seem daunting, especially to those not familiar with the operations of civil 
procedure and the litigation framework in civil law countries. Even though this is not the 
best solution for the defendant, the differences in these systems alleviate the concerns 
                                                      
Court of Porto Alegre, Relief Anticipation in Public Civil Action n. 5019819-69.2013.404.7100) (10 May 
2013). 
934 Law 7.347/85 (Brazil), Art. 16 
935 Law 8.078/90 (Brazil), art. 103 §1.  
936 See López 13 (n 912). 
937 Law 7.347/85. 
938 Law 7.913/89, art 1; Usiminas v Donaldo Armelin (TRF3, 6th Chamber, Civil Appeal n. 1275780) (2008); 
Usiminas v Ministério Público Federal (TRF3, 6th Chamber, Instrumental Appeal n. 212476) (2004); Telebrás 
S.A. v Ministério Público Federal (TRF1, 2nd Chamber, Civil Appeal n. 93.01.04391-2 / DF) (1995). 
939 Law 7.913/89 art 1; Ministério Público do Estado de São Paulo v Comind Empreendimentos S.A. (STJ, 3rd 
Chamber, REsp 8878 / SP) (2002) (‘There is no basis in Laws n 7.347/85 and 7.913/89 to legitimate the 
Prosecutor’s Office to act as the fiscal of the law in a damages action against financial institutions due to 
liquidation of debts already paid, when the extrajudicial framework to which they were subject has already 
come to an end’). 
940  Usiminas v Donaldo Armelin (n 938); Usiminas v Ministério Público Federal (n 938); Telebrás S.A. v 
Ministério Público Federal (n 938). There was also a criminal appeal that used the Public Civil Action Law as 
basis to impose collective moral damages on defendants convicted of insider trading (Luiz Gonzaga Murat 
Junior v Justiça Pública (TRF3, 5th Chamber, Criminal Appeal 45484) (2013)). 
941  Telesp v Ministério Público (TJSP, 7th Private Law Chamber, Instrument Appeal n. 0013965-
80.2002.8.26.0000) (2002); Walter Appel v Ministério Público (TJSP, 8th Private Law Chamber, Instrument 
Appeal n. 9034921-85.2007.8.26.0000) (2007). 
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and the harm that might be caused by this possibility. In contrast to the American system, 
litigation in Brazil and Spain is cheaper. A clear reason is lack of discovery,942 which can 
consume thousands of man-hours, both on the part of defendants and plaintiffs, in respect 
of the former, giving the necessity to prepare the documents to disclose, and on the part 
of the latter, given the need to sort through the documents to prepare the case.943 In civil 
law procedure, the parties need to bring their own evidence to court, without the aid of 
the adverse party.944 This difference alone, when compared to the U.S. system, cuts the 
cost of litigation tremendously. Moreover, the harm of repetitive litigation to a defendant 
is a minor concern compared to the guarantee of due process of law in deciding on a 
plaintiff’s rights. In other words, in civil law systems, the day in court remains an essential 
foundation of fairness in the judicial system, which, without causing a high degree of harm 
to defendants, guarantees the possibility of each plaintiff to claim his/her substantive 
right in court.  
The problem is that, for conflict of interest and incentives purposes, the system 
still does not present the best solutions, since it is either dependent on public institutions 
to pursue litigation 945  or on not-for-profit consumer organizations. Adding this 
consideration to the ethical restrictions that might be faced by lawyers in respect of 
solicitation, it becomes almost impossible for this system design to provide incentives 
that would in fact enable aggregate litigation as an adequate solution for legal questions 
that involve a wide-ranging group.  
                                                      
942 To be fair, there is some possibility of discovery in the Brazilian and Spanish systems, but it is highly 
limited in comparison to the U.S. In Brazil, the Civil Procedure Code (Law 5.869/1973), art. 355, states that 
the judge may demand that a party shows a document or things in his/her possession. The same is true in 
Spain, according to article 328.1 of the Civil Procedure Law: ‘each party may request the others to show 
documents that are not available and that refers to the object of the procedure or to the efficiency of 
evidence.’  The scope is limited though – in Brazil the evidence has to be described as completely as possible, 
its objective and the circumstances in which the party requesting it, have to affirm that the document exists 
(art 356) while in Spain the consequence is that, in case of failure to show a requested document, the court 
may give weight to a copy of such document (art 329.1), requiring nonetheless that the party requesting 
the exhibition of the document must have some evidence of it.  
943 On the plaintiff’s side, the legal fees can easily amount to the hundreds of thousands.  
944 Gidi 320 (n 912). 
945 On the problems of public enforcement in aggregate litigation, see Lemos. 
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3. The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages 
The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages was designed to solve a 
specific procedural problem that arose out of a mass dispute in the DES case, which had 
more than 18.000 litigants (and a potential group of up to 440.000).946 
The Act provides that when there is a settlement between the defendant and an 
association or foundation representing claimants, the settlement can be sent to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal for approval, binding all those who are potentially claimants 
unless they opt-out of the settlement.947 As it is an opt-out procedure, notice becomes 
important; it has to be made directly to all known interested persons as well as through 
newspapers, both at the moment preceding the declaration that the settlement is binding, 
and after it.948 Other questions on its operation in the transnational environment will be 
dealt with in the next chapter.  
It is becoming more common for funding to be provided by organizations and 
special purpose vehicles, which either collect money from individuals or are entitled to 
contingency fees in a successful settlement.949 This development is important because 
Dutch lawyers are not allowed to operate on a contingent fee basis due to ethical 
restrictions; 950  as such, alternative avenues for dispute resolution funding in mass 
proceedings are needed.  
4. The English Group Litigation Order 
The English Group Litigation Order is a mechanism that provides ‘for the case 
management of claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law’.951 The 
                                                      
946 Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems 70-71 (n 604). 
947 Ibid 71. 
948  Ruud Hermans and Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, ‘International Class Action Settlements in the 
Netherlands since Converium’ in Ian Dodds-Smith and Alison Brown (eds), The International Comparative 
Guide to: Class & Group Actions 2013 (5th edn, Global Legal Group Ltd. 2012) 7. 
949 Ianika Tzankova, Netherlands National Report - part 2 (2008) 3. 
950 Ibid 4. 
951 Civil Procedure Rules 19.10. 
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procedure was primarily developed through judicial discretion, due to the necessity that 
arose to manage cases with a high number of claimants in the 1980s, 952  becoming 
legislation in 2000. 953 
The mechanism allows for claims that present similar issues to be managed 
together by the same court.954 A register has to be set up to allow for claimants to join the 
procedure;955 a judge is then appointed to manage it and issue the necessary orders for 
the development of the litigation.956 
The procedure is very flexible; the court can vary the issues that will be decided, 
pick one or more cases to proceed as test cases, and define the preclusion effects for those 
who might join the register after an issue is decided.957 As an opt-in procedure, only those 
who are part of the register will be bound by the decisions rendered by the court.958 
Even though the flexibility of the court is significant, a practice has emerged 
wherein test cases are used to decide the issues that are common to the group, allowing 
for the full litigation of these cases so that a clear picture can arise.959 
Finally, the loser pays principle still applies; this might give rise to  financial 
consequences for claimants if no other arrangements between claimants and lawyers or 
third-party financiers are made.960    
                                                      
952 Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems 53 (n 604). 
953 Neil Andrews, ‘Multi-Party Proceedings in England: representative and group actions’ (2001) 11 Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 249, 249. 
954 Ibid 259. 
955 Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 19B 6.1. 
956 Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems 53 (n 604). 
957 Mulheron 98-99 (n 708). 
958 Civil Procedure Rules 19.12(1)(a). 
959 Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems 58 (n 604). 
960 Ibid 60. 
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5. The German Capital Market Model Claims Act 
The Capital Market Model Claims Act was enacted in 2005 due to the need for 
German courts to deal with a securities case brought by 15.000 investors against 
Deutsche Telekom.961 At the time when the suits were filed, the German Civil Code did not 
allow for the coordinated management of all these claims.  They had a similar factual 
background: an alleged false or misleading statement in connection with a public offering 
of American Depositary Shares.962 
The act is restricted to claims for compensation due to false, omitted or misleading 
information and to claims regarding the fulfillment of contracts under the Securities 
Acquisition and Takeover Act.963 
Similar to the English GLO procedure, the German mechanism requires that a 
register is created so that claimants can apply for the initiation of a model case.964 If there 
are 10 cases, a referral is made to a Higher Regional Court so that a model case can be 
established;965 the court that will try the matter then has to suspend pending proceedings 
that are factually or legally related to the model case.966 The Higher Regional Court will 
then decide on who will be part of the model case, considering the amount of the claim 
and if there is any agreement amongst the plaintiffs regarding a designated model 
plaintiff. 967  The decision taken is binding on the inferior courts and binding on all 
interested parties, regardless of intervention.968 
This proceeding was created as a management tool to diminish common issues 
that would have to be litigated many times; it is an interim proceeding, and as such, other 
                                                      
961 Ibid 77-78. 
962 Ibid 78. 
963 KapMuG, s 1(1).  
964 KapMuG, s 2(1). 
965 KapMuG, s (1). 
966 KapMuG, s 7(1). 
967 KapMuG, s 8(2). 
968 KapMuG, s 16(1). 
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issues such as causation and individual damages will still have to be litigated at the lower 
court.969 
An important problem with the German system is the fee distribution for lawyers. 
Lawyers of the lead plaintiffs can only recover on the basis of the fees of their own clients, 
even though the work performed will benefit all of those who might be involved in the 
litigation;970 this creates a free rider problem. 
6. Aggregate Litigation and the EU 
The last sections illustrated some of the developments of aggregate litigation in 
the Member States of the EU, but, in light of the cross-border character of securities 
transactions within the EU internal market, it is also important to consider whether, at 
the moment, the EU has a plan for the development of aggregate litigation. 
The discussion regarding aggregate litigation in the EU took off in 2007, focusing 
on the consumer law and the competition law context. In its EU Consumer Policy Strategy 
2007-2013, the Commission stated that it would ‘consider action on collective redress 
mechanisms for consumers both for infringements of consumer protection rules and for 
breaches of EU anti-trust rules’;971 it effectively did this. The Commission published a 
Green Paper on consumer collective redress in 2008,972 a White Paper on damages of 
antitrust rules,973 and launched a public consultation in 2011,974 which was the basis for 
the European Parliament to adopt the resolution ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress’.975  
                                                      
969 Peter Rott, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European 
Union - country report Germany (2008) 7. 
970 Ibid 11. 
971 Commission, ‘EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013’ (Communication) COM (2007) 99 final, 11. 
972 Commission, ‘Consumer Collective Redress’ (Green Paper) COM (2008) 794 final. 
973 Commission, ‘Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ (White Paper) COM (2008) 165 final. 
974 Commission, ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’ (Public Consultation) SEC 
(2011) 173 final. 
975 European Parliament Resolution 2011/2089/INI. 
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This debate led the Commission to its current position,976 which is enshrined in 
the Commission Recommendation ‘on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law’.977 The underlying policy of the recommendation is 
primarily, access to justice, and secondarily, some type of harmonization, even if on very 
broad terms, of the procedural design for aggregate litigation in Member States.978 
Despite access to justice being the main underlying policy of the Recommendation, 
some of the principles established therein do not work towards this goal. These 
shortcomings are a result of the fear of an approximation to the U.S. system, which is 
explicit in recital 15,979 and of the creation of an environment ripe for abusive litigation.980 
The main dimensions of the Recommendation that could have gone further in enhancing 
access to justice are reflected in the following: standing in representative actions, third-
party funding, the preference for the opt-in system and the skepticism with contingent 
fees. 
According to the principles established in the Recommendation, representative 
entities having standing for representative actions ‘should have a non-profit making 
character’.981 The problem with this approach is one of funding; either the entity will 
barely have funding, stripping the possibility for representative entities to become 
involved in complex situations,982 or the funding will be public, which transforms the 
representative entity in a de facto public entity, creating unnecessary costs for taxpayers, 
                                                      
976 See Commission, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress’ (Communication) 
COM (2013) 401 final. 
977 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU. 
978 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU recital 10. 
979 ‘Elements such as punitive damages, intrusive pre-trial discovery procedures and jury awards, most of 
which are foreign to the legal traditions of most Member States, should be avoided as a general rule’. 
980 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU recital 10. 
981 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU art 4(a). 
982  See Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’ in 
Duncan Fairgrieve and Eva Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford University Press 
2012) 2.78. 
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as explained in Chapter IV. The imposition of a non-profit character on representative 
entities undermines their role in mobilizing private parties to conduct litigation. 
The principles on external funding also complicate matters from an incentives 
perspective. Third parties providing funding are prohibited ‘to seek to influence 
procedural decisions of the claimant party, including on settlements’.983 Such a provision 
increases the risk for the third-party funder, which consequently either increases the 
interest/stake that the funder demands or precludes the lawsuit altogether, leaving both 
funder and claimants worse off. 
The opt-in system, in the aggregate litigation context, is also another problem for 
access to justice.984 Aggregate litigation mechanisms are better suited for negative claims, 
and as such it is unlikely that claimants would move to initiate litigation, leaving the 
responsibility of gathering claimants in the hands of lawyers. As explained before, due to 
ethical limitations lawyers may not pursue new clients actively; this situation thus 
weakens the economies of scale that are at the heart of the benefits arising out of 
aggregate litigation.  
Finally, contingent fees are seen as undesirable and should be avoided if they 
create ‘any incentive to litigation that is unnecessary from the point of view of the interest 
of any of the parties’.985 Firstly, it is not clear what an unnecessary incentive would be; 
however, a contingent fee arrangement is nothing more than a method of funding. Cases 
in which contingent fees would be used are unlikely to be litigated through a 
compensation system where the claimant pays upfront, especially in the aggregate 
litigation context where there should be one party managing the litigation. What the 
contingent fees system does is to put this responsibility back into the hands of the lawyer. 
The nature of all of these prohibitions is to avoid abusive litigation, which is a 
worthwhile goal since litigation can be a costly endeavor for defendants. The problem is 
                                                      
983 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU 16(a). 
984 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU art 21 provides that ‘The claimant party should be formed 
on the basis of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed (‘opt-in’ 
principle). Any exception to this principle, by law or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of 
sound administration of justice.’  
985 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU 16(a) arts 29, 30. 
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that these measures avoid the problem but to a large extent do so by harming the main 
access to justice goal that aggregate litigation is designed to achieve.986  
There are other ways to create procedural fairness and avoid abusive litigation - 
or at least, to avoid the costs incurred by defendants associated with it - when 
implementing aggregate litigation systems, and the Commission has already picked up 
some hints for such a solution. The main aspect that would create a just system is the 
reimbursement of legal costs to the winning party, which is already enshrined in article 
13 of the Recommendation. Instead of putting too many regulations around who may be 
a representative party, limiting the influence of external funders to the litigation and 
prohibiting contingent fees, the rules should be drafted in a way to give a wide degree of 
liberty to those taking the risk, but at the same time ensuring that they will be responsible 
for costs in case the claimants lose the litigation. Such an approach is even more relevant 
in cases where all of the claims are of negative value, since no single claimant would 
rationally take the litigation in his own hands, leaving the role of manager either to the 
representative entity or to the lawyer representing the claimants, who could fund the 
litigation themselves or rely on an external third party. In these cases, the representative 
entity, the lawyer or the external funder, should be made responsible for the costs, but 
should also be allowed to recover based on the risk and the possible upside of litigation. 
The only caveat is that recovery should be limited to a certain amount, the determination 
of which would depend on what can be deemed fair, to avoid abuse against claimants. 
This design is an interesting one because it opens up the possibility for private 
parties to make use of aggregate litigation mechanisms, not only enhancing access to 
justice, but at the same time limiting the downside faced by defendants, who will be 
reimbursed for the costs of litigation if they successfully defend the case. Also, on the 
claimant’s part, since those who will have the upside of the litigation are also on the hook 
in respect of its downside, it is likely that only cases with a considerable amount of merit 
will be litigated, avoiding the problem of nuisance litigation. If access to justice is the goal 
to be pursued, this approach is the best way of achieving it without undermining fairness 
to defendants. 
                                                      
986 Fairgrieve and Howells 2.79 (n 982). 
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7. Class Arbitration 
Class arbitration is a procedural device similar to the class action, developed to 
bring a dispute with multiple claimants/respondents to an end. Similarly to the class 
action, in a class arbitration there will be a decision to certify a class, defining the 
characteristics that would delineate the group of persons who would be bound by the final 
decision.987 
Developed initially in the United States, the class arbitration has been around since 
at least 1982,988 and it is increasingly becoming an international phenomena.989 As a ‘born 
and bred’ American device, interesting questions arise in relation to its effective 
development and efficiency in the transnational forum since many countries may have 
restrictions against it.  
The class arbitration mechanism is an interesting topic of study for this work 
because it encompasses a mechanism (at least when considered internationally) that 
could be, at least theoretically, used to efficiently solve securities disputes in a variety of 
different legal backgrounds.  
A. Historical Development of Class Arbitration 
Initially, in the United States, only parties to a contract or a related set of contracts, 
could be parties to a given arbitration, while class arbitrations were impermissible.990 
Soon courts started accepting class arbitration, 991  even though the initial prevalent 
position was that it was only allowed when parties explicitly agreed to it.992 
                                                      
987 The binding nature of the decision will depend on the due process standards of the arbitral seat or the 
applicable law and public policy considerations of the enforcing country. 
988 See Keating v Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).  
989 See S.I. Strong, ‘Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy 
Concerns’ (2008) 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1, 1; S.I. Strong, ‘From Class to 
Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration’ (2010) 26 Arbitration International 493. 
990 Born 1227 (n 516). See also Vernon v Drexel Burnham & Company, 52 Cal. App. 3d 706 (Cal. 1975). 
991 Keating v Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982). 
992 See E.g. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, para 18 (7th Cir. 1995)(‘We thus adopt the rationale of 
several other circuits and hold that section 4 of the FAA forbids federal judges from ordering class 
arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.’); Dominium Austin Partners, 
LLC v Emerson, 248 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001) para 23 (‘Finally, we note that the goal of the FAA is to enforce 
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This changed with a divided Supreme Court decision in Green Tree v. Bazzle,993 
where the majority opinion concluded that the interpretation of the contract and the kind 
of procedure allowed by virtue of it, was a matter for the arbitrator to decide, and not one 
for the courts. 
One of the reasons why arbitration was used in a widespread manner, especially 
in consumer and labor contracts, was the avoidance of class litigation. 994  The use of 
arbitration was a way identified by businesses to effectively bar class treatment and the 
possibility of redress for negative claims. This decision effectively opened the doors for 
class treatment in arbitration proceedings in the United States when arbitration clauses 
were silent, since it gave the power to the arbitrator to decide.995 The business community 
reacted promptly, and not only did companies start to insert clauses into their contracts 
that explicitly barred class arbitration, but arbitral institutions also started to develop 
specific rules and procedures for these kinds of proceedings. 996 
Two recent decisions confirm the trend of the possibility for class arbitration 
based on clauses that are silent on the matter. In JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President and 
Fellows of Harvard College, 997  Harvard’s investment managers complained that the 
russian gas company from which they had purchased American Depositary Receipts had 
depressed its net profits in order to reduce the dividends that the company was required 
to pay; it then filed a ‘demand for class arbitration’ with the AAA.998  The majority of 
arbitrators decided that class arbitration was allowed, despite the decision in Stolt-
                                                      
the agreement of the parties, not to effect the most expeditious resolution of claims. See Baesler v Cont'l 
Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990). As such, an arbitration agreement should be enforced ‘in 
accordance with its terms.’).  
993 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
994 In some countries, consumer and labor regulation prohibits the use of arbitration clauses (e.g. Brazil). 
The justification is that in these relationships, consumers and workers are the weaker parties, and the 
justice system is designed in a manner such that they can effectively access a forum to claim their rights.  
995 This was not explicitly stated in the decision, but it could be inferred from the power given to the 
arbitrator to decide the procedure allowed within the arbitration clause.  
996 See Phillip Allen Lacovara, ‘Class Action Arbitrations - the Challenge for the Business Community’ (2008) 
24 Arbitration International 541, 543-44 
997 2007 WL 3019234 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007).  
998 Lacovara 548 (n 996). 
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Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp999 in which Judge Rakoff had stated that New York law 
did not allow for class arbitration when the arbitration clause was silent. Judge Berman 
confirmed the award, thus allowing Harvard to pursue the claim representing a class on 
the grounds of Bazzle, finding that the arbitrators were competent to decide how to 
interpret the arbitration clause regarding procedural treatment. 
The second case concerned a doctor suing a health insurance company for denying 
or delaying reimbursements of medical services fees. 1000  In the same manner as the 
Harvard case, the arbitral tribunal issued a Class Construction Award allowing for class 
arbitration, but when challenged, the award was set aside based on the ‘manifest 
disregard’ doctrine, since the judge concluded that the NY law applicable at the time at 
which the arbitration clause was signed was settled in forbidding class arbitration when 
the arbitration clause was silent.1001 The judge’s decision was reversed on appeal. The 
justification for reversal was that a court could only vacate an award under the ‘manifest 
disregard’ doctrine when the error amounts to an ‘egregious impropriety’, and not only 
‘an erroneous interpretation of the law’.1002  
With these decisions, it became clear, at least in the United States, that the decision 
to entertain arbitration in a class form when arbitration clauses are silent is a matter for 
arbitrators to decide: moreover, courts will back up this decision, even when the 
applicable law provides otherwise.1003 
Since arbitration was a way identified by these companies to avoid class actions 
and the perils that followed it, with these decisions and the new landscape in class 
treatment in arbitration, companies had to scramble to find other ways to prevent class 
                                                      
999 435 F.Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
1000 See Cheng v Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 2005 WL 5359732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 5 December 2006) and 
Cheng v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 3d 356 (1st Dept 2007).  
1001 Cheng v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc. (2006) (n 1000). 
1002 Cheng v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc. (2007) (n 1000). 
1003 Unless of course there is an ‘egregious impropriety’, which would be an extremely high standard to 
reach. In practice, arbitrators would have to acknowledge that the applicable law would forbid class 
treatment and still move forward with the procedure.  
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disputes. An important parallel development to the class arbitration was the treatment of 
class action waivers by courts.  
B. Class Action Waivers 
Class action waivers began appearing in contracts in the 1990s after trade-journal 
articles started encouraging their use.1004 Due to the high litigation costs that are present 
in the United States, in many instances the class action was the only available means of 
redress for parties with low-value claims; it has been a widely-used procedure. While it is 
true that in some instances the class action mechanism has been abused, creating 
unnecessary social costs, within the U.S. legal system, it is, to some extent, the only way 
by which weaker parties can pursue some of their rights.  
With this problem in mind, some of the U.S. courts started deploying the 
‘unconscionability doctrine’ to address this problem. In general, to be unconscionable a 
contractual term has to be both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.1005 The 
doctrine is applicable to class action waivers and to arbitration clauses, since the FAA §2 
provides that courts must enforce arbitration agreements ‘save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract’,1006 which is mainly a state 
matter.1007 
Most courts have upheld class action waivers against unconscionability claims, but 
some have refused to enforce them.1008 The denial in enforcing these clauses is important 
because a nationwide class can be certified in these states.1009  
                                                      
1004  J. Maria Glover, ‘Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 1735, 1746. 
1005 Robert A. Hillman, ‘Debunking some Myths about Unconscionability: a New Framework for UCC Section 
2-302’ (1981-1982) 67 Cornell Law Review 1, 2-3. 
1006 9 U.S.C. §2 (2014).  
1007 Peter J. Kreher and Pat D. Robertson III, ‘Substance, Process, and the Future of Class Arbitration’ (2004) 
9 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 409, 425. 
1008  Enforcing class action waivers, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits and many District Courts; refusing to enforce class action waivers, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and state courts in California and Illinois. See Glover 1751-52 (n 1004). 
1009 Ibid 1754. 
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Even though there is a theoretical possibility of avoiding class action waivers and 
arbitration clauses on unsconscionability grounds, most courts in the United States are 
enforcing them as a practical matter, with two recent Supreme Court decisions enforcing 
arbitration clauses and class action waivers outwith and within the arbitral process.1010  
In this scenario, class arbitration will be a creature of consent. Parties who do not 
wish to engage in class arbitration will spell this out in their contracts, denying the 
possibility for the use of the mechanism.1011  Otherwise, parties will either accept the 
possibility of class arbitration by remaining silent in their contracts or will expressly 
provide in their contract for the design of the mechanism. 
C. The Types of Class Arbitration 
The development and practice of class arbitration created two main models: the 
hybrid model and the provider-created model. 
a. The Hybrid Model 
This model was created, at least in California, in the Keating v. Superior Court 
decision.1012 In the decision, the court stated that: 
Whether… an order would be justified in a case of this sort is a question 
appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court. In making that 
determination, the trial court would be called upon to consider, not only the 
factors normally relevant to class certification, but the special characteristics of 
arbitration as well, including the impact upon an arbitration proceeding of 
whatever court supervision might be required, and the availability of 
consolidation as an alternative means of assuring fairness. Whether classwide 
proceedings would prejudice the legitimate interests of the party which drafted 
the adhesion agreement must also be considered, and that party should be 
given the option of remaining in court rather than submitting to class wide 
arbitration.1013 
                                                      
1010 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) and American Express Co. v Italian Colors 
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
1011 Kreher and III 423 (n 1007). 
1012 Carole J. Buckner, ‘Due Process in Class Arbitration’ (2006) 58 Florida Law Review 185, 226-27. 
1013 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982). 
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In this model, courts are an important part of the class arbitration mechanism; 
they retain jurisdiction and decide upon various other aspects during the development of 
the procedure, such as class certification, notice, discovery, settlements and issues of 
adequate representation.1014  
b. The Provider-Created Model 
The provider-created model is based on the involvement of arbitral institutions 
and the rules they have promulgated to guide the class arbitration procedure. Two known 
arbitral institutions that have developed a system of class arbitration are the AAA and 
JAMS, both headquartered in the United States.1015 The rules that they have created are 
patterned on the American class action system. 1016 For example, the JAMS rules 1017 
provide that: 
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision 
(a) are satisfied, in addition to the criteria set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 23(b).1018 
The same is true of the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration.1019 To 
allow a member of a class to represent all others, the arbitrator has to ensure that the 
following conditions are met:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all 
members is impracticable;  
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class;  
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class; 
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class; and 
                                                      
1014 Buckner 228 (n 1012). 
1015 For a European example, see DIS-Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes 09 (SRCoLD).  
1016 Buckner 239 (n 1012). 
1017 JAMS Class Action Procedures. 
1018 JAMS Class Action Procedures, r 3(b).  
1019 AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration. 
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(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration 
clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class 
representative(s) and each of the other class members.1020 
Also, under the rules class arbitration can only be maintained if: 
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
arbitration is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.1021 
These requirements are clearly modeled on the class action requirements in the 
U.S. class action system, and these models of class arbitration will, to a certain extent, 
mirror what is done in class actions and have similar effects. Due to this, the questions 
involving conflicts-of-interest and the funding of the claim are similar. The important 
question though, is not how class arbitration is similar to the class action, but how it 
differs, and how this difference might operate in favor of an enforceable international 
class dispute resolution system.  
D. Class Arbitration Outside the U.S. 
Class arbitration can be an interesting option for an aggregate dispute resolution 
system for securities disputes, especially in the context of disputes involving issuers and 
investors.  
The possibility of using class arbitration in many jurisdictions is still not clear. As 
a starting point, arbitration is a creature of consent. The nomenclature ‘arbitration 
agreement’ and ‘arbitration clause’ translates the nature of the institute; arbitration is 
contractual, based on the will of the parties to submit their dispute to a private third-party 
instead of bringing the dispute to court. Theoretically, absent this consent, there are no 
grounds for a decision from an arbitrator to bind an unsuspecting third-party.1022 The 
arbitration agreement, constituting more than just the expression of consent of the 
                                                      
1020 AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, s 4(a). 
1021 AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, s 4(b). 
1022 (‘[…] the arbitration agreement fulfils several important functions. The most important of these in the 
present context is that it shows that the parties have consented to resolve their disputes by arbitration. This 
element of consent is essential.’) Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 9 . 
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parties, is what legally gives the arbitrator the power to decide the dispute, that is, as the 
required source of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.1023 It is this notion of consent that 
will give the arbitral award binding power in relation to those that, in one way or another, 
have agreed to be part of the arbitration, guaranteeing the binding effect of the decision.  
Since consent is the only basis for a tribunal’s jurisdiction, the important question 
in class arbitration is how consent is achieved, and whether the means of acknowledging 
consent within the legal system in which the arbitral tribunal’s decision will be enforced, 
can be flexible, as it is within the class action procedure. 
The possibility of class arbitration is a function of the type of dispute that is under 
discussion and the source of the legal relationships that need to be decided. With consent 
as the legitimating basis of the arbitral procedure, as long as consent is present, class 
arbitrations should theoretically be possible.1024 
E. Class Arbitration and the EU 
Class arbitration is viewed with skepticism in the EU,1025 and the hurdles that must 
be overcome to enable it are similar to those related to class actions. The due process and 
public policy concerns that were already discussed are also applicable in the context of 
class arbitration in the EU Member States.1026 To become a possibility, the design of class 
arbitration in European jurisdictions for securities transactions has to be made in a 
manner where due process is guaranteed through a mechanism of effective notice, in 
addition to being a possibility only where the public policy aspect of securities laws do 
not prohibit the arbitrability of the disputes. 
                                                      
1023 Ibid 10 (‘Arbitrators do not hold public office and are not vested with pre-existing jurisdictional powers, 
which they acquire only by virtue of the parties’ consent.’); See also Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien 
Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 6-7. 
1024 For a more in-depth discussion on class and collective arbitration outside the U.S., see Strong, ‘From 
Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration’ (n 989). 
1025 Philippe Billiet (ed) Class Arbitration in the European Union (Maklu 2013) 233-235. 
1026 Philippe Billiet and Laura Lozano, ‘General Reflections on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Class Arbitral Awards in Europe’ in Philippe Billiet (ed), Class Arbitration in the European Union (Maklu 
2013) 24-27. 
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The positive aspects of a class arbitration system in the EU is twofold: firstly, access 
to justice is improved, and secondly, mass type disputes would be solved similarly across 
the board, avoiding the problem that multiple and possibly different judgments could 
arise out of the same fact pattern. Allowing a class action system for securities disputes in 
the EU context, in connection with a choice of law provision, would facilitate the creation 
of an internal securities market due to the homogenization of the rights attached to the 
same securities. Under the current scenario, this is not the case; the liability regime is 
dependent on the location of the investor’s account.1027 
8. Implications 
This chapter surveyed some of the most discussed aggregate litigation systems 
that are available today, showing important differences between them. As established in 
the previous chapter, one of the most important aspects in an aggregate litigation system 
is the one of incentives; ensuring that the persons who will steer the litigation have 
adequate incentives to do so is crucial for the success of the system.  
In this context, some of the systems discussed are highly inappropriate for a 
privately-based enforcement regime, which should be the aim for the development of an 
adequate transnational system of dispute resolution for securities transactions. Here the 
examples are the representative action system, where the incentives lie in the public 
character of consumer associations and public bodies, and the German system, where 
lawyers bearing the burden of most of the work will only benefit from its clients fees, thus 
allowing for the possibility of this mechanism only where clients have a considerable 
stake in the matter. In terms of access, as these systems provide different avenues in 
addition to individual litigation, this is a step forward, but it still is too shy to constitute 
an efficient mechanism.  
The Dutch settlement system seems to be moving in the right direction; even 
though lawyers are not able to work on a contingent fee basis, the use of outside funders 
who can do so allows a third party to have a significant stake in the matter, providing 
                                                      
1027 See Chapter X. 
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incentives for the process to be pushed forward while at the same time aligning its 
interests with those of the plaintiffs’.  
The main point that should be taken out of this chapter and the previous one is 
that a proper system of incentives is crucial for the design of an efficient aggregate 
litigation system. 
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Chapter X - Transnational Aspects of 
Dispute Resolution 
The purpose of law is to provide stability and certainty in social relations, giving 
space for the planning and improvement of economic output by diminishing duplicative 
protection costs that parties would have to entail in order to protect their assets. Legal 
systems may be more or less reliable, but legal certainty is what they strive for as 
otherwise they would be virtually useless, becoming a simple forum for discussion with 
no mechanism for the enforcement and resolution of real world problems.  
When faced with transnational disputes, legal systems may then become 
ineffective systems with no real functionality. The problem arises out of the relationship 
between transnational transactions and the policy choices made in different legal systems. 
Since each jurisdiction is imbued of its own sovereignty, having power to decide which 
cases it wishes to entertain and what decisions should be enforceable in its own land, a 
legal system may not recognize a decision or may not apply a law to a transaction that 
would have been applied if the case had been litigated elsewhere. 
In the securities context, this matter is even more evident due to the regulatory 
nature of securities law and its mandatory character, enhancing the uncertainties that 
may arise out of transnational transactions. For example, an investor that invests 
overseas through a foreign broker dealer or has securities of a foreigner issuer may have 
a very hard time litigating effectively in his own country since his court may not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute, the decision that may arise out of a local procedure may not 
be enforceable overseas where the broker-dealer has its assets, and even if it is, the costs 
of engaging in such transnational litigation might be too significant; 1028  due to the 
                                                      
1028 One interesting example is the Case C- 168/02 Kronhofer v. Maier [2004] ECR I-06009, where Mr. 
Kronhofer, an Austrian resident, transferred money to an investment account in Germany after he was 
convinced by defendants to invest in a call option contract in the London Stock Exchange relating to shares. 
He lost a great deal of the money invested and sued to recover in an Austrian court; the matter was referred 
to the CJEU which decided that ‘the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ does not refer to 
the place where the claimant is domiciled or where ‘his assets are concentrated’ by reason only of the fact 
the he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was 
incurred in another Contracting State.’ 
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uncertainty of the outcomes and the costs involved, it would be only worthwhile for an 
investor to pursue this path if there was a lot at stake. 
This state of affairs limits immensely the transactions that can be made, having a 
negative effect both on investors who would want to have a wider option of investments 
and to capital seekers, who have a more limited pool of resources available.  
This chapter is developed around the following question: ‘what are the private 
international law problems related to liability in transnational securities transactions?’ 
The objective is to identify these problems so that a solution can be developed in the next 
chapter.  
To answer it, the chapter is divided in three sections: 1) jurisdiction and 
enforcement, 2) applicable law and 3) implications for securities disputes. 
1. Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Any analysis of cross border legal problems has to start from a local perspective. 
By simply understanding the legal mechanisms available locally, it will be possible to 
extend the analysis to the transnational realm. Connections amongst different legal 
systems are made through jurisdictional analysis. Jurisdiction can be understood from 
both an internal and external perspective. The internal perspective relates to the rules 
with which a court has to comply to exercise decision-making power within its legal 
system, while the external perspective relates to the requirements that have to be 
complied with in a given forum in order to recognize that a foreign court had jurisdiction, 
and therefore that its judgment will be enforceable.1029 
1. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear cases. With jurisdiction, a court can 
entertain a lawsuit, decide it and enforce the judgment. If a court decides without having 
jurisdiction, a higher court will overturn the decision. The jurisdictional rules of a legal 
                                                      
1029 See Ralf Michaels, ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions’ 
(2006) 123 Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1, 7-11. 
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system define the scope of the court’s power. This characteristic is part of the wider 
political system which can translate not only the determination of the role of courts in 
that particular legal system but also how that political system defines its importance, from 
its own perspective, to the outside world. Broader jurisdictional grounds may invade 
centers of interest of other nations, including local courts in the external relations 
considerations of the country.  
Even though courts have the power to decide based on the jurisdictional rules that 
their legal system gives them, this power is only enforceable in the specific territory of the 
state to which this court belongs and over which it has physical control. A judicial decision 
that is not complied with will require officers of the law to arrest, collect assets or perform 
any other action that is necessary to oblige the losing party to comply. An American court 
cannot directly enforce one of its decisions in Brazil through the use of American officers 
without causing a serious international political incident. 
Rules of jurisdiction vary. They are the expression of institutional choice in respect 
of dispute resolution in a state, while at the same time they are an exercise of that state’s 
sovereignty. Limits to jurisdictional rules can be found in constitutions, the most 
important being linked to the idea of due process, which taken out of context, does not 
mean much since due process is a concept that can also vary substantially depending on 
the legal system being discussed. 1030  From the plaintiff and defendant’s perspective, 
jurisdiction rules are important as they shape the means of accessing the dispute 
resolution system of a state and of a matter being brought to litigation. Jurisdiction rules 
define who can sue and who can be sued in a given legal system and ‘protects the 
defendant against the burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum’.1031  
                                                      
1030 For example, due process in the United States means both the idea of substantive due process and 
procedural due process; even in the US, these concepts may not be seen as not having any specific meaning; 
Frank Easterbrook wrote in 1982 that the ‘Court makes no pretense that its judgments have any basis other 
than the Justices’ view of desirable policy. This is fundamentally the method of substantive due process’ 
(Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘Substance and Due Process’ [1982] 1982 The Supreme Court Review 85, 125) In 
Brazil, the notion of due process is more significantly linked to the procedural side, encompassing the right 
to be heard, the right of the ‘natural judge’ and the right to not be convicted based on illegal evidence, 
amongst others (Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional 
(7th edn, Editora Saraiva 2012) 641. 
1031 World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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On the other hand, jurisdiction rules are also important to mediate the relationship 
between different courts and sovereigns. On many occasions, conflict situations may 
present to more than one court the possibility of deciding the dispute.1032 Jurisdiction 
rules may therefore also be concerned with solving the conflict that may arise out of this 
conundrum.  
This is an important inquiry for most countries as long as they are interested in 
engaging in international commercial relationships and have their legal system 
recognized as a trustworthy place in which the disputes that may arise out of these 
transactions can be resolved. In the securities context, this is even more relevant as the 
public policy aspect of securities regulation creates even more barriers to the solution of 
problems arising out of transnational transactions.  
Policy concerns arising from jurisdictional rules can be therefore translated into 
two main groups: 1) the relationship between courts and parties to the disputes, which 
translates into the fairness of the system to the defendant and 2) the relationship between 
the forum state and other states.1033 
a. The relationship between courts and parties to the disputes 
The first dimension of jurisdiction is linked to the possibility for a court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant. The focus of concern is vertical, as it does not include any 
considerations in respect of foreign sovereigns, being limited to the court-party 
relationship. The approach is diverse when comparing the American legal system to the 
civil law legal system.  
In civil law systems, the approach to jurisdiction is usually based on the 
defendant’s domicile, 1034  but might also be established in the place of contract 
                                                      
1032 Some areas that are prone to lead to jurisdictional conflicts are antitrust, securities regulation and 
insolvency when the dispute is related to global business networks. See Hanna L. Buxbaum, ‘National 
Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks’ (2010) 17 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 165. 
1033 Ralf Michaels in fact uses the distinction vertical/horizontal as paradigms from which the American 
system and the civil law systems think about jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the division is useful to categorize 
the questions that need to be discussed concerning jurisdiction. Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ 
1027 (n 514). 
1034 Brussels I Reg, 2; Brazilian Civil Procedure Code., art 94. 
 247 
performance1035 or in the place where a tort has been committed.1036 When disputes on 
in rem rights over immovable property are concerned, jurisdiction is exclusively 
established at the place where the property is situated.1037 The jurisdiction analysis tends 
to be straightforward as a given court will either have or will not have jurisdiction; there 
will be no fairness or reasonableness inquiries as to whether the forum is a proper one 
for the dispute.  
In the American legal system, the vertical jurisdictional analysis has a higher level 
of complexity, as there are many different doctrines through which a court may accept 
jurisdiction over a defendant in order to decide a dispute. While jurisdiction is a matter 
for the states, in the US, its outer limits are drawn by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution,1038 which has generated confusing jurisprudence on the matter.1039 While 
American states have the right to limit jurisdiction further, the practice has been to follow 
the guidelines set out by constitutional standards.1040 
Jurisdiction can be general or specific. General jurisdiction is broader than in the 
civil law system, because, ‘personal jurisdiction by service of process’ and ‘doing business’ 
jurisdiction can also be used, in addition to defendant’s domicile or residence, to establish 
the court’s power over a defendant, legalizing the lawsuit.  
‘Personal jurisdiction by service of process’ attaches if a person is served with 
process while being temporarily in the forum state, 1041  as long as it does not violate 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.1042 The mere service of process 
                                                      
1035 Brussels I Reg, 5(1). 
1036 Brussels I Reg, 5(3); Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 100, V. 
1037 Brussels I Reg, 22(1); Brazilian Civil Procedure Code., art 95. 
1038 Fourteenth amendment.  
1039 Linda Silberman, ‘The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business 
Transactions: The U.S. Regime’ (2004) 26 Houston Journal of International Law 327, 329-31. 
1040 Stephen B. Burbank, ‘Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium?’ 
(1999) 7 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 111, 113. 
1041 See Burnham v Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
1042 International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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while the person is in the forum state is sufficient for that state to have jurisdiction over 
the person regardless of the matter at stake.  
If the defendant is not situated in the state, than the ‘doing business’ basis of 
jurisdiction can apply. 1043  ‘Doing business’ jurisdiction can be exercised when 
corporations are carrying on a continuous and systematic, even if limited, part of its 
business in the territory of that forum.1044 This is a highly-criticized doctrine, both within 
and beyond the the American legal system,1045 as it does not provide much certainty in 
practice as to what the standard really is in order to attribute the American courts with 
general jurisdiction,1046 weakening the Rule of Law principle. The problem becomes even 
more acute when potential foreign defendants are concerned with the possible 
consequences of transacting with U.S. parties, as being caught in a lawsuit in a foreign 
country without expecting it beforehand may be unfair,1047 diminishing the incentives of 
a foreigner to do business in the U.S.1048  
Different legal systems therefore have different rules shaping the exercise of 
jurisdiction in respect of a given dispute; even if the rules were the same, without a set of 
rules to coordinate the exercise of jurisdiction, more than one court might be capable of 
being the forum in respect of the same dispute, opening up the possibility for 
irreconcilable decisions. The second inquiry in the analysis of jurisdiction concerns the 
availability of mechanisms that may be used to solve this problem.  
                                                      
1043 ‘Subsequent cases have derived from the International Shoe standard the general rule that a State may 
dispense with in-forum personal service on nonresident defendants in suits arising out of their activities in 
the State.’ (Burnham v Superior Court of California (n 1041) 618) 
1044 Perkins v Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-446 (1952).  
1045 For an in depth discussion on the doctrine, see Mary Twitchell, ‘Why We Keep Doing Business with 
Doing-Business Jurisdiction’ (2001) 2001 University of Chicago Legal Forum 171. 
1046 See ibid 182-94. 
1047 See ibid 197-202. 
1048 On the other hand, a point to be made is that if a business wants to engage in ‘doing business’ in the U.S. 
it should expect to be subject to any kind of jurisdiction that may be exercised over them. In any event, it is 
the type of decision that is harder to make when the rules are not clear.  
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b. The relationship between the forum court and other courts 
The second aspect of jurisdiction, referred to by Professor Ralf Michaels as its 
horizontal aspect,1049 reflects the preferences of the legal system in taking into account 
considerations about the relationship between the jurisdiction and other legal systems.  
The relationship between the forum court and other courts can either be 
integrated through an overarching system or be done unilaterally. Integrated systems can 
be created either through a quasi-federalist method such as the EU or through less 
complex but nonetheless complicated structures, such as international treaties. Unilateral 
systems on the other hand can either deal with the relationship with foreign courts on a 
case-by-case basis, as is the approach in the American system, or have hard and fast rules 
that do not take into consideration the relationship with foreign courts, as is the approach 
in the Brazilian system. 
As transnational transactions increase, these types of rules become even more 
important. Jurisdictional rules that clearly provide where lawsuits can be pursued in 
these situations go a long way to facilitate them. The avoidance of parallel litigation and 
of multiple decisions is important to bring legal certainty to a given transaction, especially 
when there is nothing more than the legal system to be relied upon by the parties.1050  
Integrated Jurisdiction Systems: the EU Example 
A good example of an integrated jurisdiction system is that of the European Union. 
The development of the European system for jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign 
judgments began with the enactment of the Brussels Convention1051 in 1968, a treaty 
made between Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
implementing the provisions of article 220 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community; the Convention was a legal document and did not form part of the 
                                                      
1049 Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ 1027 (n 514). 
1050 The importance of legal certainty and legal mechanisms becomes even more acute in financial markets 
and financial systems, which are essentially a legal construct. See Pistor (n 1). 
1051  Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters.  
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EEC legislation.1052 The objective of the Brussels Convention was to ‘facilitate recognition 
and to introduce an expeditious procedure for securing the enforcement of 
judgments’.1053 
The Brussels Convention was created in the context of European integration and 
was a consequence of the understanding that for cross-border trade to be efficient, the 
recognition of judgments should be easy. For this it would be important to establish 
common jurisdictional rules, as it would then become impossible to justify the denial of 
recognition and enforcement on the basis of exorbitant jurisdiction.1054 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, matters of civil 
jurisdiction came under the competence of the European Union, allowing for the creation 
of rules through the European Union’s legislative process 1055  and thus making the 
enactment, in 2001, of the Brussels I Regulation possible. 
The Brussels I Regulation establishes jurisdiction and enforcement rules for 
countries that are part of the European Union. The general rule is that a defendant can be 
sued in his domicile, 1056  but there are other specific grounds which provide that the 
defendant can be sued in the court of another Member State or that some Member State 
courts will have exclusive jurisdiction.1057 The mechanism to avoid parallel proceedings 
and disputes among different courts is based on articles 27 through 30 of the Regulation, 
establishing that the court first seized should be the one to decide if it has jurisdiction or 
not, and all the other courts have duty to stay their proceedings until a decision is 
reached.1058 If the court first seized decides that it has jurisdiction, the other courts have 
                                                      
1052 The European Community obtained power to legislate on Civil Jurisdiction matters only after the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. See Thalia Kruger, Civil Jurisdiciton Rules of the EU and their Impact on Third States (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 2. 
1053 Brussels Convention, Preamble. On the importance of private international law for the integration of 
Europe, see Lorna Gillies, ‘Creation of Subsidiary Jurisdiciton Rules in the Recast of Brussels I: Back to the 
Drawing Board?’ (2012) 8 Journal of Private International Law 489, 494-98. 
1054 Kruger 12 (n 1052). 
1055 Ibid 15 See also Andrew Dickinson, ‘European Private International Law: Embracing New Horizons or 
Mourning the Past?’ (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 197. 
1056 Brussels I Reg, art 2. 
1057 See Brussels I Reg, ss 2 to 7. 
1058 Brussels I Reg, art 27(1). 
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a duty under European law to decline jurisdiction in favor of the court first seized.1059 As 
a general matter, the Brussels I regime is applicable when the defendant is domiciled in a 
Member State of the EU;1060 if the defendant is domiciled outside the EU, the applicable 
rules of jurisdiction will be those of his national legal system.1061 
The mechanism provides certainty and efficiency to the functioning of the EU legal 
system. A single court alone will be able to decide whether it has jurisdiction; on this basis, 
long conflicts as to the place that would be the most appropriate for the resolution of the 
dispute can be avoided. The design of the system fulfills the need for legal certainty and 
efficiency as it coordinates the functioning and exercise of the judicial function amongst 
the courts of different EU Member States.  
Despite the advantages that the Brussels I regime provides to the organization of 
different legal regimes and their interaction, the system is not without its flaws. An 
important area of concern is the improper use of the mechanism, which might cause 
delays in respect of the resolution of the dispute. For example, even when the parties have 
made a choice of court agreement but the lawsuit has been initiated in a different court, 
the court identified in the agreement has to wait until the court first seized has decided 
on its lack of jurisdiction.1062 This causes delays, especially when inefficient courts are 
first seized.1063 
In 2009, a Green Paper1064 was released discussing the problems of the Brussels I 
Regulation and the possible avenues for its improvement. At the end of 2012, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the Brussels I 
Recast, which will come into force on the 10 January 2015. The Brussels I Recast changed 
                                                      
1059 Brussels I Reg, art 27(2). 
1060 Brussels I Reg, art 2(1). 
1061 Brussels I Reg, art 4(1). See also Kruger 59 (n 1052). 
1062 See Case C-116/02 Gasser v MISAT [2003] ECR I-14693 (the court second seized has to suspend the 
proceedings until the court first seized has accepted or declined jurisdiction) and Case C-159/02 Turner v 
Grovit [2004] ECR I-03565 (the ECJ decided that anti-suit injunctions, mechanisms that could help to give 
teeth to choice of court agreements, are incompatible with the Brussels Regulation). 
1063 In the literature, this is known as the Italian torpedo problem.  
1064 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters COM(2009) 175 Final.  
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the logic of jurisdictional conflict rules when choice of court agreements are at stake, 
shifting the power to decide on jurisdiction to the court designated in the agreement,1065 
thus solving the problem of the strategic use of courts to cause delay in litigation to which 
a choice of court agreement is relevant. 
The Brussels Regime, while designed mainly with the integration of Europe in 
mind, is also applicable in some cases involving parties from third states. Thus, in cases 
where the claimant is not domiciled in an EU Member State but is suing someone who is, 
the jurisdictional rules applicable are those found in the Brussels I. 1066  The logic is 
extended to the doctrine of forum non conveniens,1067 which cannot be applied when the 
defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State.1068 
The jurisdiction regime in the European context is quite different from that of the 
United States. The European rules are much more mechanical than the American ones, 
stripping courts of the scope to engage political considerations as to comity and 
convenience when deciding whether to entertain a dispute or not. The design of the 
system is a child of the needs of European integration, which emerged as an economic 
matter and has evolved in many different areas. 1069  In the commercial and financial 
transaction areas, the development of a strong legal infrastructure for dispute resolution 
is essential and the Brussels Regime goes a long way in providing for this, at least when 
considering the space within the EU. 
Unilateral Jurisdiction Systems 
Unilateral systems are based only on the rules of the forum to mediate conflicts of 
jurisdiction between different legal systems. The rules and doctrines that are used in 
                                                      
1065 Brussels I Recast, art 31(3). 
1066 See Case C-412/98 Josi v. UGIC [2000] ECR I-05925. 
1067 Which is also available in the UK. 
1068 See Case C-281/02 Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ECR I-01383. 
1069 For a brief overview of European integration, see Craig and Búrca 1-30 (n 226) ; for an overview of the 
development of European private international law, see Stefania Bariatti, Cases and materials on EU private 
international law (Hart Pub. 2011) 1-61. 
 253 
unilateral systems can either give the courts room in accepting jurisdiction to decide a 
case or can be highly specific, offering no possibility of discretion. 
The United States system is of the first type; its jurisdictional relationship with 
other forums is limited through the doctrines of forum non conveniens and ‘jurisdiction to 
prescribe’. 
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine dating back to the 1940s in the U.S.1070 that 
allows courts to decline jurisdiction when the case could be tried more conveniently in 
another forum.1071 The test was laid down in two decisions: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert1072 and 
Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.1073 The courts have to apply a test 
in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction, considering both private and public interests. 
The private interests to be taken into consideration include the relative ease of access to 
sources of proof and other practical problems that would make the trial of the case easier, 
as well as the enforceability of the judgment. 1074  Public interest, on the other hand, 
concerns administrative difficulties that courts may face and the burdens that may be 
imposed in a community that is not related to the lawsuit, such as jury duty.1075 The 
approach followed in the US is based on the notion that its courts should not waste energy 
in deciding disputes in which there is no relevant interest. One caveat is that the doctrine 
can only be applied if there is an alternative forum ‘available’, which means that the 
defendant must be ‘amenable to process’.1076 Therefore, through this doctrine, US courts 
can decline to exercise their jurisdiction when they believe there is a more convenient 
forum for the dispute. 
The other mechanism that is used by U.S. courts to mediate possible disputes with 
other courts and sovereigns is the doctrine of ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’. The analysis 
                                                      
1070  Stephen B. Burbank, ‘Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?’ 
(2004) 26 Houston Journal of International Law 385, 393. 
1071 Martin Davies, ‘Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis’ (2002) 77 Tulane Law 
Review 309, 311. 
1072 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
1073 330 U.S. 518 (1947). 
1074 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (n. 1072) 508.  
1075 Ibid 508-509. 
1076 Piper Aircraft v Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 fn22 (1981). 
 254 
made under this doctrine is geared to answer the question of when the U.S. can apply its 
own laws; it becomes especially important in cases with a relevant foreign component 
occurring outside the U.S.1077 Three landmark cases of the doctrine are Laker Airways Ltd. 
v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,1078 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California,1079 and F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v Empagran.1080 In Laker, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, while there was a parallel case running in London in respect of the same subject 
matter, confirmed what had been decided in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America1081 
and was clear in stating that ‘a country can regulate conduct occurring outside its territory 
which causes harmful results within its territory.’1082 In addition, the Laker decision to 
grant ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ was also based on the conduct of Laker and the appellants, 
who had airline routes in the United States.1083 Hartford took the ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ 
a step further. The relevant activity that was under dispute took place in the U.K. and had 
been engaged by U.K. corporations and subjects doing business outside of the United 
States, under an extensive U.K. regulatory framework that did not prohibit it.1084 In effect, 
‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ was upheld due to the substantive effects that the U.K. 
corporations’ conduct had on the U.S. market and on the lack of an obligation imposed by 
the U.K. regulatory system to behave in the way they did.10851086 Despite the increasingly 
global U.S. regulatory aspirational trend that was established with Hartford, F. Hoffman-
                                                      
1077 The bases of jurisdiction to prescribe are related to the legitimate stake of the state in the matter, which 
in the U.S. can be nationality, conduct on the territory or substantial effects in the territory, at least in 
accordance with the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See Eleanor M. 
Fox, ‘Modernization of Effects Jurisdiction: from hands-off to hands-linked’ (2009) 42 International Law 
and Politics 159, 162-64. 
1078 731 F.2d 909 (1984). 
1079 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
1080 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
1081 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
1082 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines (n. 1078) 922. 
1083 ‘In addition to the protection of American consumers' and creditors' interests, the United States has a 
substantial interest in regulating the conduct of business within the United States. The landing rights 
granted to appellants are permits to do business in this country. Foreign airlines fly in the United States on 
the prerequisite of obeying United States law.’ Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines (n. 1078) 
924. 
1084 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California (n. 1079) 819. 
1085 This second question on the lack of obligation is a matter of comity and not one of jurisdiction to 
prescribe.  
1086 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California (n. 1079) 798-799. 
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La Roche began to delineate the limits of the U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe. Even though 
this was a global case also involving American parties, the Americans settled their 
disputes and the case that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court involved only the 
provision of remedies to foreign plaintiffs in respect of conduct that had been executed 
abroad and effects that were felt outside the U.S. The decision in this case was that in this 
type of situation, U.S. Laws would not be applicable.1087  
The rule in the securities context, which was decided in Morrison v National 
Australia Bank is similar.1088 The case at stake in Morrison was a foreign cubed class action, 
where foreign investors sued a foreign issuer for a transaction that occurred in the 
context of a foreign exchange. From a conduct and effects test, the U.S. Supreme Court 
moved to a focus standard, where ‘the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place 
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States,’1089 making the place of the transaction the important connection factor for the 
applicability of U.S. Law.  
‘Jurisdiction to prescribe’ is therefore a doctrine that is used to delineate and 
justify the applicability of U.S. laws when foreign elements are present. It is one doctrine 
within that of international comity, which is wider in scope and used also for the 
enforcement of foreign judgments.1090  
It is important to underline the notion that in the U.S. system, while the 
considerations as to jurisdiction and foreign courts are, at times, taken from the 
perspective of what might happen in other courts and how appropriate it would be to 
extend U.S. laws outside the territory of the United States, they are generally made locally, 
from the perspective of the U.S. court and only valid within the U.S. legal system; this is 
                                                      
1087 ‘The price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the United States 
and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse 
domestic effect. In these circumstances, we find that the FTAIA exception does not apply (…)’. F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v Empagran (n. 1080) 164. 
1088 Morrison v National Australia Bank (n 10). 
1089 Morrison v National Australia Bank (n 10) 265. 
1090  For an overview on the U.S. Comity Doctrine, see Donald Earl Childress III, ‘Comity as Conflict: 
Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ (2010-2011) 44 UC Davis Law Review 11, 47-59; Joel 
R. Paul, ‘The Transformation of International Comity’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 19. 
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contrary to the European system, which has an overarching set of rules that include more 
than one national legal system. 
Brazil, contrary to the U.S., presents a more rigid system for dealing with foreign 
jurisdictions. The Brazilian Civil Procedure Code establishes that Brazilian courts have 
jurisdiction to solve the dispute if the defendant is domiciled in Brazil, if the obligation 
has to be performed in Brazil, or if the lawsuit arises out of facts or acts that happened in 
Brazil;1091 nevertheless, in these cases, decisions that are made in a foreign forum may be 
recognized in Brazil, as jurisdiction is not exclusive.1092 This jurisdictional power in Brazil 
is a broad one because the Brazilian courts will still accept jurisdiction even when there 
is a choice of a foreign forum to solve the dispute.1093 
Another important observation to be made is that, even though there is a provision 
for concurrent jurisdiction in Brazil, the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code is explicit in 
stating that a lawsuit in a foreign forum does not create lis pendens for Brazilian courts, 
allowing them to hear a dispute even though the dispute is already being litigated in a 
foreign court.1094  
In the context of a global world, the Brazilian system can be considered flawed; it 
is highly protective of its nationals and assumes jurisdiction in practically all cases where 
any of the requirements of article 88 of the Brazilian Procedural Civil Code are present, 
bringing foreigners to Brazilian courts simply due to the fact that they engaged in legal 
relations with Brazilians, even if it was explicit in a contract that the obligation was to be 
governed by foreign law and the dispute litigated in a foreign country. Such protectionism 
is undesirable absent a stronger justification because it makes dealing with Brazilian 
                                                      
1091 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 88.  
1092 Cases in which Brazilian courts have exclusive jurisdiction are regulated by article 89 of the Brazilian 
Civil Procedure Code: this includes matters related to immovable property in Brazil and succession 
regarding property situated in Brazil. 
1093 ‘[…]A cláusula de eleição de foro existente em contrato de prestação de serviços no exterior, portanto, 
não afasta a jurisdição brasileira.[…]’ (World Company Dance Show v Patrícia Chélida de Lima Santos (STJ, 
4th Chamber, REsp 1168547 / RJ) (2010)); ‘a competência concorrente do juiz brasileiro não pode ser 
afastada pela vontade das partes’; ‘válida a eleição de um foro estrangeiro, permanece a concorrência, isto 
é, a autoridade brasileira não estará impedida de apreciar a matéria’ (American Home Assurance Company 
v Braspetro Oil Services Company (STJ, 4th Chamber, REsp 251438 / RJ) (2000)). See also RS Components 
Limited v RS do Brasil Comércio Importação Exportação Ltda. (STJ, 3rd Chamber, REsp 804306 / SP) (2008)  
1094 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 90. 
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counterparties dangerous, creating a risk for a foreign party who never desired to step 
into Brazil, of being dragged to its courts.  
2. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
The recognition and enforcement of judgments is the external reflection of 
jurisdiction. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is the acceptance of the 
laws and the exercise of power by another legal system. Recognition and enforcement is 
also a highly local political question that is decided by each legal system: some are more 
open to foreign judgments, accepting anything that does not go against its public policy, 
while others deny recognition and enforcement to all foreign judgments.1095 
The enforcement of foreign judicial decisions is a policy choice that a country has 
to make. By accepting foreign judgments, a legal system recognizes that other courts also 
have the power to decide certain matters. Absent treaties or other type of integrated 
jurisdictional mechanisms, the decision to enforce a foreign judgment is made exclusively 
within the enforcing legal system.  
As the recognition of a foreign judgment would imply the recognition of the 
exercise of power of a foreign state, countries are prone to recognize external judgments 
only to the extent that they can benefit from such a position. This becomes increasingly 
important as a country starts to engage in transnational commerce and its subjects 
develop the need for a legal infrastructure to dispose of any controversies with foreign 
counterparties. Two of the main objectives underpinning a legal system’s recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments regime is the aim of attracting more business or of 
ensuring the enforceability of its own judgments in the courts of a foreign country, 
guaranteeing that its citizens may have legal redress mechanisms against outsiders.  
As a unilateral approach to this question was not very effective for the purposes of 
creating a sustainable and robust transnational legal infrastructure, countries started to 
enter into bilateral treaties and even attempted to establish some multilateral ones to 
                                                      
1095 An example of a more liberal country would be the U.S., and an example of a more closed country would 
be The Netherlands. See Ralf Michaels, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 3 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1848?rskey=dHgRET&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 8 July 2014.  
 258 
provide for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. One of the most 
successful examples is the Brussels Regime in the European Union.  
a. Integrated Recognition and Enforcement Systems: the EU Example 
As mentioned above, the Brussels Regime for jurisdiction and enforcement was 
born out of necessity. It was a result of the integration efforts that Europe was making 
and it established a comprehensive system to accommodate and coordinate the 
functioning of diverse legal systems. Jurisdiction rules were enacted to guarantee that no 
two courts would have jurisdiction over the same dispute, avoiding unnecessary conflicts 
between courts of different Member States.  
Ensuring that no two courts would entertain the same dispute was not enough 
however. For an efficient legal infrastructure that could solve disputes in an efficient 
manner, more was required; this amounted to provisions on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. Not only would a litigant know with certainty that only 
one court would be able to decide a case without worrying that other courts might 
entertain the same dispute, but moreover, the decision coming from that court would be 
enforceable in any other country under the same regime.1096  
Under the Brussels Regime, the grounds for refusal of recognition are very limited. 
They include only the public policy exception, the existence of a judgment given with a 
default of appearance if the defendant was not served with process, preclusion and lack 
of jurisdiction on matters of insurance, consumer contracts and exclusive jurisdiction.1097 
Thus, as the EU adopts a strict standard for non-recognition, if the procedure 
leading to the judgment is undertaken properly, in compliance with the minimum 
requirements for due process and if the exercise of jurisdiction is established in 
accordance with what it is provided for in the Brussels I Regulation, denial of recognition 
and enforcement will be highly unlikely.1098 
                                                      
1096 Brussels I Reg, art 35(3) prohibits raising the public policy exception regarding jurisdiction. 
1097 See Brussels I Reg, arts 34 and 37. 
1098 See Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski, C-7/98 [2000] ECR I-1395 and Case C-38/98 Renault v. Maxicar 
SpA [2000] ECR I-02973. 
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This design creates a system that brings certainty to litigating parties. By 
guaranteeing the enforcement of judgments, the system enables reliance on the 
infrastructure of the legal system. Of course, the functioning of a system like this one 
presupposes trust in the judiciary systems of other countries.1099 Decisions that do not 
fall within the framework of the regime could cause distrust and, if persistent, lead to the 
political deconstruction of the system.  
Another aspect of the system design is how simple it is to recognize and enforce a 
judgment. The cheaper and faster it is, the better for the robustness and efficiency of the 
legal system.  
On this front, the way in which the Brussels Regime currently operates leaves some 
ground for improvement. As it is, judgments must go through a process of declaration of 
enforceability to be enforceable in a Member State country other than the one issuing the 
decision.1100 This is known as the exequatur procedure and its costs can be considerable 
for the average investor.1101 These average at around €2,200, ranging from €1,100 in 
Bulgaria to €3,800 in Italy in simple cases, and reaching €12,700 in more complex 
ones. 1102  This procedure is considered to be an obstacle to the free circulation of 
judgments, creating costs and delays that may harm the EU internal market. 1103  The 
problem has already been addressed by the Brussels I Recast, which retires the exequatur 
procedure. From 2015 onwards, a judgment of another Member State shall be enforced 
                                                      
1099 Ulrich Magnus and Mankowski Peter, Brussels I Regulation (2nd edn, Sellier 2012) 7-8. 
1100 See Brussels I Reg, s 2. 
1101 This procedure does not apply in relation to uncontested claims (see Regulation (EC) 805/2004) and 
claims under 2000 euros (See Regulation (EC) 861/2007). 
1102 See Civil Justice: The Reform of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation and the European Commission's Green Paper 
on the Free Circulation of Public Documents: Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-677_en.htm. 
1103 See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’ (hereinafter, 
the ‘Recast Proposal’ or the ‘Proposal’), COM(2010) 748 final, 3–4. 
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in the same condition as judgments made in the country in which enforcement is 
sought,1104 subject to the usual grounds of non-recognition.1105 
The new Brussels regime diminishes the hurdles for legal protection in the 
European environment. It is an interesting development within the European Union as it 
approximates the different legal systems that exist even further under the umbrella of the 
EU legal system. Despite some of its obvious advantages, some view these changes with 
skepticism and identify some dangers.1106 Only time will tell whether the changes have 
been good ones. 
b. Unilateral Recognition Systems 
Absent treaties, states are free to design recognition systems as they see fit. At a 
general level, different recognition and enforcement systems are designed in a similar 
manner, involving tests of finality of the judgment, personal jurisdiction by the court 
rendering the decision, service of process, due process and a public policy exception, 
sometimes also having a reciprocity requirement, 1107  and engaging comity 
considerations.1108  
Even though the designs are, in general, similar, the application of recognition and 
enforcement rules always reflects the particular preferences and requirements of 
compliance with civil procedure of the country in which enforcement is being sought. For 
example, service of process on a foreign territory in a U.S. based dispute according to U.S. 
standards,1109 may preclude the recognition of the judgment in foreign courts.1110 The 
                                                      
1104 Brussels I Recast, Recital 26; art 41(1). 
1105 Public policy exception, judgment in default with no service and a judgment that is irreconcilable with 
a judgment given between the same parties in the Member State enforcing the judgment (Brussels I Recast, 
art 45). 
1106  See Laurens Je Timmer, ‘Abolition of Exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: Ill Conceived and 
Premature?’ (2013) 9 Journal of Private International Law 129. 
1107  Samuel Baumgartner, ‘Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. 
Judgments Abroad’ (2013) 45 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 965, 971. 
1108 Comity is ‘neither a matter of absolute obligation […] nor of mere courtesy and good will […] it is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another […]’.Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
1109 E.g., by delivery of the documents through a private person or by mail. 
1110 Baumgartner 972 (n 1107). 
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question is one of whether the decision will harm the sovereignty or the public interest of 
the state where recognition or enforcement is sought.1111 
The specific rules in Brazil for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments fall neatly within this pattern. To be recognized, the foreign decision has to be 
proffered by an authority with jurisdiction, service of process has to be performed or the 
absence of a party in a default judgment has to be legally verified, the judgment must be 
final and duly authenticated by the Brazilian Consul and translated by a sworn 
translator,1112 and it can be denied if it offends sovereignty or the public order.1113 
The system for recognition and enforcement in the United States is more peculiar: 
there is no overarching rule that is applicable all over the country, but the rules of each 
state govern recognition on the state territory, even in federal courts.1114 While the rules 
for recognition and enforcement are state-specific, they have been harmonized to a 
certain extent due to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,1115 enacted 
by many U.S. states.1116 The remaining states apply the common law according to The 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States.1117 Also, as soon as the 
decision is recognized, it becomes domesticated and the same protection afforded by the 
Full Faith & Credit Clause is also given to the foreign judgment.1118 
For the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, requirements are 
similar to the ones mentioned above: recognition is not given if the judgment is not 
                                                      
1111 Ibid 998. 
1112 Resolution STJ 9 [2005], art 5.  
1113 Resolution STJ 9 [2005], art 6. 
1114 The existence of a federal common law for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments was 
eliminated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Juan Carlos Martinez, ‘Recognizing 
and Enforcing Foreign Nation Judgments: the United States and Europe compared and contrasted - a call for 
revised legislation in Florida’ (1995) 4 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 49 Yuliya Zeynalova, ‘The Law 
on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: is it broken and how do we fix it? ’ (2013) 31 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 155. 
1115 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. 
1116 The act has been enacted by Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington. 
1117 Zeynalova 156 (n 1114). 
1118 Ibid 155. 
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conclusive, if notice was not given to defendant, if the judgment was obtained by fraud, if 
the basis for the decision or the claim is against public policy, if the judgment conflicts 
with another final and conclusive judgment, if the proceeding in the foreign court was 
against an agreement by the parties or in case of jurisdiction based on personal service, if 
the court where the judgment was made was highly inconvenient;1119 enforcement is 
executed according to the procedure for enforcing another U.S. state judgment. 1120 In 
addition to these requirements, some states also require reciprocity.1121  
In the UK, the doctrine that was developed was more prone to the recognition of 
foreign judgments. The idea was that what was enforced was not the foreign judgment, 
but the obligation that it produced between the parties. As long as the court rendering the 
decision had competent jurisdiction over the defendant, the foreign judgment would be 
enforced.1122 
The lack of an overarching international system of jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments could be solved by a global convention on jurisdiction. 
3. An Attempt of a Global Convention on Jurisdiction 
Many of the problems arising from different legal systems having jurisdiction over 
the same dispute and the lack of certainty for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, could be solved by a global treaty on jurisdiction; even though there has been 
an attempt to create one, so far this has not become a reality.  
The ‘Judgments Project’ at the Hague Conference on Private International Law was 
such an attempt; it had the goal of creating a global treaty for jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, a true double convention. 1123  The 
                                                      
1119 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, s 4. 
1120 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note. 
1121 Zeynalova 158 (n 1114). The reciprocity requirement became known in Hilton v. Guyot (n. 1108).  
1122 See Michaels, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ 2 (n 1095).  
1123  See HCCH, ‘The Judgments Project’ (Hague Conference on Private International Law)  
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=149> accessed 8 July 2014. 
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work was initiated in 1992, and in 1999 a draft of a mixed convention was published.1124 
Despite the effort put into the project, negotiations fell apart due to the different 
approaches that delegations from the U.S. and delegations from Europe had in 
understanding the concept of jurisdiction,1125 leading to the conclusion of a far more timid 
convention on Choice-of-Courts.1126 This is a convention that basically allows parties to 
choose courts to decide their disputes, avoiding legal uncertainty that may arise from the 
unacceptability of this kind of choice in some jurisdictions. So far the Convention has not 
been put into force, nor has it proved popular, as only the EU, Mexico and U.S. have signed 
it.1127 
Even though the Judgments Project was not successful, in 2012 The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law decided to resume working towards a future 
instrument on cross-border litigation. 1128  The work is still at its initial stage and the 
reality of a treaty on the issue of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments is still 
very far from reality.  
4. Arbitration 
The transnational aspect of judicial disputes is permeated by the efficiency 
problems of the legal infrastructure for dispute resolution. This is in part an explanation 
for the creation and growth of international arbitration in the past years.1129 Arbitration 
allows the parties to choose a mechanism for dispute resolution outside of the court 
structure that is nonetheless enforceable in courts.  
                                                      
1124 A mixed convention would be one that includes not only required and excluded bases for jurisdiction, 
but also permitted ones, that would not be recognizable outside the country establishing jurisdiction based 
on them. 
1125 See Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ 1009-11 (n 514). 
1126 The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. 
1127 See HCCH, ‘Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements’ (Hague Conference 
on Private International Law)  <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98.> 
accessed 8 July 2014. 
1128 HCCH, Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (Council on General Affairs and Policy 
of the Conference 17-20 April, 2012). 
1129 Born 65-66 (n 516). 
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This is possible due to the New York Convention, an international treaty in force 
in 149 countries,1130 which gives binding effect to international arbitration clauses and to 
agreements to arbitrate a dispute. 
The number of countries in which the New York Convention is applicable makes it 
a truly global infrastructure for dispute resolution, avoiding many of the problems that 
may arise out of the use of choice-of-court agreements since these do not provide the 
same legal certainty to the parties as arbitration. This is mainly because of the different 
approaches for foreign judgments recognition and enforcement, such as the reciprocity 
requirement, and the insecurity of whether a court will decline jurisdiction when faced 
with a choice-of-court provision. 
By choosing arbitration, the parties are able to avoid such problems since the New 
York Convention provides that agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards have to be 
recognized by a Contracting State.1131  
5. Jurisdiction and Enforcement Aspects of Aggregate Litigation 
The involvement of parties of different jurisdictions may create difficulties in 
respect of a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over all of them, especially in cases where the 
aggregate litigation mechanism is an opt-out one. With opt-in mechanisms, all of those 
plaintiffs who will be bound will have given their consent, as they will be the parties 
initiating the case.1132 
In respect of the opt-out procedure, the matter is more complicated. How can a 
court have jurisdiction over plaintiffs that have not initiated the lawsuit and are not 
domiciled in the state in which the court is located? The approach of the Amsterdam Court 
                                                      
1130 See UNCITRAL, ‘Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 1958)’ (UNCITRAL)  
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> accessed 8 
July 2014. 
1131 See New York Convention, arts II and III. 
1132 In the EU, jurisdiction would be determined according to Brussels I Reg, arts 23 and 24. 
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in certifying the Shell and Converium settlements under the WCAM procedure is 
enlightening.1133  
Since this was a settlement procedure, the Dutch court treated the applicant 
parties, the representative of the class and those who would otherwise be defendants in 
a normal proceeding, as the plaintiffs, and the interested parties, the members of the class, 
as defendants.1134 By doing this, the court established jurisdiction in respect of investors 
domiciled in the Netherlands, according to Article 2 of Brussels I 1135  and, having 
established this, prorogated jurisdiction to those who were domiciled in other Members 
States through Article 6.1; Article 6.1 provides a basis for jurisdiction if ‘the claims are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings’. In respect of the 
other foreign interested parties, the Dutch court used the open-ended provisions of article 
3(a) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, which states that Dutch courts have jurisdiction 
‘if either the petitioner or, where there are more petitioners, one of them, or one of the 
interested parties mentioned in the petition has his domicile or habitual residence in the 
Netherlands’.  
The important aspect though is not whether the Dutch court could have had 
established jurisdiction, but if jurisdiction established in this manner could have been 
seen as a problem for the recognition and enforcement of the settlement/judgment in 
other countries. On this matter, Professor Halfmeier expressed his concern that it was not 
clear whether such an approach would be allowed under Brussels I; clarification is 
                                                      
1133 See Shell Petroleum N.V. Settlement, LJN: BI 5744, NIPR 2010, 71 (Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 May 
2009); Converium Settlement, NJ 2010, 683, NIPR 2011, 85 (Court of Appeal Amsterdam 12 November 
2010); Converium Settlement, no. 200.070.039/01, LJN: BV1026 (Court of Appeal Amsterdam 17 January 
2012). 
1134 See Hélène Van Lith, The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and Private International Law (Erasmus School 
of Law 2010) 36-40 (Criticizing this approach as leading to multiple forums if more aggregate litigation 
mechanisms become available in Europe). 
1135 In the Converium case, the court also used the basis of 5.1 to establish jurisdiction, the place where the 
obligation has to be performed, since the monies would be distributed by a foundation established in the 
Netherlands.  
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required via the intervention of the CJEU.1136 In the international context, absent a treaty, 
the matter would be left to the recognizing state.  
In respect of enforcement, the most pressing aspects that can be a barrier for 
recognition and enforcement, in addition to the issue of the jurisdiction of the court seized, 
is the question of proper notice and the adequate representation of the parties; these 
considerations will be analyzed in the section on public policy below.  
2. Applicable Law 
The question of applicable law is tied to the question of where the dispute is 
decided. The forum court will apply its own choice of laws rules to decide the proper law 
to be applied to the dispute. International treaties and efforts in harmonization are some 
of the avenues that have been pursued to diminish the number of different laws that could 
be applicable in a given dispute depending on the jurisdiction in which it is decided;1137 
notwithstanding these efforts, uncertainty as to the applicable law in transnational 
securities transactions still exists and may represent a legal risk.  
As set out above, there are three different types of disputes arising out of securities 
transactions: the issuer-investor, the financial intermediary-investor and finally, the 
financial information intermediary-investor dispute. The question as to which law will 
apply depends of what kind of dispute is at stake, the legal relationship between the 
parties and the forum of the dispute. As many financial disputes involve more than one 
type of cause of action, for example, a dispute based on securities laws and on the 
contractual relationship, these questions can become quite complex.  
Absent treaties on applicable law, the determination of what law applies will fall 
to the forum deciding the dispute. Even if choice-of-law provisions are used, their 
applicability may depend on where the lawsuit is being pursued, as some legal systems 
                                                      
1136 Alex Halfmeier, ‘Recognition of a WCAM Settlement in Germany’ [2012] 2012 Nederland International 
Privaatrecht 176, 178. 
1137 An important objective of conflict-of-laws rules is to provide uniformity of decision regardless of the 
court in which the matter is decided. See  C.M.V. Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4 edn, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 18-19. 
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do allow for the use of choice-of-law, while in others the matter is not so clear. 1138 
Moreover, public policy considerations may play a role in the law applicable to the 
dispute.1139 From an ex ante perspective, it might be impossible to know which law will 
be applicable in a securities transaction involving parties who are situated in multiple 
jurisdictions,1140 creating serious legal uncertainty that can discourage transactions.1141 
In the European Union, the legal infrastructure has been going through a process 
of harmonization, or at least, of conflict avoidance, due to the efforts in establishing a 
single market and the development of the underlying political structures required to 
make it work. This is done either through EU-wide legislation harmonizing a specific field 
of law and binding on all EU Member States, or legislation providing for solutions on 
applicable law in a transnational dispute, such as the Rome Regulations, which aim to 
discourage the use of forum shopping in the EU context, based on the determination of 
the substantive law applicable to a given dispute.1142  
In the securities field, this transformation has been particularly intense. In the past 
few years the regulatory regime has become a full-blown one, operating mainly at the EU 
level and leaving little, regulation-policy wise, for the national regulators.1143 
The breadth of subject matters covered by EU securities regulation is quite broad, 
as it can be seen in the discussion in Chapter V. The important issue for this chapter is that 
the rules have been harmonized; these harmonized rules are applicable throughout the 
                                                      
1138 In Brazil, the wording of the law is not clear and the judicial decisions on the matter have not been 
friendly to choice-of-law. See Anelize Slomp Aguiar, ‘The Law Applicable to International Trade 
Transactions with Brazilian Parties: a Comparative Study of the Brazilian Law, the CISG, and the American 
Law about Contract Formation’ (LLM, University of Toronto 2011) 4-7.; Dana Stringer, ‘Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum in Brazilian International Commercial Contracts: Party Autonomy, International 
Jurisdiction, and the Emerging Third Way’ (2005-2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 959. 
1139 See section 3 below. 
1140 James Steven Rogers, ‘Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held Through Intermediaries’ 
(2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 285, 292. 
1141  See Bradley Crawford, ‘The Hague "Prima" Convention: Choice of Law to Govern Recognition of 
Dispositions of Book-Based Securities in Cross Border Transactions’ (2003) 38 Canada Business Law 
Review 157, 163. 
1142 If the substantive rules of law are harmonized, conflict-of-laws rules become unnecessary. Even though 
the regulatory framework is becoming increasingly harmonized, the liability scheme for breach of securities 
law is still mainly based on national law.  
1143 Moloney, EC Securities Regulation 4 (n 227). 
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EU, whether they concern the duties of the issuer to provide information or the suitability 
test that the financial intermediary has to perform to sell securities to investors. 
Notwithstanding some small differences in implementation in nation states, the general 
legal framework is the same in respect of the standard of behavior for securities 
transactions across the EU area. The difference that is important for applicable law 
analysis is that liability for non-compliance with EU securities law is regulated 
nationally.1144 
The two broad areas of applicable law that are related to liability aspects of 
securities transactions are contract and tort.  
A. Contract 
Applicable law in contracts is mainly based on private autonomy, that is, the 
freedom of the parties to select the law applicable to their relationship.1145 Absent choice, 
most systems have rules leading to a given applicable law, usually taking into 
consideration the relationship of the contract to a particular system and the most closely 
connected law.  
Even though private autonomy plays an important role in choice-of-law, its 
acceptance is not universal; many countries either do not accept it or impose limitations 
on its use. Brazil, for example, does not accept a choice-of-law clause in disputes to be 
decided by courts due to the Introductory Law to the Brazilian Law Norms,1146which in 
its article 9 provides that ‘to qualify and regulate obligations, the applicable law will be 
the one of where the obligations have been constituted’; 1147  if the dispute is to be 
submitted to arbitration, then choice-of-law is allowed.1148  
                                                      
1144 See Directive 2004/109/EC, art 7; Directive 2004/39/EC, art 25(1) does not have any provisions on 
civil liability for non-compliance with its rules, providing that the forum state law and private international 
law regime constitute the framework for the imposition of liability. See also Busch (n 456). 
1145 Symeon Symeonides, ‘Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a Comparative Perspective’ in K. Boele-
Woelki and others (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law - Liber Amicorum (Eleven 
International Publishing 2010) 514-15. 
1146 Decree-Law 4.657/1942. In case it is not clear where the obligation was constituted, the offeror’s place 
of residence is deemed to be the place. See art 9 §2. 
1147 See also Aguiar 4-7 (n 1138). 
1148 Law 9.307/96, art 2 §1. 
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The U.S. on the other hand, while it is not as closed as Brazil, does not take a 
consistent position on the choice-of-law question due to the state law nature of the matter, 
to the extent that the party autonomy doctrine in the U.S. has been considered 
‘chaotic’.1149 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is an influential secondary 
source in the U.S. but is not followed by all courts;1150 it allows for choice when the parties 
could have resolved the issue by an explicit provision in their agreement.1151  However, it 
limits the choice if the issue being addressed could not be resolved by an explicit provision 
in the agreement and at the same the time, the chosen state has no substantial relationship 
to the parties or the transaction, or if applying the law would be ‘contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest’ than the chosen state 
and where, in the absence of the choice, the applicable law1152 would be that of the place 
that ‘has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties’.1153 
In the EU, the approach of the Rome I Regulation to applicable law is based on 
private autonomy, allowing the parties to decide which law should be applicable to their 
contractual relationship;1154 this decision cannot displace laws that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement if the parties are either in the same country for national matters1155 
or within one or more EU states for Union law purposes.1156  
If no choice is made, article 4 defines the applicable law, which will be the one of 
the place where the seller or the service provider has residence. 1157In the securities 
context, contracts with multilateral systems, designed for buying and selling financial 
interests made in accordance with non-discretionary rules and governed by a single law, 
                                                      
1149 Mo Zhang, ‘Party Autonomy and Beyond: an International Perspective of Contractual Choice of Law’ 
(2006) 20 Emory International Law Review, 533. 
1150 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey 
(2010) 4-5. 
1151 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187(1). 
1152 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187(2). 
1153 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §188. 
1154 Rome I, art 3(1). 
1155 Rome I, art 3(3). 
1156 Rome I, art 3(4). 
1157 Rome I, art 4(1)(a) and (b). 
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will be governed by that law. 1158  If the applicable law cannot be established by this 
analysis, it will be the law of the habitual residence of the party that has to provide the 
characteristic performance of the contract.1159 Finally, if it is clear that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that established by the 
previous analysis, the law of most closely connected country will be applicable.1160 
Another aspect of contractual conflict-of-laws provisions that may be relevant in 
securities transactions, in respect of financial intermediary-investor disputes, is the 
status of the investor; he might be deemed to fall within some dimension of the ‘weaker 
party’ doctrine, that is, within the consumer category, either because of lack of 
information or a lack of bargaining power.1161If this is the case, private autonomy is 
limited even further. In the European context, if a professional1162 is transacting with a 
customer,1163 the applicable law will be the one of the habitual residence of the consumer 
if the professional pursues its commercial or professional activities in the place where the 
consumer has his habitual residence or if the activities are directed to that country.1164 A 
choice of law can still be made if it does not deprive the consumer of the protection 
afforded by the law of the country of his habitual residence.1165 In Brazil, which already 
has limits on choice of law, the rights granted to persons with consumer status are high, 
as any choice that might prejudice the consumer in comparison with the applicable 
Brazilian regime, is not allowed.1166 Finally, the U.S. does not have a specific regime for 
consumers; the general connection to the contract requirement for limitation of choice of 
law and fundamental public policy is applicable to curtail the effects of the choice of 
                                                      
1158 Rome I, art 4(1)(h). 
1159 Rome I, art 4(2). 
1160 Rome I, art 4(3). 
1161 Hans-W Micklitz, Jules Stuyck and Evelyne Terryn, Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (Hart 
Publishing 2010). 
1162 A professional is ‘person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession’. Rome I, art. 6(1). 
1163  A consumer is ‘natural person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession’. Rome I, art. 6(1). 
1164 Rome I, art 6(1)(a) and (b). 
1165 Rome I, art 6.2. 
1166 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 51 I. A textual reading of the provision does not imply that choice-
of-law is forbidden, but since arbitration clauses are not allowed in consumer transactions (art. 51 VI), the 
use of choice-of-law would also be severely limited.  
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law.1167 A problem with the U.S. approach arises from the use of such a broad standard; it 
becomes unclear what the standards for consumer protection and applicable law are.1168 
B. Tort 
In respect of matters of tort, the applicable law is also an important issue as an 
action in a country may have effects in another country, for example, in respect of the 
price of the security being traded elsewhere. The main approaches to tort choice of law 
are either based on the place where the harm occurred, the place of the conduct or 
another type of interest analysis, engaging relevant connecting factors.  
In Brazil, there is no distinction between extra-contractual and contractual choice-
of-law regulation, as both are governed by Article 9 of Decree-Law 4.657/1942, which 
states, as mentioned above, that ‘to qualify and regulate obligations, the applicable law 
will be the one of where the obligations have been constituted’. The text of the law does 
not clarify whether the lex loci delicti or the lex loci damni principle applies.  
In the U.S., the approach to applicable law is similar to that in contract; the theories 
and doctrines for applicable law in torts are diverse and provide a highly complex 
landscape, moving from a single point of contact analysis (the lex loci delicti) to 
considerations about the underlying policies of the states involved in the dispute. 1169 
Comparing different policies and factors to determine the applicable law in a cross-border 
tort dispute undermines legal certainty, as it is never clear what the decision of the court 
will be: moreover, it obliges the judge to engage in a complicated analysis.1170 Even though 
certainty is not absolute in the United States at this moment, the different approaches 
have converged to provide for similar results, as most of the time the applicable law to a 
given tort dispute will be the law of the state favoring the plaintiff.1171 
                                                      
1167 See  Giesela Ruhl, ‘Consumer Protection in Choice of Law’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 
569, 587-92. 
1168 See  James J. Healy, ‘Consumer Protection Choice of Law: European lessons for the United States’ (2009) 
19 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 535. 
1169 Symeon C. Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: why plaintiffs win and should’ (2009) 61 
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1170 Ibid 403. 
1171 86% to be more precise. See ibid 389-92. 
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In Europe, due to the needs of European integration, the system of applicable law 
in non-contractual obligations is clearer and more systematized than in Brazil and the U.S., 
having been regulated by the Rome II Regulation. 1172  The general rule is that the 
applicable law will be the lex loci damni, according to Article 4(1).1173 In some situations, 
such as car accidents, the location in which the damage occurred is easy to ascertain, but 
in others, such as negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, 1174  this may be more 
complicated, undermining legal certainty.1175The general rule is displaced if the persons 
involved have their habitual residence in the same country; in this case, the law of that 
country will be applicable.1176 Finally, when it is clear from the circumstances of the case 
that the tort is ‘manifestly more closely connected’ with another country, the law of that 
country will apply.1177 
Another important characteristic of the European regime for applicable law for 
non-contractual obligations is that the parties may choose by agreement which law they 
want to apply to their dispute after the event giving rise to the damage has occurred,1178or 
if both parties are pursuing a commercial activity, they can agree on the applicable law 
before the event happens.1179  
C. Applicable Law in Arbitration 
The nature of the securities dispute will determine whether it may be prone to 
arbitration. Both the contractual and the issuer-investor dispute are theoretically capable 
of being submitted to arbitration, due to the legal link that an investor has with the 
                                                      
1172 Regulation (EC) 864/2007. 
1173 ‘Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation 
arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the 
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries 
in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.’ 
1174 Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 328-29. 
1175 Ibid 318-19. 
1176 Rome II, art 4(2). 
1177 Rome II, art 4(3). 
1178 Rome II, art 14(1)(a). 
1179 Rome II, art 14(1)(b). 
 273 
corporation, while the disputes with informational intermediaries is not so capable, 
unless the parties agree upon arbitration ex post.  
Applicable law in arbitration is a complex issue. The initial assessment starts with 
the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, which might be different from the 
applicable law of the substantive part of the contract. This is a consequence of the 
severability presumption of the arbitration agreement, which is considered in its own 
right as a separate contract and not as part of the underlying contract.1180 
In the securities context, this consideration is especially important due to the 
public policy aspects that securities regulation has and that have to be considered in light 
of arbitration. 1181  Disputes involving securities may be non-arbitrable in some 
jurisdictions; therefore the law that will be applied to the arbitration agreement is 
important for the success of the dispute resolution process. 
To this question, a single correct answer is still missing. There is no consistent 
approach to non-arbitrability across the globe.1182 The New York Convention provides 
that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if ‘[t]he subject 
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country’,1183 giving the country in which the enforcement of an arbitral award is sought 
the possibility of protecting areas of its legal system that it believes should not be 
submitted to arbitration. This is an important consideration regarding the possible 
enforcement forums of the arbitral award, but it does not provide an answer which law 
should apply to define the non-arbitrability standard at the dispute resolution stage. Some 
of the approaches provide for the application of the law of the arbitral seat, the law of the 
forum in which enforcement may be sought or the law governing the arbitration 
agreement.1184 The best approach however would be one which engages the performance 
                                                      
1180 See Born 311-53 (n 516). 
1181 More on this in the next section. 
1182 See Born 516-35 (n 516). 
1183 Art V(2)a. 
1184 Born 520-23 (n 516). 
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of an analysis similar to that which is done in relation to the public policy exception, 
regarding the closeness of the connection of the dispute.1185  
The second question concerns the law applicable to the substantive part of the 
dispute, in the absence of agreement by the parties. National arbitral statutes differ in 
their approach and they may provide that arbitrators have to apply the conflict of law 
rules of the arbitral seat, those with the closest connection to the case, those that they 
deem to be ‘applicable’ or ‘appropriate’ or just disregard conflict of law analysis and apply 
directly the substantive law that they deem ‘applicable’ or ‘appropriate’.1186  
Generally, absent agreement of the parties, the approach to be taken is dependent 
on the law of the arbitral seat. This is an effect of article V(1)(d) of the New York 
Convention that allows refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award if it is 
not in accordance with the laws of the country in which the arbitration took place. The 
problem is the public policy aspect of securities regulation. In some specific cases, even if 
the dispute is arbitrable, it might only be properly solved if it is done under the laws of 
the country where it will be enforced, otherwise the award may be denied recognition. 
Securities law is an area that falls neatly within these concerns.  
D. Applicable Law in Aggregate Litigation with Transnational Elements 
Applicable law questions in aggregate litigation with transnational elements can 
be a cause of concern, being also tied to questions of jurisdiction; this is the case even in 
the EU context, which has a more harmonized system of private international law.  
In tort-like cases, which involve issuer – investor and information intermediary – 
investor types of disputes, and where the lex loci damni principle usually applies - as it 
does in Europe by virtue of Article 4 of Rome II Regulation - there will be as many different 
laws as there are countries in which parties have been harmed.  
The problem with this approach is that it also has effects on jurisdiction. In Roche 
v. Primus1187 the CJEU decided that, despite Roche BV in the Netherlands, together with 
                                                      
1185 Ibid 525-26. 
1186 Ibid 2114-17. 
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eight other companies in the Roche group situated in other countries having violated an 
European patent, since the Munich Convention establishes that violations have to be 
examined under the national law of each state in which the patent has been granted, 
decisions could not be irreconcilable for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Brussels I. 
The situation in a securities case would be slightly different, as there would only 
be one provider of information that is false or misleading; however, given the lex loci 
damni principle in the Rome II, the logic would be the same and there would be as many 
applicable laws as jurisdictions in which persons have been harmed, since the liability in 
securities cases is to be established according to national law, precluding the use of art 6 
(1) of Brussels I for jurisdiction purposes. The difference that exists in securities cases can 
be its salvation for aggregate litigation purposes; since the person issuing the statement 
is a single party, there is a possibility to engage the closest connection test for the 
purposes of determining the applicable law as provided for in art. 4(3) of Rome II, thus 
enabling the use of 6(1) Brussels I for jurisdiction purposes, and therefore allowing for a 
European-wide aggregate litigation mechanism.  
Transnationally, in the absence of a treaty regulating the matter, the only choice 
left for dealing with the different applicable laws is to allow for the choice of law to 
regulate the relationship between issuers and investors; this solution could also be 
applied in the EU context. The argument against this approach is that issuers would then 
be allowed to choose their laws, undermining investor protection. Nonetheless, this is a 
system that could possibly work when foreign investors reach the market in which the 
issuer operates on their own, i.e. without the active distribution of securities in the 
investor’s jurisdiction. This would not only facilitate aggregate litigation, but would also 
create a fair framework for investors, who, absent such provision, would actually have 
different rights depending on where they are based, notwithstanding that the securities 
are the same.  
3. The Public Policy Question 
The public policy provisions of a legal system are those that are applied 
irrespective of the agreement of the parties, due to their importance to the execution of 
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the forum policy.1188 They involve sensitive issues in many different areas, ranging from 
consumer protection1189 to anti-bribery legislation,1190 and have as their objective the 
protection of certain interests that are deemed to be important to the country. What falls 
within the public policy provisions of a legal system depends on the policy choices that 
are made by it; for example, the protection afforded to consumers in Brazil is much higher 
than in the United States.1191  
The approach to public policy and what is accepted or not in a decision may also 
depend on the national or international character of the dispute. Courts tend to have a 
different interpretation as to what consists public policy when the dispute is international, 
especially in arbitration, as public policy will also involve considerations regarding the 
public policy of the state of the applicable law and the law of the arbitral seat of the 
dispute.1192 
A. Public Policy and Securities Disputes 
Securities law has an important public policy aspect as it protects investors from 
fraud and other inequitable acts in securities transactions, creating confidence and 
allowing for stronger securities markets.1193 A question with which academics have been 
struggling is when mandatory laws1194 of a foreign country are applicable to a cross-
                                                      
1188 Donald Donovan and Alexander Greenawalt, ‘Mitsubishi after Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before 
Courts and International Arbitrators’ in Loukas Mistelis and Julian Dew (eds), Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2006) 13 Joseph R Nuss, ‘Public Policy Invoked as a 
Ground for Contesting the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award, or for Seeking its Annulment’ (2013) 7 Dispute 
Resolution International 119. 
1189 In the EU context for example see Case C-240/98 Oceano Editorial v Roció Quintero [2000] ECR I-04941 
(allowing courts to make preliminary assessments on the unfairness of a choice-of-court clause for 
jurisdiction purposes). 
1190 Donovan and Greenawalt (n 1188). 
1191 Compulsory arbitration in Brazil in consumer relations is forbidden by law, being allowed only in very 
few cases, while, in the U.S., arbitration is generally allowed. Compare Código de Defesa do Consumidor, art. 
51 VII with AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 536 U.S. 321 (2011). For cases in which consumer arbitration in 
Brazil was accepted, see CZ6 Empreendimentos Comerciais Ltda. V Lúcio Maciel (TJRJ, 15th Chamber, Civil 
Appeal n. 2008.001.30250) (2008). 
1192 Nuss 127 (n 1188). 
1193 See Chapter IV. 
1194 For an overview of the term, see Hans Christoph Grigoleit, ‘Mandatory Law: Fundamental Principles’ in 
Jurgen Basedow, Klaus Hopt and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European 
Private Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
 277 
border transaction.1195 An example in the securities field is useful for the purposes of 
understanding this problem. An English company decides to sell securities to an American 
company. The English company is regulated by English securities laws in respect of its 
establishment and operation, as well as in respect of the duties it owes to its clients, in 
addition to the applicable antifraud provisions. The U.S., on the other hand, has its own 
laws on the selling of securities and the determination of the applicable standards to 
identify what constitutes fraud in a securities transaction. If there were a choice-of-law 
provision choosing English law to govern the transaction, would U.S. law be imposed 
when the U.S. company sued, or would the parties’ choice be enforceable? 
The real problem mainly arises when the dispute has to be decided or where the 
judgment has to be enforced in the forum of the law not chosen in the contract; in the 
example, this would be the the U.S. courts.1196 The court considering whether to recognize 
a decision or a choice-of-law that does not take account of its domestic policies and laws, 
will have to balance the importance of such policies with the promotion of international 
harmony; a given rule of law will become a public policy provision that can be used to 
justify the public policy exception provisions when the court considers that the domestic 
public policy at stake is more important than these international considerations.1197 
Even though public policy provisions have a mandatory dimension, they may be 
relativized, depending on the interest in consideration. An interesting example is the 
interaction of the anti-waiver provisions of U.S. securities law with the choice-of-law and 
arbitration/forum selection agreements in overseas investment contracts. In Roby v. 
Corporation of Lloyd’s,1198 the Second Circuit decided that notwithstanding the choice of 
English law and of English forum and the clear inapplicability of U.S. securities law in that 
                                                      
1195  For an overview on different theories, see Thomas G. Guedj, ‘The Theory of the Lois de Police, a 
Functional Trend in Continental Private International Law - A Comparative Analysis with Modern American 
Theories’ (1991) 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 661; See also Russell J. Weintraub, ‘The 
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Law: an inquiry into the utility of a "choice-of-law" 
approach’ (1992) 70 Texas Law Review 1799. 
1196 In the UK courts, this would be easily solvable, as the problem would concern a UK company with a UK 
choice-of-law on the contract: Rome I would be applicable. See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of 
Laws (15 edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012) 2103. 
1197 Guedj 666 (n 1195). 
1198 996 F.2d 1353 (1993). 
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forum, 1199  the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law should be upheld in the U.S. courts 
unless the agreement was unreasonable under the circumstances.1200 The unreasonable 
agreement concept can be translated into ‘fraud or overreaching’, ‘inconvenience or 
unfairness of the selected forum’, deprivation of a remedy under chosen law or the 
contravention of a public policy of the forum state.1201  
In respect of the public policy aspect, in which U.S. securities legislation is 
recognized as ‘protecting American investors from injury by demanding ‘full and fair 
disclosure’ from issuers’ and ‘deterring exploitation of American investors’,1202 the court 
said that it would only ‘be contravened if the applicable foreign law failed adequately to 
deter issuers from exploiting American investors’. 1203  The court’s next step was to 
recognize that English law provided similar remedies as U.S. securities law,1204 protecting 
investors from fraud and misrepresentation,1205 while at the same time, to accept that for 
the purposes of disclosure requirements, the transaction fell within Regulation D1206 and 
that nonetheless, English law provided Lloyd’s ‘adequate inducement to disclose material 
information’.1207 While recognizing that the application of U.S. securities law would give 
the plaintiffs a higher chance of victory, the Second Circuit established that ‘ample and 
just remedies’ were available under English law and therefore that the U.S. public policy 
                                                      
1199 ‘[…] neither an English court nor an English arbitrator would apply the United States securities laws, 
because English conflict of law rules do not permit recognition of foreign tort or statutory law.’ Roby v. 
Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198) 1362. 
1200 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198) 1363. 
1201 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198). 
1202 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198) 1364. 
1203 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198). 
1204 Even though that while in the U.S. reliance would not have to be proved and controlling persons would 
also be liable for misrepresentation, this would not be the case in English law. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s 
(n. 1198) 1365. 
1205 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198). 
1206 The U.S. Securities Regulation that exempts issuers from disclosure requirements.  
1207 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s (n. 1198) 1366. 
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on securities legislation was protected.1208 The same approach has been taken by the 
Fifth,1209 Eight1210 and the Ninth Circuits.1211 
Public policy provisions therefore have at their core rules from which parties 
cannot contract out, due to policy interests of a country. They matter for private 
international law because they may allow a country to deny the recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign decision on the basis that the decision is against the public policy 
of the country; moreover, it might allow it to keep specific substantive matters exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of national courts. As it was shown, they can be relativized in 
certain jurisdictions as long as the contracting out does not lead to the complete forfeiture 
of the protection that the protected party would enjoy under the rules that have been 
contracted out, even though the level of protection may be lower.  
B. Public Policy and Notice in Aggregate Litigation 
The public policy aspects of aggregate litigation are related to the globally-
recognized right to a fair trial, which guarantees notice of process, recognized in many 
constitutions and international treaties1212. As a background matter, it is important to 
note that fundamental rights of this type are not absolute; they may be subject to 
limitations when these are justified by a legitimate aim and proportional measure to 
achieve this aim.1213 
                                                      
1208 Ibid. 
1209 Haynsworth v. The Corp, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997). 
1210 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F. 3d 156 (1993). 
1211 Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (1998). 
1212 The due process clause in the U.S. Constitution, art 5, LIV of the Brazilian Constitution, art. 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
art 8 of the American Convention of Human Rights, among others.  
1213 Lithgow and Others v the United Kingdom (1986) Series A no 102 para 194(‘[A] limitation will not be 
compatible with [a fair trial] if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved’); (‘It 
should, however, be borne in mind that fundamental rights, such as respect for the right of the defence, do 
not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be subject to restrictions. However, such restrictions must 
in fact correspond to the objectives of public interest pursued by the measure in question and must not 
constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a manifest or disproportionate breach of the rights thus 
guaranteed’) Case C-394/07 Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler [2009] ECR I-02563 para 29. 
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Notice is only an issue in opt-out procedures, since in opt-in procedures the 
plaintiff will actively consent to engage in litigation. The purpose of notice, as a general 
matter, is to inform a party that there is a legal proceeding (the outcome of which will 
bind him) in course, in order to allow the person to mount a defense. Its existence 
therefore becomes crucial to bind plaintiffs in an opt-out procedure. As if they were 
defendants, proper notice should be sufficient ground to guarantee that a trial, or 
settlement, was not unfair; as argued by Professor Feintman, this is more a matter of 
estoppel than of positive consent.1214 The fundamental right to a fair trial should not be 
seen as having been breached if the party has knowledge about the procedure and has not 
opted out or become actively involved in the process.  
There are many international instruments that allow for service of process from 
one jurisdiction to another, such as The Hague Service Convention of 1965 and Regulation 
(EC) 1393/2007. Given that these are legally permitted mechanisms, notice through them 
should be sufficient to bring absent plaintiffs to the legal dispute, binding them in respect 
of the outcome, having given them the opportunity to opt-out or to become involved in 
the lawsuit. To this extent, if notice is properly given, the only remaining objection to 
aggregate litigation in a foreign country would be the aggregate character of the lawsuit, 
which becomes a weak argument per se absent a fair trial violation.  
A problem with the normal legal ways of giving notice is that they may be costly. 
In this respect, the approach initially taken by the Amsterdam court in the Dexia case was 
to request notification by ordinary post, contrary to the requirement of a registered letter 
per Regulation (EC) 1393/2007;1215  it justified this determination by saying that the 
parties may raise any objections at the recognition and enforcement phase.1216 Since this 
approach was clearly prone to problems of recognition of the settlement agreement, the 
                                                      
1214 Richard Feintman, ‘Recognition, Enforcement and Collective Judgments’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nikitas E. 
Hatzimihail (eds), Cross-Border Class Actions: The European Way (Seillier European Law Publishers 2014) 
107-08. 
1215 Art 14. 
1216 Lith 70-71 (n 1134). 
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Amsterdam court started following the guidelines of Regulation (EC) 1393/2007 in 
subsequent cases.1217 
The preceding discussion assumed that the address of the persons to be notified 
was known, but in many situations this would not be the case, which could complicate 
matters tremendously. For example, in the EU context, Regulation (EC) 1393/2007 does 
not apply when the address of the person to be served is unknown,1218 which may impede 
the recognition of the judgment in other Member States. 1219  In fact, as there are no 
international mechanisms regulating opting-out of aggregate litigation, it becomes 
impossible to guarantee that foreign class members will be bound (even when notice by 
newspapers is widely used, as was the case in the Shell Dutch settlement 1220 ), 
undermining the legal certainty of the decision at a transnational level.  
As the methods for notice under different national laws can become a problem for 
aggregate litigation, a solution based on arbitration as a method of dispute resolution may 
facilitate the matter. Arbitration laws allow for notice of process through the means 
agreed by the parties, 1221  preempting some of the burdensome methods of notice 
required by national legislation. For example, email could be established as a means of 
notice for aggregate litigation purposes in issuer-investor disputes, allowing for the 
development of an efficient opt-out dispute resolution mechanism. This matter will be 
explored further in the next chapter.  
C. Public Policy and Arbitrability of Securities Disputes 
Arbitrability is directly related to the public policy provisions of the forum. While 
matters that are non-arbitrable under a given legal system are matters with importance 
of public policy, not all matters with a public policy importance are non-arbitrable. The 
consumer dispute example in Brazil discussed above is a matter that falls within the non-
                                                      
1217 Ibid . 
1218 Art 1(2). 
1219 Art 34(2). 
1220 Lith 74 (n 1134). 
1221 See Queensland Cotton Corporation Ltd. v Agropastoril Jotabasso Ltda. (STJ, Special Chamber, SEC 6753 
/ EX) (2013). For a discussion on the matter, see Born 1748-58 (n 516).  
 282 
arbitrable public policy category. An arbitral award arising out of a consumer dispute with 
a Brazilian customer based on a compulsory arbitration clause would not be enforceable 
according to Brazilian law.1222 Within the EU context, arbitrability in consumer disputes 
is not per se illegal, but courts do have the power to assess the unfairness of the arbitral 
clause according to the factual circumstances.1223 On the other hand, U.S. antitrust law, 
clearly a matter of public policy, falls within the arbitrable category. Previously, it was 
more common that any issues under national mandatory law were excluded from 
arbitration; this position is no longer as prevalent.1224 Some legal systems are changing, 
allowing public policy matters to be decided by arbitration but requiring the applicability 
of those laws in the arbitration procedure as a prerequisite of an enforceable award.1225 
Mandatory laws embodying public policy concerns can, therefore, be arbitrable. 
Accordingly, it is important to establish to what extent securities laws and claims arising 
out of them can be submitted to arbitration. 
In the U.S., securities transactions are clearly arbitrable, both in issuer-investor 
and the financial intermediary-investor disputes.1226 This was not always the case. In 
1953, the US Supreme Court decided in Wilko v. Swan1227  that the provisions of the 
Federal Arbitration Act could not displace the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 due 
to the language in section § 14 that provided that ‘any condition, stipulation, or provision 
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this 
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.’ Even though 
this seemed the best approach due to objectives of the Securities Act, which in part was 
created to protect investors and give them rights of redress, the situation was reversed in 
                                                      
1222 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 51, VII.  
1223 See Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil [2006] ECR I-10421 (allowing the annulment of an 
arbitration award based on an unfair term in the consumer context, even if not pleaded in the proceedings) 
and Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones v Cristina Rodríguez [2009] ECR I-09579 (giving the court 
that has to enforce an arbitral award made in the absence of the consumer, the power to assess of its own 
motion, whether the arbitration clause was unfair, if that is possible according to national law).  
1224  Pilar Viscasilas, ‘Arbitrability of (Intra-) Corporate Disputes’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. 
Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Wolters Kluwer 2009) 285. 
1225 Ibid . 
1226 See Ilias Bantekas, ‘Arbitrability in Finance and Banking’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis 
(eds), Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Wolters Kluwer 2009) 297-300. 
1227 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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Scherck v. Alberto Culver1228 and Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.1229 The first 
case involved the Securities and Exchange Act antifraud provision. The U.S. Supreme 
Court differentiated the case from Wilko v. Swan due to its international aspect, allowing 
arbitration in securities cases that involved disputes with parties from different 
countries, 1230  while the second extended this rationale to antitrust claims and 
consolidated the arbitrability of rights that fall within public policy.1231   
In civil law countries, it is not clear whether securities disputes, especially of the 
investor-issuer type, are arbitrable. In Brazil, the set-up of the financial market and the 
existence of the Câmara de Arbitragem de Mercado, coupled with the differentiated 
corporate governance levels that are available in Bovespa and require arbitration of intra-
corporate disputes,1232 seem to indicate that securities disputes can be arbitrable.1233 The 
arbitration clauses in the corporate charter of the companies listed in the relevant 
segments indicate that disputes arising out of the rules enacted by the CVM, which 
regulates information disclosure and fraud, have to be solved through arbitration.1234 
Therefore, even though securities laws have a relevant public policy dimension, 
recent developments in the field show that there might be space to soften the mandatory 
aspects involved, as long as the final regulatory aim of a strong market, based on some 
degree of investor protection, is maintained. 
                                                      
1228 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
1229 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
1230 Scherck v Alberto-Culver Co. (n. 1228) 515, 517 (‘Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the business 
entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement. […]The exception to the clear provisions 
of the Arbitration Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case such as the one before us.’) 
1231 See also the discussion above on public policy and securities law. 
1232 Novo Mercado, Nível 2 and Bovespa Mais. 
1233 See BM&FBOVESPA, ‘O que são Segmentos de Listagem’ (n 661). 
1234  E.g. Estatuto Social da Abril Educação S.A., art. 49 <http://ri.abrileducacao.com.br/pt-
br/governanca/Documents/Estatuto%20consolidado_30042013.pdf> and Estatuto Social Brasil Brokers 
Participações S.A., art. 37 
<http://www.mzweb.com.br/brbrokers/web/conteudo_pt.asp?idioma=0&conta=28&tipo=12126>. 
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D. Public Policy and Arbitration based on Corporate Charters 
In the investor-issuer dispute, the question of the arbitrability of intra-corporation 
disputes is an important one.1235 Arbitration through corporate charter provisions can be 
a viable alternative for creating a mass dispute resolution system. 
Whether arbitration based on corporate charter provisions is allowed varies 
greatly depending on the jurisdiction under analysis. While in Spain and in Brazil 
arbitration is accepted as a means of solving disputes based on corporate charters, in the 
United States the question still is hotly debated.  
In Brazil and Spain the arbitration law is clear in allowing for arbitration 
agreements in corporate charters. The Brazilian Corporation Law states that:  
the corporate charter may establish that the disputes between shareholders 
and the company, or the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, 
may be solve through arbitration, within the specified terms.1236 
 This paragraph was added by Law 10.303/2001 in 2001, which changed relevant 
provisions of the Brazilian Corporate Law and of the Law 6.385/76, the law regulating the 
securities market and the Brazilian SEC.  
The Spanish Arbitration Law has a provision of the same nature, which states that 
‘corporations may submit to arbitration the conflicts arising out of them.’ 1237  This 
provision in Spanish law is new, having been added in 2011 through Law 11/2011, and 
enacted with the objective of modernizing arbitration in Spain. In its Preamble, it was 
clear the intent of the drafters was to ‘clarify […] the existing doubts related to corporate 
charter arbitration in corporations.’1238 
In Brazil, corporate charter arbitration is not only a possibility, but it has been 
institutionalized through the Bovespa Listing Requirements for the two highest corporate 
                                                      
1235 It is true that those who have sold a security based on misleading information do not have a link to the 
company when the suit is brought, but nonetheless they did have a link at the moment when the sale was 
made. 
1236 Law 6.404/76, art 109 §3. 
1237, Law 60/2003, art 11 bis 1. 
1238 Law 11/2011, Preamble, II.  
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governance levels. 1239  The arbitration requirement is attached to a specific arbitral 
institution, the Câmara de Arbitragem de Mercado. 1240  Therefore, corporate charter 
arbitration is seen in Brazil as something better than an approach that leaves these 
matters to be litigated in courts. There are some criticisms to be made in respect of this 
current scenario in Brazil,1241 but legally, corporate charter arbitration is a possibility.  
In the United States, this subject is not as simple, and despite the possibility of 
using corporate charter arbitration,1242 its use in public companies is a disputed matter. 
Resistance from various sectors, public and private, has been made since the first 
attempts to use arbitration clauses in corporate charters of public companies. On the 
public side, in 1990, a Pennsylvania Corporation tried to include arbitration clauses in its 
charter and bylaws, but the SEC decided to decline to accelerate the effectiveness of the 
company’s registration statement, pushing it to exclude those provisions. 1243  On the 
private side, the NYSE regulatory arm changed its arbitration regulation rules to ban 
arbitration of class and derivatives claims.1244 
Despite the pro-arbitration policy in the United States, recent developments have 
reaffirmed the negative stance taken in respect of intra-corporate arbitration for public 
companies. On January 2012, the Carlyle Group was preparing an IPO and tried to include 
an arbitration provision in their corporate charter;1245 they were soon discouraged from 
                                                      
1239 See BM&FBOVESPA, ‘O que são Segmentos de Listagem’ (n 661). 
1240 Ibid. 
1241 For example, the confidentiality surrounding the financial markets arbitration system in Brazil . See 
Elton Bezerra, ‘Especialista critica arbitragem em mercado de capitais’ (Consultor Jurídico, 30 May 2013)  
<http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-mai-30/arbitragem-retrocesso-mercado-capitais-professora-gv> 
accessed 8 July 2014. 
1242 This is a discussion that has gone as far as 1988, see John C. Coffee, ‘No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies’ (1988) 53 Brooklyn Law Review 919. At that 
time it already seemed that this was a path where American Law would lead to due to the preemption 
characteristic of the FAA (Ibid 954). See also Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).  
1243 Ravanides 375 (n 507). 
1244 See FINRA Customer Code, arts. 12204 and 12205.  
1245  Steven Davidoff, ‘Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly I.P.O. for Shareholders’ (NYT Dealbook, 18 January 
2012)  <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-o-for-
shareholders/> accessed 8 July 2014. 
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doing so after consulting with the SEC and other interested parties.1246 It is also important 
to note that while the SEC and investor protection groups are fierce in combating 
arbitration clauses in American public companies, the same is not true for foreign 
companies trading in the U.S. There are many foreign companies that do have an 
arbitration clause in their corporate charter and are currently traded in the U.S. securities 
market.1247 This is interesting because foreign companies have to comply with the same 
requirements as American ones in order to trade their shares in the United States, and the 
perils that American investors might face from an arbitration clause are virtually the same, 
regardless of whether the companies are American or foreign.1248  
In any event, this is more of a political than a legal dispute. Legally-speaking, in the 
American legal system, corporate arbitration has already been accepted as being 
possible.1249 Under this legal framework, the arbitrability of securities disputes arising 
out of shareholder-company relationships is a possibility, despite the resistance of the 
SEC in accepting these provisions in the corporate charters of American companies. 
4. Implications for Securities Disputes 
The efficiency of the law in transnational transactions depends on the mechanisms 
available to apply and enforce legal rules in the jurisdictions where the parties to a dispute 
are involved. The analysis that has to be made involves jurisdiction, the applicable law to 
the dispute and the possibility of recognition and enforcement of the judgment. Having 
identified the general aspects of private international law in the systems under analysis, 
I will now analyze their implications in the securities field, contributing to the response 
to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter.  
                                                      
1246 Kevin Roose, ‘Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from I.P.O. Plans’ (NYT Dealbook, 3 February 2012)  
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-plans/> 
accessed 8 July 2014.  
1247 Ravanides 389-407 (n 507). 
1248 Except when exemptions for cross-border offerings are applicable.  See Code of Federal Regulations, 
§230.800-230.802. 
1249 See Ravanides 414-26 (n 507). 
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For each dispute, three questions have to be answered: 1) where can the dispute 
be litigated?; 2) what law is applicable?; 3) if there is the need for enforcement in another 
jurisdiction, can the decision be enforced?  
A. Investor – Issuer Disputes 
Transnational investor-issuer disputes can be categorized in the following way: if 
it is exchange-based, it can either be an investment from the investor in a foreign 
exchange or it can be made through the depositary receipt system of a foreign share in a 
local exchange; otherwise, it is an open-market transaction with a foreign counterparty.  
a. Exchange-based 
Securities that are listed on a stock exchange have a strong tie to the laws and 
regulations of the country in which the stock exchange is located. Listing requirements 
will have to be complied with, prospectus disclosure, transparency requirements and 
accounting information will all have to be made in accordance with what is required by 
that legal system.1250 As a general matter, listed securities and the obligations arising out 
of securities laws are governed by the law of the country in which the exchange is located, 
as this is considered as the relevant market for the transactions in such securities;1251 
however, private international law rules may allow for a lawsuit in a different country, as 
well as a different applicable law regarding liability than that of the place of the exchange. 
Foreign Exchange 
An example can be provided. A national from country A buys securities being 
traded in an exchange located in country B.  
As to the first question, it will normally be the case that the issuer could be sued in 
the courts of his domicile. Beyond domicile, the question of jurisdiction becomes more 
                                                      
1250 In the EU regime, the information requirements for listing and public trading of securities will be those 
of the place where the issuer is registered, which will then be used for listing in another country within the 
EU passport regime. See Wolf-Georg Ringe and Alexander Hellgardt, ‘The International Dimension of Issuer 
Liability - Liability and Choice of Law from a Transatlantic Perspective’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 23, 30-31 and Article 17, Directive 2003/71/EC. 
1251 G. Wegen and C. Lindemann, ‘The Law Applicable to Public Offerings in Continental Europe’ in Hans Van 
Houtte (ed), The Laws of Cross-Border Securities Transactions (Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 153-59. 
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complicated, since plenty of disagreement remains as to the characterization of damages 
arising out of securities fraud. 1252  In the EU, there is no clear answer to the matter. 
Following the logic of Kronhofer v. Maier1253  the approach would be to allow for the 
jurisdiction of the place where the investor’s account is situated as the place where the 
harmful event occurred; the court in this case excluded the domicile of the claimant or 
where his assets were concentrated for jurisdiction purposes. Another approach would 
be to specify the place where the damage occurred1254 as the exchange where securities 
are bought and sold, since this would be the place in which the first impact is felt. 1255 In 
the U.S., under the Morrison decision, foreign issuers would hardly be subject to 
jurisdiction unless their securities were traded in a U.S. exchange or sold in the U.S.1256 
These considerations show that investors who invest in foreign exchanges would have to 
engage in a foreign dispute resolution system to recover if fraud was ever perpetrated.  
As to the applicable law, in the EU the logic should follow that in the Kronhofer v. 
Maier case,1257 which identifies the applicable law as that of the place of the investor’s 
investment account, since both Brussels I and Rome II use the lex damni standard to assess 
jurisdiction and applicable law in tort.1258 This would cause a problem since it would 
subject an issuer to liability according to as many laws as there are securities owners with 
accounts in different jurisdictions. Instead of focusing on this approach, one which 
provides for the identification of the place of the exchange as the place where the damage 
occurred would be a better option.1259 This could be done more easily in the Rome II 
context than in the Brussels I due to the application of the close connection test according 
                                                      
1252 Ringe and Hellgardt 34 (n 1250). 
1253 (n 1028). 
1254 As established in Case C-21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace (Case C-21/76) [1976] ECR 01735. 
1255 Peter Huber, Rome II regulation: Pocket Commentary (Sellier European Law Publ. 2011) 84-85. 
1256 One problem would be the exact definition of ‘a sale of any other security in the United States’ (Morrison 
v National Australia Bank (n 10) 273). 
1257 (n. 1028). 
1258The main standard is the lex delicti for jurisdiction, but the lex damni was established for jurisdiction 
purposes in Mines de Potasse d’Alsace (n. 1254).  
1259 This approach would guarantee one applicable law for each market, equating securities rights with the 
specific regulation of the market in which it is being traded. A criticism at the EU level is that, with the rules 
on best execution, an investor that gives an order will not know in advance which liability regime would 
apply to him. See Ringe and Hellgardt 53-54 (n 1250). 
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to Article 4(3). In the U.S., applicable law would not be an issue; U.S. courts would either 
apply U.S. law for securities liability or would dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, 
not engaging in a private international law analysis due to the public policy character of 
the matter.1260 
Following on from the first paragraph on jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement would only be an issue when the forum of the place of the exchange or where 
the company is registered has jurisdiction and the assets are located elsewhere. In any 
event, the lawsuit would by itself be a complicated one, as the investor would have to go 
to a foreign forum to litigate; therefore, the investor would most likely sue where the 
issuer’s assets were available.  
The overall discussion in this section demonstrates that investors who wish to 
invest directly in foreign exchanges are not faced with an easy enforcement regime, unless 
some mechanism in the foreign forum in which the issuer will be subject to jurisdiction 
offers such a system; this would include, for example, the class action scheme in the U.S. 
Depositary Receipt1261 
The example here is the following: a national from country A buys securities traded 
on an exchange in country A, representing securities traded in an exchange in country B. 
The securities are therefore in fact being anchored in country A, where the investor is 
situated. The courts of the investor’s country therefore provide the first option for the 
lawsuit. The question then is whether a lawsuit in country B, where the issuer is located, 
will be possible. As a general matter, this would constitute a proper basis of jurisdiction, 
both in the EU and Brazil.1262 In the U.S., it is not completely clear what would be the case 
since this would deemed to be a foreign transaction, even though it is tied to an American 
                                                      
1260 Ibid 38-39. 
1261 A depositary receipt is ‘[a] negotiable financial instrument issued by a bank to represent a foreign 
company's publicly traded securities. A depository receipt trades on a local stock exchange, but a custodian 
bank in the foreign country holds the actual shares. Depository receipts can be sponsored or unsponsored 
depending on whether the company that issued the shares enters into an agreement with the custodian 
bank that issues the depository receipt.’ Investopedia, ‘Depositary Receipt’ (Investopedia)  
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/depositaryreceipt.asp> accessed 8 July 2014. 
1262 Brussels I Reg, art. 2(1); Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 88; for the U.S., see the discussion above in 
this chapter.  
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issuer. In the Morrison decision, there is language suggesting that a transaction of this kind 
would fall outside the scope of U.S. securities laws, therefore precluding the exercise by 
courts of ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’.1263  Another recent decision confirmed this trend, 
where it was decided that U.S. securities laws do not apply to transactions in foreign 
exchanges when the securities are cross-listed in the U.S., even if the buyer is 
American.1264 It seems that any transaction executed on a foreign exchange would not be 
subject to U.S. laws; nevertheless, it is still necessary to confirm if this is the case when 
the issuer is American. 
As to the applicable law, even though the depositary receipt will be governed by 
the laws of the investor’s country and at the same time, the share that it represents will 
be governed by the laws of the issuer’s country, it is not always clear which law will apply 
in case the investor is harmed as a result of the issuer’s fraud or misrepresentation. If the 
investor is suing in his country, it seems clear that his own law would apply, since the 
securities would be submitted to that legal system. What is not clear is what law would 
apply if the dispute was entertained in the issuer’s forum based on a depositary receipt 
transacted outside of it. In the EU context, the applicable law would be the one of where 
the damage occurred,1265 bringing us back to the uncertainties discussed in the foreign 
exchange section. In the U.S., the applicability of its laws would depend on whether U.S. 
courts exercised jurisdiction or not, and in Brazil, there would be some uncertainty as to 
which law would be applicable due to the underdevelopment of its private international 
law; however, it is possible to envisage a convincing argument mounted on the violation 
of Brazilian securities laws coupled with the general liability standard.  
Therefore, for securities regulation to be effective, recognition and enforcement of 
the judgment would be necessary, as the likely place for the dispute to be solved would 
be the investor’s forum, under that forum’s law. This would require the enforcing forum 
                                                      
1263 (‘[…] we think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, 
but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States’) Morrison v National Australia Bank (n 10) 
266.  
1264 City of Pontiac v UBS AG, No. 12-4355-cv (2nd Cir. May 2014). 
1265 Rome II, art 4(1).  
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to accept the investor’s country securities laws and not to raise any public policy 
considerations if the company does not have sufficient assets in the investor’s forum.  
Another aspect that may create a difference in this analysis is whether the 
Depositary Receipt is sponsored, with the participation of the issuer, or unsponsored, 
where only the depositary bank is responsible for the securities. Unsponsored depositary 
receipts do not involve the issuer, but only involve financial intermediaries that 
coordinate the program in the foreign country. In this case, it is unlikely that the issuer 
will be subject to foreign securities laws, and even if it is, it is unlikely that a judgment 
made in such circumstances would be enforced.  
b. Open Market 
Securities can also be transacted outside exchanges, through direct purchase 
agreements on the secondary market or through public offerings. As there is no exchange 
tying the regulatory obligations of the transaction, the private international law analysis 
becomes more complicated than exchange-based ones, since different mandatory laws 
may be required depending on where the issuer and the buyer of securities are located 
and how the marketing of the securities are made. 
The first question concerns where the lawsuit should be brought. In this case, the 
issuer’s forum is an obvious choice for legal purposes, as any decision arising out of that 
judgment will be enforceable, even though it may consist of a great inconvenience for the 
investor. The investor’s forum can also be a second choice, depending on the fulfillment 
of the requirements necessary for the court to exercise jurisdiction.1266 
On the applicable law question, two approaches can be used: the law of the market 
in which the transaction took place and the effects test. In the first approach, the 
applicable law would depend on who initiated the transaction, as the law of the other 
party would be the applicable one since the first party ‘went’ to the market of the second; 
                                                      
1266 As the requirement that the transaction occurred in the country, for a Brazilian law example, or that the 
forum has personal jurisdiction over defendant and is a convenient one, for a U.S. example. If an EU court 
were the forum of the investor and the issuer were domiciled in another Member State, jurisdiction could 
be established under the tort heading of the Brussels I, which gives jurisdiction to the place ‘where the 
harmful event occurred’ (art. 5(3)).   
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in the second approach, the law of the investor would always be the applicable one.1267 Of 
course, this would assume that the transaction would not constitute a public offering 
falling within the regulatory purview of the country in which the investor is situated; in 
this case, the transaction would be submitted to national mandatory law and subject to 
its liability standards. In any event, the approach to applicable law in non-exchange 
situations will be directly linked to the concept of the ‘market’ in which the transaction 
was executed.1268 
Finally, recognition would be required in the issuer’s forum if the dispute was 
pursued in the investor’s forum; this could be complicated depending on whether the 
issuer’s forum considers its securities laws to be mandatory and, if it does, whether it 
accepts a judgment, made in a foreign country, to have precedence over its public policy 
matters.  
B. Investor – Financial Intermediary Disputes 
The transnational factor in a dispute with a financial intermediary only arises if 
the investor is transacting with a foreign financial intermediary. The private international 
law analysis will depend on who took the initiative to search for the counterparty and 
where the transactions finally took place, as these transactions are based on contracts and 
regulated by the legal provisions of the place where the intermediary is located. 
a. Investor Acts Towards Financial Intermediary  
When the investor reaches out to a foreign financial intermediary to enter into a 
financial services contract, all of the transaction’s aspects are strongly tied to the financial 
intermediary’s forum, weakening the grounds to either start a lawsuit in another country 
or to apply the law of such country to the contract.  
Under the Brussels regime and the Brazilian one for jurisdiction, this would not be 
possible, as there are no specific grounds for it. In the European Union regime, the place 
of performance of an obligation, which gives jurisdictional basis in contractual relations, 
                                                      
1267 Wegen and Lindemann 161-62 (n 1251). 
1268 See Huber 84-85 (n 1255). In the EU, as explained above, the situation is not so clear due to the fact that 
the standard of the applicable law is of ‘the place in which the damage occurs’ (Rome II, art 4(3)). 
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is deemed to be where the services are provided; in the case of financial services, this 
would be the place where the financial intermediary is situated.1269 In Brazil, either the 
obligation would have to be executed in Brazil or the fact or act be considered would have 
to be made in Brazil;1270 this would not be the case in a normal securities transaction since 
the order would be placed and executed in a foreign country. In the U.S., jurisdiction would 
be available only if the foreign financial intermediary had sufficient ‘minimum contacts’, 
assuming that the case would not be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.  
A caveat in the Brazilian system concerns whether the investor can be considered 
a consumer, since a consumer is any ‘physical or legal person that buys or uses a product 
or service as the final user.’1271 If this is the case, then jurisdiction is available under Art. 
101 of the Brazilian Consumer Code. The jurisprudence in Brazil is still not clear on the 
subject, but a recent decision has allowed choice of foreign law in a contract, recognizing 
a U.S. judgment and displacing Brazilian Law, even though the party resisting 
enforcement requested the application of the Brazilian Consumer Code.1272 Even though 
this was a case concerning the determination of applicable law, the logic of the analysis 
could also be extended for jurisdictional purposes, avoiding the jurisdictional base of the 
Brazilian Consumer Defense Code. 
On the applicable law question, the answer would depend of the rules of the forum. 
In the EU, in the absence of an agreement, the applicable law would be that of the financial 
intermediary’s forum1273 while in Brazil, it would be the law of the investor, since he 
would be the offeror.1274 In the U.S., with its ‘most significant relationship’ standard for 
                                                      
1269 Brussels I Reg, art 5.1(b).  
1270 Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, art 88, II and III.  
1271 Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 2. 
1272 ‘Deveras eleito o direito aplicável à espécie em manifestação de vontade livre (GTA) referido pactum, 
mutadis mutandis, faz as vezes de ‘compromisso’ insuperável pela alegação de aplicação em contrato 
internacional do Código de defesa do Consumidor – CDC, lei interna, sob o argumento de que apenação 
inversa investiria contra a ordem pública.’ General Eletric Company v Varig S.A. (STJ, Special Chamber, SEC 
646 / US) (2008). In this case, it is important to note that the party resisting enforcement and asking for the 
application of the Brazilian Consumer Code was Varig, which was a big airline company in Brazil. The court 
did not appreciate this request due to the fact that this was an enforcement procedure, therefore it was 
prohibited from engaging the merits of the decision being enforced, even though consumer law is 
considered to be a matter of public order in Brazil.  
1273 Rome I, art 4(1)(b).  
1274 Decree-Law 4.657/1942, art 9. 
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applicable law, the law most likely to be applied would also be the one of the financial 
intermediary.  
As the most likely forum is the one of the financial intermediary, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments would not be an issue in this type of case.  
b. Financial Intermediary Acts Towards Investor 
In the situation where the financial intermediary is the one reaching out to the 
investor to offer financial services, the relationship can more easily be characterized as 
one in which consumer regulation applies.1275 
Both in the EU and in Brazil, the characterization of the investor as a consumer 
opens up the door of the domestic forum to solve disputes,1276  while in the U.S., this 
characterization is not legally relevant for the purposes of this work. It is important to 
note that, in the EU, if the defendant is not domiciled in another Member State, jurisdiction 
is established according to the jurisdiction laws of the state in which the investor is 
domiciled.1277 
The applicable law identified will also change, becoming the one where the 
investor has his habitual residence, both in the EU and in Brazil,1278 even though choice is 
expressly allowed in the EU regime, as long as it does not deprive the investor of the 
protection that he would have under the otherwise applicable law.1279 
Then, if the lawsuit is entertained in the investor’s forum, recognition and 
enforcement of the decision will be necessary; this can be problematic if the financial 
                                                      
1275  In the EU, this is clear both in the jurisdiction and the applicable law context, as the financial 
intermediary would be directing his activities to the Member State where the consumer is domiciled. See 
Brussels I Reg, arts 15.1(c) and 6.1(b). For a more detailed analysis of the EU context, see Gralf-Peter Calliess, 
Rome Regulations : commentary on the European rules on the conflict of laws (Kluwer Law International ; 
Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by Aspen Pub. 2011). 
1276 Brussels I Reg, art 16 and Brazilian Consumer Defense Code, art 101.  
1277 Brussels I Reg, arts 4 and 15(1). 
1278 Rome I, art 6(1).  
1279 Rome I, Article 6(2).  
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intermediary’s forum does not recognize the decision of the investor’s forum or if there 
was a choice-of-forum or arbitration provision that was not respected. 
C. Investor – Informational Intermediary Disputes 
In this scenario, the investor would act based on information provided by a foreign 
informational intermediary. As there is no direct link between investors and 
informational intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies and accounting firms, the 
private international law analysis is based on tort standards.  
Jurisdiction can be commonly established where the defendant is domiciled, but 
sometimes also where the harmful event occurred. In the EU context, the harmful event 
can be understood to be the place, both where event giving rise to it was perpetrated and 
also where the damage arose, 1280  which in this situation, would imply the relevant 
securities market.1281 In Brazil, it would not be possible to raise a lawsuit against a foreign 
informational intermediary due to the lack of proper jurisdictional basis. In the U.S., even 
though jurisdiction could be based on the effects that the act caused,1282it would most 
likely not survive a minimum contacts test.1283 
The applicable law question in the EU is a complicated one, as the standard is 
where the ‘damage occurs’,1284 giving rise to different possibilities such as the place where 
the assets were located just before the transfer or the branch of the bank where the 
account is held.1285 In this case though, the most likely result is the use of the ‘closest 
connection’ escape clause1286and the application of the law of the market for which the 
rating was intended. In Brazil, the applicable law would be the one of the information 
intermediary since in the Brazilian private international law system, the applicable law is 
                                                      
1280 See Case C-51/97 Réunion Européennee SA v Spliethoff’s Becrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR I-6534, 
para 28. 
1281 What exactly the relevant market is has not been made clear under EU Law.  
1282 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §37 (‘A state has a natural interest in the effects of an act 
within its territory even though the act itself was done elsewhere’).  
1283 International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 US 310 (1945). 
1284 Rome II, art 4(1).  
1285 See Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 327-30 (n 
1174); Huber 76-83 (n 1255). 
1286 Rome II, Art 4(3). 
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the one of the place where the obligation was constituted. As Brazil could only be the 
forum if it were the source of the tort, in such case Brazilian law would be the only one 
applicable. 
Recognition and enforcement may be necessary when the informational 
intermediary is sued outside its jurisdiction. Public policy could play a role if the 
jurisdiction that has to enforce the judgment finds that the forum country either had no 
jurisdiction or that the applicable law is against its public policy.  
5. Final Considerations on the Transnational Aspects of Securities 
Disputes  
This chapter has shown that the transnational infrastructure for dispute 
resolution in securities transactions stands on weak ground. Not only might the investor 
face problems in solving a securities dispute in his own country, he may also encounter 
problems regarding the law that would be applicable to his transaction. 
The lack of clear guidance in EU private international law in respect of securities 
transactions and pure economic loss situations, the discretionary aspect of the American 
system of private international law, and the under development of the Brazilian private 
international law system poses clear problems of legal certainty for investors wishing to 
invest in foreign markets. In these situations, the safest approach is litigation in the place 
where the defendant is situated, which is an unrealistic proposition for small and medium 
retail investors. 
The objective of this discussion is not investor protection per se, as the capital 
markets regimes analyzed in this work do present a strong level of investor protection for 
the national market, but rather the task of making it easier for a foreign investor to be 
protected by foreign regimes, opening up the possibility of reliance in cross-border 
transactions.  
If this is accomplished, capital markets will find a road paved for foreign investor 
confidence, opening up the possibility for stronger integration without losing the 
regulatory safeguards that national jurisdictions have developed in order to protect their 
investors from foreign predatory practices. The next chapter proposes possible solutions. 
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Chapter XI – Building a Transnational 
Securities Dispute Resolution System 
I started this thesis with the following research question:  
‘How can the legal infrastructure for transnational securities transactions disputes 
be improved?’ 
In Chapter II, the basis of the state and its development throughout the years has 
been explained, as well as the basic economic role of the legal system within the state 
structure, which comprises the role of serving as a background for the organization of 
economic activity and the instrumental role of correcting market failures. In Chapter III 
and IV, the importance of securities regulation as a mechanism to diminish transaction 
costs via the provision of reliable information to investors, has been established, and the 
significance of the role of private enforcement as a mechanism to enforce securities 
regulation and promote the goals of market efficiency has been set out. From these 
chapters, it has become clear that dispute resolution is the mechanism through which 
private enforcement can be deployed to guarantee compliance with securities regulation 
rules and to promote the confidence of investors, who will be able to rely on the 
information that is being provided in securities markets (an important consideration to 
avoid the self-destruction of the market through the logic of the lemons problem).1287 
Chapter V is where the transnational problems of securities disputes has begun to 
take place. The comparison of different liability systems for securities transactions shows 
that, despite the fact that the duties owed to investors follow the same broad lines 
(disclosure of information and protection from predatory practices), the specific aspects 
of liability can vary considerably.  
In Chapter VI, I have outlined the main institutional aspects surrounding a dispute 
resolution system, underlining the necessary aspects for access and the operation of the 
Rule of Law principle, providing some examples of alternative models in Chapter VII.  
                                                      
1287 Akerlof (n 181). 
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Due to the role that aggregate litigation can play in access to justice, Chapter VIII 
has been concerned with the problematic aspects of this mechanism of dispute resolution, 
such as conflicts of interest, due process and the operation of preclusion, while in Chapter 
IX some aggregate litigation systems have been explained.  
Finally, in Chapter X the core transnational problems of securities disputes have 
been established and analyzed, providing the necessary overview for identifying and 
understanding the main issues in transnational securities disputes.   
As securities markets become transnational, it is important that legal structures 
for dispute resolution of securities transactions are also created to deal with securities 
transactions involving transnational elements. This in turn will ease the enforcement of 
securities regulation principles and guarantee that market participants can effectively 
rely on a legal solution for their disputes. Access to justice, therefore, is an important 
background for the development of strong transnational securities markets.  
Due to the different securities regulation systems that exist today and the 
inadequacy of private international law to bring legal certainty for securities transactions, 
in this last chapter I briefly restate the problems with the current framework for each type 
of securities dispute (section 1) and then propose a solution to each of them (sections 2 
and 3). 
For mass disputes, namely, those of an investor-issuer and investor-informational 
intermediary type, I propose an arbitration model to allow for aggregate litigation and to 
ease the structuring of the dispute resolution system, while at the same time diminishing 
most of the transaction problems that arise out of cross-border litigation. For the 
investor-financial intermediary disputes, I propose a network model based on Fin-Net 
rescaled to the global environment, providing adequate information for foreign investors, 
therefore increasing access.  
1. Problems with Transnational Dispute Resolution of Securities 
Transactions 
Securities are regulated because they tap into the savings pool of the general 
population, creating the need to avoid inequitable practices. Transnationally, there are 
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two questions that are important – first, is there a legal infrastructure available to solve 
the dispute, and second, is it accessible? 
A. The Legal Infrastructure for Securities Dispute Resolution 
Any country that has a legal system will most likely have a dispute resolution 
system that will be able to deal locally with securities transactions; the range of different 
dispute resolution systems is broad and depends on policy choices made in each 
particular jurisdiction.1288  
In any developed legal system there will be a forum for securities disputes, but 
what is not given is if the country will have links with other legal systems to enforce a 
decision that is rendered by one of its courts. From the investor perspective, the 
transnational problems arises when (a) the investor purchases a security of a foreign 
company or a security listed in a foreign country, (b) the intermediary is based in a foreign 
country and finally (c) the investor relies on a rating or an audit of a foreign informational 
intermediary.  
Private international law is the area that deals with these problems, and, as 
explained above, there is no simple solution to it, as various different approaches exist, 
depending on the country that will enforce the judgment. The question here is one of 
jurisdiction over the defendant and enforceability of the decision where the defendant 
has his assets. 
Matters of jurisdiction, as well as of the enforceability of foreign decisions, are 
country-specific and will vary depending on the public policy choices of a given country. 
For the transnational system to work, the forum of the investor will have to be able to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on terms that are acceptable to the foreign 
forum, otherwise enforceability will be at stake. 1289  Alternatively, the foreign system 
                                                      
1288 For example, the FINRA arbitration forum that was developed through self-regulation mechanisms and 
industry practice, and the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Europe, encouraged by MIFID 
Directive, art 53.  
1289 Richard Fentiman frames this problem as ‘Enforcement Risk’, explaining that its absence is what allows 
for the dispute to proceed. Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press 
2010) 691. 
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needs to provide alternatives so that outside investors can obtain redress; this then 
becomes a problem of access. 
In other words, either there are bridges available to connect the different legal 
systems, allowing for a decision in one system to travel and be enforced in another, or the 
investor has available access to the foreign system.  
B. Access to a Dispute Resolution System 
Access, nationally or transnationally, is a basic problem of dispute resolution; if the 
investor is harmed, the costs and incentives should be adequate to allow the investor to 
pursue his claim. There are two paths that can be used to solve the problem, as has been 
explained throughout the previous chapters: low costs for access to the dispute resolution 
system or aggregate litigation mechanisms. Each of these paths has their advantages and 
disadvantages.  
While with low costs, any person can decide whether to pursue his claim, the 
incentives might not be high enough for them to start the lawsuit, either due to the small 
advantages that may accrue from it or to the complexity of the claim.1290 On the other 
hand, with aggregate litigation a lawyer or an investor with a more substantial stake in 
the dispute may take the lead of the lawsuit; a single set of facts common to all of the 
investors is necessary for the aggregate litigation system to work. Also, a system that 
binds those who are absent from the lawsuit is not common and can be complicated to 
implement in countries that are not familiar with the system. When the discussion moves 
to the transnational sphere, the question then becomes one of the availability of dispute 
resolution mechanisms that can effectively solve the dispute, while at the same time 
maintaining adequate access.  
                                                      
1290 This is an economic question – the more complex the claim is, the more expensive it will be to litigate. 
For a brief overview on how to calculate the value of a claim, see Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & 
Economics (Pearson Education 2014) 388-91. 
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2. Dispute Resolution Systems in Transnational Securities 
Transactions – Institutional Considerations 
Each set of disputes arising out of transnational securities transactions has their 
own particular characteristics and problems; as such, a one-size-fits-all approach to them 
would be inadequate. In Chapter V, three types of disputes in securities transactions were 
identified: investor – issuer, investor – financial intermediary and lastly, investor – 
informational intermediary. The different institutional frameworks for dispute resolution 
will be considered according to the particular characteristics of these different disputes. 
A. Investor – Issuer 
The investor-issuer dispute involves multiple investors that were harmed due to 
an omission or false statement made in connection with the purchase of securities. The 
factual pattern for the persons that were harmed in these types of cases is similar, as it 
arises out of the same information that has been given to the market.  
Even though a dispute resolution mechanism that functions on an individual basis 
can be used for this type of dispute, aggregate litigation could enhance the incentives for 
litigation, as the amount at stake for the dispute would be increased, creating the 
possibility for third parties to assume coordination costs.1291 Aggregate litigation would 
also lower the aggregate social costs for solving a single dispute with many claimants, as 
fewer judicial procedures would be necessary to solve all of the disputes arising out of the 
same factual pattern. 1292  For the type of dispute at stake, the use of an arbitration 
framework may be adequate to avoid the prohibitions on aggregate litigation and 
guarantee enforceability at the transnational level. 
a. Setting the Incentives 
For aggregate litigation to work, a party has to be able to increase the stake of the 
litigation by aggregating the claims of other parties and to benefit from it, enhancing the 
                                                      
1291 John C. Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: the Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 669, 679. 
1292 Layton 93 (n 700). 
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personal profit that can be achieved by doing so.1293 Any aggregation mechanism that 
does not take this economic logic into account is prone to failure since there would be no 
positive outcomes for a person to pursue this line of action otherwise. 
It does not matter who that person will be; a claimant, a lawyer or a third-party 
funder can function as the litigation manager, assuming the risks of failure and some of 
the profits of litigation.1294 This principle works both in simple aggregate litigation and 
class action-style mechanisms; the important aspect is that there should be additional 
advantages for the party who will be managing the claimant side of litigation so there is 
an economic reason to sue, while at the same time, aligning their incentives with 
claimants.1295 
In the absence of opt-out mechanisms, and given the fact that lawyers are suitable 
candidates for this leading position in aggregate litigation, rules on maintenance, 
champerty and solicitation, which can be identified across different jurisdictions, have to 
be softened for aggregate litigation to become a suitable mechanism for the resolution of 
mass disputes.1296 At the same time, in order to avoid abuses perpetrated by the bar, 
mechanisms should also be developed to make lawyers accountable, so that frivolous 
lawsuits can be avoided.1297 
                                                      
1293 This is important to solve the free-rider and other collective action problems, especially when the harm 
is too small for a single person to pursue it. Macey and Miller 8-9 (n 742); See generally Olson (n 705). 
1294 For a discussion on the lawyer as the litigation manager, see Macey and Miller. For a discussion on third-
party financiers as the litigation manager, see Burch, ‘Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation’ Molot 
(n 727). 
1295 In these situations, the other side of the coin is that defendants may reach out to the plaintiff’s lawyers 
to settle at a price that is below the ‘fair value’ of the claim (see Hensler and Rowe 138 (n 731)). Here the 
solution would be to set limits on the fee that the lawyer can obtain, linking it to a maximum percentage of 
the outcome for claimants.  
1296 Due to the needs of economies of scale for litigation to be economically feasible, lawyers would have to 
be able to market and line up a multitude of claimants with small claims. For a discussion on maintenance 
and champerty, see Sebok (n 750). For other problems that professional ethics rules may bring, see Charles 
Silver, ‘Ethics and Innovation’ (2011) 79 George Washington Law Review 754. 
1297 For example, in cases in which lawyers take the lead of the litigation, a fee-shifting provision making the 
lawyer liable for any loss could be an option. For a discussion in the class action context, see Hensler and 
Rowe 152-59 (n 731). 
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b. Overcoming the Prohibition of Opt-Out Aggregate Litigation 
Opt-out aggregate litigation, with preclusion operating to all of those that would 
have a claim arising out of the same factual pattern, is a device that exists only in certain 
jurisdictions.  
Its advantage is that it creates a single lawsuit that definitely solves all the claims 
arising out of the same facts, putting an end to the dispute and avoiding the need for the 
defendant to defend itself from the same case over and over again, thus diminishing 
litigation costs. In addition, by allowing the aggregation of all possible claims, it increases 
the incentive for the matter to be litigated when contingent fee schemes are allowed. At 
the same time, due to its size, it is also in danger of becoming a bet-the-company type of 
dispute, since a decision against the defendant may destroy the company financially as 
well as its reputation; some argue that it can become a form of legalized blackmail.1298 In 
any event, if a liability rule can create too much harm for the defendant, the substantive 
rule is the one that should be reformulated, not those shaping access to justice.  
As the opt-out system can be an interesting alternative to solve disputes regarding 
issuer-investor claims, the prohibitions on it have to be overcome; this can be done 
through the use of arbitration.1299 
Operationally, this can be done by including an arbitration clause in the corporate 
charter of the issuer, obliging all investors to solve any disputes with the company 
through arbitration.1300  This excludes the judicial forum as an alternative for dispute 
resolution, but it also provides for alternative procedural rules that can be more flexible 
than those in national civil procedural codes, such as rules regarding notice and service 
of process.1301 
                                                      
1298 Analyzing the claim that class actions are legalized blackmails, see Charles Silver, ‘"We're Scared to 
Death": Class Certification and Blackmail’ (2003) 78 New York University Law Review 1357. 
1299 Despite the problems that class arbitration may encounter outside of the U.S., a legal structure can be 
imagined where an ‘opt-out’ procedure based on arbitration is developed. For a discussion on these 
problems in Europe, see Billiet (n 1025). 
1300 See generally Ravanides (n 507). 
1301 See Born 1742-44 (n 516). 
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The main problem for the enforceability of the decision, public policy 
considerations on the character of securities disputes apart, would be due process 
concerns regarding notice to each and every possible claimant.1302 With this problem in 
mind, it is possible to devise a scheme which provides that when litigation ensues, the 
issuer becomes obliged to notify every investor of the lawsuit, allowing them to join or be 
represented by the lead claimant, thus making them aware that a dispute resolution 
procedure is being initiated and that they will be bound by it, and guaranteeing due 
process standards and a fair trial. With the information technology available today, this 
should not be much of a problem, as notice could easily be given by email. 
c. Transnational Aspects 
In addition to allowing easier means of notification, arbitration also facilitates the 
resolution of problems arising out of the transnational character of the transaction. As 
soon as the arbitration becomes international, the framework of the New York 
Convention can be used for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
As long as the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction can be established by the existence of 
a proper arbitration clause within the corporate charter, it is unlikely that there will be 
issues on the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. To avoid the need 
for recognizing and enforcing the award, the system could even be set up in a way so that 
the arbitration would have its seat where the decision has to be enforced. This would 
work as long as the legal system in which the seat would be located would have a pro 
arbitration regime operating at least to the same extent as the rules of the New York 
Convention. 
The only problem that may exist concerns the public order character of securities 
rules. If national legal systems provide that securities regulation is a public policy matter 
arising out of their own securities regulation regime, they may deny recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral decisions.  
                                                      
1302Under the New York Convention, one of the grounds for non-enforcement of an arbitral award is lack of 
notice of the proceedings (art. V(1)(b)). This also is a basis under national legislation (see Uncitral Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), art 36(1)(a)(ii)).  
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d. System Design and Rule of Law 
Due to the public policy character of securities regulation and the necessity of 
information for investors to assess their risks in these transactions, including legal risks, 
it is highly important that the system operates within the parameters of the Rule of Law 
principle.  
All those aspects that have been addressed in Chapter VI in respect of the legal 
dimension of the institutional aspects, have to be included in this system. Independence 
and accountability of the decision-maker and reasoned decisions that are made public are 
paramount to the success and efficacy of the system in providing for a serious alternative 
for courts that could be used for transnational transactions. 
The absence of reasoned decisions, or their confidentiality, can harm the legal 
certainty of the system, as it would be impossible to know where the law stands at any 
given moment. This is the case of Brazil today, which has an arbitration system designed 
for companies listed at the higher corporate governance levels, creating a paradox since 
those companies, which should exercise the best practices of corporate governance and 
provision of information to the market, hide behind the veil of arbitration in case of 
disputes with shareholders. A solution to this would be to oblige arbitration systems that 
deal with disputes between investors and public companies to publish their decisions; 
this could be done through industry self-regulation or legislation. Arbitral decisions 
would then have a de facto precedential value for future disputes.  
e. Implementation Aspects 
An important question concerns how such a system could become reality. 
Companies may prefer litigation regimes that make it harder for investors to obtain 
redress, so the chances of being sued and having a harmful financial setback from 
litigation is diminished. As it is the company that would have to decide to include an 
arbitration regime in its corporate charter, it seems unlikely that this would be done 
without any other incentive.  
A path for an arbitration system for issuer-investor disputes might engage the use 
of different corporate governance levels when the company is listed, to encourage its use. 
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In Brazil, for example, the companies listed at higher corporate governance levels are 
obliged to have an arbitration clause in their corporate charter.1303  
With the globalization of capital markets, this would provide an interesting way to 
use the existing legal infrastructure already available throughout the world to promote a 
level playing field for the investors of a given company, regardless of where they are from. 
It would then be easier for the company to tap foreign markets, as the rights attached to 
the shares, including procedural ones, would be uniform across countries, thus avoiding 
some of the problems that arose in foreign cubed securities class actions in the United 
States where foreign plaintiffs were not able to pursue litigation in U.S. courts due to their 
foreign status.1304  
For the company, this would imply a higher level of transparency, since actual 
rights from share ownership would vary less, and possibly attract a higher valuation due 
to it.1305 It would be important for securities exchanges to create differentiated corporate 
governance levels with arbitration and opt-out dispute resolution mechanisms, and to 
market them as such so as to make investors aware of the characteristics of these systems.  
B. Investor – Financial Intermediary 
An ideal dispute resolution system would give investors easy access to justice, 
allowing them to pursue their claims from any country in which they are situated, against 
any financial intermediary with whom they have transacted; this would be done under 
rules that they can comprehend and can manage without causing themselves serious 
harm for minor mistakes.  
Regarding access, contrary to the investor-issuer dispute, the investor-financial 
intermediary dispute is one in which the fact pattern is highly individual. The 
determination of what the financial intermediary did or said to the investor is what will 
                                                      
1303 Novo Mercado, Nível 2 and Bovespa Mais. See BM&FBOVESPA, ‘O que são Segmentos de Listagem’ (n 
661). 
1304 This implies that the securities will not be completely subject to the foreign regime, for example, by 
being listed in the foreign country. The application of this regime will be explained further below.  
1305 For a discussion on the effects of transparency when coupled with good governance, seeLifeng Gu and 
Dirk Hackbarth, ‘Governance and Equity Prices: Does Transparency Matters? ’ [2013] 2013 Review of 
Finance 1. 
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be of most significance in this type of dispute, forbidding the use of aggregate litigation as 
a mechanism to solve it.1306  
The problem of access can therefore only be solved by using alternative procedural 
mechanisms or alternative dispute resolution systems, such as the small claims court in 
Brazil or the Financial Ombudsman Service in the U.K. By having low or non-existent 
access costs and allowing a party to proceed without a lawyer, these systems enable any 
person to engage in a dispute if he deems the financial loss to be sufficiently relevant to 
be worthwhile. The forum could even be an online platform, where the investors would 
fill out a form with their claims and arguments, making access to the system extremely 
easy.1307  
The question that then arises concerns how these mechanisms would be 
structured when transnational transactions are involved, as in most countries there 
already is some type of alternative dispute resolution system that addresses these 
concerns. 
a. Transnational Aspects 
The transnational aspect in financial intermediary – investor disputes becomes 
complicated because most countries have strong regulations to protect investors and to 
regulate investment services. Securities regulation and civil liability arising out of non-
compliance is specific to the legal system and can have important differences.  
There are two situations in which a transnational dispute may arise between an 
investor and a financial intermediary: firstly, when the investor wants to invest in a 
foreign country and seeks a financial intermediary of that country which can provide 
                                                      
1306 For example, in Europe there are plenty of cases involving the demise of Lehman Brothers against 
financial intermediaries that were selling products based on Lehman Brothers’ credit risk. To illustrate 
some of these disputes in the UK, see the decisions of the Financial Ombudsman Service DRN 1570597, DRN 
191087 and DRN 3824818 (denying the investor’s claim) and DRN 3727359 and DRN 2604832 (upholding 
the complaint); in Spain, see Tribunal Supremo Sentencia n. 244/2013 (RJ 2013/3387), AP Madrid (Sección 
20a), sentencia n. 427/2013 (AC 2014/156). 
1307 Such as what has been proposed in the consumer context in Europe through the ODR Regulation, where 
the online ‘platform should take the form of an interactive website offering a single point of entry to 
consumers and traders seeking to resolve disputes out-of-court’, ‘allow[ing] consumers and traders to 
submit complaints by filling in an electronic complaint form’ (Regulation (EU) 524/2013, recital 18). 
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services to allow him to invest there, and secondly, when the financial intermediary 
reaches out to an investor in a foreign country.  
In the first case, the investor will hardly be able to bring the financial intermediary 
to his own forum. If the financial intermediary has no contacts with the country of the 
investor, there will be no basis for the investor’s forum to exercise jurisdiction over the 
defendant, and even if it does, the decision would still have to be recognized in the 
financial intermediary’s forum. The option then is for the investor to sue in the financial 
intermediary’s forum, which may be complicated due to costs and lack of information 
regarding the legal system, as well as from possible language barriers. 
In the second case, when the financial intermediary is the one reaching out to the 
investor, the regulatory regime of the investor’s forum comes into play, and so does the 
dispute resolution mechanisms that exist there. In any event, in case the financial 
intermediary loses the case and decides not to pay, the investor would still have to 
recognize the judgment where the financial intermediary has assets.  
As a result of the differences in securities regulation regimes and liability 
standards, it is important for an investor to have easy access to a dispute resolution 
system that can bind and allows for the enforcement of a decision against the financial 
intermediary. 
An overarching dispute resolution system at an international level that could solve 
this type of dispute is unlikely; its implementation would be extremely difficult due to the 
costs involved and the idiosyncrasies of each legal system.  
In the absence of a treaty on securities regulation rules that could in fact harmonize 
the regulation of investment services and create an international court to solve disputes 
arising from them, the best approach to dispute resolution would be to engage the local 
dispute resolution bodies to create a mechanism that would facilitate foreign investor 
access. Some ways in which this can be done would be through information disclosure 
and the use of easy procedures for dispute settlement, for example by using the internet 
for the submission of claims and maybe even as a means to conduct hearings. 
 309 
This is advantageous both to the investor, who will have a forum that will be able 
to deal properly with the issue, and for the market that offers these services to foreign 
investors, which will be seen as an attractive venue for investment.  
The language barrier may be an issue, and realistically no single system will be 
able to deal with all the languages of different investors. While this could be a problem, 
an investor would probably not invest in a place where the language is completely 
unknown to him. A solution that could diminish the problem would be for the dispute 
resolution system to offer the possibility of conducting the procedure in English, which is 
a language known widely in the financial industry. Another possibility is to offer cheap 
translation services for those who need it.  
Therefore, the idea is, following the model of the European approach, to develop a 
network of dispute resolution systems in charge of forwarding investors, involved in 
investor-financial intermediary disputes, to the appropriate dispute resolution bodies.  
It is true that this solution is based on the premise that the alternative dispute 
resolution bodies will be adequate and able to provide easy access to investors; this might 
not always be the case.  
b. Implementation Aspects 
For this system to be effective, two steps need to be satisfied. The first is to 
guarantee that the dispute resolution systems that will be part of the network have the 
ability to definitively solve the disputes between investor and financial intermediaries, in 
addition to giving adequate protection to the industries it is supposed to operate.1308  
Its legal aspect depends on the binding nature of the decision being issued by the 
system; otherwise, the system is nothing more than a conciliation forum. It does not 
matter that the body is based on direct or consent jurisdiction. Systems based on consent 
jurisdiction, where the granting of decision-making power is based on the consent of the 
parties, are preferable because they can rely on the arbitration framework and take 
                                                      
1308 In the Fin-Net context, there have been some problems with national ADRs schemes that were not 
comprehensive enough to provide investors with alternative forums, undermining access to justice and 
consequently, investor protection. See Moloney, How to protect investors: lessons from the EC and the UK 
455-58 (n 372). 
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advantage of the New York Convention regime. A locally-based arbitration system 
mandatory to industry members that may allow foreign investors to opt-in after a dispute 
has arisen would be an interesting option, as it would solve many transnational questions, 
provide an alternative forum for the investor while at the same time, protect due process; 
the forum would be accessible only by the investor’s acceptance after the dispute was ripe, 
weakening the investor’s argument of lack of due process in his own forum afterwards if 
there is no success in the arbitration procedure.1309 
Moreover, the preconditions for the operation of the Rule of Law principle are also 
important; the schemes should guarantee independent decision-makers and publish 
reasoned decisions so that the legal system can evolve, bringing legal certainty to its users.  
As soon as legally binding dispute resolution systems are in place, the second step 
is for the network to develop. This has to be done through discussions and agreements 
between the different systems. The development is a political one that will need the input 
of industry members, both from the investor and financial intermediary sides.1310 
C. Investor – Informational Intermediary 
The usual case in which an informational intermediary harms an investor occurs 
where the information provided is based on false or misleading representations. For 
example, when a Credit Rating Agency rates a bond as a triple-A, even though the company 
is on the verge of bankruptcy, and relying on the information provided by the CRA, the 
investor buys the security.  
The relationship between investor and informational intermediary is, for most of 
the time, inexistent, as the rating is created to inform the general market and not a specific 
investor. There is no contract or corporate link between the parties. The same is true for 
information prepared by auditors, as the investor who relies on it has no direct legal 
                                                      
1309 This design, conceptually, would not be pure arbitration, as it would require the use of both pure and 
consent jurisdictional bases. A pure arbitration basis could also be imagined, but this would require the will 
of the industry to accept such a mechanism, which is unlikely.  
1310 For a 2009 discussion on the development of Fin-Net, see DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation 
of FIN-NET (Final Report June, 2009); European Commission, Summary of the Responses to the Public 
Consultation on Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Area of Financial Services (September, 2009). 
 311 
relationship with them, unless the auditor has been hired by the investor to do due 
diligence on the company, which is not usually the case in public market transactions.  
This creates an extremely hard-to-solve scenario for a comprehensive and 
investor-friendly dispute resolution mechanism. As there is no direct contact between the 
informational intermediary and the investor, the only forum available would be the courts 
of the place in which the informational intermediary is located. The courts of the place in 
which the investor is located would be an option where it is allowed by the forum state, 
but enforcement would be extremely hard due to requirements of proper notice and the 
acceptance of the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction by foreign courts in these cases.  
As to the extent of the harm caused, this situation is similar to the one where the 
investor purchases securities based on information provided by the issuer. False or 
misleading information provided by informational intermediaries can be harmful to a 
whole collectivity, having far-reaching effects to all of those who have transacted based 
on such information. Aggregate litigation could therefore be an option to solve the dispute.  
Another problem concerns the scope for different applicable laws to the 
transaction at stake, as different countries have different approaches to the liability of 
informational intermediaries. For example, while the U.S. is lenient in its approach, 
Australia has a tighter grip on the standard of care that informational intermediaries owe 
to the market. From the investor’s perspective, the applicability of Australian law would 
be more interesting when there is an Australian aspect involved in the transaction, but 
the only certainty of its applicability would be when the Credit Rating Agency is also 
Australian. 
One way to facilitate the venue and access issue would be to have credit rating or 
auditing contracts, when so requested by the company issuing the securities, imposing an 
obligation on the informational intermediaries to accept arbitration on the same 
parameters as the system proposed for investor-issuer disputes; this would allow for 
aggregate litigation, which would connect the CRAs to the dispute resolution scheme put 
in place by the investor.  
To solve the applicable law question, a provision could be added to the contract 
between informational intermediaries and issuers, identifying the law applicable to any 
disputes arising out of their relationship and their relationship with third parties; in 
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addition, a clause should also be included in the corporate charter of the company issuing 
securities, identifying a law that would also apply to that relationship, creating an indirect 
legal link between investor and informational intermediary. 
Informational intermediaries would most likely oppose this proposition, as it 
would increase the risk of their business. Therefore, for such a system to be implemented, 
pressure would have to come from the companies using their services, which in turn 
would imply powerful investors pressuring the companies to do so. An alternative 
method could be introduced through the imposition of regulation by regulatory agencies; 
this would be more complicated to implement at the transnational level due to the local 
reach of regulatory systems.  
3. Two Systems for Transnational Dispute Resolution of Securities 
Transactions 
The question with which I started this thesis was ‘how can the legal infrastructure 
for transnational securities transactions disputes be improved?’ 
The ideal solution would be an overarching system, an international court, 
composed only of specialist judges and providing easy access for any investor that had 
been harmed. This court would have compulsory jurisdiction, where any securities 
disputes with a transnational character would be solved. Of course, this solution is not 
feasible due to the costs and political constraints of creating such a system, in addition to 
the regulatory diversity that is present in securities regulation today. Nonetheless, 
dispute resolution systems for transnational securities transactions could be socially 
beneficial, as they would strengthen cross-border confidence in different markets, 
increasing the incentives to invest in a foreign jurisdiction.  
Starting from the current landscape, there are paths that can be used to build a 
better transnational legal infrastructure. Private international law problems are tied to 
questions of jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement; they can become quite complex 
depending on the situation at hand, especially when the public policy aspects of the 
jurisdiction in which a decision has to be enforced come into play.  
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Moreover, private international law problems can be more or less prevalent 
depending on the dispute at stake; cross-listed companies will be subject to at least two 
regulatory systems, and may have investors from even more jurisdictions. Another 
regulatory system would also apply if there were any selling efforts that could have been 
seen as directed towards other jurisdiction, thus engaging an extra set of liability rules to 
be managed. On the other hand, financial intermediaries will only be subject to foreign 
law in the case that they are the ones pursuing the investor outside of the jurisdiction in 
which they are licensed to work, otherwise they will be regulated safely within the 
confines of their own jurisdiction, even if the investor is a foreigner.  
In the previous section, I outlined the main aspects of how different dispute 
resolution systems could be improved depending on the type of dispute at stake, 
discussing the parties’ incentives for litigation, the transnational aspects at stake and the 
incentives for implementation. In this section, I outline how these systems can be legally 
operationalized. As discussed throughout this work, within the broad topic of 
‘transnational dispute resolution of securities transactions’, there are two areas of 
disputes that have different problems and require different solutions, for which I propose 
(A) aggregate litigation through arbitration for the mass type of disputes and (B) a 
network of ADRs for financial intermediary disputes.  
A. Aggregate Litigation Through Arbitration 
The mass type of dispute involving many investors from different jurisdictions, 
who have been harmed as a result of information provided by relevant market actors, 
needs a better solution for access and for centralization of the dispute resolution process, 
to avoid litigation in too many different jurisdictions and the costs that come with multiple 
proceedings. The proposal advanced is the use of arbitration with an aggregate dispute 
resolution mechanism; this solves the problem as it centralizes the dispute in a single 
forum, and to a certain extent also avoids some of the private international law issues 
such as enforcement and applicable law. This can work both for the investor-issuer and 
the investor-informational intermediary type of dispute, as outlined previously in this 
chapter. The main aspects regarding the legal operationalization of the system are related 
to (A) the seat of arbitration; (B) arbitration clauses; (C) importance of the arbitral 
institution; and (D) possible problems remaining.  
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a. Seat of Arbitration and Arbitrability 
The arbitral seat is the ‘home’ of the arbitration, having important consequences 
to the legal framework under which the arbitration will fall.1311  These consequences 
include the national law applicable to the arbitral procedure, the law applicable to the 
relationship with national courts and their power to annul the award, the law applicable 
to the validity of the agreement, and the definition of the place where the award is ‘made’, 
amongst other issues.1312 
The objective of the system is twofold: (a) to increase access to investors, including 
foreign ones and (b) to provide an efficient mechanism that guarantees that the issuer 
will not have to engage in many different dispute resolution procedures for a dispute 
involving a single set of facts. The choice of the seat is closely related to the second issue.  
Efficiency, for these purposes, can be translated in a legal framework that allows 
for innovation in arbitration, since the proposal will include an opt-out aggregate 
litigation mechanism that is functionally similar to the American class action, while at the 
same time guarantees, to the highest extent possible, that the award will be enforceable 
in other countries. Liberal national legislation and a status as part of the New York 
Convention and other international arbitration regimes, is an important aspect that has 
to be taken into consideration when making the choice. This is a prerequisite for this idea 
to work.  
The second important aspect is that the arbitral seat must be closely connected 
with the place in which the issuer has assets, where the issuer is incorporated or where 
the issuer is listed. The best scenario would be if all three places where the same, 
anchoring the issuer to a single national jurisdiction.  
From the issuer’s perspective, this is important because if the assets are located in 
a jurisdiction that considers securities matters non-arbitrable, investors may sidestep the 
arbitration agreement contained in the charter and sue directly in the courts of such a 
place, defeating the purpose of the arrangement. The same is true regarding the place in 
                                                      
1311 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014) 1538. 
1312 Ibid 2053. 
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which the company is incorporated and where it is listed. If it is incorporated in one 
jurisdiction, listed in another and has most of its assets in a third, the issuer must verify if 
all three jurisdictions would accept the use of arbitration for securities disputes, which 
would increase legal risk and due diligence costs for the company.  
The limitations are clear: the issuer must be anchored in a jurisdiction with a pro-
arbitration mentality to be able to deploy a comprehensive dispute resolution system for 
arbitration disputes.  
b. Arbitration Clauses 
The second important aspect to the operation of a global dispute resolution system 
for securities transactions based on arbitration are well drafted arbitral clauses within 
the relevant documents. The foundational arbitration clause regulating the dispute 
resolution procedure between investors and issuer is to be found in the corporate charter 
of the issuer. Additional clauses could also be included in the services contract between 
issuer and informational intermediary so as to make them part of the dispute resolution 
process in case they can also be held liable under substantive law for their acts. Finally, if 
the issuer uses Depositary Receipts mechanisms to reach other markets, an arbitration 
clause should also be included in the Depositary Agreement. I provide clauses that could 
be used to construct such a system below.  
1. Corporate Charter Clause 
The corporate charter clause has to address the main aspects of the dispute 
resolution mechanism, including who will be bound by the clause, the subject matter of 
the dispute, the applicable law governing the subject matter and procedure of the 
arbitration, the arbitral institution that will manage it and its adequate rules, the language 
and the seat of arbitration. In addition, since this will be a new development in the field, 
specific due process guarantees should also be articulated in the clause. The proposal here 
is a combination of personal notice through email and the publication of the beginning of 
the arbitration procedure in major newspapers.  
Dispute Resolution and Applicable Law 
a. The Corporation, its shareholders and former shareholders, directors, 
executives and any other party engaging in contractual relations with the 
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Corporation with a clause in their contract referring to this arbitration clause, 
agree to finally solve all disputes, claims, controversies and disagreements 
relating or arising out of the Corporate Law and Securities Law provisions 
governing this Corporation and the transaction of its securities, by arbitration. 
a.1. The laws of (Jurisdiction) shall be applicable to the substantive matters of 
any disputes, claims, controversies or disagreements related to this clause as 
well as to the submission to arbitration and the arbitral proceedings.  
a.2. The arbitration shall be administered by (Arbitral Institution), the Rules of 
which (Specify the Rules) are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this 
clause.  
a.3. The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be (Specify the 
Language). 
a.4. The place of arbitration shall be (City/Country). 
 
b. To guarantee due process, notification shall be provided to every party 
included in the arbitration procedure by any means that can effectively inform 
them, including but not limited to emails, which will be regarded as the main 
method of communication. 
b.1. Each shareholder, beneficiary or of record, shall inform the issuer of an 
email address to which notice under this arbitration procedure shall be given.  
b.2. In aggregate proceedings, notice by email together with the publication on 
three different occasions within two weeks, of notice in a major newspaper of 
the country in which the arbitration will take place, shall be considered 
sufficient to include any interested party in the arbitration proceeding. 
 
2. Informational Intermediary Services Contract Clause 
To bind the informational intermediary to the aggregate arbitration procedure, an 
arbitration clause in the contract between the issuer and the informational intermediary 
is necessary. It is important to note that Credit Rating Agencies issuing ratings that are 
not requested by the issuer will never be included in the arbitration procedure, as there 
will be no link capable of bringing them to arbitration.  
Dispute Resolution 
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Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including third 
parties relying on the information provided by the Informational Intermediary, 
shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the 
Dispute Resolution and Applicable Law clause provided in the Corporate Charter 
of the Issuer.  
3. Depositary Agreement Clause 
In cases in which the issuer enters foreign markets through the use of Depositary Receipts, 
an arbitration clause should also be included in the Depositary Agreement. One 
interesting example is the Baidu and Bank of New York agreement, which provides for 
arbitration ‘in the event the Depositary is advised that a judgment of a court in the United 
States may not be recognized’.1313 In the proposed dispute resolution system, a more 
straightforward arbitration clause referring to the corporate charter of the issuer is 
preferred. 
Dispute Resolution 
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Deposit Agreement shall be 
referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Dispute 
Resolution and Applicable Law clause provided in the Corporate Charter of the 
Issuer.  
c. Importance of the Arbitral Institution 
Arbitral institutions do not decide the cases themselves, but they serve as case 
managers, guaranteeing the integrity of the arbitral procedure. 1314  In the particular 
discussion on aggregate litigation, the arbitral institution will also need to have rules that 
are adequate for the arbitration procedure and expertise on dealing with such matters, as 
they may become complicated.  
                                                      
1313 Deposit Agreement between Baidu.com, Inc., The Bank of New York and Owners and Beneficial Owners 
of American Depositary Receipts (2005) 28, 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312505140785/dex43.htm>. 
1314 Born, International Commercial Arbitration 171 (n 1311). 
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Important issues that need to be outlined in advance with clear rules are the 
minimum threshold of claimants that could start the aggregate arbitration procedure, the 
mechanism to select the lead claimant, the notice procedure and the mechanism to choose 
arbitrators. Furthermore, another interesting aspect, related to the incentives of the 
parties that could be included in the rules, is a fee-shifting provision, to avoid 
unmeritorious claims and to compensate the defendant, at least to a certain extent, if an 
unmeritorious claim is nevertheless arbitrated.  
Below I provide language for institutional rules to deal with these four issues.  
Aggregate Arbitration Procedure 
a. Minimum Threshold. Any person having at least 10% of a stake in the 
dispute may initiate an aggregate arbitration (Initial Claimant) procedure 
by giving notice to the Arbitral Institution and against whom a claim is 
being made (Respondent) of the request for aggregate arbitration. 
i. Respondent will have 10 days to respond the request for aggregate 
arbitration. 
ii. The Arbitral Institution, after analyzing the request and the 
response to the request for aggregate arbitration, will decide if the 
procedure is adequate for the dispute. 
b. Notice and Opt-out. If the Arbitral Institution decides that the aggregate 
arbitration procedure is adequate, the Initial Claimant will give notice to 
any other persons who may be part of the dispute (‘Other Claimants’). 
i. In case respondent has the information regarding any Other 
Claimants, Respondent shall be obliged to provide the information 
to the Initial Claimant.  
ii. Notice shall be given by email or any other written means, such as 
mail. Only those duly notified will be bound by the arbitration 
procedure. 
iii. Any Other Claimant who does not wish to participate in the 
aggregate proceeding may opt-out of it by informing the Arbitral 
Institution in writing, having 60 days from the decision establishing 
the Lead Claimant to do so.  
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c. Lead Claimant. Any claimant or group of claimants may apply to be Lead 
Claimant in the arbitration procedure, who will then be responsible for 
steering the claimant side of the arbitration procedure, hiring lawyers and 
exercising any other actions in the interest of all claimants.  
i. The selection of Lead Claimant shall be made by the Arbitral 
Institution according to the amount the applicant or group of 
applicants has at stake in the dispute. 
ii. In case the selected Lead Claimant is different from the Initial 
Claimant, the Lead Claimant shall reimburse any costs incurred by 
Initial Claimant in giving notice to other claimants. 
d. Arbitration Costs and Attorney’s Fees. The party that loses the arbitration 
shall pay the other party’s costs and attorney’s fees.  
i. Each party shall deposit in an escrow account the amount 
established in Annex I for Arbitration Costs and Attorney’s Fees at 
the beginning of the Arbitration Procedure.  
ii. The Initial Claimant shall be responsible for the initial deposit, and 
may be reimbursed in case a different claimant is appointed as Lead 
Claimant.  
iii. Only the Lead Claimant shall be responsible for Arbitration Costs 
and Attorney’s Fees, but in case the claims are upheld the Lead 
Claimant will also be the only one to be reimbursed. 
d. Possible Problems Remaining 
The proposed scheme solves the problem of access of small investors while at the 
same time, discourages unmeritorious suits, protecting issuers from nuisance litigation. 
Even though this scheme can provide an interesting option in respect of the current 
landscape, there are still some problems that may arise in the transnational realm due to 
the public policy aspect of securities laws.  
Assuming that the system is duly established in a jurisdiction that accepts the 
arbitrability of securities disputes, the problem of foreign investors suing overseas will 
still be present, as long as those investors are under a jurisdiction that does not accept the 
arbitrability of securities disputes. This is not a problem as long as the issuer has no assets 
or can otherwise be forced to comply with that jurisdiction’s decision.  
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Another question that comes to mind concerns the case that arises if this problem 
emerges in the context of the EU. How can a duly performed arbitration, that is recognized 
by the state where the issuer is situated, stand in face of a contrary decision of another 
Member State’s court in a procedure for enforcement, in the issuer’s state, under Brussels 
I? The problem that arises is that arbitration is not covered by Brussels I; even a court 
decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement in the issuer’s forum would most 
likely not be covered by Brussels I, due to the wide exclusion that the ECJ accepted in Marc 
Rich & Co AG v. Società Italiana Impianti.1315 This puts the arbitral award, and the court 
denying recognition of the foreign decision, in an awkward situation: under national law, 
the arbitral award has preclusion effects, but since the arbitration is excluded from 
Brussels I, the recognizing court is not able to rely on art. 34(3) but is left only with the 
public policy exception of 34(1). 
In any event, the aggregate arbitration mechanism proposed here can at least solve 
the access problem faced by foreign investors who do not have the money or energy to 
engage in this type of litigation, as it enrolls another claimant with a bigger stake to do so 
for all those who potentially have a valid claim. As the claimants who will benefit from the 
mechanism would be unlikely to sue, the procedural legal problems discussed here would 
not in fact pose such a threat to the company that adopts it.  
B. A Network of ADRs 
The investor-financial intermediary type of dispute requires a different solution 
due to the personal character of the relationship. A mass procedure would not be 
adequate, and the question of access still remains open. The investor should have an easy 
path to solve the dispute; a dispute resolution body that would hear his complaint, notify 
the financial intermediary and give a binding decision.  
As most countries already have alternative dispute resolution systems for these 
disputes, and they usually do not involve complex private international law questions, the 
best approach would be to engage the national dispute resolution bodies in a network so 
they can cooperate with one another and point the investor to the appropriate body that 
                                                      
1315 Case C-190/89 Marc Rich & Co AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, [1991] ECR I-3855. 
 321 
could deal with the dispute. The premise here is that these bodies need to offer easy access 
to the investor, solving the disputes fairly and according to Rule of Law standards. The 
Fin-Net system in Europe could be used as a model to create a global network that could 
deal with these cases. 
To operationalize such a system there is not much that can be done legally, absent 
a full treaty creating a world-wide arbitral institution or court to deal with such cases, 
which would obviously be complicated to enact. Agreements between dispute resolution 
bodies would rather provide the best approach to coordinate and create mechanisms for 
disputes involving foreign investors. 
One shortcoming of this system would arise in those cases in which the financial 
intermediary approaches the foreign investor in his jurisdiction, while not having a 
presence there. This can be a problem when the investor’s law is more beneficial than the 
financial intermediary’s, as the ADR body would not be familiar with it and might not be 
willing to apply such rules. The option left would be either for the investor to sue in the 
foreign court and try to enforce the judgment in the financial intermediary’s forum, which 
is what I have been trying to avoid throughout this work, or for the investor to accept the 
less favorable approach in exchange for a possible forum to solve the dispute.  
An argument could also be made for arbitration in these situations, but due to the 
consensual character of the procedure and the limits imposed by investor and consumer 
protections laws, this approach would not be without serious problems. In addition, 
financial intermediaries searching for retail foreign investors without establishing a 
presence in the country, are likely to be acting illegally and not in good faith; their 
acceptance to include an arbitration clause with a fair mechanism of dispute resolution is 
unlikely, leaving the investor with his own court or the ADR of the place in which the 
financial intermediary is established.  
A network of ADRs could at least facilitate access, providing a higher level of 
protection for retail investors, consequently increasing the confidence in foreign 
investments made with foreign financial intermediaries.  
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4. Final Considerations 
Throughout these pages, I have tried to show that private enforcement is an 
important mechanism for the application of securities laws and the construction of 
confidence on capital markets, which can be considered a prerequisite for its full 
development. 
Despite the globalization of capital flows, the strength of the legal infrastructure 
for the protection of small and medium investors who may participate, willingly or not, in 
transactions with transnational elements is low due to the strong national character of 
legal systems and securities regulations; this raises a variety of problems related to access 
to justice and legal uncertainty generated by public policy conflicts and the operation of 
private international law. 
The objective of this work was not to respond to the question of whether or not it 
is a good idea to involve small and medium investors in transnational securities 
transactions; however, to the extent that various investors have come to find themselves 
involved in such investments and the global securities market has also started to develop 
in this direction, it becomes important to provide alternatives that could solve, or at least 
diminish, the legal problems surrounding transnational dispute resolution, increasing 
access to justice and diminishing legal uncertainty. This is especially true in places where 
the transnational aspect of securities transactions is becoming more and more prevalent 
due to the quest for market integration, such as in the EU. 
The legal infrastructure for resolving transnational disputes therefore comes to 
form a crucial background to enable a higher degree of market integration, since more 
people would be able to rely on it and develop confidence in the system. As demonstrated 
in this final chapter, arbitration and institutional cooperation can go a long way to achieve 
these objectives for the development of truly global capital markets.  
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